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Epameinondas the great Theban general and politician (c. 318/312-362 B.C.) 
deserves credit for crippling the might of Sparta, founding the independent polis of Messenia 
and advancing the Boeotian League to the foremost position of power in all of Greece. It is 
then rather surprising that not a single dedicated monograph has been published in English on 
the general. With this thesis I hope to remedy the situation by providing a detailed and 
exhaustive account of Epameinondas’ life and career. Such a task is made difficult since the 
surviving source material for the early to the middle of the fourth century predominantly 
focuses on the affairs of Athens and Sparta. However, once information on Thebes has been 
isolated a continuous narrative may be comprehended, which uplifts the veil on an obscure 
portion of history. As a result it is possible to produce a detailed analysis of Epameinondas’ 
role in the government and his development of a federal league of states led by the Thebans. 
Along with this his military endeavours are examined in great detail with a close inspection 
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The great Theban statesman and general, Epameinondas, was indisputably one of the 
most important figures of his day. It was not merely his ability to win battles, his 
philosophical intellect, or his disinclination to imperial designs that distinguished him, but 
how dramatically the shape of the Hellenic Mediterranean world changed during his brief but 
incomparable career. Following the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans reigned supreme driven 
by the limitless ambition of King Agesilaus, whose impositions in Boeotia provoked the 
budding Theban statesman, among others, to fight back with the utmost determination. By 
crippling the Spartans’ military might, freeing many thousands of slaves and emancipating 
their most productive land, Epameinondas, all but vanquished the most powerful people in 
the Greek world. But after his death, in many ways, mainland Greece was exhausted by 
incessant warfare, paving the way for Macedonian superiority. It is arguable that, if it were 
not for Epameinondas, Philip of Macedon would never have risen to power as dramatically as 
he did. 
 
In spite of his significance, Epameinondas is today a relatively obscure figure, 
almost entirely unknown to the general public. In contrast, by ancient observers he was most 
assuredly considered equal in greatness to the likes of Alexander the Great or Julius Caesar. 
Plutarch refers to him as Epameinondas the Great (Ἐπαμεινώνδα τοῦ μεγάλου) and Cicero 
more than once measures him as the best of the Greeks.1 However, following the fourth 
century A.D. there is not a single extant reference until the tenth century, when he is 
mentioned a few times in the Suda. Then, following a minor reference in the eleventh century 
by Michael Psellus, there is again a complete dearth until the sixteenth century. This can 
generally be explained by the lack of knowledge of ancient Greek in western Europe during 
the Medieval period. But, after the Renaissance the Theban general, along with many other 
ancient figures, received a reinvigoration of interest, particularly through the intellectual 
prowess of the likes of Erasmus and Michel de Montaigne. The latter even compared him 




virtues.2 In spite of his obscurity, from the sixteenth century until today Epameinondas’ 
influence can be observed in a number of non-historical works of literature, and by several 
important historical figures, including General George S. Patton, who, at the age of 
seventeen, wrote, “Epaminondas was without doubt the best and one of the greatest Greeks 
who ever lived, without ambition, with great genius, great goodness, and great patriotism; he 
was for the age in which he lived almost a perfect man”.3 
 
As shall be examined below, there has been some 400 years of academic writing on 
Epameinondas and one may query the value of producing another exhaustive analysis of the 
general’s life and career. However, there has not been a dedicated study for over 60 years and 
the best work on Epameinondas is now nearly 120 years old and was confined to the space of 
a large Realencyclopädie article. It is usually thought that his current obscurity is likely due 
to the loss of Plutarch’s Epameinondas and the Spartan- and Athenian-centric nature of our 
surviving sources.4 But, in recent decades, a number of relevant publications have greatly 
improved our understanding of the overall period in question; many of these focus on 
Boeotian and (non-Spartan) Peloponnesian affairs significant to his activities. In addition to 
this, a growing body of archaeological, epigraphic and numismatic evidence is continually 
offering further insights that allow us to examine the topic in much greater detail than has 
ever before been possible. Because of these factors an updated monograph on Epameinondas 
is overdue and will serve to improve our understanding of his role and impact upon events 
during the first half of the fourth century B.C.  
 
 
History of Epameinondan Scholarship 
 
By the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there was a surge in academic studies on 
Epameinondas. The earliest example was by Simon Goulart, published in a 1602 edition of 
Thomas North’s English translations of Jacques Amyot’s French translations of Plutarch’s 







relying predominantly on Nepos and the scattered references in Plutarch. Goulart heavily 
praises the virtues of the general, emphasizing his superiority over all other Greeks and that 
the Thebans could not sustain their greatness without him. This is hardly an original point of 
view but one that would continue well into the nineteenth century. While Goulart’s work may 
rightly be considered a work of biography the general’s earliest appearance in historical 
writing is perhaps the brief overview in Sir Walter Raleigh’s History of the World, which was 
originally published in 1614. This heavily didactic work was intended to instruct Henry, 
Prince of Wales and was conceived of as a universal history, though Raleigh was forced to 
conclude his work after only five books. His writing displays a thorough contempt for 
monarchs and tyrants throughout history and the relevant passages on Epameinondas are 
steeped in praise, concluding that he was “the worthiest man that ever was bred in that Nation 
of Greece”.6 Later we find Johann Heinrich Boecler’s brief assessment of Epameinondas in 
volume two of his Dissertationes Academicae, which was first published in 1644 and 
reprinted as late as 1710.7 Boecler derived most of his information from Nepos’ 
Epaminondas and was therefore most interested in the Theban general’s virtuous character 
traits, very much in the classic Plutarchean biographical manner. Then, in 1665, the puritan 
clergyman, Samuel Clarke, published a Life of the general paired with one of Hannibal.8 This 
account continued the tradition of his fellow Englishmen Goulart and Raleigh, with some 
clear indications that he made use of their work.  
 
By the eighteenth century interest in Epameinondas had transferred over the channel 
to the French school, particularly at the Académie française and the Académie des 
Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, both located at the Institut de France in Paris. This may have 
begun in 1724 with the soldier and tactician, Chevalier de Folard, whose interest in massed 
infantry columns (ordre profond), led him to include descriptions of the battles of Leuctra 
and Mantinea in his Nouvelles découvertes sur la guerre dans une dissertation sur Polybe, in 
which he also provided perhaps the first published engravings of the Epameinondan order of 
battle. Folard tells us that he had the honour of explaining this use of columns to Philippe II, 






published. The Duke apparently appeared surprised at these dispositions.9 The following 
decade would see the zenith of French academic interest on the topic when, sometime in the 
1730s, Nicolas Gédoyn, who was known for his translations of Quintillian and Pausanias, 
presented a lecture at the Institut exhorting the most distinguished achievements of the 
Theban but, without the intent of offering an exhaustive account, he relied mostly on 
Pausanias. Apparently the presentation was well received and met with appropriate 
applause.10 However, his brief account would only be published posthumously in 1745.11 We 
also find a short appraisal of the Theban ascendency, with particular adoration for 
Epameinondas, in the fifth volume of Charles Rollin’s Histoire Ancienne (1738), in which he 
expresses agreement with Folard’s contention of Epameinondas as one of the greatest 
generals.12 In 1737 Charles-Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre published a comparison between 
Epameinondas and Scipio Africanus, presumably to help alleviate the loss of such a 
comparison that Plutarch surely wrote.13 Finally, the natural culmination of this scholarly 
interest was realized when Henri François d’Aguesseau, the Chancellor of France, followed 
by Saint-Pierre, both encouraged Seran de La Tour, who had previously published a history 
of Scipio in 1732, to complete his supplement to Plutarch by writing a thorough history of 
Epameinondas. This was first published in 1739 and coupled with Folard’s observations.14 
This may in fact be considered the first ever attempt to provide an exhaustive account of the 
Theban’s life, making use of Xenophon in particular, which the previous, more biographical 
works, did not. It was certainly the definitive account for the century undergoing a number of 
re-prints, including an English translation in 1787, which, in addition to Folard, also included 
Saint-Pierre’s comparison with Scipio.15 This was paired, in two volumes, with Tour’s 
history of Scipio thus completing the remedy of the lamentable loss of some of Plutarch’s 
best work. 
 
While the French academics were busy at work in the 1730s a somewhat anomalous 











book on various heroic men and women throughout the ages, called Heroes and Heroines, 
including a curious comparison between Socrates and Epameinondas, first published in 
1739.16 While the reasons for doing so would be questioned by a later scholar,17 it is clear 
that their mutual philosophic interests and the stories of Socrates’ rescue of Alcibiades and 
Epameinondas’ rescue of Pelopidas were a major source of inspiration.18 In spite of the 
criticism this work was known throughout Europe, being translated into German, Dutch, 
Swedish and Russian, alongside an abridged English version.19 
 
By the late eighteenth century we find the emergence of German works on 
Epameinondas, which would dominate the scholarship for well over a hundred years. This 
properly began with August Gottlieb Meissner’s extensive history of Epameinondas 
published in two volumes: the first in 1798, the second in 1801. Meanwhile Johann Daniel 
Tewaag, a latin teacher and Lutheran preacher from Bochum, published a life of 
Epameinondas and Pelopidas in 1800. Meissner criticized this work for apparently ignoring 
Pausanias, Diodorus and Xenophon: clearly egregious omissions.20 In spite of Tewaag, 
Meissner’s work was undoubtedly definitive, being the oldest work on Epameinondas that 
still generally merits referencing, as shall be seen. However, within a generation, Eduard 
Bauch, who was unsatisfied with the available modern scholarship, published a moderately 
sized assessment of Epameinondas’ career in 1834. This work made a number of strides, 
being rather more critical than had previously been the norm, along with introducing a 
number of new ideas. Notably, he provided probably the earliest assessment of the source 
tradition, particularly establishing the importance of Ephorus and Callisthenes.21 
 
By the mid nineteenth century a number of general histories were published, most 
important of which were the voluminous A History of Greece (1846-1856) by George Grote 
and History of Greece (1857-1867) by Ernst Curtius. Both of these works would remain 
influential well into the twentieth century and are still useful to this day. Meanwhile, in 1863, 









was the first systematic attempt to establish the exact nature of Epameinondas’ policies and 
thereby determine their merit. He noted that previous scholars had showered the general with 
praise much in the same way as many of the ancient writers.22 Mesnil therefore provides a 
more critical evaluation, illuminating much of Epameinondas’ political agenda and 
highlighting the flawed nature of his policies, though he blames much of this on the overall 
state of Greece following the events of the fifth century B.C.23 On the other hand, Mesnil 
places too much importance on the moral value of the general’s activities and almost entirely 
omits reference to other modern scholars. However, following this, in 1870, Lebrecht 
Pomtow published the first exhaustive monograph since Meissner, in which he makes 
extensive use of Grote and Curtius, along with Bauch and Mesnil.24 This work certainly 
satisfied the academic rigour of the period and still remains useful, though Pomtow has a 
tendency to be excessively laudatory of Epameinondas, even crediting him with 
achievements that were not his or certainly not his alone. Back over in England, Charles 
Sankey wrote a general history of the periods of Spartan and Theban supremacy.25 As with 
Pomtow, he also generally relies on Grote and Curtius, but his work lacks any innovation. 
 
The first truly modern work on the Theban Hegemony came in Ernst von Stern’s 
Geschichte Der Spartanischen Und Thebanischen Hegemonie Vom Königsfrieden Bis Zur 
Schlacht Bei Mantinea, published in 1884. Stern acknowledged the lack of inclusion of 
relevant modern studies in recent accounts of the period. In stark contrast to this tendency, he 
provides a helpful bibliography of all the major scholarship on the early fourth century B.C. 
Greece.26 This was undoubtedly an important piece of work and would remain the standard 
on the period until the late twentieth century. In 1890 Adolf Bauer published work on the 
general’s political and military achievements, significantly establishing his influence upon 
the likes of Philip and Alexander.27 By this stage most of the existing scholarship specifically 
on Epameinodas had become increasingly inadequate. Thus, by 1900, this was, to some 









Realencyclopädie.28 This may be considered the first exhaustive monograph, which utilizes 
modern scholarship and ideas, particularly acknowledging the over-glorification of the 
Theban present in the surviving sources (with the exception of Xenophon). It is undoubtedly 
the most successful dedicated study to date; however, Swoboda’s critique of the tradition 
preserved primarily by Plutarch and Diodorus borderlines on the extreme: he is unwilling to 
accept almost any kind of anecdotal material. 
 
During the twentieth century a large number of relevant works have been published; 
indeed, too many to list.29 Most important for my purposes are Bersanetti’s work on 
Pelopidas in 1949 and Cloché’s Thèbes de Béotie, des origines à la conquête romaine, 
published in 1952.30 In 1958 Fortina published the most recent monograph on Epameinondas. 
Unfortunately, it offers very little new discussion to the previous work on the general and, as 
a result, fails to supersede Swoboda’s important article.31  Since then, scholarship specifically 
dealing with Epameinondas is relatively scarce, the most important of which is Cawkwell’s 
study on the politics of the general, which may be considered the culmination of much of the 
scholarship from the previous 150 years.32 Following this, Buckler’s landmark 1980 
publication, The Theban Hegemony, 371-362 BC, provided the definitive account of the 
period of Theban supremacy, which is still essential for any serious study on the topic.33 In 
addition, with a focus more on the Spartan side of things, we may add Cartledge’s work on 
Agesilaus and Hamilton’s general account of the downfall of Sparta.34 Since then there have 
been a number of publications, which have improved our ability to examine the relevant 
sources: these include Georgiadou’s commentary on Plutarch’s Pelopidas and Stylianou’s 

















Although the career of Epameinondas was a major subject of a number of significant 
fourth century historical writings not one of these survive. We are therefore reliant primarily 
on Diodorus and the numerous references from Plutarch. Because of this our information on 
significant portions of his life is fragmentary: we have only a handful of references to his 
career before 371 and, even during the 360s, when he was the leading citizen in Thebes, there 
are substantial periods where his activities are almost entirely obscure to us. This means that 
any attempt at reconstruction will almost certainly be fraught with difficulties. To make 
matters worse, the events from the Battle of Leuctra to the Battle of Mantinea abound with 
chronological issues, which have yet to find consensus amongst modern scholarship. It is 
therefore imperative to exhibit a certain degree of caution when examining Epameinondas’ 
involvement in particular events; we must be weary of crediting the general with actions and 
decisions that may belong to a collective political or military unit. Conversely there is also a 
danger of presuming he had no involvement simply because the sources do not mention him. 
Because of these reasons it is useful to reflect on the methodology that will be employed 
here.  
 
A study that makes an individual, who may be deemed historically significant in the 
realms of politics and warfare, as its focal point is amongst the most traditional form of 
historical writing. It is what Nieztche would call ‘Monumental History’.36 In the nineteenth 
century German school this would best be achieved by following the Rankean model of 
empiricism or quellenkritik, i.e. critical assessment of primary sources in order to establish 
‘essentially’ what happened (“wie es eigentlich gewesen”).37 Such a proposition fits very well 
with what I am hoping to achieve in this thesis. The Rankean approach of interpreting 
sources hermeneutically contrasts with the more ‘scientific’ method of positivism or, in the 
twentieth century, logical postivism. Though these two terms are distinct, they both refer to a 
way of thinking in which the verifiability of any fact is theoretically achievable through 
logical reasoning. Both of these schools of thought have their advantages and disadvantages 
	
36	Nietzsche	(1874/1997),	57-123.	




and one could hope that a reasonable middle ground could be achieved. While this 
assessment grossly oversimplifies the diversity of historical theory in the nineteenth and early 
to mid twentieth century,38 it is likely that such thoughts influenced the most recent 
monographs on Epameinondas: Swoboda’s analysis employs a straightforward Rankean 
quellenkritik and Fortina appears to use a fairly straightforward positivist method.  
 
By the mid twentieth century many historians increasingly began to write history 
with a sociological approach by examining trends in culture such as economics, religion, race 
and gender. This shift has been termed the ‘cultural turn’. However, traditional historical 
practice, and indeed, all of traditional western thought, from around the 1970s onwards, has 
received serious criticism in the form of postmodernism, postcolonialism, feminism, etc. 
Postmodernist theory, very simply put, questions the historian’s assumption that the past is 
knowable: since historical writing generally takes on a narrative form, interpretation of the 
past is necessarily fictive and thus should be deemed a form of literature rather than a 
science.39 As a result of these developments narrative history or, more particularly, the 
history of ‘great men’, has, in recent decades, greatly depreciated in popularity and some 
scholars would even question the validity of this approach. 
 
Since the onset of such thinking, postmodernism has received some criticism: this is 
nicely summarized by Chomsky, who accuses postmodernists of lacking any empirical theory 
that proves their assertions. He also cautions that, if the writing of history does not adhere to 
some form of logically devised methodology aiming to establish ‘essentially’ what happened, 
the collective historical understanding of society can, and has often been, used by particular 
groups for their own political ends, in spite of inaccuracy or gross misinterpretation of the 
evidence.40 An example of this in Epameinondan scholarship is presented by Hanson, who, in 
his book, The Soul of Battle,41 represents the Theban general as some kind of champion of 
democracy by comparing him to the famous American generals, William Tecumseh Sherman 
	
38	 For	 recent	 examinations	 of	 historical	 thought	 see	 Burrow	 (2007);	 Iggers	 and	Wang	 (2008);	 Woolf	
(2011).	







(1820-1891) and George S. Patton (1885-1945), thus using an historical precedent to laud and 
justify the actions of important figures in American history and culture. While there is merit 
to Hanson’s study, its representations can be misleading: for one, the American democratic 
system is hardly similar to the one that may have existed in Thebes; but, more importantly, as 
we shall see, we have no reason to think that Epameinondas had any particular devotion to 
democratic ideals: there is certainly no evidence that he made a habit of establishing 
democracies himself. Thus, Hanson presents a view of the general that is more reflective of 
his own political affiliations. Even more recently he published a chapter entitled 
‘Epaminondas the Theban and the Doctrine of Preemptive War’. Here Hanson attempts to 
compare the general’s invasion of Sparta in 370/69 with the American invasion of Iraq in 
2003. Once again interesting parallels are made between both ancient and modern conflicts; 
however, a major problem with his argument arises when he fails to prove that 
Epameinondas’ attack was actually ‘preemptive’.42 This interpretation is highly misleading 
since, on examination of the events leading up to the invasion of Sparta, it was in no way 
preemptive: in fact, it was in response to Spartan intervention in Arcadia. Boeotia had also 
recently been invaded by the Spartans (in 371) and had been invaded on a number of 
occasions throughout the 370s before which Thebes had been occupied by a Spartan garrison. 
It is clear that the invasion of Sparta in 370/69 was the result of a continuous struggle against 
the Spartans and should certainly be considered retaliatory rather than preemptive. It is once 
again apparent that Hanson’s interpretation largely reflects his own political agenda and uses 
Epameinondas’ actions in order to justify modern American military aggression in the 
Middle East. 
 
Postmodernist theory argues that we cannot know the past, we can only construct a 
fictive representation of the materials that remain of the past, much of which are fictive in 
themselves. However, the problem with this view is that it implies that history should be 
treated as a literary genre with no major concern for accuracy or objectivity. This theory is 
therefore counterproductive to improving our understanding of history. While arguments 
	
42	Burton	(2012),	11-14,	arguing	against	Hanson	(2010),93-117,	asserts	that	the	invasion	of	Sparta	was	
not	 preemptive	 since	 Epameinondas’	 actions	 were	 largely	 opportunistic	 and	 improvisational.	 This	 is	
likely	 correct,	 but	 it	 is	 probably	 more	 useful	 to	 view	 the	 invasion	 in	 its	 wider	 political	 and	 military	
contexts.	 Roisman	 (2017),	 301,	 also	 against	Hanson,	 sees	 the	 invasion	 as	 a	means	 to	 expand	Boeotian	
influence	into	Arcadia	rather	than	defend	Boeotia.	
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from both sides continue to advocate for their positions on the matter more recent scholarship 
has attempted a middle ground by admitting that, perhaps, the practice of history did in fact 
need to be re-examined.43 Indeed, the study of ancient history has benefited from a number of 
different approaches that continue to be utilized and developed worldwide. But, if we do not 
employ a rigorous standard for accuracy and objectivity, it would not be possible to justify 
criticism of work that is heavily influenced by an agenda (intentionally or not). 
 
Where does that leave the study of ‘great men’? It seems to me that all reflections on 
the historical method throughout every era tend to exhibit a great deal of merit but at the 
same time harbour what, to others, may be deemed as illogical notions. The problem arises 
when one deals in absolutes, but any fact in science should theoretically be subject to the 
same degree of scrutiny as any fact of history. And while history writing can certainly not be 
entirely indistinguishable from literature, it is neither completely distinguishable from 
scientific practice, which is also limited by a need to explain its concepts in a narrative 
format. With this in mind it becomes clear how to devise a logical methodology. First it is 
necessary to identify the limitations of the topic: the ancient and medieval historian, as aptly 
noted by Carr, must recognize the fact that they know almost nothing about their topics.44 By 
comparison with modern history, the information we possess of the events in question is 
immeasureably sparse. It is therefore the ancient historian’s task to fill in the gaps through a 
process of abductive reasoning.45 This is particularly required for a study of Epameinondas 
on whom our surviving narratives have relatively few things to say and much of what does 
survive is highly eulogistic.46 Most of our information comes from writers in the Roman 
period who, however, had access to contemporary sources. This means that we possess only 
reinterpretations of interpretations of the events. Bearing this in mind, on the other hand, we 
can accept that Epameinondas had involvement in a number of significant events such as the 
battles of Leuctra and Mantinea: it would be quite difficult to argue against these facts. We 
can then, with perhaps less certainty, accept that many of the historical facts we have reflect 








evidence preserved in various writers, especially in the works of Plutarch. These are 
generally biographical, reflecting character, usually with little political or military interest. 
Generally, it is impossible to confirm or deny the historicity of these anecdotes, particularly 
as they tend to portray an idealized version of the general, but Plutarch at least had access to 
good sources and may have obtained much of his apophthegmata from the likes of 
Callisthenes and Ephorus. Of course sceptics of this material will remain, but it is probable 
that much of the information originated in the decades following Epameinondas’ death, 
which would indicate that what we do have is a reflection of the mid to late fourth century 
memory of the great Theban, which will undoubtedly bear many elements of truth that we 
can unfortunately never fully grasp. Because of the unavoidable uncertainty inherent in this 
study it is preferable to employ a wide scope of interpretation: it is logical, when a number of 
possibilities exist, to consider all of them. While I will tend to argue in favour of what 
appears to me to be the most likely option, the fallibility of my preference is manifest. Thus, 
the nature of our surviving material means that a speculative approach is largely necessary 
throughout. At times, this conjecture may overstep its bounds, but this is a necessary evil 
since, as Syme once said, “conjecture cannot be avoided, otherwise the history is not worth 
writing, for it does not become intelligible”.47 However, by maintaining a wide scope it is 
hoped that a comprehensive representation of Epameinondas’ career will present itself. 
 
 The study of an individual also naturally has a teleological aspect (his death); 
therefore, a narrative format is unavoidable. Epameinondas’ impact on succeeding events and 
his reception throughout history will also be explored to some extent, providing a telos that 
brings us up to today. While it would be possible to take a more thematic approach, as 
Cartledge did for his monograph on Agesilaus, a number of articles published in the last few 
decades have already utilized this method in isolation.48 In fact, what we are really lacking is 
a coherent narrative on Epameinondas that takes account of the abundant work that has been 
produced since Fortina’s Epaminonda. For instance, many studies now exist that examine 
Theban (and Boeotian) culture, and there have also been several significant archaeological 
	
47	Syme	(1958),	v;	cf.	Cawkwell	(2005),	21.	




and topographical surveys, along with studies on numismatics and epigraphy.49 These have 
greatly enhanced our perspective on the people and the environment in which Epameinondas 
lived.  
 
In spite of postmodernism, recent technological developments have inspired one 
scholar to posit that we may in fact be at the beginning of a new golden age in historical 
practice. This ‘golden age’ is due mainly to the internet, which has greatly improved our 
ability to access and examine information.50 An example of this, and particularly important 
for this work, is the advances in topography: although many of Epameinondas’ military 
endeavours have received excellent analyses by scholars, the majority of these were 
published before the last twenty years and lacked the advantages of modern technology: 
Google Maps allows us to obtain an in depth understanding of the topography of any given 
area within moments, whereas my predecessors had to actually visit sites in order to fully 
grasp the terrain. While this method is probably still second best, it provides an 
unprecedented efficacy in obtaining accurate topographical information. Consequently, while 
I have endeavoured to provide the relevant scholarship for topography, I have heavily 





In order to determine the nature of the source tradition my first chapter is a brief but 
comprehensive examination of the source material. This considers the purpose and relative 
biases of our material, whether surviving or non-extant, and thus provides a reasonable basis 
for interpretation and reconstruction of the relevant events. Chapter two then begins the 
historical narrative of Epameinondas’ life from his education to his first recorded election as 
boeotarch in 371. Since our record from this part of his career is almost entirely absent, rather 
than simply deal with our surviving references to the general, it is apt to consider his role 







activities throughout these events. From 371 to 366 we are on generally firmer ground in 
spite of a number of chronological difficulties, therefore chapters three to six take on a fairly 
straightforward narrative; however, throughout, it continues to be necessary to consider major 
historical events that Epameinondas may or may not have been involved in. He will, by 
necessity, have adopted a particular political stance in relation to the events, which is 
worthwhile attempting to establish. Throughout part of 366 and most of 365, practically 
nothing is known about the Theban’s activities; thus, chapter seven, considers his potential 
role and his probable attitude to the major events of this period.  
 
By 364, Epameinondas was deeply involved in the Boeotian naval project, which 
probably stretched back into the previous two years. Our knowledge of this episode is 
obscure but has been emboldened by a number of epigraphical documents, which scholars 
now generally agree indicate that the project was a major undertaking. Consequently chapter 
9 has, by necessity, adopted a hypothetical methodology in which a large variation of 
possibilities about the nature of the construction of the fleet and the shipsheds, the route of 
the expedition and its impact upon the political atmosphere of the Aegean and Propontic 
Greek city states are investigated. Much of this section relies on a great deal of circumstantial 
evidence; however, in general, I have allowed for a reasonable degree of error, to account for 
the inexorably conjectural nature of the chapter. Chapter 10 covers the events leading up to 
and including the Battle of Mantinea in 362 and Epameinondas’ death. This is the only time 
in which Xenophon places Epameinondas at the forefront of his narrative. We therefore have 










The Historiographical Tradition Part One: Fourth Century 
 
 
The source tradition pertaining to the life and career of Epameinondas or, more 
generally, the period of Theban supremacy, is a wide and varied topic; indeed, it would be 
worthy of its own monograph, far beyond the scope of these chapters. In fact, this was 
achieved to a certain extent in Shrimpton’s unpublished thesis ‘The Epaminondas Tradition’. 
While this work developed a number of compelling theories that can still reasonably be used 
as models for interpreting the surviving material, in light of a number of important and 
detailed publications, Shrimpton’s thesis is now somewhat insufficient for a comprehensive 
understanding of the source tradition, though it remains the most detailed historiographical 
study specifically concerned with Epameinondas and the Theban supremacy.51 More 
recently, commentaries on both Plutarch’s Pelopidas and Diodorus’ book 15 have expanded 
discussion on the topic and are consequently of prime importance for understanding the 
tradition.52 On the other hand, scholarship on our most detailed account of the period, in 
books six and seven of Xenophon’s Hellenica, would certainly merit a reassessment since the 
most recent commentary on his work was published well over 100 years ago.53 Thus, the 
purpose of the following two chapters is to provide an overview of the source tradition based 
on the various communes opiniones of modern scholarship in order to establish a framework 
for interpretation. This will allow us to effectively analyze the career of, and events 
surrounding, Epameinondas. To do this I will go through each relevant ancient author 
systematically. Part one covers the ancient literature from the fourth century, which formed 
the basis of the surviving tradition. Our existing sources had access to a variety of ancient 
authors whose works are no longer extant. These include Ephorus, Callisthenes, Theopompus 
	





and perhaps even Anaximenes and Timaeus. Minor portions of the following ancient 





There is no doubt that Xenophon’s account of the war between Thebes and Sparta is 
by far the most comprehensive. Plutarch asserts a personal friendship between Xenophon and 
Agesilaus to the extent that the latter provided tutelage for the former’s children at Sparta 
(Plut. Ages. 20). He also lived in the Peloponnesus during the wars with Thebes. Because of 
this, he probably had access to a myriad of primary accounts and records. However, as far as 
an historical source, his account is one-sided at best and very exclusive. His focus is largely 
on the events in the Peloponnesus with some concern for the Athenians, but largely only 
accounts for Boeotian activities when it concerns Sparta. Despite this, Xenophon provides us 
with the only extensive primary account of this era and is therefore integral to a study of any 
of the events or leading figures during this period. It is then useful to examine the Hellenica’s 
use as a source, its reliability and any other aspects, which may prove significant for a study 
on Epameinondas and the Theban Hegemony.  
 
Xenophon appears to have been ideally disposed to writing a history of his times 
considering his experience. He is generally believed to have been born c. 430 to an 
aristocratic family in a city near Athens. Though his early years are not well documented, he 
is certain to have had a good education, becoming accustomed to Athenian politics and, it is 
said that, he was a friend and student of Socrates (Diog. Laert. 2. 6. 48). He may well have 
fought in the Athenian cavalry, as was usual for the aristocratic class,55 though it is doubtful 
that he was old enough to have been present at the Battle of Delium in 424 as has been 




55	 Hutchinson	 (2000),	 14.	 This	 is	 certainly	 probable	 as	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 Xenophon	 would	 have	
subsequently	gone	on	a	mercenary	expedition	without	previous	military	experience.		
56	Diog.	Laert.	2.	5.	22;	Strabo	9.	405;	Macrob.	21.	The	story	of	Socrates’	rescue	of	Xenophon	is	generally	
considered	 too	 early	 and	 may	 have	 originated	 from	 confusion	 with	 the	 story	 of	 Socrates’	 rescue	 of	
Alcibiades	(Plat.	Symp.	225),	see	Underhill	(1900),	lxxx.	
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travelled extensively throughout the Persian Empire and was even made one of the generals 
during the latter half of their epic journey (Xen. Ana. 3. 1. 26-47). He may then have served 
uder Agesilaus during his expedition against the Persians in 396 (Diog. Laert. 2. 6. 51) and 
accordingly followed the Spartan king back to Greece for the Corinthian War, where he 
perhaps fought against his fellow Athenians at the Battle of Coronea (Xen. Ana. 5. 3. 6). 
Xenophon was then exiled from Athens either for his role in the battle or because of his 
involvement with Cyrus (Xen. Ana. 3. 1. 5). During this time, he lived in Scillus, a Spartan 
held town south of Olympus (Xen. Ana. 5. 3. 7). Then, after the area was liberated from the 
Spartans, he moved to Corinth (Diog. Laert. 2. 6. 53). When Athens soon allied itself with 
Sparta in 369 (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 1-14), his exile may have ended. Hutchinson suggests he 
moved back to Athens after Mantinea in 362, the year he concluded the Hellenica.57 Because 
he was well-travelled and friendly with the Spartans, particularly Agesilaus, there would have 
been few in a better position to write a detailed and accurate account of this period of some 
50 years.58 
 
The Hellenica as a whole covers the period between 411 to 362. It begins where 
Thucydides left off toward the end of the Peloponnesian War and ends after the Battle of 
Mantinea. It is manifest that a study of the Hellenica is essential to understanding this 
period.59 This work provides the backbone for determining the chronology of events; 
although the focus is on Sparta, his work is unparalleled. Because of his eminent position 
amongst the Spartans, Xenophon was likely to have had first-hand access to information 
concerning political and military events. Indeed, despite any failings, it can be said that his 
descriptions of military activity and topographical details seem to infer possible reports of the 
actual participants of these events.60 
 
However, when modern scholars afford such praise of Xenophon’s Hellenica, it is 
usually met with harsh criticism also. Generally speaking, his work is full of partiality 








or unflattering to the Spartans. Chief among many others is his refusal to name 
Epameinondas as the general who led the Boeotians at Leuctra and, perhaps even more 
astounding, is his omission of the founding of Messene and the new Messenian state. 
Cartledge goes so far as to say that the title Hellenica or ‘Greek History’ is a misnomer and 
that the Penguin Classics version entitled A History of My Times serves to indicate 
Xenophon’s subject matter much more precisely.61 Indeed the Hellenica is so closely focused 
on the events of the Peloponnesus that he appears to have written primarily from first-hand 
knowledge without any attempt to obtain detailed information about the activities of the 
Boeotians. Xenophon’s overall portrayal of Epameinondas, which is almost exclusively 
confined to the campaign leading up to the Battle of Mantinea in 362, is that of an excellent 
general (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 4-26). But his refusal to give him credit for any political activity has 
provided us with a heavily skewed representation of the Theban. This image has 
unfortunately affected some modern scholars’ interpretation of his political vision (i.e. that 
the scope of his schemes went no further than the spread of Theban imperialism).62 
 
It seems apparent from such omissions that Xenophon’s intentions for writing this 
work were not to provide the world with an exhaustive history of the period. The problem of 
interpreting his work, however, largely stems from the lack of a preface. In the exact section 
where one would expect the intentions of the author to be laid out, he simply just continues 
where Thucydides left off. Thus, his work is invariably contrasted to the apparently superior 
historians of the previous century: Herodotus and Thucydides.63 As Gray notes, this has 
caused scholars to assume that Xenophon was attempting to write his history in the tradition 
of Thucydides. However, she also fairly points out how far short the Hellenica falls by 
comparison: lacking that “Thucydidean concern for accuracy and analysis”.64 If then, 
Xenophon was not literally attempting a continuance of Thucydides’ work, what other 
options are there? Cartledge dismisses the view that his work is just a simple memoir on the 








contrast, in his Anabasis, Xenophon describes his return from Asia, subsequent exile and 
settlement in Scillus.  
 
Though an in-depth analysis on the intentions of Xenophon’s Hellenica goes beyond 
the scope of this discussion, a brief look at the philosophical context of his work may prove 
illuminating. Xenophon greatly admired Spartan virtues, to say the least. His Agesilaus, as 
Gray puts it, “offers the picture of a military leader possessed of all the virtues as a model for 
imitation”.66 Other works also exhibit similar didacticism: the Cyropaedia attempts to convey 
the ideal ruler through the partly fictional biography of Cyrus the Great in which Xenophon’s 
Persia is modelled more on Spartan institutions than the historical Persian ones.67 In addition, 
the Hiero is a dialogue on the different nature of happiness between a despot and a private 
citizen, arguing that the life of a tyrant can ultimately be superior.68 It is then surely 
reasonable to assume that this moralizing would apply to the Hellenica.69 If this is true, the 
fact that this work largely focuses on the activities of the Spartans is not surprising. It is 
apparent that Xenophon viewed the Spartan way of life as admirable and one of the major 
features of the Hellenica was to showcase virtue. Because the Boeotians frequently made the 
Spartans look bad during this period, it often went against his purpose to include such 
information. 
 
Xenophon was a well-travelled man who was certainly in a good position to write a 
work of history. As an experienced general his knowledge and descriptions of battles and 
military activities are detailed and vivid. However, because of his Spartophilia, the work is 
also fraught with incredible omissions, indeed, too many to list. Despite this, it appears likely 
that it was not entirely his intention to write a history comparable to that of Thucydides, 
rather, he preferred to focus on the Spartans, whom he believed to have great virtue. Indeed, 
it seems most likely that his purpose was, at least in part, to provide a moralizing model for 











Because it has been generally accepted that Diodorus used Ephorus for much of his 
narrative, the latter is perhaps the most important of our non-extant sources. There is very 
little that can be said about his life save that he came from a town in Asia Minor called Cyme 
and he was possibly a pupil of Isocrates as well as a contemporary (and fellow student) of 
Theopompus. He died before his work was finished; therefore his son Demophilus took up 
his father’s pen and completed the final book.70 He perhaps lived c. 405-330, though this is 
far from certain.71 His major work, Diodorus tells us, was a ‘universal history’72 covering 
almost 750 years in 30 books, which included prooemia, up to and including Philip’s 
conquest of Perinthus in 341/0 (Diod. 16. 76. 5). This was the very first work of its kind 
according to Polybius (Polyb. 5. 33. 2). Though difficult to determine, Barber has reasonably 
suggested that Ephorus began writing his history after 360 and continued to write until his 
death c. 330.73  
 
Ephorus generally relied on written text for his source material: this not only 
included historical works like Herodotus and Thucydides, but he often obtained information 
from poetry and inscriptions. While this sometimes led to major errors or misinterpretation, it 
did mean he was perfectly capable of establishing his own explanations for the course of 
events. As for the arrangement of his work, Diodorus again offers us insight with the 
statement: 
 
Ephorus, on the other hand, having written his general work [universal history], hit the mark, not only 
in speech, but in his arrangement; for each of his books are arranged to encompass a single topic (Ephorus 
FGrH 70 T 11 = Diod. 5. 1. 4).74 
 
	






74	Ἔφορος	 δὲ	 τὰς	 κοινὰς	 πράξεις	ἀναγράφων	 οὐ	 μόνον	 κατὰ	 τὴν	 λέξιν,	ἀλλὰ	 καὶ	 κατὰ	 τὴν	 οἰκονομίαν	
ἐπιτέτευχε:	τῶν	γὰρ	βίβλων	ἑκάστην	πεποίηκε	περιέχειν	κατὰ	γένος	τὰς	πράξεις.	
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The meaning of this passage, particularly the phrase κατὰ γένος (according to type), 
has undergone much debate, where a number of different forms of arrangement could have 
been used: episodic, thematic, or geographic.75 For a study of the Theban Hegemony and 
Epameinondas, within other works, there are several cited references to Ephorus, which bear 
historical significance.76 Other than Diodorus and Plutarch these are also found in Polybius 
and Diogenes where we find useful historical as well as historiographical information. 
Ephorus apparently covered the subject of Epameinondas within five books, as his 
arrangement was not honed to cover specific historical figures separately.77 It has been 
argued that he portrayed the Theban general in a highly laudatory manner.78 According to the 
fourth century A.D. philosopher, Porphyry, Ephorus plagiarized the works of Daimachus, 
Callisthenes and Anaximenes.79 Of these it is often concluded that Ephorus used Callisthenes 
for much of his fourth century events;80 however, this has been disputed and he may have in 




An unfortunate loss for the history of both the early fourth century and much of the 
reign of Alexander the Great is the works of Callisthenes. Originating in Olynthus around c. 
360,82 he was fathered by Diotimos and mothered by Hero, a niece of Aristotle. He 
apparently received tuition from the latter and was brought up within his house. Aristotle, 
believing that Callisthenes did not have the right kind of intelligence to be a philosopher, 
used his influence to get Callisthenes a position in Alexander’s entourage.83 He was then 
made the official chronicler of the Persian expedition. Unfortunately, he was accused of 
	
75	For	the	methodology	and	arrangement	of	Ephorus’	work	see	Barber	(1935),	17-48;	Stylianou	(1998),	













being involved in a conspiracy and was subsequently executed in a most horrific manner. It is 
likely that he was falsely implicated because of his refusal to perform proskynesis for 
Alexander. Though his final act displayed a great deal of courage against a tyrant, his legacy 
amidst the surviving ancient literature was tarnished by his excessive flattery of Alexander 
within his work. He died around about 328.84	
Before Callisthenes went on the expedition to write his Deeds of Alexander, he had 
already written some considerable work. He wrote an account of the Phocian War and a 
Hellenica in 10 books that covered the years from the Peace of Antalcidas in 387 and 
finishing at Philip’s assumption of the throne of Macedonia in 359 (Diod. 14. 117. 8). This 
work undoubtedly covered the Theban Hegemony and is likely to have been a major source 
for later writers. Indeed, as noted above, he is said to have been used by Ephorus and was 
certainly a major source for Plutarch’s work on Epameinondas and Pelopidas. That he wrote 
on Theban affairs is evident from some remaining fragments of his account.85 Examples 
include a reference to Epameinondas in a fragment relating the founding of both Megalopolis 
and Messene (Polyb. 40. 33), and also a fragment about Pelopidas at Tegyra (Plut. Pel. 17.). 
Callisthenes’ biases tend to be somewhat hostile to Sparta and partial towards Thebes. It has 
therefore been suggested that he used the Boeotian historians Dionysodorus and Anaxis.86 





Possibly an exact contemporary of Ephorus, the historian Theopompus also wrote a 
large and comprehensive history focused on the events of the fourth century.88 Photius, in 
chapter 176 of his work, tells some details about the arrangement of Theopompus’ work and 
	






88	 For	 thorough	 treatment	 of	 Theopompus’	 life	 and	 works	 see	 Shrimpton	 (1991);	 Flower	 (1994);	
Vattuone	(2014),	7-37;	Morison	BNJ	115.	
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his life.89 However, part of Photius’ brief account of Theopompus’ life does not appear to 
have come directly from his work (Phot. Biblio. 176).90 Thus, we are unable to establish the 
accuracy of many of his biographical details. According to this other source, he was born in 
Cyme to one Damasistratus. He and his father were exiled from their home for alleged 
Laconism, possibly in 394 after the defeat of the Spartan navy near Cnidus.91 Theopompus 
was pardoned sometime later by Alexander the Great during the latter’s reign. Once the 
young king had died, Theopompus was clearly unwanted by most people: he fled to Egypt 
seeking refuge at Alexandria, one of the intellectual centres of the world. However, Ptolemy, 
thinking Theopompus a busybody, tried to have him executed. Theopompus fortunately 
managed to avoid this with help from some friends. As noted above, he was apparently a 
student of Isocrates. We are uncertain about the date of his birth, but it has been estimated 
that he was born sometime between 405 and 376.92 According to Photius, Theopompus 
travelled throughout the Greek-speaking world giving displays of his oratorical virtuosity. 
The date of his death is unknown. 
 
The historical writing of Theopompus consists of an epitome of Herodotus, a history 
in 12 books covering the years 410-394 known as the Hellenica and a history of the accession 
and reign of Philip of Macedon (360/59-336) known as the Philippica, which was a massive 
work of 58 books.93 Thus he did not see fit to cover the period that included the Corinthian 
War and the Theban Hegemony. His reasons for skipping this period of history (394-360) are 
conjectured by Bruce.94 The historical value of his work then, for a study of Epameinondas, 
does not appear to be that great. However, if Photius is correct, a mere 16 books of the 58 
actually covered Philip’s career (Phot. Cod. 176). The rest of his narrative was filled with 
digressions, which entailed a large variety of information, including many historical details. It 












Epameinondas and the Theban Hegemony.95 Indeed, Plutarch refers to Theopompus twice 
during his account of the first Theban invasion of the Peloponnesus in 370/69 (Plut. Ages. 31. 
3; 32. 8-33. 1). 
 
It is uncertain to what extent later writers used Theopompus’ work as a major source 
for accounts relating to the Theban Hegemony, but his work will have certainly been read by 
many of them, especially Plutarch.96 Either way, it is significant that he was a contemporary 
and possibly fellow student of Ephorus, whose work and life was affected by the rapidly 
changing political situations of fourth century Greece. As well as historical, Theopompus 
also had political, geographical and mythical interests.97 Theopompus apparently shared the 
view (with Xenophon, Antisthenes, Plato, and Isocrates) that the entire Greek world would be 
better off with some form of hegemonic ‘one-man rule’;98 his work certainly featured many 
strongly moralistic sentiments.99 However, from the surviving fragments it is apparent that 






Although Timaeus is not referred to by any of the extant material there is a slight 
possibility that he wrote about the Theban Hegemony. We are informed that Timaeus’ history 
ended during the 129th Olympiad (264/3), which is when Polybius’ history began (Polyb. 1. 
5. 1): Timaeus probably died not long after this. For his birth, Pseudo-Lucian tells us that he 
lived to the age of 96 ([Luc.] Macrob. 22), which at least indicates that he lived a very long 
life. Therefore, an estimation of his birth some time around 350, perhaps earlier, seems 
appropriate. We know that he was exiled from his hometown of Tauromenium in Sicily 










16. 7. 1).101 From Sicily he went to Athens where he would spend 50 years presumably 
learning the ways of Athenian rhetoric (Polyb. 12. 25. 9). It is said that he was a student of 
Philiscus, a pupil of Isocrates (Suda s. v. Τίμαιος,). Probably toward the end of this period, 
Timaeus wrote his major work while still in Athens (Plut. De Exil. 14).102 
 
Timaeus’ wrote a history of Sicily, Italy and Magna Graecia in 40 books. This work 
has received much praise but mostly blame from later writers because of his tendency to 
attack all other historians. This is particularly shown by Polybius who devotes much of his 
work to the discussion of Timaeus.103 Within his Histories, Timaeus payed a lot of attention 
to chronology: Polybius tells us that, for each year, Timaeus cited the ephors and kings of 
Sparta, the archons at Athens and the victors at the Olympic games (Polyb. 12. 11). Although 
there is no direct evidence that Timaeus wrote about the Theban Hegemony, his large history, 
which covered contemporary events, surely could not have gone without reference to the 
most major events that occurred on mainland Greece.104 While Timaeus probably did not deal 
with the Theban Hegemony directly, his accounts of the tyrants Dionysius I and Dionysius II 
of Sicily and their respective support of the Spartans during this period would still have been 
a useful addition to any ancient historian writing on the topic. He may have, as a result, been 





Another interesting addition to fourth century historiography is the orator and 
historian, Anaximenes of Lampsacus. Clues for the dates of his birth and death do not appear 
to have been attested by the ancient sources, thus we must rely on the estimation of scholars. 









106	 Sherman	 (1952),	 200.	 n.	 3;	 Russel	 (2003),	 84;	 Rourke	 (2005),	 19.	 This	 is	 probably	 a	 generalized	
estimation	based	on	the	fact	that	he	was	likely	to	have	outlived	Alexander	the	Great	but,	by	the	time	of	his	
	26	
Suda tells us that he was born in Lampsacus and was a pupil of Diogenes the Cynic and 
Zoilus of Amphipolis, the grammarian. We also learn that he was a teacher of Alexander the 
Great and accompanied him on his campaign (Suda s. v. Ἀναξιμένης). Like Herodotus, 
Anaximenes gained fame by reading his work at the Olympic games (Luc. Herod. 3; Paus. 6. 
18. 2). Both Pausanias and the Suda preserve a story in which Anaximenes saved his 
hometown from destruction. As the story goes, Alexander wanted to destroy Lampsacus for 
its alleged support of the Persians, thus the Lampsacenes sent Anaximenes to reason with 
him. On hearing of this, Alexander vowed that he would do exactly the opposite of what 
Anaximenes would plead. However, when the rhetorician arrived, he asked Alexander to 
destroy Lampsacus and enslave the women and children. Because of the oath he swore, 
Alexander was forced to do the opposite of this (Paus. 6. 18. 2-4). It is also said he was a 
great rival of Theopompus: according to Pausanias and the Suda, Anaximenes wrote a 
defamatory treatise on Sparta and Athens, which he put Theopompus’ name on before 
subsequently having it published throughout the Greek world (Paus. 6. 18. 5).107 Other 
miscellaneous information is offered to us: he was said to be fat (Diog. Laert. 6. 57) and 
dressed badly (Athen. 1. 38).108 
 
For the most part, it seems that Anaximenes was a renowned rhetorician. He may 
have written an Encomium on Helen (Isoc. 10. 14), which, though originally attributed to 
Gorgias, Jebb believes was written by Anaximenes.109 Via Athenaeus, Diodorus Periegetes 
tells us that he also wrote a speech prosecuting Phryne,110 who was a famous courtesan from 
the period, which implies that he also worked as a logographer. Most famously a Rhetorica 









107	 Flower	 (1994),	 21-22.	 esp.	 n.	 37,	 believes	 that	 the	 story	 of	 Anaximenes’	 rescue	 of	 Lampsacus	 is	







written by Anaximenes.111 Unfortunately, the modern scholarship on Anaximenes has been 
overwhelmingly focused on his rhetorical work, particularly as it appears that some of his 
work has actually survived. Thus, there has been little or no attention to his historical works, 
though this is mainly due to the lack of relevant fragments. Pausanias tells us that he wrote a 
history of Philip and then subsequently a history of Alexander (Paus. 6. 18. 2). Probably 
before his affiliation with Philip, Anaximenes also wrote what seemed to have been a 
universal history entitled, according to Diodorus, as τὴν πρώτην τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν, which is 
translated by Sherman as “The First Inquiry of Greek Affairs”112 This work apparently 
covered the events from the creation of the universe down to the death of Epameinondas at 
Mantinea in 362 (Diod. 15. 89. 3). The significance of Diodorus’ testimonial, which is 
mentioned alongside the work of Xenophon, should not be underestimated. Though it is 
doubtful that Diodorus himself made use of Anaximenes’ Hellenica, Anaximenes may have 
been used by Ephorus; but, perhaps only in part, since a 12 book universal history was not 





Another historian worthy of mention, though somewhat later, is Duris of Samos.114 
According to Plutarch he claimed to have been a descendant of Alcibiades (Plut. Alc. 32. 2). 
He supposedly became a tyrant of Samos and was brother of Lynceus of Samos, the writer of 
comedies and both of them were pupils of Theophrastus (Suda s. v. Λυγκεύς; Athen. 4. 1).115 
Pausanias also tells us that his son, Skaios (who may, according to Barron, have in fact been 
his father, named Kaios),116 became a boy-boxing champion at Olympia, which occurred 
	
111	 Rourke	 (2005),	 19-23,	 provides	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 evidence	 in	 favour	 of	 this	 assertion;	 see	 also	
Wendland	(1904),	499-542.	
112	Sherman	(1952),	201.	




115	Dalby	(1991),	539-541,	has	shown	the	possible	 fallibility	of	 this	claim,	 though,	 if	Duris’	brother	was	
taught	by	Theophrastus,	there	is	every	chance	that	Duris	was	also.	
116	Barron	(1962),	189-192.	demonstrates	that	the	name	Σκαῖος	has	actually	been	corrupted	from	Καῖος,	
and	was	not	 in	 fact	Duris’	 son,	but	his	 father.	He	also	 shows	 that	Duris	may	have	had	another	brother	
named	Lysagoras,	who	could	have	been	a	politician.	
	28	
when they were in exile from Samos (Paus. 6. 13. 5).117 If Barron’s assertions about this so-
called ‘Kaios’ can be trusted then we can perhaps give more credence to his approximated 
birthdate of 360-350.118 Accepting this view, Kebric argues then, that both Kaios and his sons 
were born during this exile in Sicily. Duris himself may have been born around 330.119 As a 
pupil of Theophrastus, he appears to have completed his education in Athens, which may 
have begun around 304/2.120 The family also seems to have had some sort of friendly 
relationship with the Antigonids (Athen. 4. 1). It is certainly more than clear that he lived till 
after the death of Lysimachus in 281, as this was when he finished his histories (Plin. Nat. 
Hist. 8. 143). 
 
Duris wrote several works on various topics: most significantly he wrote a history of 
Greece and Macedonia in perhaps more than 24 books.121 Diodorus says that Duris’ history 
began at the death of Amyntas III of Macedon, a year or two following the Battle of Leuctra 
in 370/69 (Diod. 15. 60. 3-6) and ended, as mentioned before, at the death of Lysimachus in 
281. It is implied from this text that, since Ephorus could not have read Duris, Diodorus or 
another of his sources,122 had access to Duris’ work. However, Duris’ account of events from 
the years 370 to 362 must have only been covered in the first book since Athenaeus informs 
us that he had already reached the beginning of the Sacred War (357/6) by the second book. 
Though it is clear that Duris’ focus was primarily on the history of Macedonia, in his first 
book he could not have avoided mentioning events on mainland Greece and his work was 
certainly significant for the wider context of the period. 
 
 
The Athenian Orators 
 
The surviving Athenian political speeches provide a great deal of historical 









but, as Buckler notes, much is reflected of the attitudes that these pretentious intellectuals 
held towards the Thebans throughout the fourth century.123 
 
The most contemporary orator to the events in question is Isocrates whose life 
spanned some 98 years: he was born five years before the Peloponnesian War and died 
shortly after the Battle of Chaeronea (436-338).124 He was thus in an excellent position to 
comment on the activities of the Boeotians. His most important works for the topic are the 
Plataicus and the Archidamus. The Plataicus depicts a Plataean ambassador, sometime 
around 373-371, beseeching the Athenian assembly to help restore his city to its people after 
it had been destroyed by the Thebans in 373. Whether or not the speech was actually used for 
its purpose is not certain;125 however, it overtly reflects Isocrates’ wholly negative attitude 
towards Thebes’ aggressive foreign policy. It also bears a number of useful historical 
references.126 The Archidamus is a speech placed in the mouth of the then Spartan prince and 
son of Agesilaus, conveying a plea to the Spartan assembly to do what is necessary to regain 
control of Messenia. Set probably around 366, it was likely to have been composed as a 
rhetorical exercise.127 The speech provides us with insight into the Athenian and Spartan 
attitudes to the political situation in Greece. Particularly pertinent is the information provided 
on the peace of 366/5.128 From his work it is apparent that Isocrates predominantly abhorred 
Thebes during the period of Theban supremacy, particularly since his polis was at war with 













this	 year.	Historical	 details	 include:	 the	 Theban	 dismantling	 of	 the	 poleis	 of	 Thespiae	 and	 Plataea;	 the	
peace	terms	of	Pelopidas	(Isoc.	6.	26-28);	examples	of	victories	against	the	Thebans	by	the	Spartans	(Isoc.	




Other than Isocrates, only a few significant references are made by other orators. 
The most famous of these was Demosthenes who was born around 385/4 or 384/3129 and died 
in 322 after the failure of the Lamian War.130 On a number of occasions he makes relevant 
references: in the Megalopolitans (written in 353), he mentions the Battle of Mantinea (Dem. 
16. 6) and elsewhere he refers to the Battle of Leuctra and the contemporary state of the 
Peloponnesus (Dem. 18. 18). He also, on at least two other occasions, refers to the Theban 
Hegemony (Dem. 9. 23; 18. 202). Aeschines, an Athenian born of a relatively humble family, 
lived from around 390-314131 made the earliest non-historical reference to Epameinondas in 
his On the Embassy, written around 343 (Aeschin. 2. 105). This oration reflects the fear that 
the Athenians felt about Thebes’ bid for sea power in 364.132 Dinarchus, born in Corinth, 
lived c. 361/0-291, having moved to Athens probably sometime before 338.133 Within his 
speech, Against Demosthenes (c. 324), he mentions Epameinondas and Pelopidas with a 
certain degree of praise, briefly summarizing their achievements as leaders of the Theban 
Hegemony (Din. 1. 72-73). For Dinarchus, the greatness of Thebes was achieved by its 
generals. This view provides a stark contrast with Isocrates’ earlier perspective. 
 
Overall the Athenian orators appear to have exhibited a fairly negative view of 
Epameinondas and the power of Thebes, particularly believing that the Thebans 
overextended themselves; however, following the Athenian-Theban war against Macedon 



















There are a few other fourth century historians whose significance as contributors to 
the source tradition is difficult to attest; however, it is possible that each covered at least a 
portion of the Theban Hegemony.  
 
Daimachus, of whom only eight fragments and one testimonium are extant, is 
another said to have been plagiarized by Ephorus.135 The evidence here certainly informs us 
that Daimachus wrote a history, but seeing as Ephorus’ work covers the 700 years down to 
340 there is no way of knowing what periods were covered. However, the fact that 
Daimachus is placed beside Callisthenes and Anaximenes, both of whom covered the Theban 
Hegemony, it is certainly not impossible.136 On the other hand, the passages associated with a 
potential Hellenica provide mostly mythological information; thus we cannot be certain about 
which events were covered.137 
 
Another elusive man from the period was Zoilus of Amphipolis, who, as we have 
seen, may have been a teacher of Anaximenes, probably living between the years 400 to 
320.138 He is referred to as a Cynic and a Grammarian by trade; however, he was most 
famous for his criticisms of Homer for which he appeared to have been scorned by all.139 
Significantly, the Suda tells us that Zoilus wrote a universal history from the beginning of 
time to the death of Philip of Macedon (Ἱστορίαν ἀπὸ θεογονίας ἕως τῆς Φιλίππου τελευτῆς 
βιβλία). Unfortunately, not a single fragment from this work has survived and we know 
nothing more about it other than what is in the Suda. However, if indeed he was a teacher of 















influence on his pupil. Therefore, it is even possible that Anaximenes used his teacher’s work 
as a source for his own history. Of course, this is all highly speculative, but it is surely 
significant, if true, that Anaximenes’ teacher also wrote a universal history.140 
 
Finally, there were two historians from Boeotia, Anaxis and Dionysodorus, both of 
whom appear to have each written a Hellenica. The only testimonial to both of these 
historians is given by Diodorus who states: “The works of the Boeotians, Dionysodorus and 
Anaxis, in order, brought their histories of Greek affairs to an end during this year”.141 The 
year Diodorus is referring to is 361/0, not long after the Battle of Mantinea. However, 
nothing more is known of these historians and we have no indication of the scope or depth of 
their work, or even when they were writing. The suggestion that the likes of Callisthenes may 
have used their work as a source for his account of the Theban Hegemony cannot be proven 
since Callisthenes may well have written his account before them.142 Certainly one must 
avoid assumptions when there is no evidence to go on, but there are certainly speculative 
possibilities.  
 
Firstly, the significance of Diodorus’ statement is unclear, but on the surface, it 
seems to indicate that he may well have read both of these authors. However, just as with 
both Duris and Anaximenes, who are cited in Diodorus’ book 15, if it is improbable that 
Diodorus would have read so widely for his work, it becomes more likely that these writers 
were cited by his source(s). It is therefore possible that they were used by Ephorus.143 But, 
considering their obscurity, the possibility that they were instead used by Ephorus’ source 
also remains open. This may indeed lead us to suggest that Callisthenes, whom Ephorus may 
have made use of, is responsible for the reference to Anaxis and Dionysodorus. If this is an 
apt conclusion, then these Boeotian historians may have been writing in the decade or two 
following Epameinodas’ death. On the other hand, our only conclusive terminus ante quem is 
in Diodorus’ own time. It is also possible that Diodorus obtained the references from his so-
called ‘chronographic source’. This would then imply no influence on his narrative beyond 
	
140	On	Zoilus	see	William	BNJ	71.	





some of the casual facts he found in this source. However, Engels has suggested that since, 
after the rise of Macedon, the standard focus of historians changed from Greek affairs (the 
Hellenica) to Macedonian (the Philipicca, Alexandru praxeis and Macedonica). This 
suggests that the Boeotians historians were writing in the 350s or 340s, before the eclipse of 
Macedonian power in mainland Greece. In the end no decisive conclusion can be made 






















The Historiographical Tradition Part Two: Secondary Sources 
 
 
In spite of the reasonable abundance of relevant histories from the fourth century, of 
these, only Xenophon survives and, as has been established, the Hellenica is wholly 
insufficient for even a cursory understanding of the period of Theban supremacy, let alone 
the career of Epameinondas. Fortunately, many of these works were available to both Greek 
and Roman writers for many centuries; some were apparently still in existence by as late as 
the tenth century A.D. Most important of these are Diodorus, Plutarch, Nepos and Pausanias. 
As such, these writers have been presented in order of importance for this study, rather than 
chronologically, where Diodorus and Plutarch indisputably come first, while Nepos, 





Where Xenophon fails, it is necessary to consult the Bibliotheca Historica by 
Diodorus of Sicily. Modern scholarship has traditionally been scathing of this work due to its 
copious topographical, chronological and factual errors; however, recent decades have seen a 
significant rise in advocates of the work’s originality and merit (particularly for the context in 
which it was written). This polarization in the scholarship has also led to disagreement over 
the extent to which Diodorus simply copied or paraphrased his sources, or whether he 
included his own themes and methodology for writing his history.145 In spite of this, if the 
Bibliotheca had not survived, we would know next to nothing about Epameinondas within 
the context of the period that he lived. 
 
Details of Diodorus’ life are mentioned only within his own work. He tells us that he 





birth.146 It has been asserted that he was born c. 90.147 There is very little evidence to 
establish the dates in which his work was written and published, but the general indication 
has led some scholarship to assume that he began writing it around 60 (since this is when it 
finished) and would have published it in its entirety by as late as 30 or even the early 20s.148 
However, Stylianou noted that Diodorus originally intended to bring his work down to the 
year 46/5, which would make this a terminus post quem for the date the work was begun.149 
Diodorus claims to have travelled widely throughout the most important regions of Europe 
and Asia (Diod. 1. 4. 1), though specifically he only states that he visited Egypt (Diod. 1. 44. 
1), which can be dated to around 55 B.C. He also claimed to have gone to Rome at some 
other point (Diod. 1. 4. 2). As far as can be calculated, his visit to Rome had to have been 
before 45 B.C.150 Oldfather argues that within his work, it is only evident that he travelled to 
Egypt (Diod. 1. 22. 2) and that he never went to Mesopotamia as he confuses some of the 
geography.151 Diodorus also claims that he learnt Latin from the Romans in Sicily (Diod. 1. 
4. 4), a claim that has been contested, though it seems likely that he knew enough for his 
purposes.152 He may have died around the late 30s or early 20s B.C.153 
 
Diodorus’ history apparently covered the mythical period down to the year of Julius 
Caesar’s first consulship in 59 (Diod. 1. 4. 6-7).154 Of the 40 books on which he wrote, only 
books one to five and 11 to 20 survive, though fragments of the other texts are extant in other 
authors.155 The scope of his work, indeed, was so immense that he claims to have worked on 


















Egypt and Rome.156 For the period covered in which Diodorus was able to provide a year-by-
year dating system, his work becomes annalistic. His method of doing this is to provide the 
archon of Athens, who was voted in about the middle of July and the consulships of Rome, 
which commenced on the first of January. Though this presentation has caused much 
confusion, Diodorus himself admits this shortcoming (Diod. 20. 43. 7). While he cites many 
ancient historians, it is generally thought that his principal source for fourth century Greece 
was Ephorus.157 His purpose for writing these works appears to have been moralistic: for 
people to take heed of both the error and successes of the past (Diod. 1. 1. 3-5).158 Overall, 
Diodorus’ work serves as a useful counterpoint to other sources and also provides heavily 
excerpted portions of non-extant historians. 
 
The Theban Hegemony and the war with Sparta is covered in book 15: most of his 
information is likely to have come from Ephorus, though with some possible supplementation 
from Timaeus for the narrative of events in the Western Greek world.159 In addition to a 
historical narrative, Diodorus is also thought to have made use of a ‘chronographic source’, 
which not only provided his dates, but also seems to have named authors of relevant works 
and provided pieces of general historical information.160 By comparison to Xenophon who 
looks primarily at the Peloponnesus, Diodorus’ narrative covers events throughout all of 
mainland Greece as far north as Macedonia. With some minor instances of bias against 
Sparta, he tends to be relatively neutral towards the Spartans, Thebans and Athenians alike, 
always willing to praise anyone for virtuous attributes and deeds. This praise, in particular, 
has been well afforded to Epameinondas and Pelopidas, which; however, has in some cases 
had the effect of distorting aspects of the narrative. Despite this, a great deal of his 
information is unique and essential for understanding events beyond the perspective of the 
















Plutarch wrote at least three biographies that were directly related to this period and 
topic. These include his Agesilaus, Pelopidas, and Epameinondas. Chief among these for my 
purposes would have been the latter one, which unfortunately does not survive. Despite this, 
the remaining two are still invaluable sources, particularly the Pelopidas (along with the 
Comparison of Pelopidas and Marcellus), which for a study of Epameinondas offers 
significant information about his activities before and during the Theban Hegemony. Thus, as 
a major source for the topic, it is essential to determine the nature of his work. 
 
The early career of Plutarch is difficult to determine but, from a few indications in 
the sources, a general outline may be established.162 He was probably born in the early forties 
of the first century A.D.163 It is certain that he grew up in Chaeronea as he constantly admits 
to us,164 but less certain if he was actually born there.165 Very little else of his early life can be 
determined with surety except that around 66 or 67 A.D. he was a disciple of Ammonius, the 
Egyptian philosopher. At this point he was about to join an academy after an enthusiastic 
devotion to mathematics (Plut. De E Delph. 7/387f). Because of this, and since his early work 
displays the ability of a well-trained rhetorician, it is quite possible that he went to the 
Academy for Rhetoric in Athens.166 This may be the move to Athens that he refers to in his 
Demosthenes (Dem. 31. 1). Plutarch also appears to have travelled to Smyrna in Lydia (Plut. 













(Plut. Quaest. Conviv. 5. 5/678c). This was either on one big journey or two separate ones. 
When he was still young (νέον ἐμαυτὸν ἔτι), in an obscure reference, Plutarch was sent as an 
envoy to the proconsul of Achaea (Plut. Praec. 20/816d). Though a small task, it was one that 
implies his prominence of position and favour with the Romans, even at this early stage. We 
also know that Plutarch had many children and married when he was quite young (Plut. 
Amat. 2/749b): Jones estimates that, in c. 70 A.D., he was between 25 and 30.167  
 
Plutarch’s career under the Flavians is also poorly recorded, but another passage in 
Demosthenes tells us that he had to travel to Italy for some time teaching philosophy (Plut. 
Dem. 2. 2). It is also possible that, during this visit (or visits), he was also acting as a foreign 
ambassador.168 With several probable visits to Rome and a career as a philosopher and public 
figure, Plutarch became a priest of Apollo at Delphi (Plut. Quaes. Conv. 7. 2/700e), certainly 
a position requiring experience in public office. In the later stages of his life, he seems to 
have remained in Chaeronea (Put. Dem. 2. 1-2), occasionally travelling as far as Delphi (Plut. 
De E Delph. 1/384e-385b). It was during the period between Nerva and Hadrian, ending at 
his death in 120 A.D., that Plutarch wrote the majority of his works. 
 
Plutarch is best known for his Parallel Lives, which were probably written during 
the last couple decades of his life. The now lost Epameinondas was one of the earliest; the 
Pelopidas not long after, while the Agesilaus was one of his last.169 He stated his purpose 
within his text (Plut. Alex. 1. 2), making it clear that he was not attempting to relate an 
accurate depiction of history; instead he was looking at instances, which express character 
and moral qualities, good or bad. Publishing his works in the form of a diptych served to 
illustrate and compare Roman history with that of the Greeks. In this way, he was reasserting 
the eminence of the Greeks (particularly in military prowess) by conveying their great figures 
as equal to that of the Romans’.170 Thus we see Alexander with Caesar, Agesilaus with 
Pompey, Pelopidas with Marcellus and Epameinondas with Scipio. He was also willing to 
convey characters with more disreputable traits, such as Demetrius Poliorcetes and Mark 







Nepos’ own versions.171 Certainly he had read Nepos’ work (Plut. Luc. 40. 1; Marc. 30. 4) 
and may have taken some inspiration, but none can deny the superiority of Plutarch’s Vitae. 
Additionally, Plutarch may have been inspired by Varro, a contemporary of Nepos, who 
wrote a collection of portraits on important figures from Greece and Rome called his 
Imagines.172  
 
The loss of the Epameinondas is probably the most lamentable of Plutarch’s non-
extant work since, as a native Boeotian and lover of Philosophy, he undoubtedly greatly 
admired the Theban and certainly put a great deal of effort into this particular life. It was 
paired with a life of a Scipio, which may have been Scipio Aemilianus but was probably 
more likely to be Scipio Africanus.173 Fortunately, much useful information survives in the 
Pelopidas. The sources for the Pelopidas have been discussed in detail by Westlake.174 He 
argues that many sources were used; however, Plutarch relied on a “competent fourth century 
historian” for the bulk of his narrative. Because of similarities between Nepos and Plutarch’s 
Pelopidas, it has been suggested that Plutarch shares in the same source tradition as Nepos.175 
Westlake considers this to be in the same tradition as Diodorus, whom is widely thought to 
have copied large amounts of Ephorus. However, he further argues that both Plutarch and 
Ephorus used the same source, which he deems most likely to be Callisthenes. If this is the 
case, it is reasonable to assume that the same source (or sources) was used for both the 
Epameinondas and the Pelopidas; however, as it stands, the evidence indicates that, while 
Plutarch made considerable use of Callisthenes, he had certainly read Ephorus and may have 
supplemented these works with various other writers.176 
 
For the Agesilaus Plutarch appears to have been influenced by Xenophon for his 
narrative. Plutarch cites him by name six times (Plut. Ages. 18.1, 19.4, 19.6, 29.2, 34.4), 
which certainly indicates that Xenophon was a major feature of Plutarch’s research. 
However, in the text he cites Theopompus three times (Plut. Ages. 10.10, 31.4, 32.14-33.1) 









have been writing from Xenophon it may have in fact come from Theopompus. This is 
plausible since Theopompus is known to have used Xenophon’s work (Theopompus FGrH 
115 F 21 = Euseb. Praep. Evan. 10. 3).177 The fact that Plutarch includes information that 
Xenophon omits is also indicative of another source. For example, he describes the 
confrontation between Agesilaus and Epameinondas (Plut. Ages. 28.1-2) and the founding of 
Megalopolis (Plut. Ages. 34.1), both of which Xenophon failed to mention. Plutarch also cites 
by name Theophrastos (2.3), Duris (3.1), Dioscorides (35.1) and Hieronymous of Rhodes 
(13.4). Because of this evidence, Cawkwell concludes that the work appears to be mostly 
‘independent’ of Xenophon.178 In addition to this, it is also possible that, like Nepos, he relied 
on Ephorus (or even Callisthenes) greatly.179 
 
Another significant contribution to the historical record is found in Plutarch’s De 
Genio Socratis, which is a philosophical treatise consisting of Socratic discussions between 
prominent Theban aristocrats. It is, however, at the same time embroiled in history with the 
liberation of Thebes from Sparta in 379 being described in detail simultaneously with 
philosophical debate. Plutarch makes Epameinondas one of the story’s protagonists. Seen as 
intentionally modelled on Plato’s Phaedo, the treatise has been interpreted by modern 
observers as a way of creating a direct link between philosophical debate and its practical 
application in society; hence, Epameinondas’ involvement in the liberation.180 Unlike 
Plutarch’s account of the liberation in his Pelopidas, the De Genio Socratis gives equal credit 
to all the conspirators, thus offering what is perhaps a more historical and less biographical 
account.181 Despite a wealth of dubious characters and instances, the work can be reconciled 
with other accounts of the liberation.182 
 
As well as this, Plutarch makes reference to Epameinondas in at least 41 other 
works, often multiple times. This anecdotal material often contains unique information but 
generally serves to confirm some specific details about the Theban’s life. Most significant of 









Apophthegmata, along with further anecdotes on Pelopidas and Agesilaus. Early scholarship 
on the Apophthegmata argued that another writer, perhaps posthumously, compiled the 
collection from Plutarch’s Vitae; however, this idea was subsequently quashed and it is now 
generally accepted that the work is genuine Plutarch.183 More recent study has gone further to 
argue the possibility that Plutarch composed these Apophthegmata as a collection of notes 
designed to assist in his arrangement and creation of his Vitae. Even further study has argued 
it is perhaps more likely that they were either composed from the Vitae themselves or even 
assembled from a common collection of notes or memoirs (ὑπομνήματα).184 Regardless of 
the exact purpose of their composition and, even if they were compiled by someone else, 
these studies demonstrate that the Regum et Imperatorum Apophthegmata is intrinsically 
related to the Vitae. The significance of this fact manifests itself quite clearly for my study: 
Plutarch’s non-extant life of Epameinondas must indeed have been composed of many, if not 
all, of the anecdotes in these Apophthegmata, with only minor contextual differences, as 
Pelling has demonstrated. It is a tempting prospect to think one might be able to reconstruct 
the missing life from this remaining source material.185 The 40 other works that reference 





The dates concerning Cornelius Nepos’ birth are far from certain. Scholars have 
given estimates ranging from around 110 to 100.186 We know that he was a native of 
Cisalpine Gaul and, because Pliny the Elder refers to him as “a dweller of the Po River” (padi 
accola), it has often been supposed that he may have come from Ticinum.187 It seems that 
before long, he immigrated to Rome, where he would spend most of his life residing. From 
Pliny the Younger we also know that Nepos was not of senatorial rank; however, he was 










and Cicero, to whom he exchanged letters with (Macrob. Sat. 2. 1. 14; Suet. Jul. 55). Catullus 
also dedicated a book of poetry to him (Catul. 1).188 Though he was not of the ruling class, he 
was certainly held in high esteem amongst them. Nepos died sometime during the reign of 
Augustus as is attested twice by Pliny the Elder (Plin. Nat. Hist. 9. 137; 10. 60), probably 
after 32 B.C.189 
 
The greater bulk of Nepos’ work is unfortunately lost but it appears that he wrote in 
a variety of literary genres. These include a book on poetry, a universal history, a collection 
of anecdotes and a geographical treatise.190 His largest work was the De Viris Illustribus, 
which comprised of 16 books of short biographies on the lives of famous generals, kings, 
historians, orators, statesmen, philosophers, scholars and poets. These biographies were 
compiled together as comparisons, much in the same way as Plutarch’s Parallel Lives, with 
foreigners (usually Greek) contrasted with Romans. However, only the lives of the foreign 
generals have survived with the exception of a brief sketch on the life of Cato and a life of 
Atticus.  
 
In general, scholarship on Nepos’ work has been very critical, perhaps culminating 
in Horsfall’s scathing summation of his literary ability: “Nepos is an intellectual pygmy 
whom we find associating uneasily with the literary giants of his generation”.191 However, 
there is now plenty of scholarship, which has taken the focus away from Nepos’ simplistic 
style and attempted to demonstrate his methodology as being appropriate for his purpose. In a 
relatively neutral article, Lord demonstrated the wide range of topics that Nepos peruses 
throughout his work, which are related to his purposes as a biographer.192 Within his 
surviving work Nepos (like Plutarch) stresses that he is writing biography not history: “…on 
which I feel uneasy, for if I explain the matter, I will not appear to be recounting his life, but 
will appear to be writing history” (Nep. Pel. 1.1).193 By asserting the existence of a specific 











guidelines that have been determined for the selection process of material for his Vitae. 
McCarty has provided a good analysis of this conception: 
 
 …Nepos believes that the biographer should be comprehensive, including whatever materials he 
deems relevant and necessary for a complete picture; that in his evaluations he should employ the moral and 
ethical criteria of the culture and era in which each subject lived; that he should dwell on mental qualities but 
also include some res gestae; and that he should be comparative, trying to present vitae of persons from Rome 
and from foreign countries, so that the reader may make an evaluation of each. It has been shown that Nepos 
himself adhered to his own precepts.194 
 
Indeed, it seems that it was Nepos’ intention to demonstrate that a virtuous life was 
achieved by the excellence of their character, in spite of any cultural differences with 
contemporary Roman mores.195 As a result, scholarship now generally utilizes Nepos 
primarily for his useful attributes as opposed to the counterproductive, if not mis-
interpretative method of attacking his style, chronological and factual errors, as well as the 
unfair comparison with his perceived betters.196  
Nepos cites various sources within his work including Thucydides (Nep. Them. 9; 
10; Paus. 2), Theopompus and Timaeus (Nep. Alcib. 11); for Hannibal he used Polybius, 
Atticus, Sulpicius Blitho, Silenus and Sosilus (Nep. Hann. 13.1, 3). He also cites Xenophon 
as his source for his life of Agesilaus but implies that he also read other writers (Nep. Ages. 
1.1). Despite this, many scholars have denied Nepos’ use of these sources claiming that he 
obtained his information from Hellenistic biographies by the likes of Antigonus of Carystus, 
Hermippus and Satyrus.197 However, this accusation seems based on the belief that Nepos 
could not have made so many factual errors and still have used these major historians. The 
fact is there is no conclusive reason to believe he did not make first-hand use of the sources 
that he cites, particularly as he does not cite these alleged Hellenistic biographies. More 









has also been earlier argued that, in his life of Miltiades and description of the Battle of 
Marathon, Nepos was using Ephorus as his source.199 
For this study the lives of Epameinondas and Pelopidas are of importance, 
particularly as the former life is one of his largest. He also refers to Epameinondas in his 
praefatio, along with an isolated reference in his Iphicrates (Plut. Praef. 1. 1-2; Iph. 2. 5). It 
is certainly clear that Nepos had a particular interest in the Theban statesman.200 Though the 
sources for these lives cannot be determined, there are certainly possible options that have 
been previously noted (e.g Ephorus or Theopompus). Buckler also speculates that, for the 
Agesilaus, as well as Xenophon, Nepos may have been using the same source as Plutarch: 
Callisthenes, Ephorus or Thepompus.201 Overall, because of his factual and chronological 
errors, his use as a source for Epameinondas and the Theban Hegemony is fairly minor 
except where he helps to confirm the other sources. Despite this, he certainly is useful for 
understanding the source tradition as a whole and clarifying the overall dispersal of 





Our knowledge of Pausanias himself comes only from within his work. There is, as 
it seems, no mention of his life from any external source.202 It has been suggested that our 
Pausanias equates with one Pausanias of Damascus, who wrote descriptions of an ancient 
coastal region. However, this idea has been convincingly disproved, as the latter Pausanias is 
likely to have written sometime in the late second century B.C.203 Unfortunately, without 
either a prooemium or epilogue, Pausanias tells us very little about himself. We can, 
however, approximately determine when he was living. It is thought that Pausanias was likely 
writing his work between 155-180 A.D. and to have lived c. 115-180 A.D.204 Though it is not 









citizen of Magnesia on Mt. Sipylus.205 He was liable to have been part of the aristocratic class 
considering his education and he must have travelled extensively to compile his work;206 
therefore, he was probably fairly wealthy. Levi suggests that he may have been a doctor 
because of his interest in anatomy and devotion to Asklepios, a god of healing,207 though this 
cannot be confirmed.  
 
For some 20 odd years between 155-180 A.D. Pausanias travelled, researched and 
wrote his Description of Greece (Ἑλλάδος Περιήγησις). This work was done in 10 volumes 
including descriptions of all mainland Greek provinces with the exceptions of Aetolia, 
Acarnania, Epirus, Thessaly and parts of Locris. Despite lacking a prooemium, Pausanias 
states his intentions for his work in book one: to describe all of Greece (Paus. 1. 26. 5). 
Though the statement is vague it does tell us the scope of his work. He further admits some 
limitations to his subject matter stating he only set out to describe the most notable objects 
(Paus. 1. 39. 3; 2. 2. 1).208 Whatever the reason he left out the aforementioned provinces,209 
the work was an immense task to undertake: he provides geographical assessments of large 
areas, as well as more specific descriptions of sites, whilst being embroiled in local art, 
architecture and anecdotal history and myth. He may even have been the first person to 
attempt such a feat.210 Early scholarship appears to have viewed Pausanias as a compiler of 
other literary sources and that he had not in fact travelled to these places himself.211 Then for 
many decades, Pausanias was considered useful only for the Archaeologist of ancient Greece. 
However, more recently he has received a greater deal of attention and this view has been all 
but overturned.212 Generally, the Periegesis is a necessary companion to any topographical 
survey of mainland Greece. He describes the landscape and cities with accuracy and his 
numerous additions of mythological and historical detail provides a great accompaniment for 















For a study of the Theban Hegemony, Pausanias is invaluable. He briefly 
summarizes Xenophon’s Hellenica in book one, also bringing our attention to a painting 
depicting the Battle of Mantineia by Euphranor (Paus. 1. 3. 4). In book three he summarizes 
the life of Agesilaus (Paus. 3. 9. 1-10. 2), having possibly used Plutarch’s Agesilaus as a 
supplement to the Hellenica.214 In Pausanias’ book on Messenia Epameinondas is mentioned 
in relation to its reoccupation by the original inhabitants (Paus. 4. 26. 6-8). And in the eighth 
book the various theories of who killed Epameinondas are offered as well as a eulogy (Paus. 
8. 11. 5-10). Most importantly he provides a summary of the life of Epameinondas (Paus. 9. 
13. 1-15. 4), which offers several instances of unique information.215  
 
It was previously agreed that Pausanias’ source for his segments on Epameinondas 
came from Plutarch’s lost Epameinondas. This argument was generally accepted with very 
little discussion for or against it. Westlake simply accepts that it is a probability and 
Cawkwell just admits it is possible without taking sides either way.216 Shrimpton provides a 
reasonable argument that Pausanias was liable to have used a vita of Epameinondas, which, 
by comparing the similarities between Pausanias and Plutarch’s Pelopidas, concludes that the 
connection between the two is likely.217 However, his assertion is firmly based on the hasty 
conclusion that Plutarch’s Life was the only available Vita aside from Nepos’ one, which 
cannot be confirmed. The factual similarities do not conclusively prove that one was 
paraphrasing the other. In a detailed argument, Tuplin has convincingly demonstrated the 
uncertainty of any direct connection between the two.218 The possibility is definitely there, 
















Born c. 35 A.D.,219 Frontinus appears to have had a rather successful career. Bennett 
suggests he may have been educated at the Alexandrian school of mathematics.220 He held 
the consulship three times: in the years 74, 98 and 100 A.D.221 Sometime after 74 A.D. he 
was given a military post in Britain by the emperor Vespasian. There he managed to subdue 
the Silures tribe in Wales and constructed a Roman road known as the Via Julia (Tac. Agr. 
17). Later he also took part in a German campaign under Domitian during the uprising of 
Civilis (Front. Strat. 4. 3. 14). From his return to Rome in 78 to 97 A.D. nothing is known, 
but in this latter year he was made the water commissioner of Rome, a post, which he held till 
his death in 103/4 A.D. Amidst this period he wrote his most famous work, De Aqueductu, a 
treatise on the aqueducts of Rome.222  
 
During his unknown years he is presumed to have written much of his works, which 
were many and varied, including a treatise on farming and one on land surveying. All of his 
works appear to have been technical and instructional by nature. Frontinus wrote textbooks or 
field guides with the intention to educate both himself and others.223 He also wrote at least 
two military treatises: a De Re Militari, which was apparently entirely theoretical, and a 
Strategemata. The latter of these two, written in four books, has fortunately survived, though 
there is some debate as to whether the fourth book was actually written by Frontinus or 
posthumously added by a later author.224 Significantly it includes 10 examples of 
Epameinondas’s leadership, three of Pelopidas’ and several other useful examples including 
an anecdote of the rarely mentioned Theban general, Pammenes. Frontinus’ source material 
is unclear: a number of the anecdotes are significantly distinct from Plutarch and Diodorus to 
suggest that he used something different from them. He may simply have obtained much of 












earliest example being from the fourth century Aeneas Tacticus.225 On the other hand, much 






Almost 100 years after Frontinus, a similar work was written by Polyaenus. We 
know he was a Macedonian living in the second century A.D. and the Suda refers to him as a 
rhetorician who wrote a work on Thebes (Περὶ Θηβῶν) and one on battle tactics in three 
books (Suda s. v. Πολύαινος). The aforementioned work on tactics does not appear to be 
referring to his work in eight books known as the Strategica. This, as mentioned within his 
work, was dedicated to the emperors Marcus Aurelius and Verus during the Parthian war 
(162-165 A.D). He claims that he was too old to take part in the war, but this would be his 
contribution.226 
 
Though it is unknown what his work on Thebes entailed, it is possible it was a 
history. If that was in fact the case, it would not be too farfetched to presume he may have 
written about the Theban Hegemony. His surviving work, however, the Strategica, like 
Frontinus’ work, is a technical manual dedicated to examples of great generalship. By 
contrast, however, instead of being organised by topic, it is, rather, organized by each 
individual general and each general is organized into his ethnos. The work is not generally 
considered terribly useful for its historicity,227 but some of his examples can certainly be 
confirmed by more reliable sources. Significantly, he wrote a total of 15 strategemata on 
Epameinondas, three on Pelopidas and two on Gorgidas. Though some of the examples are 
somewhat suspect and the text may have been corrupted, they offer us some very significant 
historical facts. If Polyaenus did indeed write about the Theban Hegemony, it may be 








indication that he used Ephorus as a source for book three.228 However, like Frontinus, 
Polyaenus’ actual source material is nebulous and he may simply have used other existing 





Also worth mentioning is the Arcadian historian of the second century B.C., 
Polybius. His history of the rise of the Roman Republic makes no less than seven references 
to Epameinondas.229 As well as several offhand references he most interestingly briefly 
describes the significance of Pelopidas, claiming that he deserves credit for encouraging 
Epameinondas to get involved in politics (Polyb. 8. 1). Polybius also describes the events 
leading up to the Battle of Mantinea in relative detail (Polyb. 9. 8. 1-13), which can be 
confirmed by the account of Xenophon (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 8).230 He makes it undoubtedly clear 
that he was familiar with all the standard fourth century works, referencing both the likes of 





The Greek rhetorician and grammarian of the late second and early third century 
refers to Epameinondas six times and includes two references that do not appear anywhere 
else. He tells us the names of teachers who taught him how to play the flute and how he 
showed a pomegranate to the Athenians in order to settle a territorial dispute (Athen. 5. 84; 
14. 16). His references demonstrate knowledge of anecdotes that illustrate Epameinondas’ 




230	 For	 discussion	 of	 Polybius’	 account	 of	 the	 Battle	 of	 Mantinea	 see	 Walbank	 (1967),	 127-130.	 He	





Theopompus and Duris of Samos.232 However, this is just the sort of information he might 






Just as Pausanias found it necessary to talk about Epameinondas in his description of 
Boeotia the Greek philosopher who wrote his Geographica in the early first century A.D. felt 
obliged to give recognition as well. Strabo refers to him four times mentioning both the 
Battles of Mantinea and Leuctra (Strabo 8. 8. 2; 9. 2. 2, 39). In one of the references he 
quotes Ephorus, which leaves little doubt as to where he obtained his knowledge of the 





In his Lives of Eminent Philosophers, which was written sometime between 200 and 
500 A.D., Diogenes Laertes refers to Epameinondas four times. Most significantly he reveals 
the existence of another Xenophon, who wrote a biography of Epameinondas and Pelopidas 
(Diog. Laert. 6. 2. 39). Though little can be said of this otherwise unknown biographer, his 
existence is significant for historiography. Diogenes also makes reference to Mantinea and 
twice refers to Lysis as the Pythagorean tutor of Epameinondas (Diog. Laert. 2. 6. 54; 6. 2. 
39; 8. 1. 6). Diogenes was well read on at least one of the major sources of the Theban 
Hegemony (Diog. Laert. 2. 6. 54), therefore his references may have come from Ephorus as 













Justin assembled his Epitome, perhaps around the early third century A.D.,237 from 
Pompeius Trogus’ Historiae Philippicae, which was probably written in the late first century 
B.C. or early first century A.D. Justin’s account of the period of Epameinondas’ career is 
confined to just a few paragraphs (Just. 6. 6-9): it is often rather confused and provides little 
unique information. However, it is clear from the surviving prologi that Trogus included a 
much more detailed account of the events relating to Epameinondas. These include: the 
invasion of Laconia (370/69), the Battle of Mantinea and a discussion of the impact of his 
death on the whole of Greeece (Trog. Prol. 6). He also commented on Philip’s stay in Thebes 
and later refers to Epameinondas’ naval voyage.238 Since his work was centred on the rise 
and fall of Macedonian power it has often been suggested that he used a Philippic source, 
particularly that of Theopompus, who, like Trogus, made many lengthy digressions. 
However, it is perhaps unwise to commit to such an assumption as we simply do not know 
enough about Trogus’ source material.239 Indeed, Hammond has made a reasonable case for 
Marsyas of Pella,240 who wrote a history of Macedonia down to 331 (Suda s. v. Μαρσύας). It 
is also possible that he made use of Anaximenes for this period as well. In general, it is likely 
that Trogus made use of a major work for each book but may have supplemented this with 





Pseudo Plutarch mentions one Ctesiphon, who wrote a Boeotian History, though 
nothing further is known about the work. The one surviving fragment, from the third book, 
mentions a story in which Epameinondas returned home from fighting the Spartans and left 
his son, Stesimbrotus, in command while instructing him not to engage the enemy. He then 
	
237	 Though	 Syme	 (1988),	 358-371,	 argues	 for	 a	 date	 closer	 to	 390	 A.D.,	 but	 Alonso-Núñez	 (1987),	 61,	







goes against his father’s orders and is victorious. On his return to Thebes, Epameinondas 
crowns him in recognition of the success before cutting his throat.242 In itself the anecdote is 
representative of Epameinondas’ penchant for discipline, which may be exemplified in the, 
perhaps more believable, examples of his execution of a guard sleeping on duty and his 
vigilant watch over Thebes while the rest of the city celebrated a festival (Front. Strat. 3. 12. 
3; Plut. Ad Princ. 4/781c). The fantastic nature of the story is a curiosity: while we can only 
speculate, it may in fact be indicative of the existence of a partly mythological account of the 
Theban’s endeavours. Such stories could have developed in Boeotia or Messenia where he 
would continue to be revered for generations. However, it is also possible that, given the 
brutal nature of the story, it may have been intended as a vilification of the general by 
recording anecdotes that put him in a bad light. If this is the case, in spite of some clearly 
grave errors, this work probably contained an alternate perspective on Epameinondas beyond 
the generally laudatory one that survives. On the other hand, since a number of comparable 
Roman stories exist, the work may have been developed to create a parallel between 





Apart from at least four references in the Suda and six from Cicero, There are at 
least 12 other occurrences of Epameinondas’ name in ancient literature. These include 
Appian, Epictetus, Pliny the Elder, Ammianus Marcellinus, Aulus Gellius, Aelianus Tacticus, 
Claudius Aelianus, Themistius, Arrian, Valerius Maximus and Aristotle.244 They all variously 
recall some well-known character trait or deed by Epameinondas. These references are 
significant because they reflect his legacy and some of the views that their contemporary 












On examination, essentially two major traditions emerge from our surviving 
literature: the first is that of Xenophon, whose Hellenica survives and provides our most 
detailed account. Though he would certainly influence later writers his work was obviously 
not the best source of information on the Theban Hegemony. For this another tradition 
emerged through Callisthenes and Ephorus. It is possible that Ephorus’ primary source for 
the Theban ascension was Callisthenes; as a result, it is appropriate to group them together as 
a single tradition. Though Ephorus’ use of Callisthenes has been disputed it is often 
impossible to distinguish between the two when used by the likes of Plutarch and Nepos. 
Intertwined amongst this is the remnant of a third tradition from Theopompus, who was 
clearly used by a number of ancient writers for relevant events; though there is little 
indication that he had much influence on our major sources for information on 
Epameinondas. It is also possible that any of the other fourth century historians discussed 
could have influenced our remaining material; however, this remains speculative and we are 
forced to conclude that the vast majority of our knowledge on Epameinondas probably comes 
from Callisthenes and/or Ephorus. While the pool of information on the topic remains 
unsatisfactory, we can be certain that the literature on which we have to rely had access to a 















Epameinondas Before 371 B.C. 
 
 
The Early Years – Origins, Education and Philosophy 
 
There is barely any information attested about Epameinondas’ early years save for a 
few snippets from Plutarch, Nepos and Pausanias. Of course, this is due in part to the loss of 
Plutarch’s Epameinondas, which would surely have contained invaluable additions to the 
source material. However, Plutarch points out how the name of Epameinondas’ mother had 
not been recorded (Plut. Ages. 19. 6), which may indicate that any account of his younger 
years was not preserved in great detail. There could, in fact, have been a paucity of 
information that survived beyond the people that knew him personally. Certainly, Nepos and 
Diodorus, who were writing a century before Plutarch, have little else to add. Perhaps a 
reason for this was the initial lack of acknowledgement for Epameinondas’ significance by 
his contemporaries.245 Conversely, any records there may have been of such information 
were quite possibly destroyed during the destruction of Thebes in 335. For whatever reason, 
there is very little to go on, but it is definitely worth perusing all the evidence in order to 
establish everything we can discover about his early life.  
 
The only bearing we have on his age is a slightly ambiguous reference from Plutarch 
in which he states that, by the time he was 40, no one had taken much notice of him until 
afterwards, when he apparently made a name for himself (Plut. De Latenter 4/1129c).246 The 
word ὕστερον seems to imply that he did not obtain a position of trust (πιστευθεὶς) and 
leadership (ἄρξας) until after he had turned 40. And only when he had obtained these, did he 
go on to “πόλιν ἀπολλυμένην ἔσωσε”, etc. What Plutarch means, without a doubt, is that he 
was certainly 40 before the Battle of Leuctra. How long before, on the other hand, is much 
	





more difficult to tell. Early scholars have tended to estimate a birth date of c. 418 B.C.247 This 
date implies that they started counting from after the liberation of Thebes from Sparta in 
378.248 This assumption fails to consider a very important factor. Plutarch indicates that he 
was 40 just before he obtained trust and leadership in Thebes. Although his minor role in 
helping besiege the Cadmea may have won him a certain boost in prominence, there is no 
conclusive evidence to indicate that he had been made a boeotarch until 371 when he 
attended the peace treaty negotiations in Sparta (Plut. Ages. 27. 3-4). During this meeting 
Epameinondas played the role of an ambassador for Thebes, which does not in itself imply 
that he was a boeotarch; however, he would shortly act as a general for the army at Leuctra, 
therefore we can assume he was at the head of government by this stage. Of course, this was 
not necessarily the first time he had been elected, though it does indicate the possibility that 
he had not been until 371. Therefore, it may be reasonable to suppose that he turned 40 
between the years 378 and 371. Because of this it would be more appropriate to say that he 
was born around 418 to 411, admitting that we are unable to be more accurate than that. 
 
Epameinondas was born to a notable family,249 which Pausanias informs us were 
known as the Spartoi (Σπάρτοι), meaning the sown men. They are supposed to have been a 
race that spawned from a dragon’s teeth by the legendary Cadmus, who, with the help of the 
Spartoi, would found the city of Thebes ([Apollod.] Biblio, 3. 4).250 Because of the family’s 
link to the foundation myth of the city, they were likely to be descended from the early 
aristocracy. This denotes an eminent position in Theban society, one which would have 
traditionally held a prominent standing within government, though the sources indicate that 
they were relatively poor by Epameinondas’ time.251 His father was called Polymnis,252 who 
may have had at least one other son named Caphisias (Plut. De Gen. Soc. 8/579d-f). We 














only source for him, there is little reason to suspect that Plutarch simply fictionalized a 
familial tie for dramatic purposes.253 Sources for his name may have existed in earlier 
biographical or official records. Such information Plutarch would certainly have had access 
to, being a native Boeotian. Within the work, Caphisias appears to be a Theban emissary at 
Athens, which may be an indication of an active role within the government. If this is the 
case, his name could have even appeared in a historical source such as Callisthenes.  
 
He had a diverse education, including a prominent musical background. He learnt to 
sing and play the lyre or cithara254 as an accompaniment from an apparent virtuoso named 
Dionysius. He also learnt the aulos (αὐλός) from Olympiodorus and Orthagoras and was 
taught to dance by Calliphron (Nep. Epam. 2.1-2; Athen. 5. 84/4. 184e). It was common for a 
Greek youth, probably mostly from the upper classes, to have a musical education, the extent 
of which is discussed by Aristotle who concludes that such things should be discontinued 
after youth (Aristot. Pol. 8. 1340b20). For the average Athenian, the lyre was the instrument 
of choice, leaving the aulos and cithara for the professional.255 However, via Athenaeus, 
Chamaeleon of Heraclea says that it was common for the Thebans to learn the aulos (Athen. 
4. 184d; cf. Plut. Alc. 2. 4-6). The cithara, on the other hand, would have been a bit more 
unusual for an amateur to learn, it was then, more likely that he learnt the lyre. 
Epameinondas’ apparently broad musical education possibly had some connection with his 
instruction from Lysis; however, it is perhaps more apt to conclude that his musical training 
was aristocratic.256 There is no evidence that he continued to play his instruments into 
adulthood, which would fit well with Aristotle’s model of the average person’s musical 
training. But it must be noted that the presumption here is that every Greek citizen received a 
similar training, though it should be admitted that the biographies of Greek figures only very 
rarely specifically state this for an individual.257 At the very least, the fact that his musical 
	








257	 Plutarch	 tends	 to	 have	 particular	 biographical	 reasons	 for	 emphasizing	 a	 musical	 education:	
Themistocles	was	apparently	 a	poor	musician	 to	which,	 in	his	defence,	he	 asserted	 that	 improving	 the	
state	was	 a	 far	 greater	 achievement.	 Alcibiades	 preferred	 the	 lyre	 to	 the	 aulos	 since	 the	 latter	 caused	
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background is mentioned so prominently, indicates his continued proficiency, perhaps above 
that of the average Greek. 
 
He was also instructed in Philosophy by the Pythagorean, Lysis of Tarentum.258 
Though it is far from certain whether or not a significant Pythagorean community existed at 
Thebes during this period,259 the presence of other purveyors of Pythagoras such as Philolaus, 
Simmias and Cebes, indicates a reasonably welcoming atmosphere (Plat. Phaedo 61d-e).260 
The influence of this teacher on Epameinondas is demonstrated by many of his actions, 
though the evidence indicates that he did not fully adhere to their principles and should not be 
considered a Pythagorean philosopher.261 However, the sources say that he had a deep 
attachment to Lysis, and surpassed all the other students (Nep. Epam. 2. 2), even considering 
his teacher’s position as that of a πατήρ (Plut. De Gen. Soc. 13/583c).262 If it is true that he 
did, in fact, study under his teacher with such gusto, it is also likely that a certain degree of 
Pythagorean wisdom influenced his way of thinking. Buckler is right in concluding that 
Epameinondas’ Pythagorean education did not dominate his abilities as a general or 
statesman,263 but the statement “that Pythagoreanism played an essentially inconsequential 
role in Epameinondas' thinking”, goes too far.  
 
In fact, Buckler’s own arguments admit the influence that the teachings of 
Pythagoras had over him. During the liberation of Thebes, Epameinondas refused to be 















the	Hippocratic	Oath,	which	 is	 also	 prevalent	 amongst	mysteries,	 see	Burkert	 (1972),	 4-5.	 Though	 the	
association	of	Oath	with	Pythagoreans	is	no	longer	prevalent,	see	Temkin	(2001),	1-28.	




to the Orchomenians and spared the lives of some Boeotian exiles (Diod. 15. 57. 1; Paus. 9. 
15. 4). He also, allegedly, had no involvement in the destruction of Orchomenus.265 All of 
these instances may be attributed to the teachings he received from Lysis, as we know that 
the Pythagoreans were opposed to civil strife and bloodshed.266 He was also known for his 
relatively modest living conditions, his frugality at dinner parties and refusal to accept 
bribes.267 He chastised himself for wasting olive oil and, after the Battle of Leuctra, he 
reprimanded himself for feeling excessive pride over the victory.268 He would often wait for 
everyone to finish speaking before conveying his opinion, like the Pythagorean principle of 
silence.269 He essentially entertained a “genuine contempt for renown and wealth”.270 What 
we may conclude is that Epameinondas was certainly affected by many of the ethical virtues 
of the Pythagoreans. Though he probably never considered himself an outright Pythagorean, 
he surely saw the wisdom in many of their ideals, which would explain why he adhered to 
several of them. It is more than likely that he studied various philosophies and came up with 
his own criteria that members of the aristocracy should adhere to. Though Buckler’s 
arguments are essentially sound, it does appear that his wording minimizes the influence that 





Understanding the world in which Epameinondas grew up is essential to 
understanding the motivations behind his decisions. This brings us all the way back into the 
period following the Persian wars, nearly a century prior to the Theban supremacy. After the 
Persians had finally been driven out of mainland Greece the city of Thebes appears to have 
fallen into a level of despondency far below its position in the sixth century as hegemon of 
the Boeotian League. This honour seems to have been taken over by its close neighbours, the 










campaign of 459/8 (Diod. 11. 79. 5). Then, in 457/6, Thebes proposed to the Spartan force 
present in Boeotia that they would fight against Athens, acting as a counterweight to their 
power (Diod. 11. 81. 2-3). However, after the battles of Tanagra and Oenophyta, the 
Athenians took control of all of Boeotia. In spite of any agreement with Sparta the Thebans 
were left to the mercy of Athens and, as a result, their oligarchic government was replaced 
with a pro-Athenian democracy. Thus, the Athenians essentially ruled Thebes for a decade. 
In 447 a Theban led Boeotian revolt led to the Athenian slaughter at Coronea and the 
liberation of Boeotia from Athenian control. From this, Thebes re-established the oligarchy 
and managed to attain its position as the leading state of a refurbished Boeotian League.272 
 
By the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, in 432, under the pro-Spartan faction of 
Eurymachus and his son, Leontiades, Thebes controlled most of Boeotia and was firmly 
allied with Sparta. The league had a major involvement in the war effort, providing troops for 
a number of the Spartan led invasions of Attica. They proved themselves militarily capable of 
defending Boeotia against Athenian attacks without help from Sparta. However, the Thebans 
had also begun pursuing endeavours with the sole intention of increasing their own wealth 
and influence. These included the siege and destruction of Plataea (432-427), the campaign 
and victory of Delium (424/3) and the dioecism of Thespiae (423). Later they would also 
annex the significant port of Oropus from Athens (412/11) and capture the town of Oenoe in 
Ozolian Locris (411). All of these activities greatly enhanced the power of the Boeotian 
League; but, at the same time led to increasing Spartan anxiety over the possibility that 
Theban power might prove dangerous to their own.273 In 421 Thebes, along with Corinth, 
Elis, Mantinea and Megara, refused to sign the Peace of Nicias (Thuc. 5. 17. 2). This act, 
though not necessarily damaging to the alliance between the Boeotian League and Sparta, 
shows that the pro-Spartan faction did not possess complete control of the federal council. 
After the peace, while negotiating with Athens for the return of Pylos, Sparta attempted to 
convince the Thebans to return Athenian prisoners and relinquish control of Panactum, a fort 
on the frontier of Attica, which had been captured by the Boeotian League (Thuc. 5. 3. 5, 35. 
5, 39. 2). The Thebans initially refused but later accepted the terms on the condition that 
	





Sparta conclude an alliance with the Boeotian League against Athens, not as subordinates, 
but on equal terms (Thuc. 5. 59. 3). At last the league could now be officially considered a 
major power, rivalling that of Sparta and Athens.274 
 
By the end of the Decelean War (404) the Boeotian League had obtained large 
amounts of booty from successive raids into Attica, but, from this point, relations between 
Thebes and Sparta had begun to deteriorate. The anti-Spartan faction of Ismenias gained 
support when, in 405/4, the Spartans would not agree to the Boeotians’ demand to destroy 
Athens. Soon afterwards, the league gave insult to King Agis when it demanded booty from 
Decelea for Ptoan Apollo. Though the Spartans conceded, they would, 10 years later, still 
feel raw about it. Then, even more drastically, Boeotia gave aid and shelter to exiled 
Athenian democrats, after which they refused Sparta and the Thirty Tyrants’ request to 
extradite them. It is clear that, by this stage, Boeotian-Spartan relations had become openly 
unfriendly. This state of affairs began to escalate when the league, along with Corinth, 
refused to join Sparta on a campaign against Elis in 400/399. In the following year (399/8), 
the Spartans appear to have aggravated the Boeotians when they marched an army through 
their territory in order to quell stasis in Heraclea Trachinia.275 While Ismenias’ faction may 
not have been strong enough to aggressively oppose the operation, the incident probably 
enhanced popular discontent towards Sparta.276 In 397 the Boeotians refused to send troops 
on the Spartan led expedition against Persia and then, in 396, Agesilaus was prevented from 
sacrificing at Aulis by Boeotian officials. This incident ensured the Spartan king’s permanent 
hatred of Thebes and the Boeotian League. By this stage tensions between the two powers 
had grown to breaking point.277 
 
The powder keg ignited when a dispute originating between Locrians and Phocians 
brought both Sparta and the Boeotian League into war with one another in the opening 
conflict of the Corinthian War, referred to by Plutarch as the Boeotian War (Plut. Lys. 27. 1). 








upon Boeotia from the west and south respectively. The league quickly formed an alliance 
with Athens and managed to defeat the western invaders at the Battle of Haliartus in which 
Lysander was killed before Pausanias could arrive. The campaign thus went in the Boeotians’ 
favour, though Orchomenus was occupied by a Spartan garrison.278 Following this, in the 
winter of 395 a congress at Corinth concluded a grand alliance consisting of Corinth, Argos, 
Athens and Boeotia.279 Then, in 395/4, Ismenias led a force into Locrian territories, bringing 
many Spartan held cities and allies to their side. After this he invaded Phocis with just under 
6,000 troops and defeated the Phocians in a difficult fight, leaving some 1,000 enemy dead 
and 500 of their own (Diod. 14. 82).  
 
Following this, the Spartans began to mobilize an army at home under the command 
of Aristodemus and Agesilaus was recalled back from Asia Minor with his veteran force. 
Both armies fought in large-scale battles: at Nemea and Coronea respectively.280 Although 
these were both tactical victories for the Spartans, in each engagement, the Boeotians had 
held their ground and very little overall was gained from their successes.281 Throughout the 
war the faction of Ismenias appears to have generally held sway; though there were some 
attempts at peace, the Boeotians were predominantly enthusiastic at pushing the war effort, in 
spite of the cost. By 392 the alliance suffered a major defeat when a Spartan force entered the 
walls of Corinth and wiped out a Boeotian garrison, along with capturing the port of 
Lecheum, shipsheds and all (Xen. Hell. 4. 4. 7-13; Diod. 14. 86. 3-4).282 In spite of the loss, 
the war was pursued with some effort until the Peace of Antalcidas, in 387/6, when the 
Boeotians were the only ally still willing to fight Sparta. The struggle had been costly for all 
sides and would prove disastrous for the league. Without support from any major ally and 
threat of further invasion from Agesilaus, Thebes was forced to relinquish any influence over 
the poleis of Boeotia and thereby effectively dismantling the Boeotian League. The loss for 
Thebes was tremendous and many Thebans would have felt led astray by the anti-Spartan 
	









faction. Following the peace, it is apparent that power in Thebes went back to Leontiades but 
within a few years Ismenias began to come back to the fore.283 
 
Although Epameinondas would not fully concern himself with the welfare of his 
state until after the Spartan occupation of Thebes in 382, it is from the Peace of Antalcidas, 
when the chain of events that led to his ascendency truly began. Through childhood, 
Epameinondas witnessed a period of transition in Thebes from a largely pro-Spartan policy to 
one of aggression. At the same time, it was also a time of prosperity for the league: from the 
Peace of 421 the league pressured the Spartans into acknowledging its equal status in the 
alliance and, by the end of the war, it had expanded and consolidated much of its territory. 
But, by the end of the Corinthian war, this power and prestige had been utterly removed from 
Thebes while the city’s resources were spent. Conversely, Spartan influence throughout 
mainland Greece was about to reach its zenith. Nothing further is known about 
Epameinondas as a νεανίας, but he may have been old enough to have fought at the battles of 
Haliartus, Nemea and Coronea, along with many other skirmishes throughout the war. This 
experience would be unsurprising given the manifest influence these battles had on the tactics 
he would later employ. However, we have no reason to necessarily think that he was wholly 
commited to an anti-Spartan agenda. It is plausible that his father, Polymnis was a member of 
Leontiades faction during the Peloponnesian war and may have been opposed to war against 
Sparta. On the other hand, Epameinondas surely abhorred the arrogance of the Spartans and 
he would have been incensed by the massacre at Lecheum. We may then conclude that, 
though Epameinondas may have devoted much of his early adulthood to the study of 
philosophy, as a citizen and hoplite, the loss of the power and security of the league would 
surely have distressed him greatly. He was therefore, as with many Thebans and Boeotians, 
understandably sour towards the Spartans. But, from the Peace of Antalcidas, it would be five 









The Siege of Mantinea 386-385 B.C. 
 
The earliest association Epameinondas has with a historical event is the alleged 
battle in which he saved Pelopidas’ life. The story is told in the most detail by Plutarch: he 
states that it occurred at Mantinea and a Theban contingent was fighting against the 
Arcadians for the Spartans under Agesipolis. Accordingly, Pelopidas had collapsed, owing to 
his wounds, and Epameinondas bravely fought off countless foes until Agesipolis came to the 
rescue. This event apparently began the lifelong friendship between the two Theban 
noblemen (Plut. Pel. 4. 4-5). If true, it was clearly an incredibly significant incident as their 
political partnership was integral to the achievement of Theban hegemonic success. However, 
several of the details are probably spurious; indeed, so much that Buckler has concluded that 
the entire event was essentially fictional.284 Of course the event may very well be apocryphal, 
but rather than being dismissed, a reassessment of the evidence is perhaps in order. 
 
There is only one known military escapade that occurred at Mantinea during this 
period. According to both Diodorus and Xenophon, in 386, the Spartans sent a force to 
Mantinea in order to force them to separate into their five original villages. This resulted in a 
siege that only ended when the Spartans either damned the river that ran through the city or, 
according to Diodorus, diverted a river into the city. This caused an overflow of water that 
began to crumble the foundations of the walls (Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 1-7; Diod. 15. 5. 1-5, 12. 1-2). 
Isocrates also confirms the siege’s occurrence on more than one occasion (Isoc. 4. 126; 8. 
100). If this is the battle Plutarch is referring to then Epameinondas would have been between 
26 and 33, which is certainly a plausible age for him to be on such a campaign. On top of 
this, Agesipolis was indeed the general in command of the expedition. Thus, on the surface 
the evidence appears to be neatly reconcilable. But the question remains: why were the 
Thebans fighting alongside the Spartans? The answer to this seems to be given by Isocrates 
who refers to a Spartan-Theban alliance that existed after the Peace of Antalcidas in 387/6 
(Isoc. 14. 27). If we can believe Isocrates, then it is easy enough to believe that a Theban 





Unfortunately, it gets far more complicated at this point because the presence of an 
alliance between the two city-states poses several problems. Buckler’s argument begins by 
asserting the unreliability of any statement that is made by Isocrates: he demonstrates that 
any historical information given by Isocrates, especially in the Plataicus, must be viewed 
with suspicion.285 Following this, he proceeds to provide the most convincing part of his 
argument, which is grounded on the fact that Xenophon makes no mention of the alleged 
alliance.286 If such an alliance existed, the Thebans would have been compelled to join the 
Spartans, not only on their expedition against Mantinea, but also on their campaigns against 
Phlius and Olynthus. There was certainly no Theban involvement at Phlius and, according to 
Xenophon, the Thebans were negotiating an alliance with the Olynthians (Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 15, 
34; Hell. Oxy. 13). At the time, the Theban polemarchs even decreed that no arms would be 
taken up against the Olynthians (Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 27). Then the Spartans did attack Olynthus 
in 382 (Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 20): in consequence, the Thebans’ actions could certainly have been 
deemed as treasonous by the presence of an oath of alliance. As a result, the Spartans would 
have had sufficient justification to subdue the city of Thebes on their way to Olynthus. Being 
pro-Spartan, Xenophon would surely have jumped on the chance to justify their actions; 
however, he admits that these actions were dishonourable and instrumental in bringing about 
their own downfall (Xen. Hell. 6. 3. 11). Even later writers could see no justification, thus 
reproaching the Spartans.287 If this is the verdict of ancient historians both contemporary and 
later, we may well conclude that Isocrates’ assertion is entirely false.288  
 
If we agree that Buckler has convincingly put to rest any notion that an alliance 
existed between Sparta and Thebes during the years 386-382, does that altogether put to rest 
the possibility that a small contingent of Thebans were sent to assist the Spartans at Mantinea 
as Plutarch claims? There are two reasons to doubt Plutarch’s story. The main reason is that 
both Xenophon and Diodorus’ accounts of the campaign refer only to a siege and not to a 
pitched battle, which appears to be the implication of Plutarch’s account. Secondly, as Stern 
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has pointed out,289 the episode bears much similarity to Plutarch’s Alcibiades in which 
Socrates fended off many foes in defence of the wounded Alcibiades (Plut. Alc. 7. 3).290 
Thus, Buckler attributes the story to a parallel that Plutarch was making between the 
relationships of Socrates-Alcibiades and Epameinondas-Pelopidas.291 To my mind, this part 
of the argument is far from compelling.  
 
Firstly, the similarity between two separate stories should not be taken as conclusive 
evidence that one spawned the other when there is very little else to indicate this. Secondly, 
the campaign at Mantinea clearly lasted many months: from the summer of 386 to the winter 
of 385 (Diod. 15. 12. 1).292 Though a large-scale battle is not likely to have occurred, the 
accounts are very brief and may not offer us all of the information pertaining to the siege. 
During this time, it is certainly possible that small-scale hoplite engagements occurred: 
Epameinondas and Pelopidas could have been ambushed by a picked unit (perhaps just a few 
hundred men) of Mantineans who had sneaked out of the city to attack the Spartan lines, 
perhaps by night. The attack caught them off guard and fierce fighting took place until, 
having been roused, Agesipolis with his vanguard came along to drive them back. This 
reconstruction may seem fanciful, but it is meant to illustrate how the facts of an event can be 
altered and added to by the passage of time and knowledge. 
 
One more reason that Buckler doubts Plutarch’s account is that it is the only 
evidence we have of this heroic story. However, that is not entirely true. Pausanias also 
briefly remarks on the incident (Paus. 9. 13. 1), though Buckler dismisses it as merely being 
obtained from Plutarch’s non-extant Epameinondas.293 But, as has been shown above, it is far 
from certain whether this is the case.294 In fact, it is equally likely to have come from an 
entirely independent source, though perhaps following the same tradition.295 What this may 
imply is that the story is based on a longstanding tradition that was probably filtered through 










the details of the story would have become heavily distorted over time: details such as the 
nature of the battle and whether or not the Thebans were there as allies with the Spartans or 
simply doing it as a favour. Perhaps it bears similarities with the Alcibiades story only 
because of the tendency of the Greeks to mythologize the glorious deeds of past historical 
figures and the truth of it is, simply the bare facts, that Epameinondas and Pelopidas became 
friends on the campaign and fought together. 
 
The plausibility, however, of such an expedition still weighs heavily on whether or 
not it was likely, even possible, that the Thebans might have sent a contingent to aid the 
Spartans in their siege. Until Buckler’s article, scholarship largely accepted the presence of a 
Theban contingent at Mantinea.296 However, very few have made any real attempt to argue 
the case fully. The most notable exception to this is in an article by Hack, who attempted to 
reconstruct the relationship of Thebes with Sparta during the period between the Peace of 
Antalcidas and Phoebidas’ coup of the Cadmea (386-382). His arguments are accepting of 
Isocrates’ Spartan-Theban alliance, though he provides some justification for this, which may 
help to illuminate my arguments.  
 
In order to understand the political situation in Thebes at this time, it is necessary to 
look nearly 20 years earlier. Having been allied to the Spartans during the Peloponnesian War 
(Thuc. 2. 9. 2), the Thebans’ policy toward the Spartans began to change.297 During the 
Decelean War (413-404) the Theban government was led by a faction favouring an alliance 
with Sparta: this was headed by Leontiades (Hell. Oxy. 12. 3-5). However, after the defeat of 
Athens in 404, the Spartans denied the Thebans’ request to have Athens destroyed.298 Then to 
add insult to injury they also refused their demand to receive a share of the spoils of the war 
(Plut. Lys. 27.2; Just. 5. 10. 12). As a result, the pro-Spartan faction quickly began to lose 
support. In 404/3 the Thebans aided Athenian exiles against the orders of the Spartans (Xen. 
Hell. 2. 4. 1; Diod. 14. 6. 3). Then around 400 they refused to join Sparta in their second 









refusal to allow Agesilaus to sacrifice in Aulis before his Persian expedition.299 Such 
incidents all indicate the growth of the anti-Spartan faction, led by Ismenias. Though exactly 
when he was elected as boeotarch is a matter for debate,300 his rise to power can be seen as a 
crucial catalyst for the events leading to the Corinthian War.301  
 
During the war itself, the Theban government does not appear to have been entirely 
uniform. At around 392/1, the Thebans were apparently ready to accept peace terms despite 
the loss of Orchomenus from the Boeotian League (Andoc. 3. 13, 20).302 Buck suggests that 
this implies that a strengthening of the position of Leontiades was in effect: the expense of 
the war surely would have served to erode the support of Ismenias. But it is clear that he was 
far from beaten at this stage, since the terms of the peace failed to be agreed upon by all 
parties.303 We can then suggest that Ismenias generally maintained his authority up until the 
Peace of Antalcidas in 387/6, the terms of which, served to sever his support. 
 
According to the peace terms, all Greek cities would be given autonomy with the 
exception of the Ionian Greeks and Cyprus, which would belong to Persia, while the islands 
of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros would remain under Athenian dominion. However, the 
Thebans, presumably at the behest of Ismenias’ faction, demanded that they sign the peace on 
behalf of all Boeotia. Agesilaus would not allow this and, when the Thebans refused to sign, 
the Spartans threatened them with war. As a result, with no allies left willing to fight with 
them, the Thebans had no choice but to accept the terms of the armistice (Xen. Hell. 5. 1. 31-
34).304 In one move the Boeotian League had been terminated and the Spartans regained their 
overall superiority over the rest of the Greek city-states. Hack points out that,305 during the 
Corinthian War, the Boeotians failed to attain peace on two separate occasions: the first, as 













Orchomenus; the second was when Theban envoys at Sparta in 390, who were apparently 
sent to pursue peace, seemed to change their minds at the last minute (Xen. Hell. 4. 5. 6-9; 
Plut. Ages. 22. 1-3).306 Whatever the reasons, by 386 the Thebans had to admit defeat. The 
trust that the people of Thebes had placed in Ismenias’ faction would have been heavily 
damaged by the results of the peace. Having realized the importance of keeping on Sparta’s 
good side, support for the faction of Leontiades may have undergone a resurgence. 
 
As has been shown, the political situation in Thebes during this period had the 
tendency to sway back and forth between a pro and anti-Spartan policy. The situation 
following the Peace of Antalcidas seems to suggest that Leontiades had regained his leading 
position. Exactly when he may have returned to power is difficult to determine.307 Cartledge 
has noted that the negotiations with Olynthus in 383 indicate Ismenias’ authority at the time, 
which implies that his support was growing at that point.308 The only remaining evidence we 
have for Thebes’ political situation before the Spartan coup d’etat is found in the Hellenica. 
Xenophon tells us that, by 382, both Ismenias and Leontiades were polemarchs and were at 
variance (στασιαζόντων) with one another (Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 25). This indicates that there was 
a great deal of political turmoil at the time: one way or another, both parties obviously had a 
fair amount of support. Sparta’s harsh treatment of Mantinea and Phlius and the 
establishment of pro-Spartan governments in Boeotia would surely have increased the disdain 
towards them, slowly resulting in Ismenias’ return to prominence by around 383. However, 
after the peace, because of the loss of the Boeotian League and the increased influence of 
Sparta, it seems most likely that Leontiades’ faction was the dominant force managing the 
government’s foreign policies between 386 and 383. If this assertion is correct, then, during 





the	 Theban	 ambassadors	 by	 making	 them	 wait.	 However,	 Buck	 (1994),	 55-56,	 does	 not	 think	 the	
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Because of these factors we can now assert that Thebes was ‘friendly’ to Sparta 
during 386 to 385; as a result, Leontiades would certainly have wanted to make amends with 
Sparta after a lengthy period of enmity between the two city-states. Therefore, he may very 
well have deemed it worthwhile to send a Theban contingent to support the Spartans for their 
siege of Mantinea. An oath of alliance was not likely to have existed in light of the poor 
reputation the Spartans received for taking the Cadmea at Thebes, an act that would 
otherwise have been justified. However, this does not conclusively refute the presence of the 
Theban contingent. It is easy to imagine that Isocrates would have exaggerated this 
‘friendship’ by calling it an ‘alliance’ when the actual situation concerning Thebes’ foreign 
policy was clearly far more complicated and certainly not clean-cut enough to call it an 
alliance. There is, then, far from enough evidence to refute the possibility that Epameinondas 
and Pelopidas fought together at the siege of Mantinea. There is, in fact, enough evidence to 
conclude that it is a plausible story and, despite distortion, something to that effect may very 
well have occurred. 
 
 
The Tyranny of Leontiades and the Theban Revolt 382-379 B.C. 
 
In 382, on his way to Olynthus, the Spartan general Phoebidas conspired with 
Leontiades to overthrow the city of Thebes. This dramatic event resulted in the exile of the 
anti-Spartan faction and the subsequent trial and execution of Ismenias. A total of 300 exiles 
sought refuge at Athens, included among these was Pelopidas, who must have been a great 
supporter of the anti-Spartan faction by this stage: enough at least to be considered worthy of 
exile. On the other hand, Epameinondas had little or nothing to do with the exile and 
remained safely within his home while this incredible political upheaval was occurring. Three 
years later, the exiles would return and enact a very dramatic coup d’etat, which resulted in 
the disestablishment of the pro-Spartan faction, the establishment of a less autocratic, anti-
Spartan state and the removal of any and all Spartan influence on the internal and external 
affairs of the Theban government. Epameinondas’ role amidst all these events may well have 
been minimal, but his prominence and influence as an aristocratic citizen is fairly evident. 
Thus, a discussion of his activities during this period is certainly called for: most especially 
worthwhile is a consideration of his political stance before and after the events at hand. 
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Early in 382, the Spartans sent Eudamidas with a force of 2,000 hoplites, responding 
to a plea from Acanthus and Apollonia, to begin subduing the newly formed Chalcidian 
League, which was fronted by Olynthus.309 However, this was merely an advance party: 
another 8,000 men under Phoebidas, brother of Eudamidas, gathered together with the 
alleged intention of joining forces with the advance. Despite this, Phoebidas did anything but 
march straight to Chalcidice. Instead he conveniently arrived at Thebes during the festival of 
the Thesmophoria in which the Cadmea would have been occupied solely by women.310 
Leontiades then treated with Phoebidas, discussing how best their plan should unfold. The 
Spartan commander consequently seized the opportunity and occupied the Cadmea with his 
soldiers. This allowed Leontiades to take charge of the council and place Ismenias under 
arrest, subsequently having him executed. In a single day, the city of Thebes had been 
subjugated to the authority of Sparta and 300 members of the anti-Spartan faction were 
ousted from the city as exiles. Fortunately, all of these, including Pelopidas, found protection 
at Athens: there they would remain for the next three years.311  
 
What is particularly interesting about this incident is that Epameinondas apparently 
remained unmolested in Thebes. Plutarch ascribes this to his philosophical tendencies, i.e. 
that he was considered harmless due to the fact that he spent all his time in thought rather 
than in action (Plut. Pel. 5. 3). Little or no discussion has been made about the significance of 
this statement. In Swoboda’s assessment of the sources of Epameinondas before 371, he 
appears to dismiss it, along with other examples, as part of a dubious reconstruction of his 
life that occurred many years after his death.312 Swoboda’s allusion to the reference in 














It is, of course, understandable that very little thought has been afforded to the 
reference. The statement is very brief and implies that Epameinondas had nothing to do with 
the events at hand, but it is perfectly believeable, given the lack of evidence of any political 
activities, that he had, up to this point, lived the life of a philosopher and not a statesman. 
Neither Xenophon or Diodorus mention the incident; however, the former was never likely to 
mention it anyway, and the relative insignificance of the reference easily explains why these 
historians did not see fit to include it. There is no way of ascertaining where Plutarch 
obtained the information; one would guess from some sort of biographical treatise or maybe 
even the Boeotian historians Anaxis and Dionysodorus,313 who may have had access to 
information that Ephorus or Callisthenes did not. However, such speculation is futile and, as 
far as can be deduced, there is no particular reason to doubt the authenticity of Plutarch’s 
statement. 
 
Accepting this, we can then make some speculations, which may illuminate 
Epameinondas’ position during the course of these events. The most obvious and, perhaps, 
important implication is that Epameinondas appears not to have been politically active at this 
point in time. If he had been actively supporting Ismenias’ anti-Spartan faction surely he 
would have been forced into exile along with the rest of them. Of course, there were others 
sympathetic to Ismenias who remained in Thebes, otherwise the Theban coup of 379 would 
not have been possible. But as we can see, he did not go out of his way to support the anti-
Spartan faction. Because it is also clear that he would not have had much to do with the pro-
Spartan faction, it seems that, outwardly, he displayed more of a neutral political position. He 
may well have been sympathetic to the causes of Ismenias and Pelopidas, but there is no 
evidence of that until after Phoebidas’ coup. Considering the nature of Theban politics over 
the previous two decades, if he had indeed been sympathetic to the anti-Spartans, why had he 
not taken a more active role by this stage as Pelopidas had clearly done? The answer to this 
question may become clear when considering his actions during and after the Spartan 
occupation. 
 
Very little evidence exists for the period between Phoebidas’ coup and the liberation 




and Philippus, are said to have ruled the city as τύραννοι (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 1-2; Plut. Ages. 24. 
1), though whether or not the constitution underwent any formal changes is a matter of 
debate.314 The inhabitants of the city were kept in line by the presence of a Spartan garrison 
within the Cadmea. These are said to have been 1,500315 in number and were commanded by 
three Spartan harmosts: Lysanoridas, Herippidas, and Arcissus.316 The lack of freedom in 
Thebes during this period would have been sorely felt. Many of those who had once been 
partial to an alliance with Sparta would now have estranged themselves from such feelings. 
Presumably a large portion of the pro-Spartan sympathizers believed that it was necessary to 
ally themselves to the Peloponnesian League in order to guarantee the safety of the city-state 
and its people. But few would have expected such a dishonourable act, even amongst the 
anti-Spartans who were caught completely off-guard. Though Agesilaus and the rest of the 
Spartan assembly may have decided that Phoebidas’ actions were ostensibly beneficent, in 
fact, the result was that they ostracized themselves from a city that, until recently, had 
significant support for them. The consequence of Phoebidas’ coup and Leontiades’ tyranny 
was clearly an overwhelming surge of hatred for the Spartans within Thebes.  
 
If we can now imagine the general feeling in Thebes during the Spartan occupation, 
we can then come to our next piece of evidence. Apparently, Epameinondas would often 
encourage his Theban comrades to wrestle at the gymnasium with the Spartan soldiers who 
were present in the city. If they succeeded in beating their opponents and were elated by their 
victory, he would tell them they ought, rather, to feel ashamed because of their failure to 
prevent the Spartans from enslaving them (Plut. Pel. 7. 3). This practice is also reiterated by 
Polyaenus who says that, as a result, the Thebans developed contempt for the Spartan 
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and	 Xenophon’s	 references	 to	 the	 tyranny.	 See	 also	 Grote	 (1875),	 76-78,	 for	 comparisons	with	 the	 30	
tyrants	at	Athens	in	404.	Beck	and	Ganter	(2015),	147,	have	noted	that	the	so-called	tyranny	need	not	be	
taken	 literally,	but	 it	does	suggest	 that	Thebes	had	become	more	rigidly	oligarchic,	based	on	“marginal	
popular	consent”.	
315	Buck	(1994),	70,	does	not	agree	with	this	number	as	Xenophon	says	the	garrison	was	few	(ὀλίγοι)	in	








soldiers, which emboldened their confidence to face them on the battlefield (Polyaen. 2. 3. 6). 
Swoboda is dubious about these also,317 though again, little or no discussion has been 
afforded to them. Not long after the liberation, the Thebans were renowned for their physical 
strength (Diod. 15. 39. 1; Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 22-24). This may, in part, have been greatly 
influenced by Epameinondas’ emphasis on physical prowess, which he, along with Pelopidas, 
apparently excelled in.318 It was perhaps such instances, at Epameinondas’ urging, that helped 
to encourage the growth in fitness of the young Theban men who would be part of the soon-
to-be highly successful Theban military. The situation in which he encouraged this boon in 
physical achievement over a three year period is then quite plausible. This implies that 
Epameinondas, in reaction to the illegal annexation of his city, had begun to take an active 
role in preparing his brethren for future encounters of hostility as well as boosting their pride 
after it would have been brought so low.  
 
Following a period of Spartan domination in Thebes and the rest of Boeotia, the 
exiles that had been brooding in Athens decided the time was ripe to risk all, preferring death 
than to suffer Leontiades’ tyranny of their home any longer. Sometime during the winter of 
379/8, a small group of exiles, led by Melon and Pelopidas, secretly entered Thebes where 
they rallied at the house of Charon, who was a notable citizen and supporter of the anti-
Spartan faction. The conspirators, under cover of night and bad weather, split off into two 
groups: one group dressed as women in order to enter undetected into a party, where Archias 
and Philippus were getting intoxicated; the second group infiltrated the homes of Leontiades 
and Hypates. In each case the exiles successfully dispatched their enemies. Following this, 
they freed the political prisoners from their cells and then began attempting to rally the 
general populace to arms in the agora. By the morning they began to besiege the Cadmea and 
eventually forced the Spartan harmosts to surrender under truce, with some probable help 








These are essentially the bare facts, which are attested by the sources; however, in 
many places, especially between Diodorus and Xenophon, the sources are irreconcilable.320 
Nevertheless, what is not widely discussed is Epameinondas’, apparently minimal, role in this 
event. More than once by both Plutarch and Nepos, Epameinondas is alleged to have refused 
to be involved in the conspiracy against his countrymen,321 but then proceeded to assist in the 
assault on the Cadmea with gusto.322 Apparently, while the conspirators were dispatching 
their enemies and freeing the prisoners, Epameinondas, along with Gorgidas, had been 
rallying other local Thebans, old and young. After securing arms, they gathered in the agora 
before making their attack on the Cadmea. Though the bulk of the populace had not 
assembled until dawn, it seems that Epameinondas had rallied a force of soldiers to use 
against the Spartans. Then, sometime afterwards, the remaining exiles returned and it was 
Epameinondas who greeted them and brought them with Pelopidas and Melon before the 
Theban assembly.  
 
His significance during the event is generally glossed over or ignored by scholars; 
presumably for some, he is worth mentioning only because of his later importance.323 Again, 
Swoboda wishes to dismiss Plutarch’s testimony particularly because of the theatrical nature 
and unreliability of the De Genio Socratis.324 However, this assertion does not account for the 
multiple reports of Epameinondas’ activity during the coup by both Plutarch and Nepos. The 
fact that his role, despite being the main character, as portrayed in the De Genio Socratis, has 
not been blown out of proportion with the account in the Pelopidas, may well indicate 
	
320	The	debate	surrounding	the	Theban	coup	is	diverse	and	no	uniform	agreement	has	been	reached	by	
scholars.	 There	 has	 been	 a	 tendency	 to	 accept	 Xenophon’s	 account	 and	 to	 disregard	 the	 testimony	 of	
Diodorus,	see	Grote	(1872),	78-90;	Laistner	(1936),	192;	Rice	(1975),	96-103;	Howan	(1987),	385-406;	
Worthington	 (1992),	 193-195;	 Buck	 (1994),	 72-78.	 Despite	 this,	 there	 have	 been	 some	 significant	
attempts	 to	 reconcile	 the	 two	 sources:	 Cawkell	 (1973),	 56-60;	 Hamilton	 (1991),	 152-174.	 Kallet-Marx	
(1985),	 140-147,	 generally	 leans	 towards	 Xenophon	 but	 does	 not	 believe	 there	 is	 enough	 evidence	 to	
conclude	that	Athens	had	not	made	an	official	sanction	to	support	Thebes	as	attested	by	Xenophon	(Xen.	
Hell.	 5.	 4.	 19),	 whereas	 Diodorus	 specifically	 states	 that	 the	 Athenian	 assembly	 voted	 for	 supporting	
Thebes	(Diod.	15.	26.	1).	Note	that	Dinarchus	also	confirms	the	vote	by	the	assembly	(Din.	1.	39),	though	








Plutarch’s attempt to keep the events, generally, historically accurate.325 Of course, the essay 
should only be interpreted as a dramatic philosophic exercise; however, when stripped down 
to the bare facts, Epameinondas’ role is essentially the same in both accounts. Neither does 
Nepos portray his involvement in the liberation any differently: they are in fact, entirely 
reconcilable. Does this imply a common source between the two? This cannot be answered, 
but it is certainly possible to have belonged to a longstanding tradition concerning the 
liberation of Thebes and is not likely to be entirely apocryphal. 
 
Upon accepting some sort of historical basis, there is a certain degree of 
interpretation possible here. Epameinondas refused to take part in the bloodshed because of 
his philosophy, but he clearly still had an active role in the uprising. Throughout the Spartan 
occupation he had been trying to boost the pride and strength of the young generation of 
Theban men: during the liberation he led, perhaps these very men, to engage the Spartan 
regiment. He also appears to have been instrumental in organizing the rally in the town 
square in which the exiles gathered, the people gathered and a general assembly was held. 
Plutarch reports that Epameinondas and Gorgidas, after meeting with Pelopidas and Melon, 
brought them to the Theban assembly (Plut. Pel. 12. 4). Though he refused to be involved in 
the slaughter of Theban citizens, this level of involvement seems considerable for someone 
whose role in the liberation is generally glossed over. Georgiadou has even suggested that 
Epameinondas and Gorgidas were acting as unofficial boeotarchs since they urged the 
assembly to welcome the liberators as heroes.326 This suggestion may be somewhat 
presumptuous concerning the present role of Epameinondas and Gorgidas; however, it is 
clear that their political activities were of a relative significance. Both men would surely have 
required something of a prominent standing in order to have the gall required to address the 
assembly. Gorgidas is known to have been a hipparch before the Spartan occupation (Plut. 
De Gen. Soc. 5/578c), but undoubtedly, they were relying on one another’s prominence to 







After the rallying of the assembly, the following people were elected as boeotarchs: 
Pelopidas, Melon and Charon (Plut. Pel. 13. 1).327 It is clear that this was a direct result of the 
general assembly, which was called together and even addressed by Epameinondas and 
Gorgidas. Buckler asserts that they “sponsored” the elections, which were also the first 
elections of a newly revamped Theban city-state:328 he suggests that this was part of their 
plans for the liberation.329 If this was indeed all part of the liberators’ plans, then, despite 
Epameinondas’ scruples, he appears to have had an important and very involved position. 
The emphasis is that it was in the interest of the new government to have one or two men 
who could not be accused of killing native Thebans, thus only a portion of the faction could 
be charged with such if it ever arose (Plut. De Gen. Soc. 25/594b-c; Nep. Epam. 10. 3).330 He 
then acted as one of the commanders in the siege of the Cadmea (Plut. De Gen. Soc. 34/598c-
f). It is clear from this that his role during the liberation of Thebes is a testament to the 
intricate organization involved in its conception and execution. Epameinondas’ actions do not 
appear to have been random and certainly fit within the realms of plausibility whether or not 
the testimonies of Plutarch and Nepos can be believed. Though he had not, by this point, 
reached the highest echelons of government, he must have been a well-respected and well-
trusted citizen.  
	
327	Despite	Plutarch’s	clear	use	of	the	word	“βοιωτάρχης”,	scholarship	is	divided	on	whether	the	office	of	
boeotarch	had	been	 re-instated	 to	 replace	 the	polemarch.	Notable	 arguments	 against	Plutarch	 include:	
Beloch	 (1922),	 145	 n.	 2;	 Cawkwell	 (1972),	 275-276.	 However,	 Buckler	 (2008),	 87-98,	 provides	 a	




328	 It	 is	most	 often	 thought	 that,	 after	 the	 liberation,	 Thebes	 and	 the	 Boeotian	 federal	 state	 adopted	 a	
democratic	government		possibly	based,	to	some	extent,	on	the	Athenian	model,	e.g.	Busolt	(1926),	1424-


















While the evidence for Epameinondas during this period cannot be conclusively 
verified, it can neither be absolutely proven to be false. Admittedly my arguments do tend to 
make the assumption that the testimonies of Plutarch are a plethora of factual information; 
however, if his testimonies cannot be refuted for legitimate reasons, then there is more reason 
to accept at least some semblance of truth within his statements then to deny even the 
possibility of their authenticity. After then considering the evidence, it would therefore seem 
incorrect to assert that Epameinondas was not politically active until 371. There is ample 
evidence to prove that he played a relatively prominent role, though he may very well have 
spent a great deal of his time before 379 in deep philosophical thought. It is clear that the 
Spartan occupation of 382 incensed him enough to begin taking an active interest in the 
future well being of his home and fellow citizens.  
 
 
War With Sparta 378-371 B.C. 
 
From the liberation of Thebes in 379/8 to the peace treaty before Leuctra in 371, 
there is almost no specific evidence relating to the activities of Epameinondas.331 However, 
there is certainly no reason to assume that he was inactive. The fact that he is barely 
mentioned may well indicate that his involvement was relatively minimal but because of his 
relationship with Pelopidas, who would retain some form of office until his death (Plut. Pel. 
15. 3, 34. 5), the speculation can equally be made that he held some sort of middling political 
position until being made boeotarch in 371, perhaps earlier.332 There is also good reason to 
believe that he was likely to have fought as a regular hoplite during the ongoing struggle with 














given detail, which is not mentioned by any of the extant sources. The result of examining his 
role during this period is fraught with speculation, but accepting this, there is surely value in 
attempting to reconstruct his career during this time. Certainly, other scholars have made 
similar attempts; thus, it is worth examining their own speculations and historical plausibility.  
 
Shortly after the exiles’ return to Thebes and the siege of the Cadmea, the Spartan 
king Cleombrotus was sent on an expedition to Thebes. He achieved very little militarily, but 
the display of power caused the Athenians to lose their nerve in the face of a dangerous foe: 
hoping to prevent Spartan reprisals, the Athenians charged the generals who had aided the 
Thebans during their uprising. While in Boeotia, Cleombrotus also made the Spartan officer 
Sphodrias the harmost of a garrison at Thespiae (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 14-19). Some weeks after 
this,334 Sphodrias took a large force into Attica under the cover of night with the alleged 
intention of taking the Piraeus. If this was his intention, he failed miserably, and his mistake 
would bring Athens into the war alongside Thebes. Sphodrias’ reasons for attempting such a 
daring feat have been the subject of a large amount of scholarly debate for over 200 years, 
which has still yet to find any uniform agreement. There are, it seems, three possibilities: one, 
Diodorus states that, although it was without the ephors’ consent, Cleombrotus explicitly 
gave the orders (Diod. 15. 29. 5-7); two, Xenophon claims that he was incited by bribery 
from the Thebans (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 20), who Plutarch names as Pelopidas and Gorgidas (Plut. 
Pel. 14. 1-3) or Pelopidas and Melon (Plut. Ages. 24. 3-6); three, that he acted on his own 
initiative.335 In light of more recent scholarship the third motive is generally discounted as 
irrelevant or secondary, therefore scholars have tended to support either the Xenophon-
Plutarch336 account or Diodorus’ account.337 Certainly the case can be made to support either, 










337	Beloch	 (1922),	147	n.	1;	MacDonald	 (1972),	38-44;	Cawkwell	 (1973),	55-56;	Rice	 (1975),	108-109;	
Stylianou	(1998),	262-263;	Parker	(2007),	30-31;	Buckler	(2008),	79-84;	Roisman	(2017),	283.	
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Having ‘accepted’ the Xenophon-Plutarch account, we are then asserting that 
Sphodrias was persuaded by words and money to attack the Piraeus. Allegedly, the 
boeotarchs Pelopidas and Gorgidas or Pelopidas and Melon (perhaps all three) sent men who 
pretended to be Spartan sympathizers and encouraged him to attack the Piraeus. It was long 
ago suggested by Meissner that Epameinondas was surely involved in masterminding this 
plot.338 This claim was later refuted by Swoboda because Plutarch fails to mention his name 
in relation to the event.339 Though Meissner’s speculation is based only on the confidence in 
Epameinondas’ brilliance that he had, it is interesting to note that Plutarch’s discrepancy in 
naming the boeotarchs involved has received minimal discussion. Georgiadou has suggested 
that it was either a mistake on Plutarch’s part or a “looseness of expression”; however, he 
also points out that Plutarch is not devoted to providing a detailed image of the contemporary 
political situation in Thebes.340 What this means is that Plutarch may very well have not been 
bothered to give credit where it was due at every stage in his narrative. In the Pelopidas, he 
naturally awards credit to the protagonist of the biography: he also includes Gorgidas, 
perhaps feeling the need to convey that the plot was jointly conceived. However, in the 
Agesilaus, he simply throws in the names of Pelopidas and Melon. If this was not a mistake, 
it is easy enough to conclude that, for both of his accounts, there could have plausibly been 
other conspirators involved: perhaps Charon, Phillidas or Epameinondas. Though one would 
expect that, since there are two surviving accounts by Plutarch, he would have mentioned 
Epameinondas had he been involved. However, if indeed the Thebans did incite Sphodrias,341 
it is likely that Epameinondas was somehow involved, though perhaps only indirectly. 
 
Following the Athenian reaction to Sphodrias’ acquittal and declaration of hostilities 
with Sparta, in the same year, Agesilaus was called forth to lead an army against Thebes. He 






(1972),	38	n.	1,	states	that	Plutarch’s	account	 is	“derivative	and	adds	nothing	substantial”,	 the	 fact	 that	
Plutarch	has	extra	details	 indicates	that	he	got	his	 information	from	more	than	just	Xenophon,	perhaps	
Callisthenes,	 see	 Buck	 (1994),	 92.	 Therefore,	 as	 Hamilton	 suggests,	 Cleombrotus	may	well	 have	 given	





the route over Mt. Cithaeron. In support of the Thebans, the Athenians had sent 5,000 foot 
soldiers with 200 cavalry commanded by Chabrias. In preparation for the attack, the Thebans, 
probably with Athenian help, constructed a fortified stockade and trench, which likely ran 
from the hill of Cynoscephalae moving southeast, just north of the Asopos. It was apparently 
aligned 20 stadia from Thebes.342 Though Chabrias managed to repel a small-scale attack, 
Agesilaus breached the stockade by a surprise dawn attack and laid waste to much of the 
landscape. Fortunately for Thebes, he did not attempt a full-scale pitched battle and left 
having seized his spoils.343 
 
Though the use of defensive structures was nothing new, it was certainly novel to 
use stockades and trenches to defend an entire area of land.344 The sources do not specifically 
credit anyone for masterminding this innovation, though assertions and assumptions have 
been made. Both Pomtow and Curtius have suggested that Epameinondas was instrumental, 
but they provide no real argument for the case other than his self-evident genius.345 Thus 
Swoboda has discounted their assertions as vain attempts to give credit to the hero wherever 
possible.346 It is tempting to agree with them though: retrospectively it would make sense that 
the genius of Leuctra was already revolutionizing the science of war in these early days; 
however, there is no real reason to suggest that Epameinondas was in charge of military 
affairs as early as this. As we can also see, the only name mentioned on the Theban-Athenian 
side for this campaign is the experienced Athenian general Chabrias.347 Because of this, 
scholars have often simply assumed that Chabrias was the brains behind the scheme, though, 
generally without fully justifying their assertion.348 Cary, on the other hand, has noted that 
Chabrias had previously had experience in the use of field-fortifications while fighting in the 














Chabrias was certainly the most experienced general, he does not necessarily deserve sole 
credit for the fortifications. The idea may well have been conceived by Pelopidas or, perhaps 
more likely, Gorgidas,351 who stood as probably the most experienced Theban military 
commander by this stage. Despite this, Chabrias is certainly a more plausible candidate than 
Epameinondas.  
 
After Agesilaus left Theban territory, he placed a garrison at Thespiae with 
Phoebidas as harmost before heading home. Phoebidas subsequently sent raids into Theban 
farmland and villages, which prompted the Thebans to make an assault with the bulk of their 
army on Thespiae, killing the harmost.352 In the following year (377), Agesilaus once more 
took to the field against the Thebans. Again, he managed to bypass the stockade and ravaged 
the land to the east of Thebes up to Tanagra.353 Having had their land ravaged for two years 
in a row, the Thebans were severely short on food. They sent out two triremes to Pagasae in 
an effort to start a trade route (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 56-57; Front. Strat. 4. 7. 19).354  
 
In 376, the Spartans again sent an expedition against Thebes, this time led by 
Cleombrotus. Unfortunately for him the Boeotians and Athenians had already occupied Mt. 
Cithaeron by the time he got there and was unable to secure the mountain pass. As a result, 
he returned home after his defeat (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 59). Later in the year, and in 375, the 
Athenians won two significant naval victories against the Spartans (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 62; Diod. 
15. 36. 5). This gave the Thebans free rein to march throughout Boeotia and subdue many of 
the neighbouring cities (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 63-64). The new Boeotian League was then 
beginning to take shape. These included cities such as Chaeronea, Coronea, Copai, 
	
350	The	argument	for	this,	as	given	by	Parke	(1933),	60,	is	based	on	two	place	names	in	Egypt:	Χαβρίου	
χάραξ	 (Strabo	 16.	 2.	 43)	 or	 Chabriae	 castra	 (Plin.	Nat.	 Hist.	 5.	 25)	 near	 Pelusium;	 and	 Χαβρίου	 κώμη	
(Strabo	17.	1.	22)	near	Mareotis.	That	Chabrias	commanded	the	Egyptian	forces	against	the	Persians	(c.	
386-384)	is	well	attested	(Diod.	15.	29.	2-4;	Nep.	Chab.	3.	1).	The	fortifications	that	were	constructed	in	
Egypt	are	described	 in	Diodorus’	brief	account	of	 the	Persian	attack	on	Egypt,	 led	by	Pharnabazus	and	
Iphicrates	 in	 373	 (Diod.	 15.	 42.	 1-4).	 However,	 Diodorus	 makes	 no	 connection	 between	 these	
fortifications	and	Chabrias’	campaign;	therefore,	it	is	impossible	to	confirm	that	these	were	his	creation	





354	 On	 this	 event	 see	 Sprawski	 (1999),	 64-67.	 This	 event	 also	 led	 to	 the	 capture	 by	 Thebes	 of	
Oreus/Histiaea,	which	may	 be	 the	 context	 of	 a	 recently	 discovered	 treaty	 of	 alliance	 between	 the	 two	
cities,	making	Thebes,	hegemon,	see	Aravantinos	and	Papazarkadas	(2012),	239-254.	
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Akraphnion, Lebadea, Haliartos and Tanagra (Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 1; Plut. Pel. 15. 4-5).355 This 
campaign also involved the small-scale but significant Battle of Tegyra in which Pelopidas 
led the Sacred Band to victory against a larger Spartan force (Diod. 15. 37. 2; Plut. Pel. 
16.).356 Not long after, the Thebans sent a force into Phocis, which appealed to Sparta for 
help. The Spartans responded by sending a large force under Cleombrotus (Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 
1), which arrived around late August. The Thebans withdrew to defend their passes. After an 
expensive campaign at sea, the Athenians began to get fed up and suspicious of the ever-
growing Boeotian League; thus, they then decided to sue for peace with Sparta (Xen. Hell. 6. 
2. 1).357  
 
Though it is useful to summarize these events, Epameinondas’ role within them 
cannot usefully be speculated upon in any detail.358 It is, however, surely likely that he was 
involved. If, indeed, as we shall see, he held the position of ambassador for the Boeotian 
League in the peace treaty of 375/4, he must have continually held significant political and 
perhaps military positions by this stage. 
 
The scholarship surrounding the Peace of 375/4 is fraught with a wide array of 
different arguments, which have hoped to settle the issue. Unfortunately, every decade seems 
to bring an altered understanding for the instigation, result and date359 of the peace. This, as is 
often the case, is the result from the very different accounts given by our main sources. 
Xenophon states, as mentioned above, that the Athenians were exhausting their treasury to 
	
355	Buck	(1994),	98-99.	
356	 On	 the	 Battle	 of	 Tegyra,	 see	 below,	 115.	 On	 the	 Sacred	 Band	 see	 Leitao	 (2002),	 143-169,	who	 has	
questioned	both	its	erotic	nature	and	its	role	in	historical	events.	While	he	may	be	correct	for	the	former,	
his	arguments	for	the	latter	are	far	from	decisive.	His	main	argument	is	that	Callisthenes	embellished	the	
role	 of	 the	 Sacred	 Band,	while	 Xenophon,	 Ephorus	 and	 Pausanias	make	 no	mention	 of	 it;	 particularly	
absent	 is	Pelopidas	and	the	Sacred	Band’s	role	at	 the	Battle	of	Leuctra.	However,	 the	 fact	 that	Ephorus	




357	 For	 accounts	 of	 the	 various	 campaigns	 between	 378-375	 see	 DeVoto	 (1987),	 75-82;	Munn	 (1987),	
106-138;	Hamilton	(1991),	174-190;	Buck	(1994),	95-100	




(1971),	 353-361,	 esp.	 353	 (for	 bibliography),	who	 places	 the	 peace	 around	 late	 spring	 or	 in	 the	 early	
summer	of	375.		
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fund the naval campaign, which the Thebans failed to contribute anything to. As a result of 
this and their fear of the increase of Theban power, the Athenians sent ambassadors to Sparta 
in order to establish a peace treaty. Xenophon offers little in the way of the terms of the 
peace, with the exception that Timotheus being recalled back to Athens was high on the 
agenda (Xen. Hell. 6. 2. 1-2). Diodorus, on the other hand, reports, in much greater detail, 
that the peace was at the impetus of the Persian king, Artaxerxes. Accordingly, the great king, 
wishing to make war on the Egyptians with the help of Greek mercenaries decided to impose 
his influence by affecting a peace. A treaty was held and all of the Greek states involved 
agreed to the terms, which bore very similar resonances to the Peace of Antalcidas in 387/6. 
As a result, all foreign garrisons were disbanded and sent home. Unlike the Peace of the 
previous decade, both Sparta and Athens were judged worthy of the dual position of 
ἡγεμονίας. However, according to Diodorus, Epameinondas, who was acting as ambassador 
for the Boeotian League, demanded that the Thebans sign on behalf of Boeotia. He 
apparently clashed in τῷ κοινῷ συνεδρίῳ with the Athenian orator, Callistratus. Because of 
their refusal, the Thebans were excluded from the peace (Diod. 15. 38. 1-4). 
 
Diodorus’ account has frequently been discounted for various reasons. The most 
commonly perceived error is his assertion that Thebes was excluded from the peace: there is 
plenty of evidence that suggests that Thebes retained its position as a member of the Athenian 
League after the peace, therefore Diodorus has been thought to have recorded inaccurate 
information ([Dem.] 49. 14, 21, 48-54; IG II² 1607. 49, 155).360 Isocrates also states in his 
Plataicus that the Thebans seized Plataea in a time of peace (εἰρήνης οὔσης), which has been 
argued to imply that Thebes was a party to the recent treaty (Isoc. 14. 1, 5, 14). Because of 
this and similarities with the Peace of 371 (i.e. the exclusion of Thebes, the involvement of 
Artaxerxes and Epameinondas’ role as ambassador),361 it has often been suggested that 
Diodorus has mistakenly made a doublet.362 Thus many scholars have chosen to ignore 










However, in a fragment of Philochorus, a peace involving the Persian king is 
mentioned, which was similar to the Peace of Antalcidas (Philochorus FGrH F 151 = Didy. 
In Dem. col. 7). This can be equated with the Peace of 375/4, without any doubt, as he says 
that the Athenians set up an altar to Eirene in celebration of it, an action that is also 
confirmed by Nepos’ brief account of the peace (Nep. Tim. 2. 2-3). This appears to verify the 
involvement of Artaxerxes, which also indicates that Diodorus’ account cannot be completely 
erroneous. As a result of the fragment, some scholars have then accepted Persian 
intervention; though, still preferring to discount the other details provided by Diodorus.364 
The fact that a single detail in Diodorus’ account of the peace has been disputed should not 
be taken as sufficient evidence to indicate that its entirety must be cast aside. Xenophon is not 
without his faults either: he fails to specifically mention that the peace included anyone other 
than Athens and Sparta. Though their respective leagues encompassed the majority of 
significant city-states, it cannot truly be argued that Xenophon implied their inclusion.  
 
Buck has provided probably the most convincing argument against Diodorus’ 
account. His argument is threefold: first, in the Philochorus fragment, the reference to the 
king is made by Didymus, not in his quotation of Philochorus; second, he argues that the 
Persian king’s desire to make peace in order to employ Greek mercenaries is a “recooking” of 
Cyrus’ actions, as well as a “rehash” of the events of 387/6; third, he gives several reasons 
why, he believes, the Theban exclusion from the peace is inconceivable.365 In the first place, 
Buck rightly points out that it is not Philochorus’ words, which invoke the Persian king’s 
influence; however, Didymus states that Philochorus wrote on the peace in question and, 
since he was Didymus’ main source on Athenian history, it is likely the information came 
from Philochorus. More pertinent is the fact that Didymus is referring to Demosthenes, who 
states that the Persian king had benefited Athens in the past (Dem. 10. 34): Didymus notes 











King’s Peace of 387/6. Didymus reasonably rejects this notion and suggests Demosthenes 
meant either Conon and the Battle of Cnidus in 394 or another peace sponsored by the king 
and similar to the King’s Peace. This peace was recorded by Philochorus and included the 
erection of the altar to Eirene. It is doubtful that Didymus would have made this suggestion if 
he was not reasonably certain that the treaty involved Persia. He also states that the Athenians 
were exhausted by the cost of employing mercenaries, which is essentially confirmed by 
Xenophon.366 We might also add that Xenophon does not mention Persian involvement in the 
peaces of 371 or 366/5. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the Persian king was involved, 
at least in instigating the treaty. As for Buck’s second argument, the account certainly bears 
much similarity with the Peace of Antalcidas; however, so does the Peace of 371. The desire 
for the Thebes to be considered hegemon of Boeotia just as Sparta led Laconia, as well as 
Messenia, was nothing new: they had desired a measure of equality with Sparta and Athens at 
least as far back as the Peloponnesian war.367 It is somewhat unclear what Buck means by 
referring to Cyrus as he makes no citation, but perhaps he means how Cyrus sent orders to 
gather as many Peloponnesian mercenaries as he could, which would form the bulk of his 
10,000 (Xen. Anab. 1. 1. 6). It does not need to be proven that the Greeks were regularly 
hired by the Persians up to and including Alexander the Great’s conquest.368 Furthermore, it 
is known that shortly after the Peace of 375/4 the Greeks did indeed send a mercenary army 
of 20,000 soldiers under the leadership of Iphicrates to Egypt (Diod. 15. 41. 1).  
 
For the final part of Buck’s argument, he attempts to establish the inconceivability 
of Theban exclusion from the peace. However, Buck’s reasons for rejecting Theban 
exclusion are not watertight: he first states that a Spartan force was in Phocis, ready to attack 
Boeotia before the treaty, but did not attack. It should be emphasized that we are not at all 
certain about the intentions of the Spartans in Phocis: it is perfectly conceivable that they 
were there simply to prevent Theban intervention and expansion into the northwest. Second, 
he notes that the Spartan garrisons in Boeotia were removed: this seems incredible if Sparta 
was still hostile to Thebes. On this point he adds his third argument: Thebes could not have 






treaty for Boeotia, they must only have meant the members of the Boeotian League: the 
garrisoned settlements (Thespiae, Plataea and Orchomenus) were not members of the league 
and were therefore, at this stage, capable of signing the treaty for themselves. The removal of 
garrisons was just part of the treaty’s autonomy clause. For his fourth point Buck argues that 
Thebes could not have been excluded if they remained an active participant in the Second 
Athenian League. Nevertheless, we have no reason to assume that Thebes would be removed 
from the league if it was not included in the peace: members of the league were guaranteed 
autonomy and could therefore refuse to sign any treaty they wished. Finally, Buck notes that 
Diodorus may have made a doublet, copying information from the Peace of 371; however, as 
we shall see, this factor is far from certain. Furthermore, Isocrates statement that Plataea was 
attacked during peacetime does not necessarily infer that Thebes was a party to the peace; 
rather, that Plataea signed the treaty as an independent state: they would not have expected 
the Thebans to attack since two of the major parties (Athens and Sparta) had agreed to cease 
hostilities.   
 
Upon accepting Diodorus’ account, the question then arises whether we can believe 
the story of Epameinondas’ altercation with Callistratus.369 Naturally those who accept only 
Xenophon’s account are unwilling to accept this aspect of it. But their only way of refuting it 
is to suggest that Diodorus was thinking of 371 because a similar incident occurred between 
Epameinondas and Agesilaus (Plut. Ages. 27. 5-28. 3).370 Epameinondas was well known for 
his eloquence of speech and high education: if he was so successful in his clash with 
Agesilaus then he would be the perfect candidate on other occasions also. There is no 
conclusive reason to deny the altercation; in fact, the other examples ought to make it more 
convincing that such an incident was likely to have occurred.371 Whether it took place at the 
peace conference or at Athens in an assembly of the allies is not entirely certain, but this does 
not necessarily alter the significance of the verbal duel.372 If we can accept Epameinondas’ 






372	 Diodorus	 uses	 the	 term	 τῷ	 κοινῷ	 συνεδρίῳ	 (“common	 assembly”),	 a	 term,	 which	 by	 Diodorus	 is	
usually	 used	 to	 refer	 to	 similar	 kinds	 of	 leagues,	 not	 peace	 assemblies,	 see	 Judeich	 (1927),	 184	 n.	 1;	
Lauffer	(1959),	320;	Stylianou	(1998),	326-328.	
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within the Theban/Boeotian political scheme had grown to one of admirable prominence. He 
had been selected to represent Thebes as an ambassador, which was a position that was often 
taken by boeotarchs (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 33-36). Though this does not necessarily prove that he 
had been elected as a boeotarch for this year, he was probably now in the running. A person 
of a low political status would surely not presume to speak in the assembly on behalf of 
Thebes, especially in such an inflammatory manner. Thus, by this stage, Epameinondas 
clearly commanded the confidence of the Theban people and was at, or nearly at, the highest 
echelons of his government. However, it should be noted that Epameinondas failed to achieve 
recognition for Theban hegemony of Boeotia: he probably expected that the Athenians would 
have endorsed this position and their failure to do so could have sparked his provocative 
rebuttal. If the Theban emmisaries had conceded to terms almost as humiliating as the terms 
of the King’s Peace in 387/6, they would have returned home to a disappointed assembly. 
 
Though Athens rejoiced at its re-acknowledgement as a hegemonic power, the peace 
did not last long and Athenian hostilities with Sparta resumed only a year or two afterwards 
when Timotheus aided the Zacynthian exiles.373 Accordingly, the Spartans blockaded 
Corcyra by land and sea under the leadership of Mnassipus. The Athenians responded by 
sending a force of peltasts under Ctesicles to attack by land and Timotheus was to attack by 
sea; however, his lengthy preparations caused the Athenian assembly to remove him from 
office and replace him with Iphicrates. The latter still arrived late and the local Corcyraeans 
managed to defeat the Spartan force and kill Mnassipus. Thus Iphicrates’ campaign gained 
only minor benefits for the Athenian League, which included capturing 10 Syracusan ships 
sent by Dionysius of Sicily in order to aid the now defeated Spartan fleet.374 There is 
evidence that Thebes played a significant role in the campaigns of the Athenian League 
during this period: Theban ships were incorporated into the navy (IG II 1607. 50, 155) and a 










Despite having technically given up their claims as leaders of the Boeotian League, 
the Thebans took advantage of the removal of the Spartan garrisons in Boeotian cities. In 373 
they attacked and demolished the city of Plataea (Paus. 9. 1. 4-8),376 expelling the inhabitants 
from their land, who apparently sought and received refuge from Athens. Not long after this 
the cities of Thespiae377 and Orchomenus were subdued and incorporated into the league 
(Xen. 6. 3. 1, 4. 10; Diod. 15. 46. 4-6). Though there is no direct evidence that Epameinondas 
had anything to do with these events, in spite of his failure at the Peace of 375/4, it should by 
now be presumed that his role was to the fore. It has been suggested that these events reflect 
the policies of both Epameinondas and Pelopidas.378 This, of course, cannot be confirmed 
with certainty, but, as Swoboda admits,379 it is unlikely that his involvement was intermittent; 
rather, his efforts must have been concentrated. Furthermore, it must be reflected by his 
position as boeotarch and unquestioned general of the Boeotian army in 371, that he had been 
instrumental in establishing the prowess of the army and its revolutionary organization. This 























The Peace of 371 and the Battle of Leuctra 
 
 
The Peace in Sparta 
 
In 371, after a relatively fruitless campaign, Iphicrates sent Callistratus back to 
Athens with instructions to either procure more money or establish a peace treaty. Because of 
the expense of the campaign and the growing fear of Theban power, the latter option was 
chosen. Accordingly, a call for a general peace assembly in Sparta was made shortly 
afterwards, which invited all Spartan and Athenian allies, including Thebes (Xen. Hell 6. 3. 
1-3). There may very well have been a plea sent to Persia asking Artaxerxes to oversee the 
negotiations;380 however, the proceedings appear to have taken place before any Persian 
emissary was present. The ambassadors from all the various states arrived in Sparta sometime 
early in June and the terms were agreed upon on the 14th (Plut. Ages. 28. 5). Representing the 
Thebans, indeed attempting to represent all of Boeotia, was a small group of ambassadors, 
which included the boeotarch, Epameinondas. 
 
Scholars have tended to suppose that this was Epameinondas’ first assumption of the 
office of boeotarch.381 Perhaps this is true but, as I have demonstrated above, throughout the 
370s he was certainly active within the political realms of the Boeotian League. Because the 
	
380	 The	 question	 of	whether	 or	 not	 there	was	 involvement	 from	Artaxerxes	 has	 been	 subject	 to	much	
debate.	For	 the	negative	view	see	Underhill	 (1906),	239;	Lauffer	 (1959),	321ff;	Ryder	 (1963),	238	n.5;	
Ryder	(1965),	127-128.	For	acceptance	of	Persian	intervention	see	Grote	(1872),	149,	who	assumes	that	
Persian	 envoys	 were	 actually	 present	 at	 the	 assembly,	 though	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 for	 this;	 Curtius	
(1872),	383-384;	Cawkwell	 (1972),	258;	Cawkwell	 (1979),	322;	Hamilton	(1991),	199;	Buckler	(2008),	
41.	 For	 those	 less	 certain	 see	 Sealey	 (1976),	 419-420;	 Buck	 (1994),	 111-113.	 Diodorus	 specifically	
reports	 that	 the	 treaty	was	 instigated	by	 the	king	 (Diod.	 15.	 50.	 4),	which	 appears	 to	be	 confirmed	by	




Artaxerxes	 asking	 him	 to	 act	 as	 guarantor.	 This	 view	 is	 also	 be	 adopted	 by	 Buckler	 (1980a),	 48-49;	
Cartledge	(1987),	379;	Jehne	(1994),	66-67.	
381	Pomtow	(1870),	56;	Swoboda	(1900),	2680,	both	assume	it	is	his	first	time	in	office.	Cawkwell	(1972),	
257,	 263-4	 n.	 4,	 does	 not	 think	 he	 emerged	 as	 a	 statesman	 until	 371	 and	 that	 this	 was	 his	 first	 real	
prominent	role.	
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boeotarchs of the previous year had to relinquish their power by the winter solstice (Plut. Pel. 
24. 1), we can presume that he was elected into office in late December 372 or early January 
371. Pomtow has imagined that, at this election, Epameinondas said the words which are 
iterated by Plutarch: “Yet, you must deliberate on this, men: for if I am general, you will go 
to war” (Plut. Reg. Imp. Apo. 71. 18/193e).382 Of course, even if this speech is authentic, 
there is no way to attribute it to one particular election and because Plutarch introduces it by 
the use of the somewhat ambiguous adverb ὁπότε, which could mean “when” or “whenever”, 
we have no way of knowing whether he said this every time he was elected, the first time, or 
another non-specific time. Despite this, it is a rather appropriate line to attach to his, alleged, 
first office as a boeotarch, which summarizes the sort of policy he would pursue. 
 
Before the Peace of 371 Epameinondas was in office for five months. During this 
time, the Thebans were not likely to have assumed that a peace conference would be held in 
the middle of the year. It is then worth considering some of the events in the months leading 
up to the peace. Xenophon states that Athens sued for peace because the Thebans were 
campaigning against the Phocians (Xen. Hell. 6. 3. 1). No more details about this campaign 
are reported by the sources and some have been led to believe that this is a doublet of the 
previous invasion in 375,383 which was countered by a Spartan army under Cleombrotus. It 
seems more likely that Xenophon simply omitted to account for their return to Sparta 
probably when the garrisons were decommissioned following the Peace of 375/4. Because of 
this and the unlikelihood that Thebes would attack Phocis when it was occupied by a large 
Spartan contingent, some scholars have accepted the assumption that Cleombrotus had 
returned to Sparta.384 We do know, however, that by the time of the treaty, a Spartan army 
had been deployed in Phocis (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 3; Plut. Ages. 28. 3), and, if we can accept that 
they were not there prior to 371, we can also assert that they were sent in reaction to the 
current Theban invasion. It is likely that, similar to the previous campaign, the Thebans 




383	Beloch	(1922),	156	n.	1.	A	problem	arises	 from	Xenophon’s	narrative,	which	 fails	 to	account	 for	 the	
Spartan	army	in	Phocis	between	375	and	371.	According	to	a	literal	interpretation,	Cleombrotus	and	the	




If, for a moment, we assume that the invasion of Phocis was at the behest of the 
policy of Epameinondas, the quote that Plutarch claims he made appears to ring true. The 
Thebans had previously learnt that taking the pass at Mt. Cithaeron was the key to preventing 
the Spartans from invading Boeotia. Then, perhaps guessing that the next best point of entry 
would be via Phocis, the Thebans attempted to establish their dominance there in 375. The 
Spartans, realizing the Theban ploy, took their army to Phocis in order to secure the entrances 
into Boeotia. Then, again in 371, the Thebans made another attempt on Phocis and the 
Spartans reacted similarly. It is apparent that the Thebans were attempting to encircle the 
Peloponnesus: either they wished to blockade the Spartans into preventing them from having 
any further influence on city-states in central and northern Greece; or they may even have 
been intending to establish their positions for future invasions of the Peloponnesus.  
 
Nevertheless, probably sometime in late May or early June the Thebans would have 
received the invitation to attend the peace conference in Sparta. With only a short few days to 
deliberate their plan of action they appear to have withdrawn their army from Phocis385 and 
then sent ambassadors, including Epameinondas. In Xenophon’s account of the proceedings 
the Athenian ambassadors gave several speeches, all variously condemning the Spartans and 
the Thebans for their actions before Callistratus gives his more moderate speech, accepting 
mistakes on all sides: he proposes that a peace be condoned in which the Spartans are 
considered the masters of land and the Athenians as the masters of the sea (Xen. Hell. 6. 3. 4-
17). Whether or not these speeches actually reflect what each individual Athenian 
ambassador said or the manner in which the proceedings progressed is not entirely clear; 
however, the terms were agreed to by all sides with the exception of the Thebans. 386 
 
At this point the sources diverge significantly: Xenophon states that the Athenians 
and their allies all signed the treaty individually as autonomous city-states, whereas the 
Spartans signed for Laconia and all of their allies. On the following day, the Theban 
ambassadors demanded that the terms of the treaty allow them to have signed for all of 




386	 For	 detailed	 discussion	 of	 the	 speeches,	 terms	 and	 clauses	 of	 the	 peace	 see	Mosley	 (1962),	 41-46;	
Ryder	(1963),	237-241;	Ryder	(1965),	64-69;	Jehne	(1994),	65-74.	
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but had no qualms about removing them from the treaty altogether (Xen. Hell. 6. 3. 19-20). 
Diodorus adds nothing substantial to this scenario, though there is no indication that the 
Thebans signed in the first place, merely that they wished to sign on behalf of Boeotia (Diod. 
15. 50. 4-5). Neither of these accounts mention Epameinondas’ role as ambassador at these 
proceedings; on the other hand, the accounts of Plutarch, Nepos and Pausanias all confirm 
it.387 Like Diodorus, none of these report that Thebes agreed to sign at all and, more 
significantly, they refer to an altercation between Agesilaus and Epameinondas. According to 
Plutarch, whose account is the fullest, Epameinondas made an eloquent speech in front of the 
assembly, on behalf of all of Greece: he attacked Spartan imperialism and demanded that, if 
peace was declared in all fairness, it must be made on terms of equality and justice by all 
involved parties. Agesilaus replied by asking him whether he thought it just that the cities of 
Boeotia remain subject to Thebes. Epameinondas quickly retorted by asking Agesilaus if he 
thought it just that the cities of Laconia remain subject to Sparta. This altercation continued 
in the same manner until, in furious anger, Agesilaus removed the Thebans from the treaty. 
 
Though the details of Xenophon’s account are generally favoured over all the others, 
most scholars accept the details of Epameinondas’ role during the proceedings.388 It is 
perhaps strange that Xenophon omitted his presence considering its significance, but few 
would deny his tendency to glorify Spartan activity and condemn the Thebans. The speech 
and the altercation served to exemplify and attack Spartan imperial inclinations and, though 
Agesilaus justifiably struck their signatures from the treaty, the eloquence and inflammatory 
nature of Epameinondas’ verbal duel allowed the Thebans to come away with a certain 
amount of dignity. It is therefore no surprise that Xenophon attempted to diminish the moral 
victory, which the Thebans did achieve, albeit isolating themselves to face the might of 
Sparta alone.389 It has, in fact, been suggested that the speech that Xenophon attributes to the 
Athenian ambassador Autocles is far too antagonistic towards Sparta (Xen. Hell. 6. 3. 7-9), 
thus being contrary to the Athenian motivation for attempting to establish a peace. This 
	
387	Plut.	Ages.	27.	3-28.	2;	Nepos.	Epam.	6.	4;	Paus.	9.	3.	1.	
388	Notable	exceptions	 include	Sealey	 (1976),	419-420,	who	relies	almost	entirely	on	Xenophon	 for	his	
discussion	of	 the	peace;	Swoboda	(1900),	2680-2681,	 is	 suspicious	of	 the	details	of	Plutarch’s	account;	
however,	 he	 accepts	 Epameinondas’	 presence,	 which	 is	 odd	 because	 the	 sources	 that	 confirm	 his	
presence	also	confirm	the	altercation	with	Agesilaus.	




suggestion has led to the speculation that Xenophon actually disguised Epameinondas’ 
speech under the guise of Autocles’.390 Though such a claim could never be proven, 
Autocles’ speech is consistent with the sentiments of Epameinondas, as presented by Plutarch 
and Nepos. If there is a semblance of truth in this suggestion, Ryder may indeed be correct in 
proposing that the speeches, as presented by Xenophon, reflect the successive stages in the 
negotiations.391 Therefore, it is possible that Autocles’ speech reflects the anti-Spartan 
sentiments at the treaty, which may have been primarily exhorted by the Thebans, namely 
Epameinondas. Instead of crediting such a speech to the likes of the illustrious boeotarch, 
Xenophon preferred to reflect these ideals through an Athenian orator, which further serves 
to undermine the significance of the Theban’s presence during the proceedings. 
 
Upon reconciling Xenophon’s account with that of Plutarch, Nepos and Pausanias, 
the question remains why Epameinondas waited until the following day to make the demand 
to sign on behalf of Boeotia. Stern concluded that, under the obligations of the Athenian 
Confederacy, the Thebans were compelled to sign merely as members of the alliance; then, 
later they decided to attempt to include all of Boeotia.392 Cawkwell makes two suggestions: 
one, that the Thebans wrongly assumed that their signatures would be counted as valid for all 
of Boeotia, then, realizing their mistake, demanded the inscription be altered on the following 
day; two, that the Theban ambassadors’ nerves failed during the proceedings and perhaps 
Epameinondas managed to convince them to change their minds overnight. Cawkwell gives 
more credence to the latter option as the impression given by Xenophon is that the Thebans 
changed their mind.393 A mistake seems somewhat unlikely; however, fear may explain the 
situation to an extent. As Buckler points out,394 a similar situation had occurred during the 
Peace of 375/4 in which the Thebans had attempted to have the Boeotian League legitimately 
recognised, which they failed to achieve. However, in the case of this peace, the autonomy 
clause in which no state would be obligated to come to the defence of another, would allow 
the Spartans to attack Thebes whether they were included in the peace or not. It then seems 








rather than accept the terms of a peace, which, if signed, would publicly relinquish their 
hegemony over Boeotia. It is unclear whether such an outcome was expected by 
Epameinondas and the other Theban ambassadors, but judging from the kind of policy he 
followed and would continue to follow, there is faint likelihood that he would have bowed to 
the behest of Sparta and Athens.395 
 
Following the treaty, the Spartans wasted very little time. Cleombrotus, who was 
commanding the army in Phocis sent word to the assembly asking for instructions. In 
accordance with the terms of the peace they were obligated to withdraw all garrisons, indeed, 
one Prothous tried to convince the Ephors that they ought to withdraw Cleombrotus, make 
offerings to Apollo and await the full support of their allies before attempting an expedition 
against Thebes. Prothous’ advice was not accepted and the council voted to send the army. 
According to Plutarch, this decision was given strong support from Agesilaus, which is a 
detail Xenophon was probably happy to omit (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 2-3; Plut. Ages. 28. 3-4). 
Before marching out, Cleombrotus allegedly sent out an ultimatum to the Thebans, 
instructing them to make all the cities of Boeotia independent. This was promptly rejected 
and the Spartan army set forth from Phocis (Diod. 15. 51. 3-4; Aristid. 12. 7).396 
 
It is said that when the Theban ambassadors returned home, they were in a state of 
despondency or ἀθύμως (Xen. Hell. 6. 3. 20). If this is so, it is unlikely to be because they 
expected Sparta to give in to their demands, but perhaps because they had hoped that Athens 
would offer them some form of support.397 Either way, they surely had good reason to feel 
	
395	It	is	accepted	by	many	scholars	that	Epameinondas	was	well	aware	of	the	consequences	of	his	actions	
during	 the	 peace	 and	 had	 genuinely	 been	 planning	 on	 instigating	 further	 hostilities	 with	 Sparta.	 See	
Pomtow	 (1870),	 59;	 Grote	 (1872),	 162;	 Meyer	 (1913),	 405-407;	 Beloch	 (1922),	 163-164;	 Cartledge	
(1987),	 379-380.	 Cawkwell	 (1972),	 264-265,	 even	 suggests	 that	 the	 speech,	 which	 Epameinondas	
delivered	at	the	meeting,	foreshadowed	his	intention	of	liberating	Messenia	and	bringing	Spartan	tyranny	




heartedly	 rejects	 Diodorus’	 statement	 but	 is	 clearly	 not	 entirely	 certain.	 Other	 recent	 scholars	 have	
tended	to	accept	the	ultimatum:	see	Buckler	(1980a),	54-55;	Hamilton	(1991),	203-204;	Roisman	(2017),	
288.	Stylianou	(1998),	387,	has	noted	that	Xenophon	actually	implies	the	existence	of	such	an	ultimatum	





nervous knowing they would have to face the might of the Spartan army by themselves. On 
their return, an assembly was called, which deliberated on the course of action for the defence 
of Boeotia. Such an assembly is referred to by Diodorus, though he appears to have 
befuddled several of his facts. He reports that some of the Thebans proposed to send their 
women and children to Athens for safety. Diodorus gives the impression that this proposal 
was voted upon and implemented, which is doubtful. Pausanias notes a similar instance just 
before the battle in which some of the boeotarchs began to lose their nerve and suggested a 
comparable proposal before sealing themselves off inside the city (Paus. 9. 13. 6). This, as 
Stylianou suggests,398 may indicate that Ephorus’ account could have contained an episode in 
which Epameinondas urged the assembly to vote in favour of marching out to meet 
Cleombrotus head on; however, some may have opposed this, preferring the former option. If 
such a proposal was indeed made at the assembly, it clearly did not get enough support to be 
put into practice.  
 
Diodorus then further states that Epameinondas was made general and given primary 
command during the war, whereas the other six boeotarchs would act merely as his advisors. 
Though it is certainly true that the boeotarchs could relinquish their power in favour of one or 
two,399 the fact that they would later vote on the decision to fight just before the battle 
demonstrates that (Diod. 15. 53. 3), on this occasion, all the boeotarchs were exercising equal 
authority.400 Nepos also refers to Epameinondas’ position during the battle as imperatore 
(Nep. Pel. 4. 2), which seems to indicate a position of military eminence. It may in fact have 
been Diodorus’ intention (or mistake) not to assert that he was voted as superior to the other 
boeotarchs; rather, that he was given the position as leader in the army, i.e. that he would be 
the primary officer in charge while the actual engagement took place. Regardless of the 
manner in which the assembly proceeded, the vote was in favour of meeting the Spartans in 











Before accounting for the troop movements prior to the battle and the battle itself, it 
is worth discussing separately the various omens and prophecies that apparently occurred on 
the road to Leuctra. At this stage Diodorus mentions two separate omens that occurred, 
presumably before the full Boeotian force had gathered. When the Theban soldiers were 
marching out of the city, a blind herald, who was hoping to recover some runaway slaves, 
warned that they must be brought back unharmed. This rather ambiguous instance was 
interpreted by some of the older people to be an omen, though Diodorus does not express 
whether he thinks it was good or bad (Diod. 15. 52. 3-4).401 In response to this, 
Epameinondas is said to have quoted from the Iliad, saying “One omen is best, to fight for 
our fatherland” (Hom. Il. 12. 243).402 Shortly afterwards another omen appeared. The clerk or 
registrar (γραμματεύς), having signalled some orders during the advance, was seized by a 
heavy breeze that caused the ribbon on his spear to rip. It nestled upon a grave where 
Peloponnesian soldiers had been killed during one of Agesilaus’ campaigns a few years 
earlier. This sign was interpreted by some as opposition from the gods; though, 
Epameinondas is said to have believed that nobility and justice were the preferred 
interpretations and he refused to respond (Diod. 15. 52. 5-6). Frontinus offers a slightly 
different version of this story, saying that the ribbon was torn off of Epameinondas’ spear 
himself. To this he accordingly said that tombs are only decorated for funerals, thus the omen 
foretells the Spartans’ defeat (Front. Strat. 1. 12. 5). Though these omens are not confirmed 
by any of the other major sources, the discrepancy between Diodorus and Frontinus indicates 
that the latter was using an alternate source, but in a similar tradition. The authenticity of the 
passages cannot be established, but it is likely that a number of alternate versions of the same 
story began to circulate shortly after the battle. Stylianou asserts that the passage in Diodorus 
is part of the Ephoran theme of παιδεία in which Ephorus demonstrates the superiority of 









When the armies had arrived at Leuctra, the Boeotians were greatly fearful of the 
coming battle, considering the previous omens they had perceived and the size of the Spartan 
army. Realizing this, Epameinondas appears to have taken matters into his own hands in 
order to boost the morale of his troops. He accordingly carefully fabricated favourable omens 
in an attempt to counter the previous ones. The story is variously reported but the general 
idea is that he secretly ordered some men to remove the weapons from the statue of Heracles 
at the temple in Thebes.404 Some accounts state that Epameinondas merely instructed 
newcomers to the camp to make claims of this phenomenon (Diod. 15. 53. 4; Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 
7),405 whereas others claim that he actually sent people to remove the weapons: either so that 
they disappeared (Front. Strat. 1. 11. 16), or that they were polished and placed on the floor 
(Polyaen. 2. 3. 8). Interestingly another account is given in a fragment of Callisthenes via 
Cicero, which accepts the incident as a genuine omen, declaring that the doors of the temple 
burst open and the armour of the statue was found on the floor.406 As well as this, Diodorus 
and Polyaenus say that he further instructed a man to appear, claiming to have been sent by 
Trophonius,407 who said that they would be victorious if they attacked first (Polyaen. 2. 3. 8) 
and that on this day they must hold a festival in honour of Trophonius at Lebadea (Diod. 15. 
53. 4). The same fragment of Callisthenes also describes a similar instance, accepting it as a 
genuine omen. The difference between Diodorus and the Polyaenus-Frontinus accounts may 
reflect the difference in the material presented by Ephorus and Callisthenes. Either way, there 
are clearly at least two traditions: the first, in which Epameinondas employed these measures 
as strategemata; the second, that these were considered authentic omens, as Callisthenes said, 
being officially legitimized by the Boeotian augurs. From a modern point of view, the fact 
that Xenophon admits that reports of the omens being falsified later emerged should be taken 
as good evidence that they were devices employed by the Boeotian leaders, namely 
Epameinondas. The existence of an alternate tradition may indicate the overwhelming 
success that these devices had: because of their victory, a large proportion of the populace 
	
404	See	Schachter	(1981-1994),	ii.	14ff,	for	the	Heracleion	at	Thebes.	








would have willingly believed such things in spite of reports to the contrary, which, in their 
eyes, might serve to diminish the victory. 
 
Pausanias records an alternative (or addition) to the oracle from Trophonius. He 
describes a Theban tradition in which responses were received from Ismenian and Ptoan 
Apollo, along with replies from Abae and Delphi, though he does not go into any detail on 
these. From Lebadea, however, Trophonius apparently implored the Thebans to set up a 
trophy adorned with the shield that Aristomenes, the Messenian hero, placed in the temple. If 
this were done Trophonius would ensure the Spartans’ defeat. On hearing of this, 
Epameinondas sent Xenocrates, a fellow boeotarch, to retrieve the shield. They then set up 
the trophy somewhere in view of the Spartan army so it could be clearly seen. Apparently, 
the shield was well known and most of the enemy would recognize it, especially since it was 
said to have been emblazoned with an eagle. Pausanias ties this in with a Messenian tradition 
that Aristomenes briefly returned from the dead to fight at Leuctra and was instrumental in 
the Theban victory (Paus. 4. 32. 4-6). While the tradition of Aristomenes’ presence may well 
have been fabricated post hoc, a contemporary inscription, which refers to the use of a trophy 
and includes the name of Xenocrates may indicate some truth to the use of Aristomenes’ 
shield at the battle (IG VII 2467). If it can be confirmed that stories of Aristomenes and his 
shield were already prevalent by this period, it would have been highly fitting for 
Epameinondas to have utilized their symbolic importance. Because of its status as a magical 
item and a weapon against Sparta, the use of such an artefact could well have inspired a 
certain amount of fear, especially amongst the Spartiates.408  
 
Other omens have also been recorded by Polyaenus and Frontinus, which are not, 
however, mentioned by any of the major sources. At the temple of Athena in Thebes, 
Epameinondas apparently employed a similar device, almost identical to the one mentioned 
above, in which the arms of Athena changed position (Polyaen. 2. 3. 13). There is also 
mention of a meteor, which flew over the night sky and Epameinondas exclaimed to the 







us that, just before the battle, the seat Epameinondas was sitting on gave way, which was 
interpreted as an unlucky omen by the soldiers; to this he replied that it only meant that they 
must not sit down, but fight (Front. Strat. 1. 12. 7).  
 
The most prominent of all of the omens is the story of the daughters of Scedasus, 
known as the Leuctridae, who were violated by Spartan men and, being overcome with 
shame and grief, they committed suicide. Plutarch says that Pelopidas had a dream in which 
Scedasus demanded that he sacrifice a fair-haired virgin to appease his daughters. When he 
told the seers and the officers, there was debate about whether or not to act upon the dream. 
Fortunately, a fire-coloured filly broke away from the herd and Theocritus the seer declared 
that this was the virgin. The young horse was then decorated with garlands and sacrificed at 
the tomb of the daughters of Scedasus. Though it is doubtful a human sacrifice was actually 
considered, the story’s prominence in the sources suggests that it was widely known at the 
time of the battle, or at least not long afterwards. It is therefore not unbelievable that a filly410 
was offered up as a representation of a true virgin sacrifice, in the manner of Iphigenia, 
before the Trojan War.411 Pausanias says that Epameinondas made the sacrifice himself 
(Paus. 9. 13. 6).  
	
B.C.,	see	Kronk	(1999),	4-5.	However,	recent	astronomers	tend	to	view	these	claims	with	suspicion,	see	
Sekanina	 and	 Chodas	 (2007),	 673-674.	 It	 must	 also	 be	 admitted	 that	 the	 dates	 which	 these	 ancient	
writers	associate	with	the	sighting	of	the	meteor	are	not	certain	and	likely	to	have	occurred	significantly	










done	 in	 the	 usual	manner.	 If	 Epameinondas	 did	 indeed	 slaughter	 a	 filly,	 it	 is	 a	 rare	 example	 of	 horse	
sacrifice	in	ancient	Greece.	
411	Xen.	Hell.	6.	4.	7;	Diod.	15.	54.	1-3;	Plut.	Pel.	20-22;	De	Herod.	11/856f;	Amat.	3/773b-774b;	Paus.	9.	13.	











The abundance of all of these alleged omens should not come as too much of a 
surprise considering the incredible significance and unprecedented result of the battle. 
Whether or not such phenomena occurred is a matter for much speculation and argument; 
however, the purpose of the sources to include them was surely in an attempt to demonstrate 
Epameinondas’ intellect and ability to quell the fears of his superstitious soldiers.412 Thus, 
with his oratorical prowess he successfully refuted all such claims of bad omens and with his 
skill and ingenuity he further constructed a series of blatantly good omens, which ensured the 
confidence of his troops before engaging the enemy. 
 
 
The Road to Leuctra 
 
Upon realizing that the Thebans would not yield, Cleombrotus led his army from 
Phocis into Boeotia. He accordingly marched to Chaeronea, apparently to await the arrival of 
more allies (Diod. 15. 52. 1).413 Naturally being aware of the oncoming Spartan army, 
Epameinondas,414 having gathered his troops took what was probably the bulk of the army to 
the pass at Coronea just a few kilometres east, which was situated between a steep slope and 
Lake Copais (Diod. 15. 52. 7; Paus. 9. 13. 3). These narrows would prevent the Spartans from 
making the most of their superior numbers. As well as this, in case there was any attempt to 
flank the Boeotian defence, a smaller detachment under the boeotarch, Brachillydes, was sent 









413	 I	 accept	 the	 re-emendation	 of	 Tuplin	 (1979),	 351-356:	 Wesseling	 (1798),	 395,	 had	 previously	
proposed	that	the	text	should	be	altered	to	Κορώνειαν	from	the	original	manuscripts,	which	read	either	
Xερώνειαν	 or	 Xαιρώνειαν.	 These	 appear	 to	 clearly	 transliterate	 to	 Chaeronea	 and	 it	would	make	 very	








Chaireas, who was ordered to guard the routes over Mt. Helicon to the southwest of their 
position near Coronea (Paus. 9. 13. 3).415 It is apparent that Epameinondas was hoping to 
engage the Spartans at the pass, but he was certainly aware of the possibility of a flanking 
manoeuvre. Burn points out that the Phalarus valley, which runs between the pass at Coronea 
and Mt. Helicon, would have provided an efficient line of communication between the two 
forces.416 Thus, not wishing to assume that Cleombrotus would attack where the Boeotians 
were at a strategic advantage, Epameinondas had established his positions in the defence of 
Boeotia. 
 
Seeing that the pass had already been secured, Cleombrotus pulled back his army to 
the Phocian town of Ambrossus (Paus. 9. 13. 3). Then he marched along the path that rises 
across Mt. Helicon, which eventually leads to Thisbae (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 3). While crossing 
this route he encountered the force under Chaireas and apparently killed (ἀποκτείνας) the 
entire detachment (Paus. 9. 13. 3). From Thisbae he traversed the difficult path that leads to 
Creusis where he promptly occupied the town and captured either 10 (Diod. 15. 53. 1) or 12 
triremes (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 3-4). Lying on the coast to the southwest of Leuctra, Cleombrotus 
had now opened himself a useful supply and reinforcement line across the Corinthian Gulf. 
Presumably, after leaving some sort of garrison at Creusis, he then crossed the mountain 
range that lay to the north and made his way into the plain of Leuctra.417 Cleombrotus’ 
flanking movement demonstrated his skill in manoeuvring soldiers quickly and over a long 
distance. Though Epameinondas’ placement of the detachment under Chaireas showed 
excellent foresight, its decimation at the hands of the Spartans was likely to be a major blow 
to the defenders’ morale. When Mt. Helicon was taken, it is evident that a messenger was 
quickly sent to the main Boeotian force to warn them of the Spartans’ movements. Without 
further hesitation, Epameinondas readied his soldiers and marched at speed in order to 
prevent the Spartans from attacking Thebes undefended. 
 
	







Before marching, Epameinondas appears to have sent a messenger to Mt. Cithaeron, 
ordering the contingent under Brachillydes to rejoin the main force (Paus. 9. 13. 7). Some 
scholars presumed that the army returned to Thebes before marching to Leuctra,418 which is 
an assumption that should obviously be discounted. This mistake probably arose from the 
confusing manner in which Diodorus accounts for the manoeuvres and the omens that 
occurred along the way. It would only make sense if the full Boeotian force had not been sent 
to Coronea, but Epameinondas could hardly have expected to hold out against the full might 
of the Spartan army with only a portion of his force. However, some extra soldiers from 
Thebes may have joined them as they neared the battlefield as is reported by Diodorus (Diod. 
15. 53. 4). Very little is attested about the route the Boeotians took to reach Leuctra, but the 
path is reasonably obvious. The army probably marched along the lowland path to the 
southeast of Mt. Helicon, which leads past Thespiae, then continues southward toward the 
Corinthian Gulf until they reached the plain of Leuctra (Diod. 15. 53. 1-2).419 Burn 
inexplicably assumes that the Boeotian force arrived first, which is surely to the contrary 
according to the sources.420 Thus, having sighted the Spartan army on the hills south of the 
plain, the Boeotians encamped on the low ridges to the north, with a distance of about two 
kilometres between the opposing forces.421 
 
It is likely that, upon making camp, both sides rested for the remainder of the day, 
allowing time for Brachillydes to arrive with the rest of the army.422 In the meantime the 
Boeotians held a war council, in order to decide whether or not to fight. This is recorded in 
the best detail by Pausanias who says that the boeotarchs were divided in opinion: 
Epameinondas, Malgis and Xenocrates were in favour of battle and Damocleidas, 
Damophilus and Simangelus apparently preferred the idea of sending their women and 
children to Athens while barricading themselves behind the walls of Thebes (Paus. 9. 13. 6). 











(Plut. Pel. 20. 2).423 Xenophon reports the reasons, which compelled the Thebans to fight: in 
the event of their defeat some Boeotian cities might revolt and Thebes would be captured and 
enslaved or destroyed. They also further reasoned that, because many of them had been 
enslaved or exiled by the Spartans only eight years before, they would rather die than allow it 
to happen again (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 6). These sentiments may well reflect the subject of 
discussion during the war council. After some time of disagreement Brachillydes arrived, 
quickly giving his support to Epameinondas and they agreed upon the decision to risk open 
battle with the Spartan army (Paus. 9. 13. 6).  
 
Swoboda doubts the authenticity of this scenario as pictured by Diodorus, Pausanias 
and Plutarch. He argues that it bears striking similarities to the Athenian war council before 
the Battle of Marathon (Hdt. 6. 109-110); therefore, the story was imagined by those wishing 
to glorify Epameinondas.424 Presumably, this argument is also based on the fact that 
Xenophon records only the Thebans’ motivation to fight and makes no mention of their 
division. Despite this, the story is reported by three of the major ancient writers on the topic 
and most probably came from Ephorus or Callisthenes. Hamilton suggests that the 
discrepancy may be explained by the fact that Xenophon was writing from the Spartan side 
and may have simply been unaware of what really went on in the Boeotian camp.425 
Furthermore, the fact that Pausanias records the names of all seven boeotarchs implies that he 
had access to fairly detailed information. It may be noted that the inclusion of Brachillydes’ 
return from Mt. Cithaeron is a likely scenario,426 which, assuming there were indeed seven 
boeotarchs, would have made an even division of opinion possible until the seventh one 
arrived. In spite of any argument to the contrary, the division amongst the boeotarchs is 
















In another instance before the battle, Epameinondas, being suspicious of them, 
apparently allowed the Thespian hoplites to return home along with any other Boeotian who 
did not wish to fight (Paus. 9. 13. 8, 14. 1; Polyaen. 2. 3. 3). Some earlier scholars have 
disputed this occurrence due to its reminiscence with Leonidas, who sent home the Spartan 
allies at the Battle of Thermopylae (Hdt. 7. 219-220).428 Again, Xenophon’s omission has 
probably affected their position on the matter. Buckler points out that the inclusion of the 
Thespian departure would have made the Spartan defeat all the more humiliating, therefore 
unsurprising that Xenophon would ignore this fact.429 The presence of two parallels with 
Herodotus’ account of the Persian wars is certainly curious and may lead one to doubt some 
of the details, but a similarity with past events should not cause us to discount it entirely. In 
the case of Thermopylae, more than half the allies of the force are said to have dispersed 
(Hdt. 7. 219-222),430 whereas the Thespian contingent at Leuctra was not likely to be 
comparably as large, probably less than 1,000.431 While this was still a significant loss for the 
Boeotian army, the Thespian soldiers were a relatively new addition to the league;432 
consequently, they may not have been trained and integrated into the new Theban way of 
fighting, which the Boeotians had been refining. And, as we shall see, Epameinondas was not 













they	are	 likely	 to	 reflect	 the	 remaining	number	of	men	capable	of	 fighting.	Another	 force	of	Thespians	
underwent	 heavy	 casualties	 at	 the	 Battle	 of	 Delium	 in	 424	 (Thuc.	 4.	 96.	 3),	with	 about	 300	 dead,	 see	
Demand	 (1982),	110-118.	This	 comprised	perhaps	half	 of	 the	 total	Thespian	hoplite	 force,	 see	Hanson	
(1999),	203-218	n.	15.	Then,	at	the	later	Battle	of	Nemea	in	394,	the	Thespian	contingent	also	appears	to	






Around the same time a group of Lacedaimonian mercenaries, Phocian peltasts and 
horsemen from Heraclea and Phlius led by the Spartan commander, Hieron, attempted a 
skirmishing assault on the Boeotian camp. He must have approached from the rear, north of 
the camp, so as not to be seen. Unbeknownst to Hieron, he arrived when a number of the 
Boeotian non-combatants were departing. Thinking them the enemy he attacked and drove 
many of them back to the camp (Xen. Hell 6. 4. 9). This minor sortie therefore achieved next 
to nothing for the Spartans.433 
 
Perhaps in the morning before the battle, Epameinondas is said to have held an 
assembly (ἐκκλησίᾳ), during which the Spartan exile, Leandrias, spoke of a Spartan proverb 
that foretold their defeat at the hands of the Thebans (Diod. 15. 54. 1). If such an assembly 
was actually held, it would not be surprising if Epameinondas gave a speech to encourage his 
men. Bauch and Pomtow both imagined such an oration in which Epameinondas refers to all 
the injustices of the Spartans and the various favourable omens that had appeared.434 
Although there is no direct evidence for this, it would have been the ideal way to rouse his 
men into battle-readiness. He had clearly put a lot of effort into fabricating these good omens 
and it would have been useful to emphasize this as well as refute the bad ones. Polyaenus 
may also relate part of this speech: when addressing his men before the battle, Epameinondas 
used a snake as analogous for the Spartan army. He then crushed its head, demonstrating how 
the body will fall when the head is destroyed. Thus, the soldiers understood that they only 
had to beat the Spartiate troops in order to win (Polyaen. 2. 3. 15). If this passage can be 
trusted,435 we can see that Epameinondas was attempting to explain the effectiveness of his 
tactics by analogy, which was apparently well understood and helped to inspire confidence. 
Whatever he may have done, the Boeotian leaders’ attempts to encourage their men in the 









436	 The	 assertion	 that	 generals	 gave	 exhortations	 to	 their	 troops	 before	 battle	 has	 been	 disputed	 by	






There has been a wide variety of discussion over the exact nature of both sides’ 
strategies and the manner in which the battle unfolded. The following discussion attempts to 
establish the general nature of the battle in order to determine how it most likely unfolded 
and the extent to which the battle can be considered a significant landmark in the evolution of 
military ingenuity. Most of the discussion surrounding the battle has involved reconciling 
Plutarch’s Pelopidas with Xenophon, where it is generally agreed that the latter’s account is 
accurate but incomplete; therefore, provided there is no contradiction, Plutarch’s account 
helps to fill in the sizeable gaps left by Xenophon. Because of this, most of Diodorus’ 
account has been disregarded due its various inconsistencies with the Hellenica.437 
 
The plain of Leuctra is a wide, generally level, stretch of ground bordered to the 
south by Mt. Korombili, where the Spartan army camped, and to the north, where the 
Boeotians camped, by a series of low hills, which lie somewhat less than two kilometres 
north of the lower slopes of Korombili. The plain is open and without trees, making it ideal 
for a large-scale pitched battle with plenty of space for cavalry manoeuvres, though Buckler 
notes that the ground has risen slightly and modern farming has made the surface more level 
than it probably was in antiquity. Today the reconstructed battle monument stands in the 
plain, just north of Korombili, and a little under a kilometre northwest of modern Lefktra.438 
 
After a night of rest, on the morning of the fifth of the Attic month, Hecatombaeon 













soldiers for battle. Plutarch says that the Spartan army totalled 10,000 hoplites and 1,000 
cavalry (Plut. Pel. 20. 1),440 which included four Lacedaimonian regiments probably 
numbering slightly more than 2,000 altogether (Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 1). Of these, there were about 
700 Spartiates (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 15). Amongst their allies there were mercenaries led by 
Hieron, peltasts from Phocis as well as Heracleots and Phliasians adding to the cavalry 
contingent (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 9). The Spartan army also apparently included some Arcadians 
(Paus. 8. 6. 2). On the Boeotian side there were, according to Diodorus, about 6,000 hoplites 
in total (Diod. 15. 52. 2), along with approximately 600 cavalry. It has also been estimated 
that the Thebans contributed around 2,000 hoplites to this total. Though none of these figures 
can be confirmed with any real degree of certainty, it is generally agreed that the Spartan 
force was likely to have outnumbered the Boeotians by about three to two.441 
 
Epameinondas and the Boeotians’ initial strategy for victory is not altogether 
obvious as the course of the battle clearly necessitated a large degree of improvisation. But 
judging from the initial dispositions, some suppositions can be made. The Theban hoplites, 
who were by far the most experienced soldiers of the Boeotians, were situated on the left 
flank (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 12; Diod. 15. 55. 1-2), contrary to the standard placement of crack 
troops. The remainder of the Boeotians would have made up the middle to right wing of the 
army, probably to a standard depth of between 8 and 12.442 Conversely the left wing was 
constructed to an unprecedented depth of at least 50 (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 12). Amidst these, he 













442	Roisman	(2017),	293,	asserts	 that	Epameinondas	must	have	extended	his	 line	 to	 the	right	by	either	





most likely placed at the very front of the Theban left wing.443 It is also made generally clear 
that the Boeotian force purposefully advanced at an oblique angle: the right side were ordered 
to avoid fighting the enemy, withdrawing somewhat, while the left would make a quick, 
targeted strike at the Spartan right flank. Something to this effect is confirmed by all three of 
the major sources.444 As for the cavalry, they were presumably initially placed on the left 
wing.445 From these dispositions it is more than clear that Epameinondas believed he could 
obtain victory by concentrating his force to attack the Spartiates, which, if defeated, would 
cause the remainder of the enemy to lose their nerve. As noted before, this strategy is 
perfectly demonstrated by his analogy with the snake.446 
 
Both sides had their own idea of how the battle would be won and because the 
Spartans’ plans ultimately failed, theirs is perhaps more obscure.  An attempt to determine 
these plans is appropriate because Cleombrotus’ strategy dictated the reactions of the 
Boeotian army during the battle. Due to the tendency for hoplites to move their unprotected 
sides to the shield of the man next to them, the phalanx would generally drift to the right 
during its advance (Thuc. 5. 71. 1).447 In response to this, the right wing was usually where 
the crack troops were positioned: in this case, the elite native Spartan citizens. The standard 
Spartan tactic would be to attempt to gain the upper hand on their right wing; then, wheeling 
leftward along the side of the enemy’s left, they would outflank them.448 Cleombrotus 
appears to have been happy employing this classic strategy. He accordingly drew up his 
phalanx 12 hoplites deep (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 12), with the Spartan soldiers on the right flank 
(Plut. Pel. 23. 1),449 which is also where he would lead the advance (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 13). 
	
443	 The	 suggestion	 that	 the	 Sacred	Band	was	 situated	 at	 the	 rear	 of	 the	phalanx,	made	by	Rüstow	and	





first	 to	 use	 the	 so-called	 ‘wedge’	 formation;	 however,	 this	 makes	 little	 sense	 when	 considering	 the	
evidence	of	Plutarch	and	Diodorus	and	has	been	successfully	refuted	by	Buckler	(1985),	134-143.	









Buckler has suggested that Cleombrotus could have suspected at least two things from the 
Thebans: firstly, as at Delium in 424 (Thuc. 4. 93. 4) and Nemea in 394 (Xen. Hell. 4. 2. 13, 
18), the Thebans were now known for their unusually deep columns; however secondly, at 
these two battles as well as Coronea in 394 (Xen. Hell. 4. 3. 16), the Theban force would 
normally hold the right flank, just as the Spartans did. Also at Coronea, the Theban phalanx 
advanced ahead of their allies (Xen. Hell. 4. 3. 17).450  As a result, Cleombrotus seems to 
have intended on leading his phalanx to the right in order to outflank the Boeotian left. 
 
The Spartan king’s use of cavalry is more puzzling: Xenophon says that they were 
placed in front of the phalanx but gives the impression that this was done at the very 
beginning when he was drawing up his troops (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 10). Because they would have 
been in the way of the hoplites’ advance and cavalry were normally used to protect the 
flanks, there seems little tactical advantage in this decision. However, on seeing that the 
Boeotian army was concentrating their strength on the left, he reacted by attempting a rather 
complicated flanking move (Plut. Pel. 23. 1-2).451 Thus scholars have often argued that the 
cavalry placement was part of this reaction: in an attempt to confuse the enemy, he hoped to 
screen these movements by placing his cavalry in front of his army. This is certainly a 
rational reason for placing them in front of the phalanx and may be the only one;452 however, 
this interpretation is not specifically evident in the sources and Roisman has argued that the 
terrain actually favoured the placement.453 He also suggests that Cleombrotus may have 
hoped that the cavalry could be used to spoil the enemy’s phalanx.454 Though the king’s 
original intentions before the battle are not entirely clear, his positioning of the cavalry 
	
by	 Diodorus;	 however,	 the	 latter’s	 report	 that	 Archidamus	 occupied	 the	 left	 is	 generally	 considered	
erroneous,	 see	Stern	 (1884),	136-137;	Delbrück	 (1920),	157;	Wolter	 (1926),	315-316;	Buckler	 (2008),	
116	n.	20.	
450	Buckler	(2008),	123-124.	
451	What	 exactly	 this	 flanking	move	 entailed	 has	 been	much	 debated:	 see	 Anderson	 (1970),	 218,	 402;	
Lazenby	(1985),	158-159;	Tuplin	(1987),	89-93;	Buckler	(2008),	116-126;	Buckler	(2013),	661.	It	 is	far	
from	clear	exactly	how	this	manoeuvre	would	have	manifested	itself,	though	for	my	purpose	it	 is	really	





right	 wing	 of	 the	 Spartan	 force;	 therefore,	 no	 need	 to	 place	 them	 in	 front:	 personal	 observations	 in	
October	2015.	
454	 Roisman	 (2017),	 292.	 Interestingly,	 Buckler	 (2013),	 667-668,	 offers	 the	 same	 reasons	 for	 the	
placement	of	the	Theban	cavalry	in	front	of	the	phalanx.	
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indicates that he was going to try and catch the Thebans off guard. Unfortunately for him, 
everything went wrong. 
 
The battle began rather abruptly for the Spartans: apparently their horsemen were 
already engaged with the Boeotian cavalry by the time the phalanx perceived it was time to 
advance (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 10-11). It is clear that Epameinondas interpreted the positioning of 
the Spartan cavalry as some sort of ruse; then, without further ado, also brought his cavalry 
up to the front ranks and ordered them to charge post-haste. The cavalry engagement must 
have occurred while the Spartan right wing was attempting to extend its line and prevented 
them from advancing any significant distance.455 Owing to the superiority of the Boeotian 
cavalry and poor quality of the Spartans’ (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 10-12), the engagement must have 
been over fairly quickly. Accordingly, the Spartan cavalry was driven back into its own line 
(Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 13), thus severing the right wing from the left as it attempted its 
manoeuvre.456 Meanwhile, the Theban wing had probably advanced simultaneously with the 
cavalry, targeting its left toward the Spartan right. As Pelopidas perceived the extension of 
the Spartan right flank, he ordered the Sacred Band to detach from the main body and 
prevented them from establishing their position, most likely by using the 300’s greater 
manoeuvrability in order to attack the flank (Plut. Pel. 23. 2-4). Consequently, the Spartan 
attempt at an outflanking move was thwarted. Shortly afterwards the main body of the 
Theban left wing met the Spartan force in full and heavy fighting broke out. In spite of 
everything, the Spartans held out for some time while Cleombrotus fell, followed by several 
other eminent citizens including a polemarch named Deinon, the infamous Sphodrias and the 
latter’s son, Cleonymus. Eventually they began to be pushed back and the left wing of the 













The Spartan army then fell back to their campsite on the southern slopes of the plain 
and fortified themselves on their position. Many of the Spartans, ashamed at their defeat, 
demanded that they prevent the enemy from setting up a trophy and reclaim their dead by 
another assault. However, the remaining polemarchs decided, on the weight of their losses, 
that it would be better to call for a truce. They accordingly sent a herald to the Boeotians, 
requesting their permission to recover the dead (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 14-15). Apparently, in order 
to emphasize the scale of the Spartiate losses, Epameinondas allowed only the Spartan allies 
to gather their dead at first, thus what remained were the large numbers of Spartiate hoplites 
(Paus. 9. 13. 11; Plut. Reg. Imp. Apo. 71. 2/193b). The extent of the casualties on the Spartan 
side is numbered at nearly 1,000 and of the 700 Spartiates present, about 400 of these were 
killed (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 15). This sits reasonably well with Xenophon’s other figure, stating 
that at least as many Spartans died at Leuctra as survived (Xen. Ages. 2. 24). Diodorus’ claim 
that 4,000 were killed on the Spartan side is obviously an exaggeration, but his figure of 300 
for the Thebans is often considered to be reasonable (Diod. 15. 56. 4).457 Pausanias’ claim 
that only 47 Thebans were killed is, again, likely to be far too low, though Lazenby suggests 
that this figure may indicate the number killed in the Sacred Band.458 Having said that, 
Pausanias also states that more than 1,000 were killed on the Spartan side, which is fairly 
close to Xenophon’s figure (Paus. 9. 13. 12), a number also confirmed by Plutarch (Plut. 
Ages. 28. 5). Whatever the actual losses were on either side, it is clear that, as even Xenophon 
admits, the attempt to despatch as many Spartiates as possible was entirely successful.  
 
Word was sent back to Sparta and arrived when they were celebrating the 
Gymnopaediae, which caused considerable distress amidst the populace. The ephors decided 
to send another army to support the now defeated force at Leuctra. This was no mere relief 
force either: soldiers from Mantinea, Tegea, Achaea, Phlius and other states were sent, 
alongside Spartans, Corinthians and Sicyonians manning triremes (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 18). This 
was a large-scale mobilization intended to rescue the crippled force of Cleombrotus or 
perhaps even attempt to steal back a victory. At Leuctra both sides maintained their positions 
for several days, as Xenophon claims, the Boeotians sent word to both Jason of Pherae and 





marched through Phocis to the plain of Leuctra. Once he arrived the Boeotians tried to 
convince him to help them finish off the Spartan force; however, wishing to maintain 
friendship with both sides, Jason convinced them to make a truce. Initially Epameinondas 
only allowed Sparta’s allies to leave. This action may have served to further sever the bonds 
of the Peloponnesian League,459 but the Theban finally conceded when he received word of 
the relief army’s approach. The defeated troops then marched homeward. En route over 
Cithaeron, they met the force being led by Archidamus, which then returned back into the 
Peloponnesus and disbanded (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 16-26). 
 
 
Epameinondas: The Revolutionary General? 
 
Can it then be said that, at the Battle of Leuctra, Epameinondas employed 
revolutionary tactical innovations as had never before been seen in the history of warfare? 
Throughout the past 200 years most scholars generally and unfailingly agreed with this. 
Curtius eloquently summarized this point by explaining that the military developments for 
the battle were all specifically honed to deal with the Spartan way of war.460 It cannot be 
denied that Cleombrotus was taken entirely by surprise, especially with Epameinondas’ 
decisive use of cavalry and Pelopidas’ excellent attack with the Sacred Band. More recent 
scholars, to be sure, have continued to maintain this, providing various arguments to confirm 
their assertions.461 However, in response to such claims Hanson published an article in which 
he attempted to systematically prove that every single tactic used by Epameinondas and the 
Thebans in the battle had been done before in one way or another; therefore, no such 
innovations can truly be claimed.462 Following this, subsequent scholarship tended to either 













silence, Buckler made an attempt, in a lengthy footnote, to refute some of the claims made by 
Hanson.465 Unfortunately, although he makes valid points, his refutation is necessarily short 
and does not fully argue away Hanson’s conclusions. Even more recently, taking Buckler’s 
arguments into account, Hanson has further expressed his disagreement and asserted that 
Buckler misunderstood his point of view.466 Following this Buckler attempted a further 
refutation in more detail.467 While this was done somewhat successfully, unfortunately 
Buckler’s untimely death has prevented any possibility to fully settle the matter any further 
between the two scholars. Thus, I have taken it upon myself to weigh each argument against 
one another in an attempt to come to some degree of conclusiveness on the overall novelty 
and importance of Epameinondas’ tactics at Leuctra. 
 
The first ‘innovation’ that Hanson discredits is Epameinondas’ deployment of a 
wing 50 shields deep. As cited above, the use of an unusually deep wing was certainly 
nothing new and Buckler is happy to accept this, though he does point out that never before 
had such a depth been utilized.468 Buckler then later pointed out, drawing from all examples 
of the use of a deepened wing, that its most successful utilizations were borne out of 
necessity, not by the foresight of the armies’ generals, which was the case for Leuctra.469 
However, this fails to refute Hanson’s argument, who specifically questions the viability of a 
deepened wing. Though, as he argues, there are advantages offered by increasing the depth: 
enhanced confidence, increased momentum for the charge and “adaptability to the confining 
terrain”; there are inherent disadvantages. First, a large number of men would have been 
prevented from engaging the enemy at all; second, the shorter length of the phalanx would 
have increased the risk of a flanking attack. Finally, he believes there must have been a 
“saturation point”: after a depth of about 16 to 24 the proportional increase in the thrust of the 






403;	however,	 this	was	only	due	to	 the	 fighting	taking	place	 in	 the	narrow	streets.	See	Buckler	(2013),	
664.	
469	Buckler	(2013),	664-666.	The	examples	include	the	Battle	of	Delium	(424);	the	Athenian	invasion	of	




hoplite phalanxes involved pushing from almost all of the ranks; but, a more recent study has 
shown that this was improbable, as even in a depth of 8 to 12, the front ranks would be 
crushed by their own side. Van Wees has quite convincingly argued that the fighting and 
‘pushing’ occurred only in the front two ranks of the phalanx. Xenophon, indeed, believed 
that, in theory, a phalanx with a depth of only two could withstand an army of any number 
(Xen. Cyrop. 6. 3. 21-23; 6. 4. 17). Though this scenario is unrealistic, an experienced soldier 
such as Xenophon could hardly have made such a suggestion if hoplite warfare involved 
massed pushing from the entire phalanx. What he suggests, in fact, is that only the first two 
ranks are capable of attacking the enemy; thus, in theory, without casualties, a phalanx only 
two deep could defeat a larger army of greater depth.471 What this seems to indicate for the 
Battle of Leuctra and other engagements where the Theban phalanx was of a great depth, is 
that Epameinondas was not trying to increase the strength of his charge upon the enemy, nor 
was he concerned with the length of the enemy phalanx. In this case, he must have been 
aware of the Spartan hoplites’ superiority and worried that the casualties on his left wing 
would have been too great to push them back. Therefore, he increased the depth, knowing 
that the first few rows of his wing were likely to be obliterated. If it is correct that there were 
300 Theban dead out of approximately 2,000, with a front of about 40 in width, almost eight 
rows of the Theban phalanx would have been killed. If he had drawn up the phalanx to an 
average depth, the Theban line may well have been broken. Though this was not necessarily 
an innovation, the advantages of this strategy have not been fully realized by Hanson. 
 
Second, Epameinondas’ positioning of the Theban hoplites on the left, thus 
specifically honing his troops to attack the Spartan right wing is often considered to be the 
most important ‘innovation’ that was first utilized at the battle.472 Hanson cites several 
examples in which similar strategies were employed.473 At the Battle of Plataea in 479, the 
Athenians are said to have changed their position from one wing to the other, then 
subsequently moved back, in an attempt to pit their troops directly against the Persian 
soldiers (Hdt. 9. 46-48). However, this passage in Herodotus is generally considered to 






the Spartans.474 Therefore, the exact nature and intentions of the ultimately unsuccessful 
manoeuvre cannot be determined. Then, at the Battle of Solygeia in 425, the Corinthians 
began the battle by directly attacking the Athenian right wing (Thuc. 4. 43). Again, Hanson’s 
comparison with Leuctra is somewhat misguided as the evidence implies that the Corinthians 
attacked the Athenian right, simply because they were the first to disembark from their ships. 
The engagement had not been planned; rather, the Corinthian leader, Lycophron, merely took 
the initiative to attack before the Athenians had properly assembled.475 Much later, in 382, 
when Teleutias led a force of 10,000 against the city of Olynthus, during the Spartan 
campaign to subdue the Chalcidian League, he positioned his crack Spartan troops on the left 
wing (Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 40-43). However, Buckler argues that, because Teleutias made this 
decision in order to attack the enemy as they spewed forth from the gates of the city, the left 
flank was the only “immediate line of attack”.476 Thus, he believes that it was an act of 
necessity. But it is clear that Teleutias calculated this as the best way to engage the enemy; 
therefore, in this case the decision to place the best troops on the left wing was surely pre-
conceived, but the intentions were not (as Epameinondas’ would be) in an attempt to engage 
the enemy’s elite troops directly. The reasoning was instead a matter of the tactical 
implications of assaulting an army outside the walls of its city. Then in 375, at the Battle of 
Tegyra, Pelopidas achieved victory against a larger Spartan force by forming the Sacred 
Band up in close array and directly charging the Spartan right wing (Plut. Pel. 16-17; Diod. 
15. 37. 1). Again, Buckler argued that, because of the nature of the topography, an attack on 
the Spartan right was the only option Pelopidas had.477 It must further be mentioned that 
Hanson states that Pelopidas placed his “better men” on the left.478 He has here made the 
assumption that there were more hoplites present than the 300 of the Sacred Band, making up 
a “right wing”.479 However, the evidence merely indicates that Pelopidas put what soldiers he 
had into close order in an attempt to attack at one concerted point. Finally, Hanson cites the 












against the successful Theban right wing in order to achieve victory (Xen. Hell. 4. 3. 16-20). 
However, as Buckler points out, for the initial dispositions both the Spartans and Thebans 
held the right wings of their respective sides. The emphasis of Buckler’s arguments on this 
point is that Epameinondas’ reasoning for the placement of his crack troops was wholly pre-
conceived and not something improvised on the spur of the moment. Though his strategy was 
undoubtedly inspired by such battles as Hanson cites, unlike those battles (with the possible 
exception of Tegyra),480 he was here attempting to beat the enemy by killing as many 
Spartans as possible, hence the analogy of the snake’s head.481 
 
For the use of cavalry during the battle, Hanson has argued that the only novelty 
here was Cleombrotus’ unsuccessful attempt to screen his flanking move by placing the 
cavalry in front of the phalanx.482 Buckler initially agreed with him on this point, but stressed 
that Epameinondas merely took advantage of a golden opportunity.483 He must have 
understood that by routing the Spartan cavalry, their right wing would be separated from the 
centre. Hanson is correct that there is no indication that the Boeotian cavalry intentionally 
drove them into their own line; however, as he further points out, they had nowhere else to 
go. The inevitability of the direction in which the Spartan cavalry retreated should not detract 
from the success of Epameinondas’ order. He was well aware of what he was doing and 
showed the level-headedness of a brilliant general able to make quick and correct decisions 
without hesitation. Hanson cites other previous instances where cavalry units were 
successfully integrated alongside hoplite combat, such as at the Battle of Delium in 424 
(Thuc. 4. 93), where the Boeotian cavalry from the right wing was sent to support the 
crumbling left. Other examples can be seen during Agesilaus’ campaign in Asia Minor such 
as at the Pactolos River in 395 (Xen. Hell. 3. 4. 23), where he sent his cavalry to lead the 
attack with the phalanx following close behind. Rahe, indeed, argues that Agesilaus was 












and peltasts.484 However, none of these examples are quite the same as at Leuctra and, in fact, 
what appears to be the best example, which Hanson does not cite, is at the Battle of Tegyra: 
Pelopidas quickly sent cavalry in an attempt to hinder the Spartans’ advance and formation of 
their phalanx. Thus at Leuctra, Epameinondas displayed a similar level of tactical excellence: 
he saw that Cleombrotus was attempting some sort of manoeuvre to thwart the Boeotian 
attack, therefore he quickly sought to hinder their progress before his own phalanx could 
engage them.485 Novel or not, the cavalry engagement bore its own uniqueness that was 
different from any battle before.  
 
This brings us to our final486 and what is probably considered Epameinondas’ most 
important innovation: the oblique formation. Buckler sees this manoeuvre as consisting of 
two separate innovations: first, the left advancing obliquely ahead of the right; second, the 
right avoiding battle by ‘refusing’ the wing.487 Hanson argued against the first by remarking 
that the oblique formation was an inevitable result of a deep left wing. That Plutarch recorded 
this and Xenophon did not was simply because the latter thought this would have been an 
obvious result of the Theban dispositions.488 However, the obviousness and inevitability of 
the oblique advance are not arguments against its novelty. Naturally if Epameinondas 
intended to maintain the standard rightward drift, he would probably have stationed his crack 
troops on the right. But by placing them on the left, the opposite direction was necessary. 
Admittedly, the only source that specifically states that the right wing refused or withdrew is 
Diodorus, whose confused account provides much suspect information (Diod. 15. 55. 2). But 
whether the right wing withdrew or advanced slowly, an oblique formation would have 
formed. In this case, it may be argued that Plutarch’s account implies that the right wing 
avoided battle as Diodorus explicitly says it did, though it did not necessarily move 













to withdraw when they faced equally suspect, allied Peloponnesian troops opposite?” This 
question seems astounding for two reasons: one, the Boeotians were greatly outnumbered, 
therefore avoiding a head-on collision with the enemy was paramount; two, there is no 
evidence to indicate that the Boeotians had any real idea of the actual extent of discontent 
amongst the Spartan allies and they surely could not risk the entire battle whether they had 
become aware of this or not. Either way, the argument should be made on the strength of 
Plutarch, not Diodorus, and whether or not Xenophon deliberately omitted to mention the 
oblique advance or just assumed that the reader would understand this, Hanson makes no 
particular indication nor offers evidence that actually detracts from the fact that this tactic 
was completely novel. 
 
If none of Epameinondas’ use of tactics can be said to be novel, should he not be 
considered an innovator of warfare? Of course, in reality, he should be. To deny this is, based 
on the evidence, utterly groundless. Yes, he was not the first to deepen a flank, place the 
crack troops on the left or coordinate a cavalry attack with the advance of the phalanx. 
Though the oblique advance was almost undoubtedly an innovation, if it was simply an 
inevitable result of his dispositions, surely, he still deserves credit for its debut. What, 
however, is his most significant contribution is actually the fact that his tactics were not 
novel, but that he developed them and combined them together in a way that most certainly 
was. The nature of his tactics at Leuctra are most appropriately described in Ward’s 
translation of Curtius: “Epaminondas, whose philosophical mind could not rest satisfied with 
isolated changes and inventions, now sought to develop a new system of tactics”.489 Thus, the 
various innovations that had been attempted throughout the previous century of incessant 
warfare were brought together in a manner that finally demonstrated that the Spartan army 










The Reduction of Sparta	370-369 B.C. 
 
 
Aftermath and Consolidation 
 
In the weeks and months following the Battle of Leuctra, almost all of mainland 
Greece went through significant changes during what might be termed as a hegemonic power 
vacuum. However, the true extent of Sparta’s downfall was not yet widely perceivable and it 
would continue to be a formidable threat to its enemies for some time.490 Probably within 
only a few weeks of the battle, Athens saw an opportunity to establish their defence against 
the potential threat of an invasion from Boeotia; thus, they invited ambassadors from all 
Greek states (excluding Persian held states) to re-ratify the Peace of Antalcidas. Unlike the 
peace from earlier in the year, this agreement included clauses for a defensive alliance; 
hence, all those who unlawfully attacked another state, should be subject to attack from 
guarantors of the peace. This, as most scholars agree, was an attempt from Athens to attain 
the position, which Sparta had previously achieved from the Peace of Antalcidas in 387/6.491 
With Sparta apparently no longer capable of calling itself hegemon of Greece, Athens 
instigated this peace in a desperate attempt to raise its pre-eminence throughout the Aegean. 
Naturally neither Thebes, nor presumably any of the Boeotian cities were present at the 
peace, but the oath was apparently sworn by every other state with the exception of Elis 
(Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 1-3).492 
 
Elis had previously lost ownership of Triphylia, as well as the towns of Margana and 
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result of the Spartan defeat, they decided the time was ripe to reclaim their ancestral rule; 
consequently, they refused to swear to the peace (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 2-3). This treaty also 
instigated further defiance against Sparta starting late in 371 and throughout 370. With the 
independence that was supposed to be officially guaranteed by the peace, the people of 
Mantinea decided to rebuild their city walls and re-establish themselves as a city-state.494 
Agesilaus journeyed to the city as an ambassador and tried to convince them to put their work 
on hold; a proposal, which was sternly refused (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 3-5). Sometime afterwards 
Argos became wracked with political variance wherein democratic demagogues led the 
populace against a faction of aristocratic oligarchs, apparently killing over 1,200.495 
Meanwhile in Tegea, the faction of Proxenus and Callibius tried to convince the Arcadians to 
form a league,496 which would be led by a council called the myrioi497 and a standing army of 
5,000 soldiers. Their actions led to civil strife against the faction of Stassipus. After Proxenus 
was killed in an engagement, Callibius fled to Mantinea, having requested their assistance. 
Mantinean soldiers were sent to Tegea and accordingly despatched Stassipus and any of his 
faction who remained in the city (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 6-9; Diod. 15. 59. 1-4). 800 of the oligarchs 
managed to escape to Sparta and requested their support. The Spartans were delighted to have 
a pretext to put the Arcadians in their place and subsequently sent a force under Agesilaus. 
What followed was an eventful but ultimately fruitless campaign for either side, though 
Agesilaus declared that he disbanded his army without having been properly challenged by 
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Meanwhile, because of the internal turmoil within the Peloponnesus,498 the 
Boeotians and Thessalians were given free rein to consolidate and expand their influences 
throughout central Greece. On his return to Thessaly, Jason captured Hyampolis, which was a 
strategically important city for passage between Phocis and Locris and into Orchomenus. He 
then demolished the defences of Heraclea, allowing him unhindered access through the pass 
of Thermopylae. From these actions, it seems more than clear that he was paving the way for 
an invasion of Boeotia (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 27-28; Diod. 15. 57. 2).499 For the time being the 
Thebans needed to consolidate their dominion over Boeotia before thinking about expanding 
beyond their native borders. Thus, early in 370, Epameinondas was charged with subduing 
and reducing the inhabitants of Orchomenus. However, hoping to settle the issue more 
diplomatically, he managed to secure the city’s safety provided that they join the Boeotian 
federation, albeit with substantially less political power (Diod. 15. 57. 1).500 Buckler has 
noted that this move would have helped to increase the unity of the Boeotian League whilst 
preventing a potentially discreditable use of military force.501 The southern coast of Boeotia 
was also possibly fortified with watchtowers around this time from Chorsiae to Thisbae and 
Siphae, then Creusis.502 
 
Any designs that the Thebans had on the north were initially hindered by the 
presence of the growing threat of Jason of Pherae. After his calculated actions at Leuctra and 
subsequent military endeavours while returning to Thessaly, Epameinondas and the Thebans 
must have viewed him with a great deal of caution and suspicion. If it is true that Jason 
intended on conquering Persia (Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 12; Isoc. 5. 119), then subjugation of the 
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the Great would later discover. Indeed, turmoil at home was the reason for Agesilaus’ failure 
in the east over 20 years earlier.503 With this ever-increasing threat from the north, 
Epameinondas’ consolidation and expansion of alliances throughout Boeotia was essential. 
He could not reasonably further his apparent ambitions of dismantling the power of Sparta 
when Jason had just cleared the pathway into Boeotia. Though there is no indication that the 
Thebans would have risked open battle with the Thessalians, the results could have been 
potentially detrimental to their newly attained position of power. Certainly, Jason appears to 
have been openly confident that his shrewdness and military experience would be more than 
a match for the recently discovered genius of the Theban general as Westlake argues (Diod. 
15. 60. 1-2).504 On the other hand Westlake’s certainty in Jason’s military ability may be 
over-stated as the latter was surely an excellent general, but there is no evidence that he had 
experience in large-scale battles comparable to that of Leuctra. But it must be noted that 
Jason’s overwhelming superiority, and apparently innovative use of cavalry,505 would have 
provided a distinct advantage over the Boeotians’ predominantly hoplite force.  
 
In spite of this, Jason’s standing army of 6,000 highly trained mercenaries and the 
possible potential of drafting a further force of 20,000 hoplites, 8,000 cavalry and perhaps as 
many peltasts (Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 5, 19),506 would have amounted to the largest fighting force in 
all of mainland Greece. By 370, Jason had consolidated his reign and was in a strong position 
to muster such an army; hence, he appears to have been doing just that at the time of the 
Pythian festival (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 30), around late August to early September.507 When news 
of this amassing sortie reached Thebes, the desperation of their situation must have dawned 
on them. Fortunately circumstances quickly changed for the Thessalians when, shortly after 
an inspection of his cavalry, Jason was assassinated by seven young men, who according to 













behest of Jason’s brother Polydorus (Ephorus FGrH 70 F214 = Diod. 15. 60. 5).508 Indeed, 
Xenophon states that the assassins were welcomed by many other Greek cities, a fact which 
indicated how fearful they were of Jason’s tyranny (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 31-32). Because of the 
overwhelming good fortune and benefit this meant for Thebes, Tropea has theorized that the 
assassination may have been engineered by the Thebans, in which case the order could have 
come from Pelopidas or Epameinondas himself.509 However, as Westlake argues, there is no 
conclusive reason to make such an assumption, considering that there are several equally 
plausible possibilities.510 Despite this, such a scenario should not be ruled out and because the 
Thebans were certainly aware of the impending danger, it is not beyond the realms of 
possibility that they preferred to resort to unscrupulous dealings than face an army of 
overwhelming numbers. 
 
Regardless of the motive behind Jason’s assassination, the Boeotians would 
certainly have been fearful of him and his death provided a massive relief from the danger of 
an invasion from the north. Making the most of the reprieve offered to them by the ensuing 
internal difficulties the united Thessaly must have faced, the Thebans quickly secured a so-
called defensive alliance with Phocis and alliances with the states in Locris, Acarnania, 
Aetolia and Euboea, which notably defected from the Athenian Confederacy in order to join. 
Further north they established alliances with the Malians and probably the Oitaioi, as well as 
freeing the territory of Heraclea, allowing safe passage through Thermopylae. With the 
doorway into Thessaly open on several fronts, the Thessalians were also compelled into 
alliance with Thebes.511 All of this appears to have been achieved within the single 
campaigning season of 370. Buckler imagines an expedition led by Epameinondas and even 
plotted out the probable route in which he led his forces.512 Indeed, amidst the negotiations 
for these alliances Epameinondas was likely to have been integral to their implementation; 
however, there is no other intelligible evidence that a Boeotian army was led on a lengthy 
foray through central Greece at this time. Furthermore, the exact nature of these alliances 
cannot be determined with certainty beyond the fact that most of these states provided 
	







soldiers for the up-and-coming campaign in the Peloponnesus.513 Though the Phocians would 
later state that their alliance with Thebes was purely defensive (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 4), it was not 
necessarily the case at this point owing to the obvious fact that they also provided troops for 
the campaign. As well as this, Xenophon refers to the Phocians on the matter of their 
relations with Thebes as subjects (ὑπήκοοι). This implies that the Phocians were, perhaps not 
violently, but forcibly compelled into submission by the Thebans. On the other hand, Buckler 
argues that, because Xenophon later admitted that the alliance was defensive, his assertion of 
subjugation was based solely on his prejudice towards the Thebans. Additionally, the 
temptation for booty may well have compelled them to join the expedition.514 Diodorus also 
describes the alliances as φιλοῖ, though his wording should not necessarily be taken at face 
value. Although we cannot ultimately conclude that all the alliances were defensive by 
nature, as Buckler does, it is likely that all of these states were compelled through practicality 
and fear into alliance with Thebes; an alliance which, does not appear to have been 
imperialistic but may have been influenced by the presence of a Boeotian army, possibly with 
Epameinondas at the helm. 
 
 
The First Peloponnesian Expedition  
 
The Spartan campaign in Arcadia led by Agesilaus probably started around late 
autumn or the beginning of winter of 370 (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 20). Despite their loss at Leuctra, 
the Spartan reputation for military superiority had not yet been entirely tarnished; therefore, 
the Arcadians prudently sent envoys to find help. First the Athenians were asked, but they 
refused, perhaps feeling that it would breach their newly established peace treaty.515 The next 
choice, naturally, were the newly fledged slayers of the Spartan army, the Thebans (Diod. 15. 
62. 2-3). The decision on whether or not to help the estranged Peloponnesian states was not a 
simple one and most likely not unanimous. An assembly can be imagined, in which the 
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various pros and cons for a campaign were argued upon by various officials. It is more than 
clear that the parties of Epameinondas and Pelopidas strongly supported further military 
action against the Spartans, but there is good evidence to suggest that opinions were divided 
on the subject.  
 
We know that Menecleidas, a Theban statesman, who later condemned 
Epameinondas for his aggressive policy (Plut. Pel. 25; Nep. Epam. 5. 1-6),516 was likely to 
have been present. Menecleidas probably represented the leader of a more conservative 
faction; thus, after the league’s recent successes and consolidation of their power, they were 
hesitant to risk all they had gained for the apparent sake of affairs that had no ostensible 
bearing on Boeotia. But Epameinondas was aware that the might of Sparta had not been 
entirely vanquished and if they managed to subdue the Arcadians, some of their former glory 
could be retained. As long as they maintained their dominance over Laconia and Messenia, 
they were still a formidable and potentially threatening foe.517 It is unclear if Epameinondas’ 
intentions of completely crippling the Spartans were introduced to the assembly, but at this 
stage it seems unlikely. He managed to argue that it would be beneficial to Theban 
superiority and success if the Peloponnesian powers were able to be effectively and 
permanently emancipated from Spartan dominance. It seems that Epameinondas and 
Pelopidas staked their reputation on their triumph as the other boeotarchs relinquished all 
authority of the army, giving responsibility to the two Theban statesmen (Diod. 15. 62. 4). To 
seal the deal, the Mantineans had borrowed 10 talents from the Eleans in order to fund the 
Boeotians’ march into Arcadia (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 19). Thus, the Boeotian League once again 
rallied its troops. 
 
Having concluded an alliance,518 the Thebans began preparations for the coming 










all of their newly found allies.519 The Boeotians formed together a force of around 5,000 to 
6,000 hoplites and, along with their allies, they marched into Arcadia near the middle of the 
winter of 370/69 (Plut. Pel. 24. 2-3; Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 20). The force that ultimately marched 
into the Peloponnesus has been estimated to have been as low as 15,000 to as high as 30,000 
soldiers.520 When they arrived, Agesilaus had already departed, either unaware of the 
oncoming danger or simply under the assumption that the Thebans intended only to help in 
defence of Arcadia (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 21). However, the Arcadians did not desire to let the 
Spartans get away without repercussions and they invited the Thebans to join them on a 
massive expedition into Laconia and march on the unfortified city of Sparta itself (Diod. 15. 
62. 5). The Boeotian army in Arcadia must have been perceived by the Peloponnesians with a 
certain mystique, indeed, there is one anecdote in which Epameinondas allegedly refused to 
allow his men to dine with the locals as they would soon realise that the victors of Leuctra 
were just ordinary Greeks (Plut. An Seni 8/788a).521  
 
It is, at this point, worth discussing the actual intentions of Epameinondas. Various 
assumptions have before been made asserting that an invasion of the Peloponnesus was 
planned all along by the Theban general; however, though this cannot be ruled out, several 
points need to be stressed before any kind of conclusion can be made. The general 
assumption appears to be based mainly on the grand scale of the plans, which would 
henceforth be achieved by the army with Epameinondas as the commander-in-chief and his 
instant enthusiasm for the invitation from the Arcadians. But varying degrees of the scale of 
his forethought have been proposed: Grote, for instance, has asserted that he had been 
planning on the resettlement of Messenia and founding of Megalopolis before he had left 
Boeotia.522 Others more reasonably assert the probability that Epameinondas had envisioned 
the hope of some form of invasion into Sparta.523 And others take a contrary point of view, 











decision.524 Despite all of these relatively arbitrary opinions, very little discussion has been 
made in favour of one or the other.  
 
Without coming to any outright conclusion, Hanson has offered some indications of 
Epameinondas’ prior intentions before marching into the Peloponnesus. As mentioned 
before, the stated intentions of the campaign were to assist the Arcadians against the Spartan 
army that was harassing cities in the central Peloponnesus. However, after Leuctra, 
Epameinondas was at pains to be convinced to allow the besieged Spartan army to return 
home (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 22-24). If he had had his way, he would surely have preferred to have 
dealt with the Spartan lion there and then. If that is true, then for over a year he must have 
been brooding the idea and planning his long-desired invasion of Laconia. It is said that 
Epameinondas was one for keeping secrets and remaining silent while others spoke (Nep. 
Epam. 3. 2-3; Plut. De Recta 3/ 39b). Hanson emphasizes that, if he had indeed been planning 
on the invasion, it was best kept secret from the army and even his colleagues considering it 
was the winter season. The logistics of moving a large army long distances at this time of the 
year would have proved difficult to overcome and the great number of farmers that were 
present must have joined the expedition only begrudgingly. If on the other hand, before they 
left, they had been aware that they would spend several months trudging throughout Arcadia 
and Laconia, along with thousands of other soldiers, pillaging, plundering and generally 
exhausting the limits of their stamina, would they then have agreed to follow? It is perhaps 
doubtful, or at least Hanson certainly thinks so.525 But these points only demonstrate the 
possibility of a pre-conceived plan and Hanson’s discussion is strewn with the interpretation 
of Epameinondas as a liberator from tyranny,526 which, though he inadvertently may have 
been, we have no real reason to assume that that was key to his motivation.  
 
It is clear from Epameinondas’ conduct after Leuctra that he did desire to further 
cripple Spartan power and there is some indication that many were expecting an invasion 
from the Thebans (Plut. Ages. 30. 1). Laistner has also argued that the Thebans would not 
have mustered so large an army if they had not initially been planning on attacking Sparta 
	





and further suggests that, in the war conference that was held in Arcadia in which the 
boeotarchs were present, Epameinondas may have been the one who initiated the suggestion 
of invasion (Diod. 15. 62. 5).527 However, his argument seems to be contradicted by the 
political problems that faced the boeotarchs when they reached Arcadia. Whether or not, 
along with Epameinondas and Pelopidas, the other five boeotarchs were present,528 they 
faced a potentially fatal technicality from their Boeotian laws. As elected officials, they were 
required to relinquish their authority by the winter solstice. If then, they proceeded with an 
invasion further south they would be committing treason, the penalty for which was death.529 
Despite this, Epameinondas did not wish to waste such an opportunity and managed to 
convince his colleagues to agree to the invasion by claiming full responsibility for any 
repercussions from the Boeotian assembly. When considering this evidence, if a prolonged 
campaign had before been envisioned by the assembly, surely allowances for an extended 
term of office would have been discussed. Furthermore, Xenophon specifically notes that the 
Boeotian leaders had to be convinced to join the expedition as they were preparing to leave 
when the offer was made (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 23).  
 
Given consideration, Laistner and Hanson’s arguments fail to convince and there are 
further reasons to think differently. It is very clearly indicated by the sources that the Thebans 
began their march into the Peloponnesus while Agesilaus was still in Arcadia. Despite the 
winter season, their primary objective was to defend Arcadia from the Spartans. Therefore, it 
is likely that, when they left Boeotia, the most they could expect from the campaign was a 
battle in Arcadia against the Spartan force. Without knowing that Agesilaus would pull back 
homeward, Epameinondas could not have been certain that an invasion of Laconia would 
even have been possible at this stage. It is far more probable that he was expecting a follow 
up to Leuctra, which would be the ultimate decider in the war, especially if he managed to 
defeat Agesilaus himself. Therefore, it seems apt to conclude that, though the idea of an 










been planning it all along is not indicated by the sources and it is far more likely that the 
Arcadians first made the suggestion. On the other hand, realizing that the campaign would 
otherwise have been a waste, the offer was snapped up by the Theban boeotarch without any 
concern for his own life. It is, however, plausible that he had previously imagined liberating 
the Messenians, if it is indeed true that he had used the Shield of Aristomenes at Leuctra.530 
 
Having rallied an army of around 40,000 hoplites alongside another 30,000 peltasts 
and camp followers,531 Epameinondas formulated the plan of invasion. Because this was the 
biggest internal Greek military sortie since the Battle of Plataea in 479 and the routes into 
Laconia were difficult, one could not simply lead a massive rabble across the mountains 
lightly. Epameinondas was aware of the difficulty. Apparently, intelligence suggested that all 
of the easiest points of entry into Laconia were fortified by garrisons. These included a force 
at Oeum, in Sciritis, of emancipated Helots and 400 Tegean exiles under the command of 
Ischolaus and another at Leuctrum, near Maleatis. He also considered that the Spartans would 
fight much more ferociously in defence of their homeland, just as his own men had done the 
previous year (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 24). With a relative lack of topographical knowledge, the 
difficulty of resupplying such a huge force and the likelihood of having to fight the enemy in 
narrow passages, the logistics of the invasion must have been incredibly daunting as well as 
potentially catastrophic. In fact, because of the tremendous expense of supplying the army,532 
if the crossing of the mountain ranges was prolonged beyond just a few days, the invasion 
would probably have had to be called off. Thus, it was absolutely essential to break through 
the Spartan defence as quickly as possible in order to live off of the enemy’s land.  
 
Fortunately for the invasion force, people from the town of Caryae arrived offering 
to act as guides, seeing them across the mountain passes. In addition, word was brought of 
the dearth of Spartan soldiers, along with Perioeci, claiming that they would surely revolt if 




can	 be	 believed	when	 considering	 the	 large	 array	 of	 allies	 involved	 and	 that	 nearly	 half	 of	 them	were	
peltasts	or	simply	along	for	the	ride,	see	Bauer	(1890),	243-246;	Hanson	(1999),	425-426	n.	46.	




been the most convincing factor leading to the decision for invasion. Everything depended on 
successfully entering Laconia. Once they reached Caryae itself, the town would boost their 
water and food supply as well as providing a juncture with a path leading from Asea to 
Sciritis. If they reached Caryae quickly enough, the Spartans would have to fight the Thebans 
within their own territory.534 The disaffection of the Perioeci and the Helots must surely have 
bolstered their confidence. It was becoming abundantly apparent that the Spartans would 
struggle to mount a defence with a sufficient enough manpower to stop the invasion. 
Provided the crossing was successful, there was little else that could withstand a force of such 
immensity. It is more than clear that all of these factors influenced Epameinondas’ plan for 
the advance into Laconia. 
 
Thus, he decided to divide up the army into four separate contingents.535 Each of 
these would take an alternative path on their advance over the ranges, ultimately 
rendezvousing at Sellasia (Diod. 15. 63. 4, 64. 6). It was often a great risk for Greek armies to 
divide their forces over long distances. Hanson536 cites two examples: in 424 before the 
Battle of Delium, the Athenian generals, Demosthenes and Hippocrates attempted a two-
pronged attack on the Boeotians by land and sea but failed to successfully co-ordinate their 
arrival and the divided army was easily dealt with (Thuc. 4. 76-77, 89-101). On another 
occasion, in 413, when the Athenians were retreating after the failed Sicilian expedition, the 
army was divided between Demosthenes and Nicias. Both forces became lost and were 
subsequently cut down by the Syracusians almost to the man (Thuc. 7. 80-86). However, on 
this occasion, numbers were in Epameinondas’ favour. He could split the army into separate 
units consisting of around 15,000 to 20,000 men, each of which was a force formidable 
enough on its own. Marching in a single unit would also be difficult to co-ordinate with such 
a great number of men; it was then, strategically sound to divide up the army. Taking all the 
major routes at once would prevent the Spartans from concentrating their forces at any one 








then attack the defenders from the rear.537 The successful co-ordination of this massive-scale 
invasion was key and the guides provided by the Caryaeans must have been a most crucial 
factor for its success. 
 
The divided forces left from Mantinea, probably at separate times. The Boeotians 
took the most direct route through the mountains down the road from Tegea, along the 
Sarandopotamus and into Caryae. The Arcadians went by way of Oeum, defeating the 
garrison there under Ischolaus, then, invaded the town of Sciritis. From there they 
rendezvoused with the Boeotians in Caryae. The Argives, marching from Tegea, crossed over 
Mt. Parnon, along the Astros-Sparta road. During their climb they also fought a Spartan 
garrison led by one Alexander, which included a group of Boeotian refugees. Diodorus 
describes the Eleans’ route too ambiguously for it to be fully ascertained but they may have 
followed the Olympia-Sparta road to the south-east past Pellana, leaving this road near the 
modern village of Kalyvia, crossed the Eurotas and reached Sellasia. Here, all four 
contingents gathered together and apparently burned and pillaged the town (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 
25-27; Diod. 15. 64. 1-6).538  
 
The territory of Laconia had now been Infiltrated by a foreign army for the first 
time, according to the traditional view, since the Doric people were alleged to have settled 
there some 500 or 600 years before (Plut. Ages. 31. 2; Diod. 15. 65. 1).539 The grand army 
proceeded to march along the eastern side of the Eurotas, pillaging and plundering the 
countryside until the peaks of the Taygetus mountain range could be seen and the city of 
Sparta came into view (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 27-28). Again, Hanson envisions an uproarious scene, 
noting that since there were no crops to harvest during the winter months, the army must have 






539	 The	 so-called	 Dorian	 Invasion	 is	 traditionally	 dated	 to	 around	 the	 tenth	 century;	 however,	 it	 is	
debatable	 as	 to	 whether	 an	 actual	 invasion	 occurred	 or,	 alternatively,	 the	 ongoing	 settlement	 of	 an	




as they went, adding to their massive entourage.540 For the Spartans this would have appeared 
to be the end of all things: apparently, the women of Sparta were uncharacteristically 
overcome with fear when they saw the oncoming smoke,541 which trailed the invaders as they 
marched (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 28). Such was the enormity of the invasion that Theopompus 
referred to it as “a surging eruption of war” (Theopompus FGrH 115 F322 = Plut. Ages. 31. 
3).542 
 
With the ensuing mass upon them the Spartans had neither the time nor the numbers 
to mount a defence on the open plains; thus, it was necessary for them to withdraw to the 
capital in a desperate attempt to defend the city and its inhabitants. Agesilaus organized the 
defence by deploying his soldiers around the most central (μέσα) and strategically 
commanding (κυριώτατα) positions of the city (Plut. Ages. 31. 3). Even with well chosen 
defensive positions, the numbers of Spartiates remaining to be recruited would have been 
perilously low, perhaps as few as 1,000: scarcely enough to defend the city against the 
onslaught. Because of this and the disaffection of the Perioeci, more soldiers were necessary 
for a successful defence. As a result of the desperation, Agesilaus decided to offer freedom to 
any Helot that fought in the defence of Sparta. The turnouts for this ploy were staggering: 
some 6,000 Helots rallied together, enough indeed to make the Spartiates nervous that they 
would turn against them.543 Fortunately for the Spartans, the mercenaries from Orchomenus 
came to their aid, along with troops from Phlius, Corinth, Epidaurus, Pellene, Troezen, 
Hermione, Halia and Sicyon (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 28-29; 7. 2. 2-3). We can perhaps assume that 
most of these allies consisted of the troops who were involved in the recent expedition in 
Arcadia, which included Orchomenians and Phliasians (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 10-21). Along with 
the other allies that joined them, arriving by sea via Prasiae (Xen. Hell. 7. 2. 2),544 the 
Spartans appear to have mustered a force of approximately 10,000 soldiers, which would 
include a large body of peltasts and some cavalry (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 14, 17). It is perhaps also 









later.545 With well-established defensive positions, this modest force now had a good chance 
of preventing the invaders from overwhelming the city. 
 
Because the Eurotas had swollen over the winter period (Diod. 15. 65. 2; Plut. Ages. 
32. 2),546 it was too dangerous for Epameinondas to cross the river so close to the city. He 
then marched the army further south and crossed near the town of Amyclae (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 
30). Aware of the difficulty the enemy force would have fording the river, Agesilaus 
apparently sent out his troops to attack them amidst the disorganization caused by the 
crossing. At this point the sources differ significantly: according to Diodorus, the Spartans 
managed to inflict heavy casualties until enough of the army had crossed to encircle the 
enemy, which caused them to flee back to the city (Diod. 15. 65. 2-3). Frontinus and 
Polyaenus give similar accounts in which Agesilaus announced to the troops that an oracle 
told him to fight the Thebans on high ground. He therefore sent out a small force to entice the 
enemy to fight when crossing the river, drew them into an ambush and managed to kill 600 of 
them (Front. Strat. 1. 10. 3; Polyaen. 2. 1. 27). Plutarch’s account depicts a similar scenario 
in which Agesilaus waited for Epameinondas on the other side of the river, but he only offers 
highlights of the event (Plut. Ages. 32. 2-3). On the other hand, Xenophon seems to imply 
that they crossed the Eurotas unopposed (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 30). Buckler accepts Xenophon’s 
account without question and Hanson is happy to relate the account, though is somewhat 
cautious. Underhill points out that it is hard to believe that Xenophon would have completely 
ignored a Spartan victory. The tradition of a fight at the Eurotas probably comes from 
Ephorus and Callisthenes. It is possible that the engagement itself has been exaggerated and, 
instead, was a fairly minor skirmish.547 However, it seems difficult to come to any reasonable 
conclusion when considering that Xenophon is the only one who mentions that 
Epameinondas marched further south before crossing the Eurotas: the others seem to imply 
that he crossed much closer to Sparta. Despite this these divergences have not attracted 










Upon crossing the river, Epameinondas marched the army toward the city of Sparta, 
proceeding to plunder the land as they went (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 30).549 Again, at this point we 
have a divergence in the sources. Diodorus describes a rather large-scale assault upon the city 
in which the attackers pressed hard upon the Spartans but found it too difficult to successfully 
penetrate the strong defences and were thus recalled by Epameinondas after some casualties 
(Diod. 15. 65. 4). Xenophon, on the other hand, describes a scene in which the Spartans sent 
a small force of cavalry and 300 hoplites to the racecourse at the sanctuary of Poseidon 
Gaeochus.550 Here they ambushed part of the enemy army causing them to flee briefly before 
they stood their ground and encamped themselves, presumably on advantageous ground 
(Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 30-32). Plutarch does not mention any fighting at the city and both 
Polyaenus and Aelian relate a story in which Agesilaus wisely restrained his men from battle 
in order to focus their efforts on the defence of the hill.551 However, this divergence is not 
widely discussed with most scholars taking Xenophon’s side and, on the strength of the other 
sources, it is generally accepted that, because the city was well-defended and he could not 
entice the Spartans to rally forth for a pitched battle, Epameinondas did not actually attack 
the city itself.552 
 
Other than the prudence of avoiding a potentially bloody siege against a city made 
up of winding streets, there were alternative reasons that may have prevented Epameinondas 
from destroying Sparta outright. Buckler speculates that the Theban general never intended 
on completely dismantling Spartan culture. In fact, as he suggests, it was to the advantage of 
Thebes and all of Boeotia for that matter to preserve at least a semblance of their former 
glory. It was clear that the other Peloponnesian city-states were unpredictable in their bid for 





550	 Underhill	 (1900),	 262-23,	 asserts	 that	 this	 is	 the	 sanctuary	 mentioned	 in	 Pausanias	 to	 be	 near	
Therapne	(Paus.	3.	20.	2);	however,	this	would	be	strange	as	Therapne	is	nearly	five	kilometres	east	of	the	
Eurotas	and	Xenophon	says	Epameinondas	had	just	crossed	over	to	the	western	bank.	Either	Xenophon	







particular, it was necessary to maintain a certain balance of power. This idea is illustrated by 
Polyaenus who describes Epameinondas’ response to being accosted for not capturing Sparta. 
He apparently argued that if he had destroyed Sparta, they would have to go to war with all 
the other Peloponnesians (Polyaen. 2. 3. 5).553 Similarly, it has also been suggested that 
Epameinondas’ intention was only to humiliate the Spartans, not to destroy them, as this 
would be enough to demonstrate Boeotian supremacy.554 Shipley has further noted that later 
events would show that the Thebans did not have the resources to garrison the area in any 
event and therefore allowing the Spartans to remain as a counterbalance for Peloponnesian 
power was a practical solution.555 On another note, Tuplin has asserted that the most likely 
reason for the withdrawal southward from the city was the arrival of the Spartan allies.556 He 
offers some fairly reasonable chronological considerations to prove his point. Xenophon 
further indicates that the allies had to slip past the invaders to reach Sparta and surely did 
(Xen. Hell. 7. 2. 3). Another point may perhaps be speculated: at the end of the 
Peloponnesian war in 404/3, the Thebans wanted to raze the city of Athens to the ground, a 
suggestion, which the Spartans refused (Xen. Hell. 2. 2. 20). The Thebans had received a 
rather bad reputation over the last three decades because of this fact.557 In order to create an 
image of liberators rather than conquerors, it was perhaps decided by Epameinondas to alter 
this reputation by sparing the conquered. In fact, he went a step further and allowed them to 
keep their autonomy. Rather than choosing a single motive, it may be best to assume that all 
of these factors were taken into consideration, particularly with the arrival of the Spartan 
allies. It was therefore not expedient to attempt to take the city of Sparta itself. 
 
In an effort to compel the Spartans to fight them in open battle many of the invaders 
hurled insults and taunts at them, calling Agesilaus by name to come out and fight. Wisely, 
he responded by saying that when the occasion was suitable, he would risk everything in 
battle against them (Diod. 15. 65. 4-5; Plut. Ages. 32. 6-7). Epameinondas withdrew his army 







557	 An	 example	 of	 this	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 Plataicus	 in	 which	 Isocrates	 cites	 this	 occasion	 to	 further	
discredit	the	conduct	of	the	Thebans	(Isoc.	14.	31).	
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continuing to pillage the landscape. They took the road to Helos and the port of Gythium. 
Along the way they sacked and burned every township they came across. When they reached 
the mouth of the Eurotas, the road forked at this point, east to Helos and west to Gythium, 
marching along the southern shoreline of the Peloponnesus.558 Once at the old Spartan port, 
Epameinondas proceeded to besiege it for three days (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 32). Because the port 
had been sacked by the Athenian Tolimides in 455 (Paus. 1. 27. 5), it is likely that the town 
had since been fortified, which would make sense considering how long the siege lasted. An 
anecdote in Polyaenus tells of how the Thebans occupied the town, then three days later 
Isidas, the son of Phoebidas, ousted the garrison, which had been left there (Polyaen. 2. 9. 1). 
However, the story of Isidas appears to be a replication of a later scene in 362 at Sparta (Plut. 
Ages. 34. 6-8; Ael. Var. Hist. 6. 3). Thus, it is perhaps unwise to use his testimony as 
evidence that Epameinondas was successful in capturing the port.559 Furthermore, Buckler 
has noted that Xenophon’s use of an imperfect verb (προσέβαλλον) to describe the attack 
indicates that the siege was not completed and therefore unsuccessful.560 During this leg of 
the invasion it is said that many of the Perioeci joined in the fight, having been liberated by 
the army of Epameinondas (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 32). 
 
After a lengthy campaign in Laconia, the Theban general decided it was best to 
leave the now thoroughly ravaged land. The principal reasons for withdrawing at this point 
are often argued alongside the reasons for leaving the city unscathed; however, different 
factors underlie both situations and it is important not to conflate one event with another.561 
According to the sources the key reasons for the army’s ultimate withdrawal from Laconia 
are: one, the Peloponnesian allies had begun to disband owing to winter weariness and an 
overload of plunder; two, supplies were running low as practically the entire landscape had 
either been plundered or burned; three, it was winter and storms had descended upon them.562 
Plutarch also cites Theopompus who claimed that Agesilaus bribed the Thebans with 10 
	
558	For	the	road	to	Gythium	see	Leake	(1830b),	36-37;	Roy	(1961),	206-215;	Buckler	(1980a),	84-85.	
559	 As	 Fermor	 (1958),	 304,	 does,	 though	 admittedly	 this	 is	 not	 a	 scholarly	 work.	 Hanson	 (1999),	 93,	








talents for their expense to withdraw (Theopompus FGrH 115 F323 = Plut. Ages. 32. 8). This 
story is generally rejected and even Plutarch is suspicious of it as no other writer mentions it 
(Plut. Ages. 33. 1).563 All factors considered, Epameinondas had achieved most of what he 
intended to in Laconia. With a diminishing army and supplies he had no reason to remain 
there any longer. On the other hand, though we cannot know when the idea was first 
conceived or presented to the army, the second phase of Epameinondas’ plan was yet to be 
enacted: the re-foundation of the independent state of Messenia. He gathered up his 
remaining forces, probably mostly soldiers from central and northern Greece by this stage, 
and marched northward out of Laconia via the road to the plain of Megalopolis.564 
 
 
The Re-founding of Messenia 
 
After almost 300 years (as the sources indicate) Epameinondas liberated from 
slavery and returned the land of Messenia to the people who had lived there in one form or 
another from as far back as the Dorian Invasion and possibly even the Mycenaean Bronze 
Age. However, in order to fully grasp the magnitude of this deed, it is worth considering a 
few aspects of Messenian-Spartan history. By the time of the first Messenian war, dated to 
around 743/2-724/2565 (Paus. 14. 5. 9-10; 4. 13. 7), the Spartan state had already established 
itself as masters of Laconia and had coveted much of the plain of Makaria at the head of the 
Messenian Gulf, which lies south-west of Sparta beyond Taygetus. It has also been generally 
recognized that, by c. 750, a level of contact between Messenia and Sparta had been firmly 
established.566 At this time Messenia consisted merely of the Stenyklaros plain.567 From this 
it is clear that the Spartans had already begun to encroach upon the territory of the 
Messenians before the alleged disputes that triggered the war as Pausanias claims (Paus. 4. 4. 
	
563	Shipley	(1997),	348,	points	out	 that	bribery	 is	a	common	accusation	 in	hostile	accounts	such	as	 the	
alleged	bribery	of	Sphodrias,	see	above,	78-79.	See	also	Flower	(1994),	199-202;	Morison	BNJ	115	F323.	







4-5. 7).568 The Spartan wont for conquest and subjugation in the eighth century appears to 
have been largely due to the “relative overpopulation” in the Eurotas valley and, because they 
had successfully integrated the Laconian Perioeci into their culture, it was perhaps a natural 
step to look to their militarily inferior neighbours across the Taygetus. Other city-states 
solved their population problems by either over-seas colonization, which was not a common 
step for inland states, or internal colonization (as practiced in Boeotia, the Argolid and 
Attica), which was difficult given the nature of the Spartiate-Perioeci relations as well as the 
fact that the land of Laconia was not the most productive, agriculturally.569 Whether or not 
the initial triggers for war can be believed, they may in fact represent what was a growing 
animosity between the two territories, particularly as the Spartans began to expand their 
territory within the vicinity of Messenia.  
 
Thus, while most states began to prosper economically via exchange with their 
colonized settlements, Sparta at the same time became vastly wealthier, but their wealth was 
primarily obtained from the conquest of agricultural land. Sparta had then committed itself to 
an almost exclusively agricultural economy and its future success and power was, as a result, 
inextricably linked to the subjugation of its Peloponnesian territories, especially Messenia. 
Though Sparta could and would certainly be daring in its endeavours, it could never make an 
outward step without ensuring the security of its assets back home.570 Because of this and the 
animosity that the Messenians had towards them, Spartan superiority was constantly treading 
on thin ice. This is clearly illustrated by the uprisings that occurred over the centuries 
including the Second Messenian War (685-668) and the attempts at uprising or escape in the 
fifth century.571 What these revolts always lacked was significant support from external city-
states, which is exactly what was brought to them in the winter of 369. Epameinondas clearly 
understood both the fact that the Messenian Helots would take any chance of freedom and 
	
568	 For	 a	 recent	 overview	 and	 assessment	 of	 the	 archaeological	 and	 literary	 evidence	 concerning	 the	
connections	and	distinctions	between	 the	people	of	Laconia	and	Messenia	 see	Luraghi	 (2008),	68-146,	




571	 The	 chronology	 of	 these	 events	 has	 been	 disputed	 due	 to	 the	 apparent	 fallibility	 of	 the	 Olympiad	
dating	system.	Thus,	the	first	Messenian	war	was	now	c.	600	and	the	second	war	in	the	late	sixth	early	
fifth	 century.	 See	 Shaw	 (2003),	 esp.	 100-145;	 Bourke	 (2018),	 69-76.	 In	 the	 end,	 dating	 these	 alleged	
events	 will	 always	 be	 tentative.	 For	 many	 more	 of	 the	 numerous	 attempts	 at	 chronology	 see	 Odgen	
(2004),	133	n.	14.	
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autonomy with gusto and that, without the economic support of the land, the greatness of 
Sparta would never recover. 
 
On returning to Arcadia, Epameinondas compelled the remainder of his army to join 
him in freeing Messenia from its enslavement. It is not clear when he first announced this 
idea to the army or when he conceived of it, but it is likely that it had been part of his wider 
plan for Spartan oppression from at least the beginning of the invasion. Unfortunately, 
Xenophon’s pride or embarrassment on behalf of the Spartans has prevented him from even 
referring to this most significant event; therefore, we must rely primarily on the fairly vivid 
account by Pausanias. Accordingly, Epameinondas held a conference with his soldiers and 
the Arcadians and the notion was agreed upon by all parties involved (Diod. 15. 66. 1). The 
Argives also offered their assistance and bid Epiteles, son of Aeschines, presumably the 
leader of the Argive forces that went to Laconia, to follow the Thebans into Messenia (Paus. 
4. 26. 7). As the greater part of the Arcadian soldiers had returned home, having taken as 
much loot as they could bear (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 50; Plut. Ages. 32. 8), the Theban general led 
his still large army consisting of men from central Greece, as well as an unspecified number 
of liberated Laconian Perioeci and Helots. There is no indication that they were met by any 
hostility on their way into Messenia. It is likely that whatever Spartan defences were 
normally present there had been recalled for the protection of Sparta. With the knowledge of 
the oncoming liberators the Helots in Messenia may well have already ousted their local 
δεσπόται as they now had nothing to fear from Spartan reprisals. 
 
In order to found a new city-state Epameinondas needed two things: people to 
populate it and a site for the new capital. The former task was by far the easiest. By 
comparison to the dwindling state of the Spartiate population, the number of Helots was vast. 
Hanson’s estimate of a total population of over 200,000 Helots in Messenia alone, as well as 
another 100,000 to 150,000 Helots and Perioeci in Laconia, may well be too high but they 
were still likely to outnumber the Spartiates by a great deal.572 Naturally the land would 
	
572	 Hanson	 (1999),	 66,	 423	 n.	 34.	 Most	 other	 scholars	 have	 been	 too	 cautious	 to	 give	 any	 specific	
estimates,	although	if	 the	ratio	(7:1)	of	Helots	to	Spartiates	at	the	Battle	of	Plataea	is	anything	to	go	by	
(Hdt.	9.	10,	28-29),	the	Helot	population	must	have	been	much	greater,	possibly	reaching	numbers	in	the	
low	hundreds	 of	 thousands	 (Hdt.	 9.	 10,	 28-29).	 See	 also	Cartledge	 (1979),	 175-177,	 307-12;	 Cartledge	
(1987),	37-40,	160-175;	Lazenby	(1985),	56-62.	Alternatively,	a	more	recent	study	has	concluded	that	the	
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require a large population to be able to defend itself if Sparta ever attempted to take arms 
against it, thus he also invited the refugee Perioeci and Helots from Laconia to take resident 
in Messenia as full citizens (Diod. 15. 66. 1). He also sent word to all of the Messenians who 
had settled in various places including Italy, Sicily and Euesperitae. This was apparently well 
received and acted upon with enthusiasm (Paus. 4. 26. 5). There is some contention as to the 
extent of the returned Messenian exiles, local Messenian Helots and Laconian Helots and 
Perioeci. It may be that the predominant population of the new Messenian state were of the 
latter two ethne, which would later be a cause of complaint for the Spartans (Isoc. 6. 28), 
arguing that it was a simple matter between slave and master as opposed to the return home 
of a long-lost culture.573 For Epameinondas, however, the exact ethnicity of the inhabitants of 
new Messenia was not important. Instead the propaganda behind such a claim would be 
enough for the deed to impress upon the rest of the Greek world. Either way, the indication 
we are given is that, once word had been sent out, the population quickly grew from a rapid 
flow of immigrants.574 
 
The location of the new capital required even more careful thought. The site needed 
to be easily defensible as it would be the major stronghold against attacks from east of the 
Taygetus. It would also need to adhere to the inhabitants’, albeit small, cultural affinities. 
Pausanias’ account describes how Epameinondas chose the site. In a dream, an old man, 
appearing as a priest of Demeter, bid him to restore Messenia to its people for which, in 
exchange, he would be given undying glory. Subsequently, Epiteles also experienced a 
similar apparition in which he was told to dig on Mt. Ithome wherever he found Yew and 
Myrtle in order to rescue the old woman (ἀνασῶσαι τήν γραῦν). Piously obeying the dream, 
Epiteles proceeded to dig on the mountain and found a copper urn. Bringing this to 
Epameinondas, the latter looked inside and found a thin sheet of tin, inscribed with the 
mysteries of the great goddesses. This is said to have been the deposit (παρακαταθήκη) of 
	





Either	 view	 is	 derived	 from	 separate	 political	 agendas	 in	 which	 both	 sides	 attempted	 to	 justify	 their	




Aristomenes. Pausanias then relates a story of how two youths from Andania angered the 
Dioscuri because they killed some Spartans who were giving sacrifice to them, which caused 
their perpetual hatred of the Messenians. However, because of the dream of Epameinondas 
they would hate them no longer. It is said that when these inscriptions were discovered, 
priests wrote them down into books. Epameinondas also consulted oracles of Bacis (βάκιδι), 
which said that it was foretold that the greatness of Sparta would fall and that Messenia 
would once again be inhabited. Consequently, after making auspicious offerings to the gods, 
he decided to found the new capital on Mt. Ithome (Paus. 4. 26. 6-27.5). 
 
Despite the spuriousness of some of the details of the account, the story may reflect 
Epameinondas’ use of oracles and dreams as propaganda tools, as he so successfully utilized 
at Leuctra.575 In order to steer clear of any Spartan claim that the new Messenians had no 
right to autonomy, Epameinondas needed to secure divine sanction to justify his actions in 
the minds of people all over the Greek world. A story very much like the one recounted by 
Pausanias would have been ideal to spread throughout the populace, demonstrating the 
righteousness of the deed. Though it cannot be confirmed whether this was the actual story 
that was used, considering the fact that similar devices were used during the Leuctra 
campaign, we can perhaps expect that Epameinondas was likely to have employed them on 
this occasion as well. The political ramifications of this deed were even more significant than 
Leuctra and it was absolutely crucial that his actions were considered legitimate by the rest of 
the Greek world in order to prevent them from aiding Sparta to recapture the land and its 
inhabitants.576  
 
If that is the case, this evidence does not then explain why Epameinondas chose Mt. 
Ithome, but on brief reflection, there are some obvious answers to this question. If Pausanias 
can be believed, the local Messenians refused to resettle in Andania or Oechalia as both sites 
had previously met with disaster (Paus. 4. 26. 6). Andania, according to tradition, was the site 
of one of the original cities of Messenia, founded by Polycaon, a Laconian prince, and his 
wife, Messene, of whom the land was named after (Paus. 4. 1. 1-2). During the Second 





Andania to desert the city (Paus. 4. 15. 4, 17. 6-10). Oechalia was also an ancient city, named 
after the wife of Melaneus, a son of Apollo (Paus. 4. 2. 2), which was also sacked according 
to a poem attributed to Homer (Strabo 14. 1. 18; Callim. Epig. 7). Because of the past failures 
of these locations to withstand attack, the locals felt it would be unwise to settle them again. 
However, it is doubtful that Epameinondas would have even considered these locations as 
they were around the northwest of Messenia, along the Arcadian border:577 hardly 
strategically sound places for defence against Sparta. Fortunately, a much better choice was 
available. After Andania had been abandoned, Aristomenes apparently led the remaining 
insurgents to Mt. Ithome where they proceeded to withstand Spartan attacks for 11 years 
(Paus. 4. 17. 10-11). Here was a site, which was held as part of the local Messenian Helots’ 
own proud history of revolt and would clearly be a good stronghold for defence against their 
former masters. As Buckler puts, because it “enjoyed a central position in the plain of 
Pamisos, Epameinondas chose it as the only logical site for the capital of the new Messenian 
polis”.578 
 
Before construction of the new city began, Epameinondas and the Thebans made 
sacrifices to various gods and heroes, especially to Aristomenes.579 Then, on the following 
day construction on the new walls began. Apparently, the builders worked to the sounds of 
Boeotian and Argive flutes (Paus. 4. 27. 7-8). The remains of this city are amongst the most 
impressive of all Classical Greek sites. The walls themselves were over four meters high with 
a thickness of up to two and a half meters. Along the walls were built over 30 towers, which 
rose over them about twice the height. They were built from un-mortared square blocks, 
which made up what would become a vast fortress. In Pausanias’ time they are still referred 
to as among the strongest fortifications in the Greek world (Paus. 4. 31. 5). It is likely that the 
design of the city was conceived by Theban architects.580 Hanson notes that such a spectacle, 




579	 Though	 it	 is	 uncertain	 how	 prevalent	 the	 stories	 of	 Aristomenes	were	 by	 this	 period,	 his	 cult	was	
certainly	 established	 by	 the	 restoration	 of	 Messene	 and	 a	 number	 of	 factors	 bear	 striking	 parallels	
between	Aristomenes	and	Epameinondas,	see	Ogden	(2004),	esp.	38,	49-50,	56,	62,	90-92,	97,	106-108,	
141-142.	
580	 The	 walls	 were	 constructed	 in	 the	 same	 emplekton	 technique	 that	 was	 used	 to	 construct	 a	 large	
number	 of	 fortifications	 throughout	 Boeotia	 from	 this	 period.	 See	 Luraghi	 (2008),	 217-218.	 On	 the	
Boeotian	fortifications	see	Cooper	(2000),	151-191.	
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had not been seen since the rapid building of the walls connecting athens to the Piraeus at the 
end of the Persian wars.581  
 
Hanson would be happy to assume the new government of Messenia was a 
democratic regime allegedly based on the Theban model;582 however, it is nowhere stated 
what the exact form the new government would take. Certainly, it is a plausible assumption: 
the country had been re-established by a potentially democratic society and democracy 
provided a stark contrast and purposeful disdain for Spartan oligarchy, which would surely 
have been one of the prime reasons for the Thebans to establish a democracy in 379/8, if 
indeed they did. The fact is, not only is it uncertain that the Boeotian League was actually 
democratic, there is no evidence that Epameinondas had any intentions for Messenia except 
that it become a powerful force in the defence of the Peloponnesus against a Spartan attempt 
at resurgence. There is also an indication that the original inhabitants of the new Messenia 
bore a strong connection with Laconian culture in spite of an apparent hatred for the 
Spartiates.583 As a result, though possible, we cannot assume that Messenia became a 
democracy, but we can assert that they were allowed to govern their land and people without 
the influence of a foreign power.584 
 
Once the deed had been set into motion, Epameinondas left a sizeable garrison to 
protect the city during its construction (Diod. 15. 67. 1), and gathered his remaining force 
before marching back to Boeotia. The reduction of Spartan power had been an enormous 
success, especially with the loss of the land and slaves of Messenia. Sparta would never again 
regain even a semblance of their previous hegemonic power, though not for lack of trying. 
Epameinondas had achieved in about four months585 what the Helots had failed to achieve 





584	 See	 Robinson	 (2009),	 138,	 who	 leans	 toward	 a	 more	 conservative	 government.	 See	 also	 Rhodes	
(2016),	63.	




construction, Messene and the soon to be built Megalopolis,586 would all stand as fortresses 
against the Spartans. The danger for the Boeotians that had for many years been marching 
over Mt. Cithaeron, had been all but extinguished. For Epameinondas, to whom the safety of 
his people was paramount, the campaign would have been a crowning achievement, one, 



















2).	 Most	 scholars	 dispute	 the	 authenticity	 of	 this	 statement	 but	 if,	 as	 Hornblower	 postulates,	 the	
construction	of	the	city	had	indeed	begun	shortly	after	the	Battle	of	Leuctra,	 late	in	371,	it	 is	believable	
that	 the	Theban	general	did	 indeed	 leave	a	garrison	under	Pammenes	 to	help	 in	 its	defence	during	 its	





The Campaigns of 369-368 B.C. and political hostilities 
 
 
Return to Boeotia 
 
During the pillage of Laconia, the Spartans became desperate and were thus 
compelled to ask Athens for assistance. Athens was essentially the only major power left in 
mainland Greece that was not aligned with the Thebans and would certainly have been the 
only ones capable of combating them. A Spartan embassy was sent to the Athenians and gave 
several speeches in an attempt to compel them into an alliance (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 33-49). There 
is some indication from the text that a Theban embassy was present with the intention of 
preventing the alliance, but nothing further is indicated about their arguments or who was 
present (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 46).587 As a result of the delegation an alliance was concluded in 
which the Athenians were made the masters by sea and the Spartans by land (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 
14; Diod. 15. 67. 1).588 
 
Without further ado the Athenian assembly voted to send Iphicrates with a full levy 
of 12,000 men, who were to meet the Boeotian force as they crossed the Isthmus (Xen. Hell. 
6. 5. 49; Diod. 15. 63. 2). Iphicrates took his troops to Corinth where he waited for a few 
days. After a while his soldiers became impatient, so he marched them up and down the 
Isthmus despatching the apparent strongholds that Epameinondas had set up earlier on their 
march into the Peloponnesus. When Epameinondas began the journey homeward, Iphicrates 
appears to have been in Arcadia and, though no detail is offered as to his actions, he was 
probably there in an aggressive capacity (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 51).589 On hearing of the oncoming 
Boeotian force, Iphicrates pulled his men back to Corinth and established defensive positions 
	
587	 Since	 the	phrase	 “νῦν	δεομένους”,	 as	 stated	by	Procles	 in	 relation	 to	 the	Thebans,	 is	 in	 the	present	
tense,	 it	 implies	 their	 presence	 at	 the	 Athenian	 assembly.	 Though	 Breitenbach	 (1876),	 176-177,	 has	
expressed	some	doubt	as	to	whether	Procles	was	indeed	referring	to	a	present	Theban	embassy,	Buckler	






on the main road that went between the city of Corinth and Mt. Oneum. However, not 
intending to engage the Boeotians directly, he left open a convenient pass that ran from 
Solygeia to Cenchreae at the eastern side of Oneum, despite the enthusiasm of his 
inexperienced draftees (Polyaen. 3. 9. 28). As Epameinondas also had no desire to fight the 
Athenians, he was happy to take the route, which had been left for him. But, in a display of 
hostility and perhaps an attempt to hurry the Boeotians away, Iphicrates sent his cavalry 
contingent, consisting of Athenians and Corinthians, to attack the enemy in the rear as they 
withdrew. They apparently lost 20 horsemen in the skirmish and Epameinondas managed to 
drive them off towards Corinth.590 Xenophon criticizes Iphicrates for allowing the Boeotians 
to pass so easily; however, it appears that he misunderstood the Athenian’s intentions. 
Iphicrates’ task was to support Sparta, which was no longer in danger. He therefore merely 
attempted to coax the Boeotians out of the Peloponnesus.591 
 
After the highly successful campaign with very few losses Epameinondas, perhaps, 
should have returned to Thebes as a triumphant hero. It is even probable that the greater 
populace of the city received the returning soldiers as heroes because they had all but 
completely relieved them of any threat from the Spartan scourge. Unfortunately, many of his 
peers in the assembly had a very different perception of his conduct. Because the boeotarchs 
who went on the expedition had exceeded their office by several months, a crime punishable 
by death, their political opponents used this as an opportunity to charge them with treason. 
The trial is widely attested by the ancient sources and together, a single tradition appears to 
emerge. It is more than clear that Menecleidas was at the forefront of the prosecution and one 
can imagine that he probably gave a fiery speech condemning those who violated the law. In 
an attempt to minimize the threat to his political allies, Epameinondas had instructed 
Pelopidas and the other boeotarchs to ask for mercy in the court and persuade the jury that the 
impetus and blame for the crime lay only on him. Then when it came to Epameinondas’ turn 
	
590	Xen.	Hell.	6.	5.	51-52;	Paus.	9.	14.	6-7;	Plut.	Pel.	24.	5.	
591	 Grote	 (1872),	 227	 n.	 1;	 Buckler	 (1980a),	 295	 n.	 30.	 Pausanias	 also	 seems	 to	 indicate	 that	
Epameinondas	 drove	 the	 Athenian	 cavalry	 all	 the	 way	 back	 to	 Athens	 itself	 as	 Jones	 (1918),	 235,	




refute	 them.	 Frazer	 (1898e),	 54,	 does	 not	 believe	 Pausanias	 can	 be	 re-interpreted	 in	 this	 manner,	 in	
which	case	the	latter’s	account	must	simply	be	wrong.	
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to offer his defence he refused to answer the charges, admitting his guilt. Instead he merely 
requested that, if he was to be executed, they inscribe on his epitaph that they did so because 
he had compelled the Thebans to ravage the land which had been unravaged for 500 years; he 
had helped to organize the Arcadians into a league; that he had resettled Messenia after 230 
years and restored freedom to the Greeks. The sentiments had the desired effect and the jury 
burst into laughter, apparently even deciding against the necessity of voting.592 
 
The subject of this trial has undergone much debate by scholars largely due to the 
apparent mention of another trial by Diodorus, which he places after the second invasion of 
the Peloponnesus (Diod. 15. 72. 1-2).593 This is mainly because he omits mention of the first 
trial, whereas the other sources fail to mention the second, though there are possible 
references to it (Plut. Pel. 28. 1; Nep. Epam. 7. 1). Beloch, followed by Westlake, accept only 
the second trial while denying the historicity of the first.594 On the other hand, arguing against 
Beloch, Cary believes the trial must have taken place before the second invasion, but he does 
not accept the evidence of Diodorus.595 However, most scholars have accepted the existence 
of two trials, which, though with some dispute over the chronology, has been essentially 
proven by Wiseman and subsequent work on the topic.596  
 
The details of these arguments need not be attested here, but it has been generally 
established that both Epameinondas and Pelopidas had already been re-elected as boeotarchs 
for the year. The problem had arisen from the fact that they had not officially relinquished 
their authority by the customary time of the first of Boukatios, i.e. the first month after the 
winter solstice (Plut. Pel. 24. 2).597 It seems that the law entailed no specific provisions for 
the opportunity that arose for Epameinondas because a comparable situation had never before 













justification of his plight and saw good reason to ignore what was clearly an outdated law. 
Though he knew he was risking his life, he was also quite confident that the assembly would 
see his point of view once the campaign was over. However, out of the actual details of the 
trial that took place, two facts are entirely clear and are certainly the most significant: one, 
the issue did go to trial and those involved were facing execution; two, the case was 
subsequently thrown out of court without a vote. What this means exactly, as Buckler states, 
“Epameinondas had set a legal precedent”, thus the constitution would no longer necessarily 
condemn a boeotarch to death merely for exceeding their term.598  
 
In fact, some additional points may be made: if Epameinondas’ conduct had been 
universally controversial at the time, one may expect that the assembly at home would have 
sent an official emissary into the Peloponnesus demanding that the boeotarchs relinquish 
their command. Though the sources are not perfect, there is not a single indication that the 
Boeotian assembly was perturbed by the situation for several months until the army returned 
from the campaign. This may indicate that, in general, the assembly had decided to allow the 
army to complete its activities unhindered and then resolve the issue of the extended term 
when they returned. What then becomes clear is that everyone was aware that Epameinondas 
was testing the waters of an un-established legal precedent. The assembly back in Thebes 
understood that he was essentially completing his mission to protect Arcadia from Sparta, 
which of course was part of the ultimate goal of reducing Spartan power. However, the 
opposition party led by Menecleidas saw the opportunity to make accusations against their 
rivals and exploited the situation. None could deny that the boeotarchs had broken the law 
and the trial was unavoidable.  
 
It is unlikely that Menecleidas and his followers were pro-Spartan as he had been 
involved in the liberation (Plut. Pel. 25. 3). It appears more likely that they were against 
intervention in the Peloponnesus and on this point the liberators had diverged in policy. 
Ostensibly, Menecleidas may now have had more than one reason to argue in the assembly. 
Considering his apparent skill in oratory and tendency to slander (Nep. Epam. 5. 1-6), he is 




in oratorical fashion,599 that Epameinondas had now established two more potential threats in 
the Arcadian League and the new Messenian state. Furthermore, they were now officially at 
war with Athens, which was a development of potentially catastrophic implications. Though 
the former arguments could easily be cast aside, the latter was surely an issue that struck fear 
into the Boeotians. Despite the apparent ease in which Epameinondas escaped the charges, 
the number of opponents he had in the assembly must have increased and signified the 
beginnings of his declining popularity, which would be clearly evident by the following year 
when he failed to be re-elected as boeotarch. Apparently when he left the courtroom, his dog 
came to greet him affectionately, which spurred him to exclaim, “See how it shows affection 
to me for the good I have given it, but the Thebans, for whom I have often suffered, condemn 
me to death” (Ael. Var. Hist. 13. 42).600 Epameinondas’ responses to the charges may be 
perceived as somewhat arrogant since he clearly believed he deserved most of the credit for 
his achievements and appears contemptuous towards his own people for their accusations.601 
 
 
The Second Peloponnesian Expedition 369 B.C. 
 
When the invading army had departed from the Peloponnesus, in the spring or early 
summer of 369 the Spartans again sent ambassadors, along with their other allies, to Athens 
in order to establish the finer points of the alliance, which had previously been agreed upon in 
haste. While the Athenians probably accepted Spartan claims to Messenia, the Spartans 
doubtless recognized Athenian claims to Amphipolis.602 Although initially the assembly was 
erring towards the traditional alliance of Athenian naval leadership and Spartan leadership on 
land, at the last moment Cephisodotus convinced them that a shared hegemony alternating 
every five days was preferable. Though militarily nonsensical, politically this enabled a sense 
of equality between the two powers, particularly as the war against Thebes would take place 
predominantly on land and, for the most part, the Athenians had very little to gain from the 
alliance other than the prospect of minimizing and potentially defeating the Thebans who 
	
599	Georgiadou	(1997),	187.	





were undoubtedly the most powerful mainland state at this time.603 Meanwhile, after 
probably only a month or two of rest, the Arcadian League drafted another force of 5,000 
hoplites called the ‘chosen’, which was led by Lycomedes.604 They again marched into 
Laconia and attacked the city of Pellana, which was situated on the Eurotas River nearly 20 
kilometres northwest of Sparta.605 They successfully took the city, ravaged the countryside 
and massacred the 300 soldiers that had been stationed there (Diod. 15. 67. 2).606 The Argives 
also appear to have made a failed attack upon Phlius (Xen. Hell. 7. 2. 4).607 Following these 
events,608 with the newly ratified alliance between Athens and Sparta and their respective 
allies, the Arcadians were ready to expect fresh hostilities. Not wanting to face them alone, 
they again requested assistance from the Thebans. 
 
The request appears to have been positively received in Thebes and the assembly 
quickly voted that Epameinondas lead the expedition, though with ἄλλων βοιωταρχῶν, as 
usual (Diod. 15. 68. 1). Arguably there was little more damage that could be inflicted upon 
the Spartans; however, with the help of Athens, the remaining Peloponnesian allies still posed 
a significant threat to the Arcadians, Argives and Eleans. At this stage, a single decisive 
battle could even now prove the deciding factor in the war and the Arcadian League did not 
have enough troops to guarantee a victory despite the apparent military competence of 
Lycomedes. It was therefore still necessary for them to combine forces with the Boeotians in 
order to secure their dominance during the campaign to come. The Spartan allies included 
	
603	Xen.	Hell.	7.	1.	1-15;	Ways	5.	7;	Diod.	15.	67.	1;	 Isoc.	12.	159.	See	Buckler	 (1980a),	90-91.	Stylianou	
(1998),	 444-445,	 notes	 that	 the	 previous	 alliance	 concluded	 during	 the	 recent	 invasion	 should	 not	
necessarily	be	considered	an	official	symmachia	in	which	oaths	were	sworn.	Although	it	seems	clear	that	







606	 Diodorus	 provides	 the	 only	 evidence	 for	 this	 campaign,	 though	 a	 tombstone	 in	 Pellana	 bearing	 the	
name	 Olbiadas	 may	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 attack	 (IG	 V	 1.	 1591),	 see	 Cartledge	 (1979),	 300;	 Stylianou	
(1998),	 445.	 It	 ought	 to	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 death	 of	 300	 “Lacedaemonians”	 should	 not	 be	 considered	








Sicyon, Epidaurus and Corinth, all three of which occupied significant harbours along the 
northeastern Peloponnesus, serving to block communications between Thebes and their 
Peloponnesian allies. Of these, Corinth was the most powerful and strategically significant, 
particularly as they guarded the access to the Peloponnesus and would have been 
fundamental in communication between Athens and Sparta. With Athens in the picture it 
became all the more necessary to secure the Isthmus and suppress the Spartan allies from 
effectively supporting the war effort. Taking these factors into account Epameinondas made 
Corinth the primary target for the second invasion into the Peloponnesus.609 The federal 
Boeotian forces thus began to muster. 
 
Having become conscious of the oncoming invasion, the Athenians, also being 
aware of the strategic value of the Isthmus, sent an army under Chabrias in order to defend 
the passes and prevent the Thebans from entering the Peloponnesus. Apparently arriving 
sometime before Epameinondas, the Athenians joined forces with allies from Megara, 
Corinth and the Achaean Pellene, making a force of 10,000 soldiers. Before long the Spartans 
had arrived with troops from the remaining allies making a combined army of 20,000 (Diod. 
15. 68. 1-2): ample numbers to defend the passes. The Isthmus offered both natural and man-
made positions for a defence to be mounted. The stretch of land from the port of Lechaeum, 
on the Corinthian Gulf, to the city of Corinth and its acropolis, Acrocorinth, was fortified 
with two long walls, spanning nearly four kilometres. This made the entire northern pass 
essentially impenetrable without resorting to a costly siege. The circuit wall of Acrocorinth 
pressed close to the main road that led to Argos, which lay at the foot of Mt. Oneum, making 
this pass easily defensible from either side. The mountain itself stretches east from the road 
for about seven kilometres to a maximum height of 584 metres above sea level, on which 
only two of its eastern passes could sustain the passage of a large army: Stanotopi and 
Maritsa (west to east respectively). Finally, from the eastern side of Oneum is the pass that 
goes between the Saronic Gulf and the foot of the mountain, just over 300 metres apart. Thus, 
with only four available routes for the Thebans to choose from, the Spartan-Athenian force 




only about three kilometres apart altogether.610 The defenders then quickly began to establish 
wooden palisades along all of the passes, which were completed before the enemy arrived 
(Diod. 15. 68. 3; Front. Strat. 2. 5. 26).611 They then took up their defensive positions: it 
appears that the Athenians took the pass between Acrocorinth and Mt. Oneum, probably also 
placing troops along the coastal road. The Spartans, along with the Pelleneans, stationed their 
soldiers on the most assailable position (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 15; Diod. 15. 68. 4). This is probably 
the Maritsa pass, which lies just east of the peak of the mountain.612 The Stanotopi pass, then, 
would likely have been occupied by the remaining Spartan allies. 
 
Perhaps some time around July the Boeotian army had been fully assembled, 
consisting of 7,000 infantry and 600 cavalry (Diod. 15. 68. 1).613 When all was ready, 
Epameinondas led his troops toward the Isthmus. The main and coastal roads were probably 
too easily defensible for Epameinondas to even consider crossing them, whereas the pass of 
Maritsa, which crosses the mountain itself, would have been somewhat more awkward to 
defend, considering the slopes. The Spartan polemarch was aware of this, which is perhaps 
why he took it upon himself to occupy the pass. When the Boeotians arrived in the vicinity of 
Mt. Oneum, Epameinondas saw the position of the Spartans. Hoping to play on Spartan 
pride, he readied his troops for battle in an attempt to draw the enemy out and coax them into 
a pitched battle (Diod. 15. 68. 4). The enemy refused to budge from their advantageous 
positions; as a result, he decided to employ a different tactic. The army encamped some 30 
stadia (c. five kilometres) away, presumably from the Spartan position. The sources seem to 
diverge at this point, but the testimony of Xenophon is generally accepted above the rest. 
Epameinondas waited until dark and calculated a march upon which they would reach the 
Spartan position by dawn. This they did and, in good order, successfully fell upon the 




611	 These	 were	 possibly	 instigated	 by	 Chabrias,	 see	 above,	 79.	 Buckler	 (1980a),	 296	 n.	 37,	 notes	 that	
Diodorus’	 claim	 that	 the	 palisades	 stretched	 all	 the	 way	 across	 the	 Isthmus	 is	 very	 unlikely	 and	
unnecessary,	considering	most	of	the	mountain	was	impassable.	This	wall	is	to	be	distinguished	from	the	







brief one-sided engagement in which the Boeotians appear to have driven off the unprepared 
defenders with ease. The polemarch withdrew with the other survivors up the nearest hill in 
order to gain a better position against the attackers. From the new position, the survivors were 
able to block the Boeotians’ descent. Though they could not have held the position for long, 
Epameinondas was hesitant to assault the Spartan force frontally.614 After a brief stalemate, 
the two sides concluded a truce, which allowed the Boeotians to enter the Peloponnesus 
unhindered and the Spartan and Pellenean survivors could go home (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 15-17). 
 
Though Xenophon’s account is liable to be the most accurate, there are four other 
testimonies of the Isthmus crossing, all with differing details; because of this, they are worth 
some discussion. Pausanias claims that a battle occurred at Lecheum between the Boeotians 
and the Spartans, Pelleneans and Athenians, under Chabrias (Paus. 9. 15. 4). His erroneous 
detail seems almost curious: on the one hand, he imagines a full-scale battle, on the other, he 
claims it occurred on the opposite side of the Isthmus. It is sometimes noted that his mistake 
is comparable to his previous assertion that Epameinondas chased the Athenian cavalry all 
the way to Athens (Paus. 9. 14. 7).615 Though it cannot be proven, his blunder here may also 
be based on a misinterpretation of his source. Lecheum is, of course, one of the two ports of 
the Isthmus and the engagement itself occurred not far from the second, Cenchreae. It is 
simple enough to imagine that Pausanias’ source indicated that the event occurred near a port 
of Corinth. This may well have led him to the conclusion that it was Lecheum, considering 
this is closer to the major road between Acrocorinth and Mt. Oneum. It is also possible that 
Pausanias’ imagining of the engagement as a real battle can be seen as a rhetorical device to 
glorify the protagonist of the story. Furthermore, the fact that he has some factual 
information, i.e. Chabrias and the presence of the Pelleneans, demonstrates that his source 




have	drawn	 reinforcements	 and	 supplies	 from	Cenchreae	 (Xen.	7.	 1.	 17).	However,	 this	does	not	 seem	
likely	as	Epameinondas’	troops	stood	between	the	Spartans	and	the	port.	From	Epameinondas’	point	of	
view,	though	the	Spartans	were	outnumbered,	they	appear	to	have	been	in	a	position	of	strength,	it	was	






Polyaenus decribes a scenario in which Epameinondas appeared as if he would 
attack immediately, therefore compelling the Spartans to remain battle-ready the whole night 
through. However, the Boeotians slept and attacked at dawn when the enemy was exhausted, 
easily defeating them (Polyaen. 2. 3. 9). Frontinus, on the other hand, reports that 
Epameinondas sent light-armed soldiers to skirmish the Spartan defences throughout the 
whole night. By dawn, both sides retired, then he brought forth the bulk of his army to attack 
the ramparts, which by this stage were largely undefended (Front. Strat. 2. 5. 26). Both of 
these accounts refer to a strategem in which the Spartans were made to be exhausted before 
being attacked by the Boeotians, though this is achieved in two different ways. Tuplin has 
asserted that the similarity between the accounts represents a common tradition distinct from 
Xenophon or Diodorus.616 A common tradition perhaps, but a common source is unlikely. 
The difference appears fairly significant: one actually indicates prolonged night time 
skirmishing on the Spartan position, while the other describes a situation in which the 
Boeotians only feigned battle readiness. Whether the idea of exhausting the enemy came 
from a single tradition is difficult to ascertain, but it is apparent that the anecdotes come from 
two distinct accounts of the engagement.  
 
Diodorus asserts that the Boeotians attacked the defenders throughout the whole area 
and imagines a comparatively large engagement between the Spartans and the Thebans 
(Diod. 15. 68. 4-5). Again, Diodorus appears to exaggerate the full extent of the engagement, 
as is his rhetorical wont. It is also not likely that Epameinondas attacked the Isthmus defence 
on multiple fronts as the Greek seems to imply: κατά πάντα… τόπον.617 However, τόπον 
need not necessarily refer to attacks across a wide area, but instead may have specifically 
been attacks upon the Spartan-Pellenean position from multiple sides. Diodorus’ account has 
been ultimately discredited because of his assertion that the fortifications were constructed 
across the entire Isthmus and that he said the Thebans were outnumbered three to one.618 
Despite his perceived inaccuracies, Diodorus’ claim that Epameinondas attempted to coax the 
enemy out to fight is seen as generally factual. If accepted, it may indicate some accuracy 







of the engagement itself, other than a couple embellishments, κατά πάντα… τόπον is the only 
major divergence from Xenophon. 
 
Pausanias, then, can be put to one side as his account provides no substantial 
information other than confirming the major players involved. Now if we focus rather on the 
similarities between the four remaining sources, several interesting connections can be made. 
First, they all emphasize that the engagement occurred predominantly against the Spartan 
position; second, Xenophon, Frontinus and Polyaenus indicate that the attack occurred 
around dawn; third, Diodorus and Frontinus confirm the use of palisades by the defenders; 
fourth, Frontinus and Polyaenus both refer to a strategem in which the enemy were 
exhausted, which may relate to the dawn attack; and fifth, Xenophon and Polyaenus both 
specifically make reference to the Boeotians halting within the vicinity of Mt. Oneum, which 
also may relate to Diodorus’ assertion that they tried to compel the Spartans from their 
positions to fight.619 When viewed from this perspective the divergences between the sources 
do not appear as great and may indicate a greater reliability than has normally been 
presumed. Polyaenus and, particularly Frontinus, could have used sources that are more 
closely connected with a contemporary account, perhaps indirectly using the likes of 
Callisthenes, Theopompus or something similar; hence, Tuplin’s speculated common 
tradition. Though I would not presume that these claims can be made with any concrete 
assertiveness, we can at least deliberate on the possibility that Epameinondas used light-
armed soldiers to distract the Spartans while the main force approached the palisades in 
secret, or even that they attacked the Spartan-Pellenean defence from multiple sides. 
 
Once the Boeotian force had crossed the mountain, they quickly rendezvoused with 
their Peloponnesian allies: the Arcadians, Argives and Eleans (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 18).620 It is 
probable that they established a junction with them on the road to Nemea (Xen. Hell. 7. 2. 










the town of Phoebia can indeed be associated with the ruins of an ancient fortress on the 
western bank of the valley of the Nemea River, which lies just opposite Mt. Apesas,622 then 
this may well have been Epameinondas’ first target (Paus. 9. 5. 14).623 If Pausanias’ unique 
detail can be trusted, they captured the town and discovered a large number of Boeotian 
exiles living there. According to Theban law, all prisoners would be ransomed off with the 
exception of Boeotian exiles, who were instead to be condemned to death. Fortunately for 
them, Epameinondas did not wish to execute so many of his fellow countrymen. As a clever 
alternative he simply gathered up as many of the exiles as he could and awarded them a new 
nationality before allowing them to go free. With a lack of any corroborating evidence it is 
difficult to accept the testimony of Pausanias by itself. However, the story is believable 
enough considering Epameinondas’ detestation at the killing of fellow Boeotians.624 
Furthermore, if the position of the town is correct then it lay directly on the route from 
Nemea to Sicyon and would provide a useful stronghold against attacks from the south. 
Epameinondas’ actions were not only morally advantageous but were useful politically as 
well. Though some Theban aristocrats would have preferred that he adhere to the law, if he 
had condemned such a large number of his own people, the feeling back home would have 
potentially been that of shock and outrage. By freeing them he would have gained not only 
good grace from the people of Boeotia, but also from the exiles.625 It may be speculated that 
he allowed them to assume Sicyonian, or even Phoebian, nationality. These men then could 
have taken a position as the garrison defending Phoebia. 
 
Epameinondas led the army further north towards the Corinthian Gulf, intent on 
capturing the city of Sicyon (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 18; Diod. 15. 69. 1). The people of the area had 
long been staunch supporters of Sparta, at least since the latter ousted the last tyrant of Sicyon 
around 550 (FGrH 105 F1 = P. Ryland 18).626 Since then, the city had remained firmly 
oligarchic and consistently provided large numbers of troops to help with the Spartan war 
effort. During the Corinthian war the Sicyonians lived under the constant threat of nearby 









loyalty to the Peloponnesian League, by the time Epameinondas arrived in the summer of 
369, Sicyon had been run by a heavily pro-Spartan oligarchic faction that was not willing to 
relinquish control to the Thebans lightly.627 The city itself lay to the northwest of the Asopus 
River, at the foot of a hill on a triangular plateau, over three kilometres south of the gulf. On 
the hill by the plateau was the acropolis. Heading northeast towards the sea there was a plain 
of agricultural land, which ended in the port of Sicyon. Encompassing the city from the 
southeast and northwest two large walls had been constructed to defend the city from either 
side. The walls appear to have stretched out for much of the plain and probably walled off the 
entire city. Though the evidence is scanty, it is not entirely clear if the wall encompassed the 
port; however, the port itself may have had its own fortifications.628 
 
To reach Sicyon, Epameinondas and his army would have had to ford the Asopus, 
presumably several kilometres southwest of the city in order to cross unchallenged. Then, 
proceeding along the western bank of the river, they came within view of the acropolis. Since 
the city had extensive fortifications, Epameinondas perhaps decided that besieging the city 
would be too costly and time-consuming for the purposes of his expedition; thus, a strategem 
would again be employed. There is some evidence that a Sicyonian force joined in the attack 
on the city (Paus. 6. 3. 3), which, if true, gives us further indication of the political situation 
at the time: though the pro-Spartan regime was in control at this stage, the recent downfall of 
the Spartans had probably shaken their unanimous support. If a force of Sicyonians helped 
the attack on the city, this is clear evidence of an anti-Spartan or pro-Theban faction existing 
around the territory and probably in the city as well. With local support from within and 
without, the Thebans could devise a plan to take Sicyon with minimal expenditure. 
 
After careful deliberation, the Theban officer, Pammenes, devised a cunning scheme 
in order to take the city. He took a force of Theban soldiers and acquired a large merchant 
vessel, perhaps with help from local Sicyonian supporters. A portion of the soldiers boarded 
the ship and disguised themselves as merchants before sailing for the harbour of Sicyon, 




and	defend	himself	 from	the	Arcadians	 (Xen.	Hell.	7.	3.	2),	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	port’s	 fortifications	were	
separate.	
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port, they apparently fooled any sort of customs officer that they may have had and were 
allowed to remain overnight. When evening came, Pammenes attacked part of the city, which 
alerted all of the guards. The Theban soldiers from the ship at once attacked the undefended 
harbour and apparently took it with ease.629 Frontinus states that this incident led to the 
capture of the city (Thebanae naves et portum vacantem et urbem occupaverunt), though he 
is not clear if the city was taken as a direct result of taking the port or whether it occurred 
afterwards.630 It is not entirely clear as to how the city was ultimately taken, but once the port 
had been, the Sicyonians may have lost their ability to replenish their supply reserves, which 
would have made it difficult to withstand a siege. As well as this, the port could have served 
as a base of operations for Epameinondas and he was then able to attack the city from 
multiple sides, which he may well have done. Either way, it is apparent that the city did not 
last long once the harbour had been taken. It was then incorporated into the Boeotian-
Peloponnesian League; however, the internal affairs of the city were not tampered with and 
they were allowed to maintain their oligarchic constitution (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 44).631 
 
From Sicyon the army marched toward the Achaean city of Pellene, which lay about 
15 kilometres northwest of Sicyon, some 60 stadia (nearly nine and a half kilometres) from 
the sea. It consisted of a small village with a sizeable hill fort just above (Plin. Nat. Hist. 4. 6; 
Strabo 8. 7. 5). Pausanias mentions a road that led directly to the port of Pellene, called 
Aristonautae (Paus. 2. 12. 2).632 The city, as part of the Achaean League, had been 
democratic for most of the fifth century, but was subsequently reorganized into an oligarchy 
during the Peloponnesian War. Since that time the Achaeans, and Pelleneans in particular, 
had frequently supported the Spartans in their military endeavours. However, because the rest 
of Achaea at this time had avoided the more recent military actions inside the Peloponnesus, 
their loyalty appears to have been ambiguous. But without question the Pelleneans were still 
	
629	Polyaen.	5.	16.	3;	Front.	Strat.	3.	2.	10;	Aen.	Tact.	29.	12.	The	episode	appears	to	be	genuine	as	specific	







632	 For	 the	 site	 of	 Pellene	 see	 Leake	 (1830b),	 4.	 215-217,	 224,	 389-390;	 Frazer	 (1898d),	 181-183;	
Anderson	(1954),	74.	
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providing significant support to the Spartans.633 By capturing Pellene, Epameinondas would 
not only have secured another outpost in defence against possible incursions from Achaea or 
Corinth, he would also secure a second port on the Corinthian Gulf. With the occupied forts 
of Phoebia, Sicyon and Pellene in an alliance with the Thebans, a large area would be secured 
under allied garrisons and the Spartans would be blocked from communication with their 
Achaean allies. The northern Peloponnesus would be all but removed from Spartan influence. 
We may presume that the Boeotians marched along the coastal road and first captured the 
port, which could not rely on the city for its defence being a considerable distance away. 
After this they were likely to have advanced upon the city either attacking them or attempting 
to convince them to surrender. 
 
Unfortunately, the sources do not explicitly state the outcome of the attack (Xen. 
Hell. 7. 1. 18; Diod. 15. 69. 1), which has led some to conclude that they failed to take the 
city.634 On the other hand, Diodorus does not mention Pellene at all; instead he states that 
Sicyon and Phlius, along with other cities, were frightened into joining the Thebans. But we 
know from Xenophon that Phlius remained uncaptured and loyal to Sparta (Xen. Hell. 7. 2. 5-
9). Because of this, Buckler has suggested that Diodorus must have mistook Pellene for 
Phlius, hence the mistake.635 If this is true, then Diodorus’ language implies that the cities, 
including Pellene, were taken. Though there is no conclusive evidence for either case, it may 
be asserted that Xenophon’s account of the invasion describes in detail only events in which 
the Boeotians were essentially unsuccessful, other than the crossing of the Isthmus, which 
obviously could not be avoided. He states that Sicyon and Pellene were attacked but says 
nothing about the outcome of these attacks. As we know that Sicyon was indeed taken, it 
seems likely that Pellene was also, as we could expect Xenophon to glory in a Theban failure 
to capture the city.636 In light of these considerations, I would argue that it is most likely that 










Epameinondas then retraced his steps, marching the army southeast through the 
Argolid to the territory of Epidaurus. Its borders spanned from the Gulf of Argos to the west, 
the boundary of Corinth to the north and to Hermione and Troezen in the south and east. The 
city itself lay at the coast, on the southern arm of the Saronic Gulf, situated on a rocky hill of 
the peninsula of Acte, near the modern Palaia Epidaurus. The peninsula would have been 
easily defensible, particularly if the acropolis had fortifications. The inhabitants had been 
loyal allies of the Spartans at least since the Peloponnesian War and would continue to do so 
throughout this period.637 Marching across the countryside unhindered, Epameinondas failed 
to take the city because of its sizeable garrison, but caused great damage ravaging the 
landscape (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 18; Diod. 15. 69. 1). Moving further to the southeast, the army 
then entered Troezen, continuing its molestation of the land. This city lay nearly two and a 
half kilometres from the coast on the Saronic Gulf and was situated on the northern slope of 
Mt. Phorbantion. The acropolis was defended by an encircling wall in polygonal masonry.638 
Again, the Boeotians failed to take the city due to its large garrison, making a siege upon the 
city time-consuming and inexpedient (Diod. 15. 69. 1).639 Despite the failure to take both of 
the cities, the damage to their infrastructure would have been significant, as well as isolating 
the Corinthians from their allies. 
 
After this,640 the army marched back northwards with the intention of attacking the 
city of Corinth. While Epameinondas had been conducting his campaign, Chabrias and the 
Athenian force seem to have fortified themselves in Corinth. Epameinondas led the army 
along the main road, which runs between Mt. Oneum and Acrocorinth. Before reaching the 
pass, they turned north before Acrocorinth and reached the path that goes between 
Acrocorinth and modern Penteskouphi, marching up towards the city. From this point the city 




639	 An	 inscription	 states	 that	 Troezen	would	 later	 (368/7)	 send	 Athens	 two	 gold	 crowns	 as	 a	 sign	 of	
gratitude	 (IG	 II²	 1425A	 col.	 2	 lines	 227-231).	 Stylianou	 (1998),	 450,	 has	 suggested	 that	 this	might	 be	
evidence	 that	 the	 garrisons	 in	 both	 Epidaurus	 and	 Troezen	were	 reinforced	 by	 soldiers	 from	 Athens.	







wall of Corinth, interrupted only by the Phliasian gate.641 It is not clear exactly how the 
Athenians structured their defence but it seems apparent that by the time Epameinondas 
arrived, they were within the walls of the city.  
 
At this point Diodorus and Xenophon offer two rather different accounts of the 
attack on Corinth. Xenophon reports that the Thebans advanced with their army towards the 
gates, sending the Sacred Band (ἐπιλέκτοις) ahead with the hope of forcing an entrance 
before the gates were closed. The defenders rallied forth some four plethra (c. 120 metres) 
from the city and, using the high ground to their advantage, managed to drive off the 
attackers during a bloody skirmish of javelins and other missile weapons. They pursued them 
for a distance of about half a kilometre. Afterwards, a truce was made in order for the 
Thebans to recover their dead and the victors erected a trophy (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 18-19). 
Diodorus recounts that Epameinondas brought his army upon the city and the Corinthians 
came out to meet him but were easily driven back towards the gates. However, when some of 
the Boeotians entered the city, the Athenians under Chabrias managed to drive them out 
again. Epameinondas then gathered up his force in full and attacked Corinth, but Chabrias 
and his men, fighting on superior ground, managed to kill many of the attackers and cause 
them to retreat (Diod. 15. 69. 1-4). There has been a tendency for scholars to either favour the 
testimony of Xenophon642 or to arbitrarily combine the accounts together.643 However, when 
viewed in parallel, it becomes clearer where each source’s respective faults lie and a better 
reconciliation may be attempted.  
 
There are at least two reasons to suspect that Xenophon’s account is incomplete. The 
first and most obvious is that he does not specify the nationality of the defenders: on his 
description alone, we would have no option but to assume that they were solely Corinthian. 
Second, the motivation for the Sacred Band to rush ahead was to attempt to enter the city “if 
the gates happened to be open” (εἰ ἀνεῳγμέναι τύχοιεν). Tuplin has argued that the local 
topography of the area should have given the defenders ample opportunity to sight the 







charge upon the city. There is, then, little chance that Epameinondas would have expected the 
gates to be left open. However, as a resident of Corinth, Xenophon was likely to have known 
the full story and had little reason to misrepresent the facts, considering it was a Theban loss. 
Indeed, Xenophon seems to indicate the use of a first-hand account, considering his 
approximated distances and the detail that the defenders climbed on burial monuments to 
gain more high ground. This is surely a valid reason to trust the accuracy of the details he has 
provided; however, his failure to offer a logical context in which the Thebans would attack 
the gate may imply that he has only told the climax and conclusion of the battle. If he did not, 
in fact, recount the full story, this begs the question as to why. Tuplin has suggested that he 
wanted to emphasize a point about Theban-overconfidence and the effectiveness of the light-
armed troops against the attackers.644  
 
The usual reason to accept Xenophon over Diodorus in this case is due to an 
anecdote of Plutarch’s. He states that, after the trophy had been set up, Epameinondas 
scathingly joked that they ought to set up a Hecate instead, which was apparently a common 
thing to erect in front of gates where three roads met. Epameinondas’ irreverence seems to 
indicate that he did not consider the loss a significant one, therefore not worthy of a trophy. 
Because Xenophon also describes the event as small-scale, Plutarch appears to confirm his 
reliability. Diodorus describes a large-scale battle, so must therefore be dismissed. However, 
unlike Xenophon, Plutarch does in fact agree with Diodorus on the presence of Chabrias, thus 
confirming at least one solid fact in his account (Plut. Reg. Imp. Apo. 71. 19/193f). 
Furthermore, there are two certain similarities between Xenophon and Diodorus’ respective 
accounts: first, both state that the defenders ultimately defeated the attackers by making use 
of higher ground; second, unlike Plutarch, who says only a few, both accounts specifically 
attest that many Thebans were killed in the attack. A further possible similarity is Diodorus’ 
statement that the Athenians were well supplied from the city. The word χορηγουμένων need 
not be interpreted as referring to supplies such as food since the attack was very brief. In fact, 
if we determine that he was referring to the supply of equipment or weaponry, it could be 
asserted he meant the supply of javelins and other light-armed missile weapons. If accepted, 





Now, when considering Diodorus, his primary flaw is in how much he exaggerates 
the scale of the battle. This, however, can be fairly easily explained due the typically 
rhetorical nature of his work,645 as was seen with the previous engagement while crossing Mt. 
Oneum.646 He also provides several other aspects lacking in Xenophon, which makes up a 
fairly detailed account. Diodorus’ description of the battle can be divided into three separate 
engagements: first, Corinthian soldiers came outside of their gates to meet the Boeotians but 
were quickly repelled and were driven back to the city; two, the Boeotian soldiers pursued 
the Corinthians into the gates of the city and were met by Chabrias and the Athenians, who 
drove the enemy back outside the wall; three, the Boeotians rallied together to attack the city 
once more, but were forced to retreat due to the superior terrain of the Athenian defenders. 
When examining Xenophon’s account, his description is, essentially, entirely reconcilable 
with the third engagement. Diodorus may even serve to illuminate the faulty logic in 
Xenophon: after the Athenians had driven the Boeotians from the city and the former began 
taking their positions on the higher ground, the latter proceeded to make a rush for the gates 
before they could be closed. Although Diodorus surely exaggerates the scale of the battle, as 
it is likely that the engagements were all small skirmishes (perhaps involving primarily the 
Sacred Band), this does not prove that his general outline of events is erroneous, especially 
when it can be reconciled with Xenophon. Perhaps Xenophon simply did not wish to recount 
the initial success of the Thebans at the beginning of the battle.647 
 
Again, taking the expedient approach, Epameinondas instead decided to ravage the 
landscape; thus, completing his essential reduction of the wealth and strength of the Spartan 
allies. He accordingly split his army into groups and they roamed the plain between the hill 
adjoined to the city and the sea, destroying and looting everything they could find of value 
while the Athenians and Corinthians did not dare venture to attack them (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 20). 
In the meantime, the Spartans had previously requested support from Dionysius, the tyrant of 










unit of some 50 horsemen. These reinforcements apparently engaged Epameinondas’ men in 
some skirmishing, for which Xenophon takes particular interest in the attack and retreat 
tactics used by the horsemen. Despite no obvious decisive success, the skirmishes may well 
have catalyzed the departure of the Boeotians, considering that the Spartans awarded the 
mercenaries some sort of honour or prize (τιμηθέντες). After a few days of ravaging 
Corinthia, and because the summer was drawing to a close, Epameinondas willingly 
disbanded his army and led the Boeotians homeward (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 20-22; Diod. 15. 70. 1). 
 
Though the second invasion of the Peloponnesus was far less impressive in scale and 
achievement than the first, there was little else required to complete the decimation of 
Spartan power. The Boeotian army captured or devastated the lands of almost all of Sparta’s 
remaining Peloponnesian allies and the Spartans had proven themselves militarily incapable 
of preventing them. The inevitable result of Sparta’s failure to support their allies was a 
decline of interest in the common goals of the Peloponnesian League, replaced by a zeal for 
self-preservation in which the allies were forced either to make peace with Thebes and the 
Arcadian League or at the very least be compliant and accept the changing balance of power. 
From this point only Corinth and Phlius would continue to support the Spartans with any 
enthusiasm and even this was beginning to dwindle. For all intents and purposes 
Epameinondas would have returned to Thebes reasonably certain of the success of the 
expedition. However, with a high degree of security from Sparta, the Arcadian League 
decided to assert their own policies independent of their Theban allies.650 
 
 
A Year Out of Office – 368 B.C. 
 
When Epameinondas returned to his home in Thebes he would have quickly learned 










successors, Polydorus and Polyphron, Alexander of Pherae had been attempting to re-assert 
his authority over Thessaly as the tagus. In response to this, the Aleuadae of Larissa travelled 
to Macedonia and asked the king, Alexander II, to help them overthrow the tyrant. When 
Alexander of Pherae caught wind of the plot he intended on attacking Macedonia, but the 
king acted first and occupied the cities of Larissa and later Crannon. The tyrant could not (or 
would not) contend with the king and returned to Pherae. Unfortunately for Larissa and 
Crannon, Alexander II refused to relinquish control of the cities and occupied them with 
garrisons (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 33-35; Diod. 15. 61. 2-5). As a result of the defensive alliance with 
the Boeotian League, the latter had been requested to come to the Thessalians’ aid and, since 
Epameinondas was in the Peloponnesus at the time, Pelopidas was appointed general of an 
army, which would march into Thessaly. He then proceeded to Larissa and appears to have 
negotiated the Macedonian garrisons’ withdrawal without any bloodshed.652 Once the 
Macedonians had departed, Pelopidas appears to have spent some time campaigning against 
the Pheraeans (Front. Strat. 1. 5. 2; 3. 8. 2; 4. 7. 28; Polyaen. 2. 4. 1-2), which resulted in 
unsuccessful negotiations with Alexander of Pherae. Following this,653 Pelopidas then 
marched further north into Macedonia where there was much civil strife: Alexander II was at 
war with his brother-in-law, Ptolemy of Alorus, over some dispute. They both requested 
Pelopidas’ presence so he could function as an arbiter, hoping to settle the crisis peacefully. 
Somehow, he managed to bring them to a temporary accord and, after making an alliance 
with Alexander II, Pelopidas received 30 hostages of noble lineage, as well as the king’s 
adolescent younger brother, Philip, who would eventually become the king himself (Diod. 
15. 67. 3-4; Plut. Pel. 26. 1-4).654 
	
have	put	 together	 at	 least	 1,000-2,000	more	men	 if	 required;	 plus,	most	 likely	 receiving	 support	 from	
















The significance of Philip’s three-year ‘sojourn’ in Thebes is far from certain, but it 
is certainly possible that the military and diplomatic prowess of Epameinondas had a 
profound effect on the young prince.655 However, a minor discrepancy in the sources, with 
regards to whose residence Philip resided, has been largely ignored by scholars and, because 
it directly involves Epameinondas himself, is worth a brief discussion. There are eight 
separate references to Philip’s stay in Thebes, three providing non-specific information,656 
and each of the rest offering unique detail. Plutarch states that Philip lived with the Theban, 
Pammenes (Plut. Plut. 26. 4). The Suda also mentions Pammenes, but as Philip’s lover, 
which does not necessarily imply that Philip stayed at his house (Suda s. v. Κάρανος). In one 
reference Justin merely states that Epameinondas and Pelopidas had great influence on Philip 
(Just. 6. 9. 7); however, in another, he specifically states that he stayed at the house of 
Epameinondas (Just. 7. 5. 2). Finally, Diodorus also reports that Philip was entrusted to the 
father of Epameinondas (Diod. 16. 2. 2-3), which is surely the same house as the son. As one 
can see, the sources are far from uniform in their details of Philip’s stay at Thebes; but in 
spite of this, most scholars have simply accepted Plutarch’s testimony that Philip stayed at 
the house of Pammenes.657 
 
Plutarch is perhaps accepted over the other accounts because of his likely use of 
Callisthenes and reconcilability with Diodorus’ book 15 reference, which probably came 
from Ephorus, though not necessarily. Hammond has argued that Justin used Theopompus 
for his book six reference and Marsyas the Macedonian for the reference in book seven.658 
Thus with at least four possible contemporary sources it is easy to see why the traditions vary 
so much. We may well assert that because Diodorus’ book 16 tells us that Philip was given to 
the Thebans by the Illyrians, that he used a similar source to Justin’s book seven, which states 
essentially the same thing. Though this is far from clear, the discrepancy between the two 
references in Diodorus may be explained because his source for the information in book 16 









claim that Philip was raised as a fellow student of Pythagorean philosophy with 
Epameinondas. This information is entirely erroneous as Epameinodas was most assuredly 
too old to be a fellow student and his philosophy teacher, Lysis, was most probably dead by 
this time (Plut. De Gen. Soc. 13/583c). Elder has suggested that Justin, on the other hand, has 
attempted to combine conflicting stories, though does not clarify the exact manner in which 
this was achieved.659 The Suda’s inclusion of Pammenes as Philip’s lover may well bear 
some truth, but it seems to imply that Amyntas was the one who offered Philip up as a 
hostage to Thebes. If there is any truth to the notion of Philip’s stay in Illyria as a hostage, the 
Suda may also have conflated two different episodes into one. Unfortunately, the sources for 
Philip’s stay in Thebes are too confused for any acceptable reconcilement or consensus to be 
reached; indeed, it does not seem particularly justifiable to accept Diodorus and Justin’s 
assertions that Philip stayed with Epameinondas. Despite this, Philip did stay in Thebes for 
three years and according to Aelian, when Alexander the Great destroyed Thebes, he spared 
those (plural) who had entertained Philip as a guest. This may imply that Philip stayed at 
more than one house, which is certainly possible considering the length of time he spent 
there. 
 
Either way, Epameinondas will not have had very much time to meet the 
Macedonian prince when he first arrived as his political enemies again plotted against him. 
The existence of a second trial brought against him after the second invasion of the 
Peloponnesus, as previously discussed,660 cannot be confirmed for its historicity; however, 
recent scholarship tends to accept some historical truth in the testimony of Diodorus, our only 
specific account of the alleged trial. He relates that, during the recent invasion, when 
Epameinondas attacked the Spartan force while crossing the Isthmus, he allowed the 
remaining soldiers to return home under truce. Because of his leniency, his political enemies 
accused him of sparing the enemy as a personal favour to them. Charges of treason were then 
brought against him in the assembly and, as a result, he was removed from office and made a 
private citizen (Diod. 15. 72. 1-2). The main contention scholars have with this evidence is 
that if he was charged with treason, a crime punishable by death, why then did he receive 





that Epameinondas was in fact acquitted: his removal from office, rather than a punishment, 
was merely the standard (Athenian) protocol in preparation to a trial of an official magistrate, 
known as apocheirotonia.661 However, this does not explain why he was a private citizen in 
the following campaigning season, which is the whole purpose of Diodorus’ inclusion of the 
anecdote and seems to imply that Epameinondas was sent off as a regular hoplite almost 
directly subsequent to the trial. Buckler has further argued that Diodorus has compressed 
events in 369 with 368, assuming that his removal from office stretched into the following 
campaigning season.  
 
It is, of course, not unusual for Diodorus to make such awkward chronological 
mistakes. But because of this confusion, the presence of the second trial has occasionally 
been used as evidence for the low chronology with the second Peloponnesian invasion 
occurring in 368.662 Thus, after returning, Epameinondas was charged, removed from office 
and sent into Thessaly as a regular hoplite on the campaign to rescue Pelopidas and Ismenias. 
However, if this were the case there would have to be three separate campaigns into Thessaly 
in a single year: one, Pelopidas’ first incursion; two, Pelopidas’ second incursion with 
Ismenias and subsequent capture; three, the rescue attempt with Epameinondas as an ordinary 
hoplite. The acceptance of the low chronology would require acceptance of this order of 
events, which I find very difficult. There was hardly enough time in the campaigning season 
for three separate incursions into Thessaly and it seems unlikely that the Boeotian assembly 
would consider there was ample justification to use considerable expenditure in funding four 
campaigns in a single year, dealing with no single political or military situation that directly 
affected Boeotia. Furthermore, as noted above, Plutarch implies that Pelopidas first left for 
Thessaly after Epameinondas had already left for the Peloponnesus: it is hard to believe 
Pelopidas had already been on two campaigns in the north before Epameinondas had even 
returned. Given consideration to this, it makes far more sense for the second and third 








Stylianou has treated Buckler’s suggestion of a compression in Diodorus’ account 
with suspicion partly because of his preference to the low chronology, which would make a 
compression unnecessary and also because we cannot be certain if the Thebans really did use 
the Athenian practice of apocheirotonia. He has further argued that Diodorus’ testimony need 
not be taken as actual evidence for the trial having taken place, suggesting that the talk is of 
“slanderous accusations of treason” in the assembly (πλῆθος), as opposed to a law court.663 
But if there was no trial, then there is no real reason to believe Diodorus’ further statement 
that he was removed from office. It is ironic that Stylianou is willing to accept Diodorus’, at 
best, murky sense of chronology but reject his very blatant assertion that the allegations went 
to trial. Whether or not a trial actually took place is difficult to ascertain; however, it is 
certainly clear Epameinondas did not receive the appropriate punishment for those who 
commit treason. Thus, we can conclude that he either was not charged at all or he was 
acquitted. 
 
More important than the existence of the trial were the consequences of the 
allegations, which was the main purpose of Diodorus’ testimony. Both Plutarch and Nepos 
also offer evidence, which is often seen to confirm the second trial. Similar to Diodorus, they 
include clauses explaining why Epameinondas fought as a regular hoplite, briefly stating that 
he had incurred either the anger (ὀργήν) or envy (invidiam) of the Theban people (Plut. Pel. 
28. 1; Nep. Epam. 7. 1). Of course, these statements do not confirm the occurrence of the 
trial, nor do they specifically state that he was stripped of his office; however, they do 
confirm that he was, at this point, a private citizen fighting as a hoplite. Ignoring Diodorus for 
the moment, off the strength of Plutarch and Nepos alone we can deduce that Epameinondas 
failed to be re-elected as boeotarch for this year. Then, bringing Diodorus back into the 
picture, his claim that allegations were brought against Epameinondas would explain why he 
failed the election, regardless of whether there was a trial or not. Undoubtedly, Menecleidas 
was at the forefront of the allegations and clearly succeeded in damaging Epameinondas’ 
reputation. During the elections early in 368, Epameinondas did not obtain enough votes to 





In order to establish Epameinondas’ role during the events of 368 it is necessary to 
briefly summarize the events in northern Greece from late in 369 to the first rescue attempt in 
Thessaly. Shortly after Pelopidas’ first intervention Alexander of Pherae had resumed his 
characteristic harassment of the Thessalian cities and the newly formed Thessalian League 
had proven ineffectual to stop him.664 Early in spring, as Buckler dates, another plea for 
assistance from Thebes was sent. Although the Boeotian assembly was unwilling to send a 
full-scale expedition into the north due to the lack of evidence that Alexander was violating 
the truce, they agreed to send two eminent Theban politicians: Pelopidas and Ismenias.665 
Their apparent mission was to act as ambassadors with the intention of investigating the 
claims.666 Without bringing a military force their actions would accord with the terms of the 
truce, though they undoubtedly had an escort. But on their arrival in Thessaly, presumably in 
Pharsalus, Pelopidas seems to have sensed some impending danger from Alexander and thus 
began to recruit local Thessalian soldiers as a precaution (Diod. 15. 71. 2; Plut. Pel. 27. 1). 
 
Meanwhile, dire news arrived from Macedonia where the level of political strife and 
variance had become severely troubling and complicated. Around this time, though perhaps 
earlier, Alexander II had been assassinated, allegedly by the arrangement of Ptolemy of 
Alorus. The usurper then made himself regent, ruling like a king, without actually claiming 
the kingship. Simultaneously, Pausanias, an exiled aristocrat of royal blood and pretender of 
the throne, laid his claim. These events divided the Macedonian people and triggered a civil 
war between the two factions. Then, Ptolemy requested help from the Athenian Iphicrates, 
who, with the intention of besieging Amphipolis, drove Pausanias out of Macedonia.667 In 
spite of the threat posed by Alexander of Pherae, Pelopidas would have been well aware of 
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for him to take the initiative and march northwards in order to re-establish relations with the 
new ruler.668 
 
Due to his lack of troops, Pelopidas managed to hire what must have been a 
reasonably sized, though crude, force of mercenaries, subsequently marching them into 
Macedonia. Unfortunately, Ptolemy cleverly took an opportunity to bribe the mercenaries 
with higher pay so that they would abandon Pelopidas and this they did. With little or no 
support, the Theban statesmen were potentially stranded in hostile territory; however, 
Ptolemy realized the temporary nature of his advantage: imprisoning the Thebans could bring 
their wrath upon them and an alliance with Athens would leave him open to Athenian 
territorial ambitions. It was therefore more prudent to strike a bargain with the Thebans. 
Ptolemy then welcomed Pelopidas and the two discussed the terms of an alliance: the 
Thebans would recognize his regency in return for 50 more hostages, including Ptolemy’s 
son, Philoxenus, as well as accepting Perdiccas and Philip’s respective claims to the throne 
(Plut. Pel. 27. 2-3). Regardless of the unjust nature of Ptolemy’s usurpation, the alliance 
settled matters satisfactorily in the interest of Boeotia, thus impinging upon Athenian designs 
in the north and preventing any chance of further Macedonian influence to the south, for the 
time being.669 In every way this accords well with the policies of Epameinondas, which were 
clearly to ensure the defence of Boeotia and did not include the imposition of hegemonic or 
imperialistic designs upon foreign states; instead, merely to establish politically and militarily 
advantageous alliances. It is clear from Pelopidas’ actions that he and Epameinondas held 
essentially the same ideals for the government of the Boeotian League. 
 
However, having sent the Macedonian hostages to Thebes, Pelopidas would display 
a certain degree of rashness that his brother-in-arms did not. Having learned that the 
mercenaries who had betrayed him were staying in Pharsalus with their families and 
belongings, he conceived the idea to exact some form of punishment on them. He therefore 
proceeded to gather together as many Thessalian soldiers who would follow him and led 
them to Pharsalus. On arrival in the vicinity of the city, the forces of Alexander of Pherae 
	
668	Buckler	(1980a),	121.	
669	 Momigliano	 (1934),	 34;	 Westlake	 (1935),	 139-141;	 Hammond	 and	 Griffith	 (1979),	 185;	 Buckler	
(1980a),	121-123;	Hammond	(1989),	87-88;	Hornblower	(2011),	257-259;	Hatzopoulos	(1985),	247-257.	
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were also present. Pelopidas and Ismenias decided to approach them under the protection of 
their role as ambassadors. Unfortunately, they were now marching on a Thessalian city with 
an army and without any guise of legality in their actions. Alexander saw this and jumped on 
the opportunity to arrest them immediately before taking the city of Pharsalus himself.670 
Alexander had now, by such an act, effectively declared open war with Thebes.671 
 
News of Pelopidas and Ismenias’ incarceration outraged the Theban populace who 
appear to have reacted almost immediately despite the lateness in the campaigning season. It 
was quickly voted to send a full-scale draft into Thessaly consisting of 8,000 hoplites and 600 
cavalry. Two boeotarchs, Cleomenes and Hypatus, men who were comparatively 
inexperienced in military matters, were made the leaders of the expedition. Epameinondas, 
though without any distinguished position, joined the sortie as a regular hoplite, still willing 
to do what he could to serve his country. Alexander appears to have been surprised by the 
rapidity of the Theban reprisals and quickly fast-tracked his alliance with the Athenians by 
offering to sell them meat at half an obol per μνᾶ. They subsequently sent 1,000 hoplites with 
30 triremes under the leadership of Autocles. On hearing of this alliance Epameinondas is 
said to have exclaimed “and we will supply the Athenians wood for this meat as a gift, for if 
they cause trouble, we will cut down their country” (Diod. 15. 71. 3; Plut. apo. reg. imp. 71. 
17/193d-e).672 
 
Despite this, the Boeotian army arrived in Thessaly while the Athenians were still 
circuiting Euboea. With the enemy’s reinforcements not yet present, it was the boeotarchs’s 
intention to entice Alexander into a pitched battle as soon as possible. Alexander’s hoplites 
were inferior in number and experience to the Boeotian veterans and could not hope to defeat 
them head on; however, their cavalry force was far greater than the Boeotians and could thus 
prove advantageous.673 Being aware of this potential problem, the boetarchs recruited some 
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to	a	unified	Thessaly;	however,	 it	may	 inform	us,	 to	an	extent,	on	 the	size	of	 the	 forces	 that	Alexander	
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of the local Thessalians to swell their own cavalry force. However, Alexander had no 
intention of facing the Boeotian veterans in battle; instead, he would use his superior cavalry 
in the open plains. Thus, when Cleomenes and Hypatus had crossed the pass at Thermopylae, 
Alexander surprised them with the presence of his army (Paus. 9. 15. 2), causing the 
Thessalian allies to abandon them. Then, while avoiding battle with the Thebans, Alexander 
cut off their supplies by preventing them from foraging for more food. This gave enough time 
for Autocles and other allies to arrive. Now running low in supplies and facing an enlarged 
enemy army, the boeotarchs decided to retreat. Alexander immediately set his cavalry upon 
the withdrawing force, harassing them with missile weapons. In an attempt to shake off the 
attackers they led the army onto difficult terrain (τόπους χαλεπούς), which caused the 
phalanx to fall into disorder. According to Diodorus, they were in a position where they could 
neither halt nor advance and, due to lack of provisions, became utterly helpless.674 If the 
boeotarchs were forced to surrender at this point, the consequences would have been 
devastating for the Boeotian League: if the bulk of their army and their two best generals 
were captured it would likely have instantly nullified any influence and power that the 
Thebans had over the rest of mainland Greece. 
 
Fortunately, the army, being faithful to the general that made them great, demanded 
that Epameinondas take the helm and lead them to safety. With no protestations from the, 
undoubtedly, panicking boeotarchs, Epameinondas reformed the phalanx with apparent ease 
and wheeled them toward the attackers, who quickly backed off from the reorganized 
hoplites. Then, placing his light-armed men and cavalry at the back of the phalanx in order to 
ward off the skirmishing attackers, he began to continue the retreat. This manoeuvre was a 
great success: the Thessalian force, being unable to inflict further damage on the Boeotians, 
withdrew.675 The story serves as a brilliant example of Epameinondas’ level headedness and 










have less trouble believing it.677 Considering the fact that Epameinondas and Pelopidas had 
led every major campaign in recent years it is unsurprising that the Thebans could not 
provide an experienced general for the expedition and that they were unable to deal with the 
skirmishing tactics of Alexander. There is also no reason to doubt that Epameinondas was 
present, considering he had not been elected to the magistracy. Furthermore, this event was 
likely the predominant reason for his return to office the following year: he had rescued the 
league from despondency, which must have re-established his good reputation amongst his 
peers and the populace.  
 
Although this was unquestionably Epameinondas’ finest achievement of the year, 
was it all he did? The fact that he was not elected to the head of government does not 
necessarily mean that he did not take part in any other civic duties for that year. There is, in 
fact, one piece of anecdotal evidence that may be reasonably associated with this year. 
Plutarch states that he was appointed the position of telmarchos (τέλμαρχος),678 which he 
describes as the official in charge of keeping streets clean (Plut. Praec. Ger. Rep. 15/811b). 
Though it may reasonably be argued that this was just as likely to have occurred before 371 
when Epameinondas first became a boeotarch;679 however, Plutarch specifically claims that 
he was given the position as a result of ill-will through hubris (φθόνῳ καί πρός ὕβριν). His 
popularity in the assembly was clearly very low at this point and would therefore be the most 
fitting year for him to have held such a position. If we can trust the anecdote, then it speaks 
volumes about his love of civic duty. Plutarch reports that he advanced, what was normally 
considered a lowly job, to an office of distinction. Epameinondas’ apparently selfless attitude 
to civic duty meant that he would try to excel in whatever task was set before him. Perhaps 
from the combined goodwill he received from his time as telmarchos and his brilliant rescue 
of the Boeotian army, his chances of getting enough votes to be elected boeotarch for the 















Ambitions of the Peloponnesian States 369-367 B.C. 
 
Following Epameinondas’ second expedition to the south, the independent states in 
the Peloponnesus began to pursue their own policies of self-interest, as opposed to the larger 
objectives of the Boeotian-Peloponnesian League. After the Boeotian army left, late in 369, 
the mercenaries that had been sent by Dionysius of Syracuse invaded the territory of Sicyon, 
defeating and killing some 70 Sicyonians. They then proceeded to capture the stronghold of 
Deras.680 Once the mercenaries had departed, the Argives then attacked Epidaurus with 
apparent limited success. On their return journey they were blocked from returning home by 
Chabrias with his force of Athenians, Corinthians and mercenaries.681 Meanwhile, 
Lycomedes stirred up the Arcadians’ desire for hegemony, convincing them that they should 
not be so dependent upon the Boeotians. Ready for more fighting, he led them to the Argolid 
in order to secure the safe return of the Argive force: being threatened from both sides, 
Chabrias was thus forced to retire. Then, perhaps combining with the Argives, the Arcadians 
attacked the Messenian Asine,682 defeating the garrison and the polemarch, Geranor, before 
ravaging the outer city. Xenophon also seems to imply further campaigning but is not 
specific. Because of these events, the Eleans asked for the return of the cities,683 which Sparta 
	









appear	 to	 have	 joined	 the	 Arcadian	 League.	 The	 Eleans	 now	 had	 very	 little	 reason	 to	 remain	 in	 the	
alliance	as	Sparta	no	 longer	held	 their	 territory,	whereas	Arcadia,	 their	ally,	did,	 see	Roy	(1971a),	575.	
Though	the	situation	may	have	been	somewhat	more	complicated	than	this,	see	Bourke	(2018),	187-191.	
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had deprived them of, but the Arcadians refused. This, as Xenophon remarks, encouraged 
Elean enmity towards Arcadia (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 22-26).684  
 
Then, probably in the winter or early spring of 368, a renewed attempt at a general 
peace had manifested itself. At the behest of Artaxerxes, the satrap of Phrygia, Ariobarzanes 
sent his trusted servant, Philiscus of Abydus, to mainland Greece in an attempt to bring the 
warring Greek states to some form of accord. The Persian king was once again motivated by 
the desire to utilize Greek mercenaries, hoping to reclaim Egypt, as well as the growing 
dangers of widespread rebellion, which would soon come forth as the so-called ‘Great 
Satrap’s Revolt’.685 Though Sparta or Athens may have, in fact, been the initiators of the 
congress,686 it was held in Delphi, which represented a position of neutrality, as it is perhaps 
unlikely that Thebans would have attended a meeting at the former two states, considering 
their ongoing hostilities. Though it is not explicitly stated, all city-states may have been 
represented and a general peace would have been mutually beneficial for all parties; however, 
the Spartans refused to recognize the autonomy of Messenia, which resulted in the 
breakdown and overall failure of the negotiations. It is also possible that the issues of 
Athenian claims to Amphipolis and Theban leadership of Boeotia were raised, though none 
of the leading powers had much reason to dispute the former, nor were they in any position to 
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not	 see	 why	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 believe	 that	 Lycomedes	 could	 have	 led	 the	 Arcadians	 on	 two	 separate	
campaigns	before	and	after	the	Boeotians’	second	invasion.	It	is	certainly	clear	that	the	Spartans	were	not	





his	 reassessment	 of	 the	 events,	 Weiskopf	 (1989)	 concluded	 that	 the	 revolts	 were	 nothing	 more	 than	
small-scale,	 independent	satrapal	rebellions	 that	posed	no	real	 threat	 to	 the	Persian	crown.	Weiskopf’s	
thesis	has	since	received	a	mixed	reception	from	almost	utter	rejection,	see	Moysey	(1991),	113-122,	to	
some	 degree	 of	 acceptance,	 see	 Wiesehöfer	 (2001),	 90;	 Briant	 (2003),	 656-675,	 993-998.	 The	 main	
problem,	 it	 has	 been	 argued,	 with	 Weiskopf’s	 thesis	 is	 his	 minimal	 understanding	 of	 his	 sources,	 cf.	
Hornblower	(1990b),	363-365.	He	is	all	too	ready	to	dismiss	the	evidence	of	Diodorus	without	in-depth	
discussion	of	 the	historian’s	 intentions	and	use	of	his	own	sources.	Because	of	Diodorus’	propensity	 to	





dispute the latter. As a result, Philiscus remained on the mainland in order to hire a force of 
2,000 mercenaries to support the Spartan war effort (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 27; Diod. 15. 70. 2).687 
 
It is abundantly clear that, overall, the Persians were mostly interested in procuring 
the goodwill of the Spartans.688 Ariobarzanes had been on consistently friendly terms with 
Sparta and naturally he saw them as the ideal city-state to support (Xen. Hell. 5. 1. 28; Ages. 
2. 26), given their traditional superiority.689 Persian support ought to guarantee the return of 
Messenia to Sparta: by treaty or through military force. Being aware of the alliance, Philiscus 
also travelled to Athens and appears to have garnered their support, possibly by recognizing 
their right to the Chersonesus.690 As a reward, Ariobarzanes and Philiscus were awarded 
Athenian citizenship (Dem. 23. 141). This Persian intervention, though perhaps instigated by 
Artaxerxes, appears to have been directly under Ariobarzanes’ control. His ostensible 
intention was to benefit his friends, the Spartans, but under the circumstances, providing 
them with support only served to guarantee a continuance of the war in Greece, contrary to 
the king’s avowed intentions. Indeed, in the following year at Susa, Artaxerxes was swayed 
rather easily in favour of the Thebans.691 All this seems to indicate that Ariobarzanes either 
failed to grasp contemporary mainland Greek politics or he wilfully acted to benefit those he 
favoured over those who were certainly the most powerful at this time.  
 
 Significantly, the proceedings of this failed peace treaty may illuminate some points 
of Theban policy. In spite of the possibility that Athens was involved at least one scholar is 
suspicious of this assumption. Though Diodorus refers to it as a Common Peace (εἰρήνην… 
κοινήν), which implies the inclusion of all city-states, Xenophon claims that only the 







688	 Whether	 or	 not,	 this	 was	 for	 the	 beneficence	 of	 Artaxerxes	 or	 Ariobarzanes’	 own	 independent	
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issue at hand was Messenia, Weiskopf is right in asserting that Athens’ presence was 
unnecessary.692 If then, as Xenophon reports, the negotiations revolved around whether the 
Thebans would agree to allow Messenia to return to the ownership of Sparta, we can see a 
possible opportunity missed. If this was the only major issue at hand; then, if the Thebans 
agreed with the terms, this would, implicitly, compel the Spartans to recognize Theban 
leadership over the Boeotian League. Even though some politicians in Thebes were against 
Peloponnesian intervention, it is clear that the majority, at this point, still considered the 
reduction of Sparta a key policy. It is most likely that Epameinondas was not present at the 
proceedings, nor could we confirm the presence of the likes of Pelopidas, as the sources do 
not name any specific personnel with the exception of Philiscus. This may imply that, in spite 
of Epameinondas’ absence, his policies still bore the majority of support within the Theban 
assembly. Certainly, allowing Sparta to regain any of its former economic power was out of 
the question. On the other hand, Epameinondas’ exclusion from office during this year may 
have been the primary reason that Thebes did not send an expedition into the Peloponnesus in 
order to support their allies against an imminent Spartan counterattack. 
 
Around this time, Dionysius of Syracuse formed a defensive alliance with Athens 
(IG II2 1. 105) and provided a force of mercenaries to the Spartan-Athenian alliance, which 
arrived in Athens, either during or sometime after the Peace of Philiscus. Although the 
Athenians argued they should fight in Thessaly against the Thebans, the Spartans preferred 
that they join them in the Peloponnesus. Perhaps because of their closer ties with Sparta, the 
latter option was chosen and certainly the wiser, as the Spartan army desperately needed to 
reinforce their diminished numbers, particularly as the Arcadians and Argives seemed dead 
set on continuous campaigning against them (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 28). With, perhaps, 4,000 
reinforcements in total,693 Agesilaus’ son Archidamus then led the Spartan counterattack 
against Arcadia. The campaign was a relative success for the Spartans, who re-conquered 
Caryae after despatching every man in the garrison. Then, after a series of manoeuvres in or 
	
692	Weiskopf	 (1982),	 362;	Weiskopf	 (1989),	 35	 n.	 63,	 64.	 Though	Messenia	may	 have	 been	 the	major	
issue,	see	also	Ryder	(1965),	134-135,	Weiskopf’s	arguments	against	a	Common	Peace	fail	to	convince.	It	




693	The	number	of	mercenaries	 from	Dionysius	may	well	have	been	 the	same	as	 the	previous	year,	 see	
Stylianou	(1998),	462.	
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near the plain of Megalopolis, the Arcadian-Argive force was devastated in the Tearless 
Battle, during which, not a single soldier under Archidamus was killed. News of this victory 
was greeted by uncharacteristic elation in Sparta, with Agesilaus himself apparently bursting 
into tears.694 
 
Also during this year, Euphron, the most influential man in Sicyon, convinced the 
Arcadians and Argives that the reigning oligarchic government in his city would inevitably 
return to its alliance with Sparta.695 They subsequently helped him to establish a democracy 
in Sicyon, making Euphron one of the leading generals of the city. In his ambitions Euphron 
then began removing many of his rivals, which allowed him to rule the city as a democratic 
tyrant (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 44-46; Diod. 15. 70. 3). It seems that, although the coup was enacted 
with the support of the Peloponnesian allies, Thebes was not consulted before hand and the 
event serves to demonstrate the rapid undermining of their leadership. Though, despite any 
misgivings they may have had on the reversals of Epameinondas’ policies,696 it appears they 
agreed to allow Euphron to retain his ‘democracy’ on the condition that a Theban harmost 
and garrison be allowed to occupy the city for defence against Phlius and Corinth (Xen. Hell. 
7. 2. 11).697  
 
Though the results of the Peace of Philiscus seemed to indicate that the Thebans 
would continue to support the Peloponnesian states against Sparta, their lack of activity in the 
south during 368 is certainly one of the primary reasons for the defeat at the Tearless Battle. 
It may be that the Thebans were disinclined to support the Arcadian and Argive endeavours, 
	
694	Xen.	Hell.	7.	1.	28-32;	Diod.	15.	72.	3;	Plut.	Ages.	33.	3-5;	Apo.	Lac.	20.	5/218f.	For	this	campaign	see	
Buckler	 (1980a),	105-107;	Cartledge	 (1987),	387;	Hamilton	 (1991),	235-236;	Shipley	 (1997),	355-359;	




446-447;	 Skalet	 (1928),	 73.	 See	 below,	 200-207,	 for	 the	 Achaean	 oligarchies.	 However,	 considering	
Euphron’s	 role	 in	 the	 attack	on	Phlius	 in	366,	 later	 scholars	have	preferred	Diodorus’	 order	of	 events,	










which appeared more self-serving than for the greater good of the alliance, particularly in the 
case of Elis’ disillusionment with Arcadia. But it is no coincidence that the lack of Theban 
intervention occurred during the very year that Epameinondas failed to retain his office, 
perhaps allowing his political opponents, who had anti-Peloponnesian policies, to hold sway 
in the assembly during his absence. Pelopidas’ concern with Thessalian affairs may also have 
been a factor, particularly as he was in a Pheraean jail cell at this stage. The independent 
ambitions of the Peloponnesian states, especially those of the Arcadians, under Lycomedes, 
had begun to sever the unifying factor in the Theban-Peloponnesian alliance: anti-Spartan 
policy. Elis no longer had much reason to oppose Sparta and the Arcadians were openly 
resentful of Theban leadership, attempting to fight without the latter’s support. Because of the 
lack of a unanimous policy within the Theban assembly and their failure to arbitrate between 
their allies or send support to oppose the Spartan counterattack, the seeds of the fall of the 
Theban Hegemony had been sown. It is certainly possible that, had Epameinondas been 
present, he would have attempted to prevent these outcomes; however, it is difficult to 




Pelopidas’ Rescue  
 
Early in 367 Epameinondas was successfully re-elected as boeotarch. Without any 
further hesitation, the assembly again agreed to send a second expedition in an attempt to 
rescue Pelopidas and Ismenias from the clutches of Alexander of Pherae. Pelopidas, by this 
stage, had been imprisoned for several months and, if we can believe the testimony of 
Plutarch, he had courageously undergone much torture and humiliation, but not without 
encouraging the hate of Thebe (the wife of Alexander and daughter of the late Jason) against 
her husband (Plut. Pel. 28. 1-5; Reg. Imp. Apo. 72. 3-4/194d).698 Although Pelopidas was 
	
698	 As	 the	 story	 of	 Pelopidas’	 incarceration	 and	 secret	 meetings	 with	 Thebe	 are	 preserved	 only	 by	
Plutarch,	Georgiadou	(1997),	199-200,	has	suggested	that	 it	may	have	been	 invented	by	him.	Although,	
Plutarch	 also	 notes	 that	 Jason	 had	 been	 friendly	 towards	 Pelopidas,	 which,	 if	 true,	 may	 lend	 some	
plausibility	 to	 the	 story;	 indeed,	 Jason’s	wife	may	well	 have	been	 a	Theban	 (Xen.	Hell.	 6.	 4.	 37),	which	
could	explain	why	their	daughter	was	named	Thebe,	see	Westlake	(1935),	89.	
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Epameinondas’ friend and is said to have saved his life,699 there was likely to have been more 
practical motivations for this campaign than simply, once again, risking the Boeotian army 
for the sake of two men. The previous year’s campaign had resulted in Thebes’ first 
significant military defeat since the Corinthian War and certainly must have served to weaken 
their reputation: it was important for this reason to return to Thessaly and prove to Alexander 
that he could not toy with the wrath of the Boeotian League without consequences. Having 
forced the Boeotian army from Thessaly with such ease Alexander would have been 
encouraged by his success and would therefore see no reason why he should further succumb 
to the whims of any foreign power. But now with an experienced general at the helm the 
campaign would be executed with far more efficiency.  
 
It is likely that the Boeotian army would have consisted of a regular draft similar to 
that of the previous year. Once gathered, they marched north, probably sometime early in 
spring. We have very little information about this campaign; however, one anecdote from 
Polyaenus preserves a small portion, which is often cited but rarely discussed (Polyaen. 2. 3. 
13).700 If the evidence could be considered genuine it may help to reconstruct the general 
course of events. There are, in fact, a number of reasons to trust Polyaenus’ testimony. As he 
says, in an attempt to prevent the Boeotian army’s entrance into Thessaly, the tyrant’s force 
guarded the bridge over the Spercheus River. Unwilling to risk his soldiers crossing in the 
face of the enemy, Epameinondas instead encamped somewhere near the southern bank of 
the river. At dawn he noticed that heavy fog would envelop the river: from this a plan was 
devised. Either the following night, or another, the Boeotian soldiers were each instructed to 
carry two logs of wood: one green and one dry. The dry wood was then ignited below the 
green wood, which created a dense smoke. By morning the smoke served to heavily augment 
the fog, thus obscuring the vision of the enemy. He subsequently gathered his force and 
crossed the river unobserved. By the time the fog had cleared the Boeotians had enough time 







Firstly, it is probable that Epameinondas entered Thessaly via the pass at 
Thermopylae, just as had been the route on the previous campaign. Alexander701 may have, 
once again, been attempting to ambush the Boeotian army after they had crossed the pass. 
But perhaps, on this occasion, they failed to reach their chosen position before the Boeotians 
had reached the western coast of the Malian Gulf; therefore, they decided to guard the bridge 
at the river Spercheus,702 hoping to ward Epameinondas from crossing. If Alexander had 
become aware of the oncoming invasion, sending troops to guard these passages was 
militarily prudent: he had succeeded in this action during the previous year and would 
therefore be relatively confident in the success of a similar stratagem. The fact that it failed is 
owed more to the creative thinking of Epameinondas than to the incompetence of Alexander. 
 
What happened next, before Pelopidas’ release, is not recorded, but one clue may be 
found in the words of Plutarch. He states that Epameinondas was concerned that Alexander 
might execute his prisoners if bloodshed occurred; as a result, he says, “Epameinondas… 
kept the battle in suspense, and going in a roundabout motion, his preparations and 
threatening movements restricted the tyrant, thus did not stir up his arrogance and neither 
encourage his cruelty and arouse his hot-headedness” (Plut. Pel. 29. 3).703 For one, Plutarch is 
perfectly consistent with Polyaenus: Epameinondas used a stratagem to subvert the enemy 
without engaging them directly. It is also clear that, like the previous campaign, Alexander 
was unwilling to risk a pitched battle against the Boeotian veterans; hence, the threatening 
movements (τῇ μελλήσει) indicate that Epameinondas attempted to bring Alexander into a 
position where he had to either fight or retire to a more advantageous position. Polyaenus 
describes exactly this: once the Boeotian force had crossed the river, they drew up into ranks, 
ready for battle. It is apparent that neither army properly engaged one another during the 
campaign; therefore, in this case it appears that Alexander would have withdrawn his men 




on	 this	 occasion;	 but,	 judging	 from	 his	 previous	 tendency	 to	 be	 amongst	 his	 soldiers,	 we	 may	 well	
conclude	that	he	was,	e.g.	see	above,	172-173.	
702	For	the	river	Spercheus	see	Béquignon	(1937),	49-58.	
703	Ἐπαμεινώνδας…	ἐπῃωρεῖτο	τῷ πολέμῳ, καί κύκλῳ περιϊών, τῇ παρασκευῇ καί τῇ μελλήσει κατεσκεύαζε 
καί συνέστελλε τόν τύραννον, ὡς μήτε ἀντεῖναι τό αὔθαδες αὐτοῦ καί θρασυνόμενον μήτε τό πικρόν καί 
θυμοειδές ἐξερεθίσαι.	
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Plutarch has only provided a general outline of the manner in which the campaign 
was directed, which seems to imply that there were multiple scenarios similar to the 
anecdote. If Polyaenus’ story was the only episode of the campaign recorded we would 
expect Plutarch to have made a more specific reference, such as the name of the river. The 
fact that he does not may indicate the existence of a fuller account of the campaign, from 
which Polyaenus chose the most impressive part. Of course, Plutarch had no real reason to 
discuss the campaign in depth considering his narrative is about Pelopidas and not 
Epameinondas, but the general nature of his statement appears to be more of a summary of 
the events. In light of this we may then speculate that the campaign went on for several days 
in this way, consisting of a series of manoeuvres with each side attempting to gain the 
advantage. Unfortunately for Alexander, Epameinondas was clearly the superior and 
eventually must have outmanoeuvred him into a position where he was forced either to fight 
or come to terms.  
 
Epameinondas’ cautious approach was fully justified as Alexander had a reputation 
for brutality;704 indeed, the people of nearby Meliboea and Scotussa had recently705 been 
massacred by him.706 Thus, instead of inducing Alexander to fight, he forced him to accept 
negotiations. With a certain degree of leverage, Alexander sent envoys that offered to 
exchange the prisoners for the conclusion of a peace treaty and friendship with one another. 
Buckler suggests that he may also have demanded recognition of his position as tagus and the 
allowance to conduct his affairs in Thessaly unhindered by Theban intervention. However, 
Epameinondas was unwilling to agree to such terms and offered nothing more than a 30 day 





Alexander,	see	Sprawski	 (2006),	135-147,	who,	 in	spite	of	his	brutality,	concluded	that,	 though	he	may	
not	 have	 been	 as	 shrewd	 as	 Jason,	 he	 did	 in	 fact	 demonstrate	 some	 prudence	 of	 policy,	 as	 well	 as	
excellence	as	a	general;	but	his	attempts	to	maintain	and	progress	what	Jason	had	started	were	hindered	
by	changing	internal	and	external	political	situations.		
705	 Beloch	 (1922),	 183	 n.	 1;	 Westlake	 (1935),	 144-145,	 both	 think	 that	 the	 massacres	 occurred	 after	
Epameinondas’	third	invasion	into	the	Peloponnesus,	but	Sordi	(1958),	215	n.	1,	has	noted	that	Diodorus	
places	 the	event	before	Pelopidas’	 rescue,	which	 is	consistent	with	Plutarch’s	account	and	also	offers	a	
plausible	context	for	Epameinondas’	cautiousness	during	this	campaign.	See	also	Stylianou	(1998),	480.	




Thebes to a permanent treaty, which he did not want, or because it had not been officially 
sanctioned by the assembly.707 Although Alexander could threaten to execute the prisoners, 
this would achieve nothing except incurring the wrath of the Boeotian army, which was likely 
to be in an advantageous position by this stage. As a result, he accepted the terms and 
released both Pelopidas and Ismenias.708  
 
Regardless of the success of the campaign, the overall dealing of the situation in 
Thessaly had been a failure on Pelopidas’ part. Following this campaign, the Thebans would 
not again intervene in the north until 364. Because of this, though he may not have realized it 
initially, Alexander had been awarded a respite from foreign influence on his internal 
Thessalian policies and, in spite of Plutarch’s statement that the people of Thessaly held high 
hopes at the presence of Epameinondas and his army (Plut. Pel. 29. 2), nothing had been 
achieved for these people.709 It may be argued that if Epameinondas had been the one in 
charge of Thessalian intervention he would have dealt with the situation more tactfully than 
Pelopidas, but he now seemed less than interested in affairs to the north; indeed, he only went 
to Thessaly out of necessity: first as a regular hoplite and second to rescue his friend and 
intimidate Alexander. If at first, he was in support of Thessalian intervention, the recent 
events in the Peloponnesus drew his attention to the south. For now, Epameinondas and the 
Theban assembly were satisfied with the fact that Alexander of Pherae would, at the very 
least, no longer present any kind of threat to Boeotia.  
 
 
The Peace Treaty in Susa 
 
Perhaps in the autumn of 367,710 in light of their victory at the Tearless Battle and 
good relations with Ariobarzanes, the Spartans sent ambassadors to Susa, hoping to secure 
further support from the king. These certainly included Euthycles, who may have also been 
	
707	Buckler	(1980a),	126-128.	
708	 Plut.	Pel.	 29.	 6;	Reg.	 Imp.	Apo.	 72.	 6/194e;	Diod.	 15.	 75.	 2;	 Paus.	 9.	 15.	 2.	Grote	 (1870),	 272	n.	 1,	 is	







the same Euthycles representing Sparta in 333, before the Battle of Issus (Arr. Anab. 2. 
15),711 and also may have involved Antalcidas (Plut. Artax. 22. 4).712 On hearing of this, other 
Greek states wasted no time in sending their own emissaries; thus, the Thebans sent 
Pelopidas and Ismenias. The Arcadians sent a pancratiast named Antiochus, the Eleans were 
represented by one Archidamus and the Argives sent an unnamed ambassador. Athens, 
independent of their allies, sent their own ambassadors, Timagoras and Leon.713 Preventing 
the Spartans from obtaining further Persian support was vital for the Boeotian-Peloponnesian 
alliance, especially as the Spartans had now proved their effective use of mercenaries, which 
demonstrated that monetary provisions would be all that they required in order to revitalize 
themselves as a threatening power in the Peloponnesus. Buckler also suggests that, by this 
year, the Thebans had essentially achieved their primary goals, particularly where the 
Peloponnesians were concerned. As a result, this was the perfect opportunity to receive 
universal recognition for their accomplishments.714 
 
Arriving in Susa around late September or October, the ambassadors proceeded to 
negotiate a settlement that would be endorsed by Artaxerxes. Though it is not specifically 
expressed, it is clear that the Spartans asked for recognition of their right to Messenia and the 
Athenians wanted recognition of their territorial expansion into the Aegean, perhaps 
specifically mentioning Amphipolis.715 During the course of these negotiations the words of 
Pelopidas won the favour of the king. He first highlighted the fact that the Thebans had 
supported the Persians at the Battle of Plataea in 479 and had since never directly opposed 
them, while the Athenians and Spartans had both made war upon them at one stage or 
another. He then described recent Theban victories against the Spartans and also noted the 
















Boeotians. Artaxerxes was satisfied with these sentiments and allowed Pelopidas to dictate 
the major clauses of a new King’s Peace,716 which included autonomy for all poleis with 
particular recognition of Messenian independence, the disbanding of the Athenian fleet and it 
also appears that Elean claims to Triphylia were favoured over Arcadia.717 It has also been 
asserted that Artaxerxes offered to sponsor a Theban navy in order to contend with the threat 
of the Athenian naval superiority.718 
 
The reactions of each ambassador to the terms of the peace varied greatly. 
Archidamus, the Elean, was naturally pleased and praised the work of the king, whereas 
Antiochus, representing Arcadia, was so incensed that he refused the customary gifts. The 
situation was no more acceptable for the Athenian, Leon, who exclaimed that perhaps it was 
time for the Athenians to find another φίλος.719 In response to this Artaxerxes added a further 
clause, which stated that if the Athenians could formulate fairer (δικαιότερον) provisions, he 
would be open to further negotiations.720 Interestingly, the reaction of the Spartan 
ambassador is not recorded though it would be more than safe to presume it was negative, 
perhaps similar to that of Leon, though with more brevity. On the other hand, the second 
Athenian ambassador, Timagoras, seems to have been receptive to Pelopidas’ terms and may 
have even secretly colluded with him; indeed, on their return to Athens Leon, despite 
allegedly being colleagues for four years,721 made such accusations against him, as well as 
accusing him of receiving bribes from the king.722 
	
716	 Ryder	 (1965),	 136,	 thinks	 that	 this	was	meant	 to	 be	 another	 Common	 Peace,	which	 appears	 to	 be	
confirmed	by	Diodorus’	statement,	“ταῖς	κοιναῖς	ὁμολογίαις”	(Diod.	15.	81.	3),	though	he	only	refers	to	it	
retrospectively.		
717	 Xen.	Hell.	 7.	 1.	 33-38;	Plut.	Pel.	 30.	 1-5.	On	 the	 terms	 and	 clauses	 of	 this	 abortive	 treaty,	 see	Ryder	












Τιμαγόρας.	 The	 charges	 of	 bribery	 (as	 opposed	 to	 collusion)	 have	 been	widely	 accepted	 by	 almost	 all	
scholars,	 though	 Tuplin	 (1993),	 153,	 expressed	 some	 doubts	 due	 to	 Xenophon’s	 silence.	 In	 a	 recent	
article,	 Bearzot	 (2011),	 21-37,	 after	 examining	 the	 differences	 between	 Plutarch	 and	 Xenophon’s	
	 187	
 
After a few weeks of negotiations, the ambassadors journeyed back to their 
respective homes to report the results of the proceedings. When Pelopidas returned, perhaps 
around February of 366, an embassy was held in Thebes inviting all of their allies to be 
present and swear an oath to the King’s Peace. Lycomedes, who represented Arcadia, among 
others, after hearing the provisions of the treaty, reacted with hostility. He claimed he had not 
come to swear any oath, merely to listen to the terms. Having been denied recognition of 
Triphylia as an Arcadian state, they were not likely to accept the treaty any time soon. He 
then defiantly stated that the embassy should be held at the seat of war (i.e. Arcadia), which 
was surely a comment designed to undermine Thebes’ right to hegemony. The Theban 
representatives responded angrily, claiming that he was deliberately destroying the alliance. 
As a result, Lycomedes and the other Arcadians refused to sit in the congress any longer and 
abruptly left. Because the Thebans’ most powerful allies refused to swear to the peace, the 
embassy ended in utter failure. Following this, in a desperate attempt to salvage the treaty, 
Thebes attempted to convince each individual city-state separately by sending ambassadors to 
them. Their first attempt, at Corinth, was again met with failure and apparently any other city 
they tried resulted in the same (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 39-40). Thus, Theban attempts to re-enact the 
Peace of Antalcidas, which had officially made Sparta hegemon of Greece, ended 
ignominiously. Their efforts had proved that they could not gain universal acceptance of their 
leadership and their inability to properly arbitrate the dispute of Triphylia had caused a major 
fracture in the Boeotian-Peloponnesian alliance. As well as this, they were apparently 
unwilling to use military force to compel their allies, as the Spartans had done. The result was 
an embarrassing failure and major tarnishing of Thebes’ reputation as the hegemon of 
Greece.723 
 
Out of this debacle, the question arises as to what role, if any, did Epameinondas 
play during this series of events. Firstly, it may be considered surprising that he was not the 








the job than Pelopidas: he had represented Thebes at as many as two peace treaties and was 
well known for his oratorical abilities, whereas Pelopidas was not.724 Furthermore, 
Epameinondas was most assuredly a boeotarch during this year, so there was no legal reason 
why he would not be chosen. Buckler dismissively asserts that he was probably held behind 
on the off chance that the state needed defending from invaders. There are at least two 
reasons why this is not a satisfactory explanation for his absence. First, Pelopidas was also an 
excellent general, perfectly capable of defending their state; thus, in light of Epameinodas’ 
oratorical prowess, the latter was surely the wisest choice. Second, it is unlikely that any 
major operations would take place while negotiations for a Common Peace were 
commencing: any particular party’s success in Susa would have been entirely counteracted if 
they had been undergoing simultaneous campaigning against the belligerents whom they 
were negotiating with.  
 
It is, then, unlikely that Epameinondas’ absence from Susa can be simply explained 
away. In order to make some kind of attempt, it is important to recognize the sort of policy 
that Epameinondas pursued. Hammond has noted one important result of the failed treaty that 
may help to illuminate this context, which is worth quoting verbatim: “when the Greek states 
refused to accept the terms of the peace sponsored by Boeotia and Persia, the Boeotian 
Assembly accepted the policy advocated by Epaminondas, namely to enforce the terms by 
war on land and sea”.725 This is an echo of an anecdote Plutarch attributes to Epameinondas 
in which he states that if the assembly votes for him, it is a vote for war.726 Despite the fact 
that Epameinondas had represented Thebes at the treaty in 371, his famous altercation with 
Agesilaus had brought further war upon them. Two possibilities may be surmised from this: 
either the assembly did not want Epameinondas to represent them; or, he himself did not wish 
to represent them. For the former, he was known to go against the whims of the assembly, i.e. 
at the treaty in 371 or the invasion of Laconia in 370/69. It is possible that they could not 
trust him to stick true to their desired policies, which would ideally result in a general peace. 
On the other hand, he may well have been against the treaty and therefore refused to be a part 






result may well have been aware that the negotiations would fail. From the type of policy he 
pursued, and would continue to pursue, he appeared to understand that Greek city-states 
could only be compelled through careful compromise or military force. It seems, to me, 
perfectly likely that, when deciding who should represent Boeotia at Susa, the assembly 
either did not wish to choose Epameinondas, or if they did, he would have refused. 




The Third Peloponnesian Expedition 366 B.C. 
 
After the failure of the Thebans to reach a settlement either with their enemies, or 
their allies, Epameinondas was now awarded free rein to pursue his aggressive policies. In 
366, it was therefore agreed upon by the assembly that he should lead a third campaign into 
the Peloponnesus. The primary targets of this operation were the cities of Achaea. Ostensibly, 
according to Xenophon, this was an attempt to compel the Arcadians into recognizing 
Theban hegemonia, essentially to achieve what they had just failed to obtain through 
negotiations (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 41). Lycomedes’ challenge to the leadership had threatened the 
existence of the Boeotian-Peloponnesian alliance and it was therefore necessary for the 
Thebans to take more drastic measures to reaffirm their dominance. An invasion of Arcadia 
itself would not have been strictly justified, also undoubtedly detrimental to the alliance. 
Achaea, on the other hand, was technically allied with Sparta, making it a perfectly 
reasonable target for the invasion.727 Both the Eleans and Argives would be called to 
contribute troops and the natural rendezvous was clearly in Arcadia. If the Arcadians refused 
to be part of the campaign or allow allied access to their territory, the blame for the disruption 
of the alliance would land squarely on them.728  
 
There are of course other considerations that gave merit to the campaign, which 
could plausibly have been used by Epameinondas to justify the endeavour in the eyes of the 
	




Theban assembly. As Achaea was technically allied to Sparta their removal from the latter’s 
influence would further serve to weaken the enemy alliance, though perhaps more 
symbolically than militarily. They could also provide a levy to support allied endeavours, 
though the exact potential for this is uncertain.729 More significantly, however, the rift in the 
alliance with Arcadia was becoming a serious threat, particularly because of their dispute 
with Elis over Triphylia. If it came to open hostilities it was crucial for the Thebans to be able 
to maintain communication with Elis. Thus, attaching Achaea to the alliance would solve this 
impending problem because it could serve as a thoroughfare to the borders of Elis without 
having to pass through Arcadian territory. On the other hand, Achaea in itself was of little 
value strategically: the northern mountains of Arcadia acted as a natural barrier against 
attacks from the north, making it unlikely that Achaean cities would be used as military 
bases. Furthermore, the country of Achaea had always been of relatively meagre wealth, 
which would make the spoils of any campaign inevitably negligible.730 
 
There has been some suggestion that one of the primary reasons for the campaign 
was in order to control the Achaean coast and thus secure the Corinthian Gulf, which would 
allow the Thebans to disrupt Corinthian shipping.731 This argument appears to be tied in with 
the onset of the Theban naval program, which would commence later in the year.732 
Epameinondas would also secure influence in Naupactus, a town on the northern coast of the 
gulf (discussed below), which could have been useful for blocking the straits. However, 
Buckler has argued that these factors are merely fortuitous coincidences: when the naval 
program commenced, its focus was on the Aegean and the Athenian navy, therefore such a 
scheme would have been overstepping the practicalities of their current situation. For certain, 
the most pressing matter was to reassert control over the precarious alliance with Arcadia. It 
is of course possible that Epameinondas did hope to use his gains in the Corinthian Gulf for 










future plans.733 Though the naval program was not likely to be at the forefront of Theban 
considerations, this does not necessarily exclude the possibility that securing the gulf was 
part of their overall plan for the campaign. Other scholars, without even the suggestion of the 
Theban navy, have asserted that Epameinondas was attempting to turn the Corinthian Gulf 
into a “Boeotian lake”.734 While this is a very loose term, there is actually some merit to its 
use. By securing alliances with and access to all of the ports in the Corinthian Gulf, the 
Thebans could gain at least two important advantages: one, with or without a naval program, 
control of the coast would serve to hinder Corinthian shipping, at the very least preventing 
trade and access to said ports. The other point, which has been noted by some scholars, is that 
the Boeotian army now had another safe point of access to the Peloponnesus: by sea.735 It 
may be noted that the Spartan army had previously made their entry into Boeotia via the 
Corinthian Gulf in 371 before the Battle of Leuctra. This would be made all but impossible 
with the success of this campaign. It is not inconceivable that all these factors were brought 
before the Theban assembly, which subsequently voted in favour of sending a general levy 
into the Peloponnesus with Epameinondas at the helm. 
 
Probably around March or April, the army gathered together. With the primary 
objective being without a powerful army, the major problem for the Boeotian army, as usual, 
was getting into the Peloponnesus. Mt. Oneum was at this time guarded by a force of 
mercenaries under the command of the Spartan, Naucles, and another force under the 
Athenian, Timomachus. The assault on the mountain in 368 had proven to be a dangerous 
and difficult endeavour for the Boeotians and Epameinondas had no desire to once again take 
the same risk. Because of this he decided upon an alternative tactic to secure safe passage for 
his army. As the defenders were expecting attack to come from the north, he secretly sent 
word to the Argives, requesting them to take the pass from the south. In compliance with this, 
Peisias, the Argive general was given a force of 2,000 hoplites and set out for the Isthmus. 
Upon arrival, after scouting the area, Peisias determined that the defences were carelessly 
maintained (ἀμελουμένην), he therefore unhesitatingly decided to attack one of the passes at 






side of Mt. Oneum.736 Xenophon states that the pass on the hill above Cenchreae was taken 
(τόν ὑπέρ Κεγχρειῶν λόφον), which is most likely to be Stanotopi.737 This was the logical 
choice of the two passes, given the laxity of the defence, the Stanotopi pass was a 
considerably shorter climb and therefore the most convenient. The night attack was 
successful and Peisias secured the defences before awaiting the arrival of the Boeotian force. 
He had prudently brought enough supplies for seven days: more than enough time for 
Epameinondas and his men to meet them (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 41). 
 
Once the Boeotians had cleared the Isthmus they assembled with the rest of the 
allies in Arcadia, probably near Nemea as they had done in 369.738 Xenophon states that all 
of the allies (πάντες οἱ σύμμαχοι) gathered together (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 42). These were 
undoubtedly the Peloponnesian allies, which included Argos, Messene, Elis, Arcadia and 
perhaps Sicyon. Arcadia’s quiescence to the call to arms automatically served as 
acknowledgement of Theban superiority, essentially achieving the underlying purpose of the 
expedition. It is likely that the Arcadian government was not, at this stage, in a position to 
oppose Theban hegemonia with hostility. This may have been the result of factionalism 
within the Arcadian assembly739 or perhaps they were simply prudently biding their time until 
they could secure additional support. In one fell swoop, Epameinondas had symbolically 
restored, albeit temporarily, the recent breakdowns in the unity of the alliance. The success of 
the campaign and the inclusion of more alliances would further serve to secure their 
position.740 After the allied force rallied together, they marched for Achaea.  
 
At this point the question now arises as to the route that the invaders took, which, to 
my knowledge, has not yet been thoroughly examined in sufficient detail. Buckler has 
asserted that from Nemea Epameinondas marched to the coast before making his way to 
Rhium where the Corinthian Gulf’s northern shore is roughly two and a half kilometres 
distant. From there he may well have sent small detachments across the gulf to the Aetolian 









continued along the coastline, further southwest, past Patras and finally to Dyme.741 
Considering the lack of discussion, it is worth assessing whether or not there is good reason 
to accord with Buckler’s understanding of the campaign since alternatives are undoubtedly 
possible. Our sources for the route the army took are fairly scanty and non-specific. On 
Xenophon’s silence, we can rely only on Diodorus’ statement that Epameinondas liberated 
the cities of Dyme, Naupactus and Calydon (Diod. 15. 75. 2). To add to this, we have a small 
fragment of Ephorus’, which confirms the arrival of the army at Dyme (Ephorus FGrH 70 F 
84 = Steph. Byz. Dyme).742 Thus we essentially have only two pieces of information from 
which we can reconstruct the campaign: one, the army went to Dyme; two, they had to be in 
a position, which allowed them to make contact with Naupactus and Calydon.  
 
From this it is easy to see Buckler’s logic. Because the hills in Achaea are so 
precipitous the primary way to commute through Achaea is along the coastal road. Travelling 
along this route from Nemea would then have been the most efficient way to cross the 
country.743 The assumption that the army marched to Rhium has clearly been made because 
this is without a doubt the best spot to send detachments to Aetolia. Then from Rhium, 
Epameinondas could simply have continued along the same path to reach Dyme. If this was 
indeed the route that was taken, further speculations may be presented. Because the Thebans 
had previously gained influence in Sicyon, it would be likely that said city and its port would 
have been their first coastal destination, as they could camp and resupply there. Thus, from 
Nemea, they could have taken the same route they had previously taken in 368, along the 
Nemea River, past Phoebia.744 From the port of Sicyon, it is nearly 100 kilometres to Rhium, 
a journey that would have taken several days. Then, having spent an uncertain amount of 
time at Rhium, organizing affairs in Naupactus and Calydon, the army marched to Dyme, 




742	 See	 Parker	 BNJ	 70	 F84.	 A	 fragment	 of	 Daimachus	 is	 often	 associated	 with	 this	 event	 as	 well	







However, the plausibility of his assertions notwithstanding, there is not enough 
evidence to confirm that this was the route taken. There are, in fact, one or two factors, which 
may have compelled Epameinondas to consider a different possibility. It ought to be noted 
that the coastal road would have been easily defensible at the numerous points where the hills 
reach the sea, making the road narrow. With a sufficient force, it would be easy enough to 
prevent the passage of even a large army. Though Epameinondas may not have been 
concerned about the Achaeans’ military capabilities, the potential for danger along this route 
would surely not have been lost on him. As well as this, because of the proximity of the sea 
with the mountains for the majority of the journey there is little space for crops to grow. The 
army would have therefore been required to send bands of soldiers inland to obtain supplies. 
 
If, for a moment, we assume he took a different path, what then was another viable 
option? At first glance, marching into Achaea via Pellene appears to be a possibility: the city 
had also fallen under Theban influence in 368 and, being on the eastern end of Achaea with a 
nearby port, it could have made a useful base of operations. But on further inspection of the 
topography, the inland paths heading west from Pellene are precipitous and impractical for 
large bodies of soldiers. The fact that the city had been left under Theban influence 
unchallenged is testimony to its isolation from the rest of Achaea. Nor would an attack from 
the south be a likely candidate, as previously mentioned, it was not considered an option 
because of the northern Arcadian mountains and can therefore also be dismissed.745 There is 
one more possibility that may be examined. For the most part navigating an army through 
Achaea is a challenge for any army, one that may prove more difficult than worthwhile; 
however, the entrance through Elis into Achaea, along the west coast, is a wide, flat plain. 
Because of this the settlements in this area could scarcely defend themselves against an attack 
by a large land force. It is possible that Epameinondas instead marched his army across 
Arcadia into Elis and then invaded Achaea from the southwest.  
 
As is clear, there are only two practicable routes in which to march a large army on 
the offensive into Achaea. Regardless of what one might prefer, there is no way to 
conclusively prove which way Epameinondas went; however, a brief comparison of both 




unlike the coastal road, the army would have been in no danger of attack and supplies from 
allied settlements and farms were likely to be abundant. There could also have been a certain 
element of surprise: whether or not the Achaeans were well aware of the oncoming invasion 
is not obvious but the route the army would take to enter the country could well have been 
kept a secret, and prudently so. In fact, the evidence may well indicate this. Though Diodorus 
offers no real details about the manner in which the campaign was conducted, the fragment of 
Ephorus might: he says, “When the army arrived at Dyme, at first, the Dymeans, being 
terrified…” (Ephorus FGrH 70 F84 = Steph Byz. Dyme).746 Wickersham has suggested that 
this fragment, albeit a portion of a sentence, infers that the Dymeans were at first fearful of 
the approach of the invading army before being relieved to discover that there would be no 
bloodshed.747 The fragment clearly comes from Ephorus’ account of the campaign as no 
other known military venture involves the approach of an army to Dyme in the fourth century 
or earlier.748 
 
There are at least two important abductions that can be drawn from this fragment. 
Firstly, Ephorus states that the Dymeans were fearful (καταπλαγέντες) in the face of the 
approaching army. Though the fragment is incomplete and we cannot determine the exact 
nature of their fear, it would be fair to suggest, as Wickersham did, that they were surprised 
and uncertain of the army’s intentions. Now when applying this factor to our two different 
routes, certain questions emerge. If they had taken the coastal road, they were using the main 
highway of Achaea, passing several ports and many of the major settlements, including the 
capital, Aegeum.749 According to Buckler’s understanding, before reaching Dyme, 
Epameinondas had already been to Rhium and sent detachments to secure Naupactus and 
Calydon. With this logic Dyme would have been the very last place the army marched to, a 
journey, which would have taken many days. If then, they had taken the coastal road, how is 
it possible that the Dymeans were still fearful of the invaders? Surely word would spread 











engagements, what reason would they have had to be fearful? It appears more likely that the 
presence of fear amidst a city from an oncoming army is more consistent with its initial 
arrival into the country of Achaea at a point when there definitely would have been 
uncertainty over the invaders’ intentions. Furthermore, if the army had already marched to 
Aegeum, where the federal council stood, there would scarcely be any need to send the army 
to Dyme, which was a city of relative unimportance, other than its proximity to Elis. Of 
course, one might argue that Ephorus’ statement is rhetorical; however, this point is irrelevant 
to my argument. It is, in the same context, unlikely that Ephorus would denote the fear the 
Achaeans had from the invaders at the end of the campaign, when fear would have been most 
rife at its onset.  
 
My second abduction, admittedly, is something of a stretch, but with consideration 
one might consider it logical. The nature of the fragment indicates that it is a portion of a 
relatively detailed account of the campaign. As can be observed, Ephorus is describing the 
approach of the army to Dyme, as opposed to the brief account of Diodorus, who merely 
names the cities that were liberated. However, it is likely that Diodorus used Ephorus as his 
source for the campaign, thus providing us with a condensed version of Ephorus’ account. 
Now, when Diodorus lists the cities, which were ‘liberated’, he does it in this order: Dyme, 
Naupactus and Calydon. On the surface one would not dare presume that the order of events 
could be determined by a list that Diodorus wrote, but there may be reason. On the likelihood 
that Ephorus’ account was substantially longer, i.e. at least a few sentences, we may guess 
that he provided no such list, instead actually describing how each city was secured by the 
army, as he clearly did for Dyme. Diodorus, on the other hand did not have the space to go 
into so much detail, he therefore decided to outline the major achievements of the campaign. 
If, considering the nature of note taking and paraphrasing, one is compelled to compile a list 
of names, places, facts, etc, it is not difficult to admit that one would invariably write them in 
the same order that they find them on whatever work they are reading. The same principle, in 
this case, may be applied to Diodorus. When he wrote his brief account of the campaign, he 
was reading Ephorus and therefore probably listed the cities that were liberated in the same 
order that Ephorus narrated them. It may also be added that Naupactus is a coastal city in 
Aetolia, whereas Calydon is further inland: some four kilometres from the sea. It is therefore 
likely that Naupactus was liberated first: this factor is wholly consistent with my argument.  
	 197	
 
Of course, this level of interpretation may be a step too far, but at the very least this 
discussion demonstrates that Buckler’s assumption that Epameinondas used the coastal road 
to enter Achaea should not be accepted without due consideration. Thus, because of the 
previous arguments I have made, I will proceed under the assumption that the army marched 
into Elis before heading north and arriving at Dyme. 
 
The army appears to have reached the city of Dyme, which is most frequently 
associated with ruins in the vicinity of the modern town of Kato Achaia,750 without any 
resistance from the locals. The Dymeans were naturally shocked and fearful of the surprise 
presence of a large foreign army, but their fear would have quickly been quelled once they 
had learned that bloodshed could be easily avoided. Diodorus tells us that the city was 
liberated (ἠλευθέρωσεν) from the Achaeans (Diod. 15. 75. 2). Although we should not 
naturally interpret his phrasing at face value, it is curious that the ‘liberation’ of Dyme is 
categorized similarly to Naupactus and Calydon. While the latter two cities are not in 
Achaea, making their occupation by Achaean garrisons a situation for a potential ‘liberation’, 
Dyme on the other hand was one of the original Achaean cities. By all accounts Dyme was 
one of the 12 major cities that made up Achaea.751 Considering this, it must certainly be a 
mistake to refer to the Theban occupation of the city as ‘liberation’. Indeed, it is likely that 
Diodorus did this for convenience in his condensation of the event, as well as his lack of 
concern for such detail. We may then reasonably conclude that the city was occupied for its 
strategic value, being the westernmost Achaean city and the closest to Elis.752  
 
	
750	 Leake	 (1830a),	 160-163,	 originally	 concluded	 that	 the	 modern	 town	 of	 Karavostasi	 is	 the	 best	






which	 is	possible,	but	 there	 is	no	 further	evidence	 for	 this.	 See	also	Robinson	 (2009),	135-147,	and,	 in	
agreement,	see	Kralli	(2017),	8,	36	n.	47.	Hamilton	(1959),	505,	asserts	that	Dyme	had	previously	been	




Having succeeded in the initial stages of the campaign, Epameinondas had 
intentions to manage Achaean influence in northern Greece. As mentioned above, the 
obvious place to do this from was at the promontory of Rhium. It is then likely that, from 
Dyme, the army marched to Rhium along the coast, via Patrae, a journey of around 36 
kilometres. Along this route the land between the sea and the inland hills is wide enough for 
the army to have comfortably marched uninhibited the entire way. It is possible that they 
made a stop in Patrae as it would seem imprudent to simply pass it by, but without any 
evidence to indicate this, it must remain mere speculation. Rhium, situated in modern day 
Rio, was the name of the promontory, which, along with the promontory in Aetolia, 
Antirrhium, forms the entrance to the Corinthian Gulf. Both points lie about two and a half 
kilometres from one another (in spite of inaccurate ancient calculations), making it the 
narrowest strait between Achaia and Aetolian/Ozolian Locris. As there was apparently a 
temple of Poseidon in the area, there was likely to be a small township dependent upon it.753 
From here it would have been simple enough to send some form of detachment over to 
Aetolia.  
 
This detachment may have consisted of both soldiers and emissaries: perhaps even 
including boeotarchs, as others could well have been present. They sailed to the port of 
Naupactus and, either sending a separate expedition or, from there, travelled west to the city 
of Calydon, which lay about four kilometres inland on the western bank of the river Euenus 
(Plin. Nat. Hist. 4. 3; Strabo 10. 2. 21).754 Both of these cities, by this time, had undergone 
changes of sovereignty on a number of occasions. According to Homer, Calydon was 
originally an Aetolian city (Hom. Il. 2. 638-640, 9. 529-531, 13. 2I6-2I8). Then, around 389, 
during the Corinthian war, the Achaeans garrisoned the city in response to a threat from the 
Acarnanians, who were being helped by the Athenians and Boeotians (Xen. Hell. 4. 6. 1);755 
however, Xenophon states that the people of Calydon had previously been made Achaean 




754	Though	 the	sources	give	a	 figure	closer	 to	11	kilometres,	 the	site	of	Calydon	 is	normally	associated	
with	the	remains	at	modern	Kurtagá,	at	the	spur	of	Mt.	Aracynthus,	see	Leake	(1835),	533-538.	For	more	





Naupactus was originally part of Ozolian Locris but around 457/6 the Athenians removed it 
from Locrian control and resettled it with Messenian exiles from the Peloponnesus.756 The 
relationship between the Messenians and local Naupactians was good enough for them to 
form a sympoliteia (IG IX2 1 fasc. 3 IX)757 and also maintained a loyal alliance with the 
Athenians throughout the Peloponnesian war, providing hundreds of troops on a number of 
occasions (Thuc. 2. 9. 4, 3. 75. 1; Diod. 12. 48. 1, 13. 48. 6). After the Athenian defeat at 
Aegospotami, the Messenians were then driven from Naupactus by the Spartans and given 
back to the local Locrians, sometime between 401 and 398.758 From this point we do not 
know when Naupactus came under Achaean influence,759 but Merker has reasonably 
surmised a possible date of 389, during the same campaign that Calydon received a 
garrison.760 Thus by 366, Achaean control had been firmly established in both cities. 
 
What motivated Epameinondas to liberate these cities can only be speculated upon, 
but the reason seems clear enough. Both Calydon and Naupactus were originally Aetolian 
and Locrian cities respectively and both of these countries were, at this time, allied to 
Thebes.761 Having secured Achaea, a dispute of ownership over these cities could well have 
emerged; therefore, in order to please his allies, Epameinondas probably deemed it prudent to 
return the two cities to their original seats of power. From this he would gain the goodwill of 
both his allies and potential bases of operations, plausibly keeping in mind future designs for 
naval control over the Corinthian Gulf.762 Perhaps more importantly, removing Achaean 
foreign influence was likely to have an adverse effect on their power and economy, in 





758	Diod.	 14.	 34.	 2;	 Paus.	 4.	 26.	 2;	 10.	 38.	 10.	 The	dates	 of	 these	 events	 have	 long	been	 in	dispute,	 see	
Merker	 (1989),	 304	n.	 6,	 for	 a	 summary	of	 the	 evidence	 and	 scholarship.	 For	 the	Messenian	 colony	 at	
Naupactus	in	general	see	Luraghi	(2008),	188-194.	
759	 Oldfather	 (1935),	 1989,	 purports	 possible	 Aetolian	 control	 sometime	 between	 401-398	 and	 the	










Following these events, while the bulk of the army was probably still around Rhium, 
the Achaean government decided to send their own emissary in order to agree upon the terms 
of surrender. Epameinondas then, according to Xenophon, used his own personal influence to 
conduct affairs. He allowed them to maintain their oligarchic government under the condition 
that they would swear to an alliance in which they had to follow the Thebans wherever they 
go, i.e. as a subject-ally (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 42). This arrangement had previously been used 
with Sicyon and Pellene and had subsequently been successfully ratified by the Boeotian 
Confederacy. Epameinondas had little reason to believe that it would not work now. 
Unfortunately, in spite of these previous successes, the events that followed would 
demonstrate the failings of Epameinondas’ informality.763 However, at this stage, the 
invasion had been, for all intents and purposes, an utter success. Indeed, he had achieved his 
plans without any apparent drop of blood on Achaean soil: an ideal outcome for all parties 





When Epameinondas returned to Thebes his arrangements in Achaea were 
immediately criticized in the assembly. Representatives from Arcadia and others were sent to 
Thebes in order to repeal Epameinondas’ settlement, arguing that his arrangement had been 
for the benefit of the Spartans. As a result, the Theban assembly resolved to send harmosts to 
Achaea who dismantled the oligarchic government and drove out the aristocrats before 
establishing a new democratic rule (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 43). This episode offers many insights 
into the nature of Arcadian and Achaean federalism, disunity within the Theban assembly 
and, perhaps, Epameinondas’ pragmatism but failure as a diplomat; therefore, meriting some 
discussion.  
 
There were at least two different groups involved in convincing the Thebans to 
reverse their conclusion of affairs in Achaea. Xenophon bluntly names the Arcadians as one, 





either refers to Theban opponents of Epameinondas or Achaean democrats though prefers the 
latter because Xenophon follows his statement with “ἔδοξε θηβαίοις”.765 Though not exactly 
a strong argument, this position has been generally accepted in varying degrees, but most 
scholars maintain that opponents of Epameinondas were likely to be instrumental in 
supporting the case in the assembly.766 Once accepting the involvement of these opponents, it 
is also easy enough to suppose that Menecleidas was the leading voice in support of the 
reversals. Though Thompson is right in cautioning anyone to make such an assumption,767 
Buckler has offered some fairly plausible arguments for this specific case.768 However, the 
truth behind this assumption is less important than the implications of the event. Xenophon’s 
words seem to indicate that Epameinondas’ settlement was not seriously questioned until the 
arrival of the Arcadian emissary and Achaean democrats. Once they had given their case to 
the assembly a window of opportunity was opened for Epameinondas’ political opponents to 
further damage his reputation. As Menecleidas is the only one of these explicitly named in 
the sources, it is likely that he was the leader of this theoretical faction. Menecleidas’ 
activities may be interpreted as the role of a single person or merely that of the most 
enthusiastic proponent of a group, which continually attempted to thwart the policies of 
Epameinondas and Pelopidas. If he existed as the sources indicate, he would undoubtedly 
have taken part in this event, but, if not, his name can still be reasonably used to represent a 
group of politicians at odds with Epameinondan policy.  
 
The question of motivation is also important to establish as, on the surface, the 
original settlement appears to have been largely accepted by the people of Achaea, just as had 
been achieved with Sicyon and Pellene. Why then did the Arcadians and the other factions 
involved find it necessary to appeal the settlement? The most controversial aspect of this 
question is the position of the Arcadians, which has received some attention by scholars over 
the last half century. In a compelling article, Roy highlighted the ongoing competition 








trend in the politics of Arcadia.769 From the unification of the Arcadian federation, in 370, the 
league was founded upon heavily democratic and anti-oligarchic ideals. This is evident 
primarily in Tegea where most of the oligarchic supporters were either exiled or 
massacred.770 Although the other major Arcadian city, Mantinea, became democratic 
peacefully, the oligarchs there must have been fewer in number and probably recognized the 
value of taciturnity as a means of self-preservation. Then, throughout the decade, in its 
foreign affairs the league consistently offered support to fellow democrats in the 
Peloponnesus.771 The reversals in Achaea can certainly be interpreted as one such situation: 
Achaean democrats, dissatisfied with Epameinondas’ settlement, appealed to Arcadia for 
support, which was accepted due to Arcadian zeal for democracy.  
 
Thompson, however, later offered a different interpretation: in his article on 
Arcadian factionalism he argues that Lycomedes, having recently affronted the Theban 
assembly by walking out of the peace talks,772 was not likely to have asked the Thebans to 
intervene in the Peloponnesus by sending harmosts to Achaea. Rather, he suggests, that this 
delegation would have been sent at the behest of a rival Arcadian faction that was in favour 
of improving relations with Thebes and now influenced the Arcadian assembly over 
Lycomedes and his supporters.773 Buckler, on the other hand, is perfectly happy to envision 
Lycomedes’ role in this episode, though he interprets his motivation to be an attempt to 
create negative propaganda out of Epameinondas’ actions without necessarily expecting the 
Thebans to concede.774 More recently Roy has reassessed the topic and has presented a fair 
point, which may refute Thompson’s argument to an extent. He notes that, in the words of 
Xenophon, in establishing his settlement, Epameinondas presented his allies with a fait 
accompli, which they were likely to resent given their recent misgivings with Theban 
hegemonic activities. The Arcadians then, as Roy suggests, had three options: one, accept the 
settlement and oligarchic control of Achaea; two, attempt to overthrow the oligarchs without 
Theban approval, potentially jeopardizing the alliance; three, request that the Thebans reverse 
	








the settlement. Though they may not have wished for Thebes to send harmosts to Achaea, the 
latter choice was safest and still resulted in Achaean conversion to democracy. Roy further 
points out (and rightly so) that there is no evidence that Lycomedes or any other Arcadian 
“ate humble pie”, as Thompson put.775 Having considered all the arguments the question of 
motivation, perhaps, should not be put down to a single factor. It is more than clear that the 
Arcadians felt duty bound to support foreign democratic factions.776 However, 
Epameinondas’ fait accompli may have been taken as another attempt to secure Thebes’ 
position as hegemon, which they had apparently attempted in the previous year with the 
peace conferences. Regardless of the reason for Arcadia’s desire for Achaean democracy, 
these actions symbolically undermined Theban power and damaged the reputation of their 
most eminent military leader, even accusing him of arranging affairs for the benefit of the 
Spartans.777 
 
For the Boeotians, although the motivations of such people as Menecleidas may be 
put down to rivalry against Epameinondas and disdain towards his aggressive policy, the 
reasons why the reversals were ratified by the Theban assembly cannot. Buckler imagines 
what Menecleidas had to achieve in order to convince them: because of recent events the 
Thebans were likely to be very unhappy with the Arcadians and overcoming this would have 
been the initial challenge for the orator. He may have attempted to induce sympathy from the 
Thebans for their ‘fellow’ democrats and argued that it was necessary for more stringent 
measures to be made in order to insure Achaean fealty. It may further have helped that the 
Arcadians appeared willing to accept the new settlement with Theban harmosts.778 If we stop 
here it may be easy to establish that the assembly’s motivation was to support democratic 
factions and, perhaps, to help maintain the ailing Peloponnesian alliance. But on dissection, 
the nature of Theban foreign policy is not so simple to detect. Unlike Arcadia, the Thebans 












and Pellene and allowed a tyrant to control much of Thessaly. Thus, it is not likely that the 
Boeotian League had any established policy for democratic support. In more general terms, 
what can be noted is that they tended to support foreign federal states such as in Messenia, 
Thessaly, Elis, Arcadia and Argos. This tendency has led some scholars to argue that Thebes 
had a federal program in which they reshaped foreign federal constitutions in the image of 
their own.779 However, Beck has since provided a compelling refutation, concluding that 
Thebes’ foreign policy was not motivated by ideological or constitutional concepts, but 
rather, was determined by power politics.780 The argument he presented essentially 
demonstrates that Thebes had no major influence on the constitution of any federal state with 
the exception of Thessaly, which was generally oligarchic, and Messenia, whose constitution, 
as earlier noted,781 is unknowable. The only evidently democratic federal states were Arcadia 
and Argos, both of which had been established before the Boeotian League took an active 
interest in Peloponnesian affairs. Even Elis appears to have been rather politically ambiguous 
in its ties to either democracy or oligarchy.782 Because of this, referring to the Boeotian-
Peloponnesian alliance as a “coalition of democratic states”783 may serve to skew our 
understanding of each respective political manifesto during this period.  
 
Other than hatred towards Sparta it is impossible to deduce a specific ideological 
concept that bound this alliance together. However, there is at least one abduction that can be 
made: the Thebans’ support for federal states is abundantly apparent. Without any need to 
consider particular political ideals we can safely assert that the Boeotian League found it 
prudent to be allied with other federal states. What this tells us about the events of 366 is that 
the concern of the Theban assembly was not that Epameinondas had allowed Achaea to 
remain oligarchic or that they desired to reframe the Achaean federation in their own image, 





782	 Roy	 (1971a),	 572-573.	 Cf.	 Swoboda	 (1900),	 2401-2403.	 See	 Robinson	 (2009),	 135-147,	 for	 Elis’	





previously established.784 We may then conclude that the assembly did not ratify the reversals 
because of any particular disapproval of Epameinondas’ arrangement. It may even be 
suggested that if the Achaeans were generally happy to remain oligarchic, the Thebans were 
happy to allow them.785 This, to my mind, leaves but one major factor, which was the 
primary reason for the ratification of the reversals: the Arcadians. Though Buckler has 
reasonably asserted that the Arcadians would have been unpopular in Thebes at this time, it 
may be recognized that the Thebans, understandably, did not want to further jeopardize the 
alliance; therefore, accepting Arcadia’s request was diplomatically pertinent. Furthermore, 
the primary motivation for the campaign in the first place was to attempt to reassert 
dominance over the Arcadians. Having achieved this, the Arcadian request for reversals, 
though defiant, could not be cast aside lightly. It is even possible that Epameinondas accepted 
the changes without a large degree of objection, knowing the necessity of maintaining the 
alliance. This conclusion is far from certain as we just do not know enough about the 
Boeotian League’s foreign policies; however, this was undoubtedly a significant factor and 
the only one we can be certain of.  
 
For the Achaean side of things, the subsequent events must be recounted. Following 
the instalment of the Theban harmosts, removal of the oligarchs and the accession of the 
democrats, the exiles fled and banded together, probably not far away.786 They seem to have 
gathered a large number of followers and plotted their reprisals. It is not certain how long it 
took for them to act but Xenophon gives us the impression that events occurred rather 
rapidly. The oligarchs marched throughout the country and removed the harmosts and 
democrats from each Achaean city. Once this had been achieved the Achaeans renewed their 
alliance with Sparta and endeavoured to fight on its side with increased vigour (Xen. Hell. 7. 










786	Buckler	 (1980a),	191;	Freitag	 (2009),	24,	both	 suggest	Elis,	 though	 there	 is	no	particular	 reason	 to	
think	 this	and,	 given	 that	 the	Eleans	were	allied	 to	 the	Thebans,	 it	 seems	unlikely	 they	would	harbour	
fugitives.		
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had a reasonable amount of support; however, their attainment of power, being characterized 
by the imperialistic actions of Thebes, would have caused them to be criticized as traitors. 
The oligarchs, playing upon these sentiments, revitalized their support from the populace. 
Robinson argues that popular government had fairly large support in Achaea due to the 
potential for a strong democratic presence in Dyme.787 But a single, garrisoned, city in 
Achaea is not an indicator for widespread support throughout the country. It is made even 
more difficult to confirm considering the ease with which the oligarchs returned to power. 
Either the democratic leaders were vilified enough to lose all support or they never had it in 
the first place. 
 
That the Achaeans felt the actions of the Thebans were treacherous, there is little 
doubt;788 but perhaps they were also conceived as imperialistic. The question then arises as to 
whether the Thebans were beginning to show signs of imperialism. Underhill noted that the 
use of ἁρμοσταί was very similar to the way in which the Spartans conducted their 
hegemony.789 However, Buckler argues that, like at Sicyon, harmosts were used to protect 
their allies from attack, in this case, from themselves. They must have been aware that the 
exiled aristocrats could attempt to regain their power; it was therefore appropriate to provide 
them with assistance.790 Indeed, it was traditional for the hegemon to protect its allies; in this 
instance they were simply being consistent with this role. However, more striking is the fact 
that they interfered with the internal political structure of Achaea, which may be considered a 
breach of their autonomy. But during this period of history, the exact way in which people 
perceived autonomia is far from certain. Indeed, both the hegemonies of Athens and Sparta 
over the previous century or so defined autonomia to suit their own agenda and had 
	
787	Robinson	(2009),	144-145.	See	above,	197	n.	752.	
788	 Buckler	 (1980a),	 192,	 states	 that	 “it	 would	 be	 an	 injustice	 to	 accuse	 the	 Thebans	 of	 perfidy”,	 a	




Thebans	 had	 no	 intention	 of	 betraying	 the	 Achaeans	 until	 extenuating	 circumstances	 altered	 their	







conducted and justified their actions under the guise of their own interpretations.791 Even the 
exact nature of what was deemed imperialistic cannot be ascertained: it is unlikely that the 
Athenian Empire was considered to be in the same league as the Persian Empire, which did 
actively control the internal affairs of its subjects. Just as the definition of autonomia was not 
strictly defined nor was the role of the hegemon.792 The Thebans may have, in some sense, 
overstepped their bounds, but their actions were consistent with those of previous 
hegemonies and, provided this position was not ‘frequently’ abused, it was not likely to 
outrage the majority of Greek people. It should be further noted that, as suggested above, 
they acted more out of necessity than with any intention of tightening their control over an 
ally and we have no reason to think that Achaean autonomy would not be returned once a 
safe transition of government had been established.  
 
The whole affair seems to demonstrate the foresight of Epameinondas. He was 
keenly aware that most city-states were generally content to change their allegiances as long 
as their internal affairs were not interfered with. On the other hand, however, he was also 
short-sighted in his conduct. By presenting the Arcadians with a fait accompli and giving 
them no opportunity to contribute to the initial settlement, he provoked them into challenging 
his actions. It may be argued that the subsequent oligarchic revolution was the result, not 
specifically from the instalment of democracy, but from the Theban betrayal of 
Epameinondas’ settlement. It is possible that the Achaeans would have been happy with a 
democratic government provided it had been established in the original settlement. In this 
case, the failure of the entire affair may, to some extent, be blamed on Epameinondas 
himself, who was not willing to allow the Arcadians any influence in settling affairs. But, in 
the end, the nature of the whole episode is obscure and any conclusions must remain 
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Boeotian Dominance in Mainland Greece 366-365 B.C. 
 
 
Following the re-instatement of oligarchy in Achaea, the remainder of 366 and some 
of 365 were characterized by a number of other significant events in which the Boeotian 
League played the role of hegemon and expanded its territory. However, Epameinondas is 
nowhere specifically attested for this period and we can in no way be certain of his level of 
involvement. He was, on the other hand, at the very least, keenly aware of these events and 
would have adopted a particular political stance on each of them. There are also a number of 
contextual factors that make Epameinondas’ involvement highly plausible, particularly for 
the Oropus affair and the Peace of 366/5. The debacle with Euphron may be more of a stretch 
but still merits some investigation since it is indicative of the political atmosphere at Thebes. 




Sicyon and the Fall of Euphron 
 
Though Epameinondas is nowhere mentioned during this episode, the course of 
events led to the Theban assembly itself where he was undoubtedly present. It is, then, 
certainly worthy of examination, particularly establishing the involvement of Thebes during 
the whole affair. Since 368,793 Euphron had ruthlessly established his dominance over 
Sicyon, effectively reigning as a dictator.794 It is interesting, however, that during this period 
a Theban harmost, apparently with a garrison, occupied the city (Xen. Hell. 7. 2. 11). This 
may have served as a conditional check on Euphron’s power,795 but we are given the 
impression that he was able to implement his policies unhindered. Indeed, the harmost’s role 
	
793	See	above,	179.	





appears to have been primarily military, i.e. preventing insurgence and spearheading military 
endeavours.  
 
Thus, in 366, this harmost led a joint expedition against Phlius, which had, over the 
last two years, successfully repelled three separate attacks, mostly instigated by the Argives 
(Xen. Hell. 7. 2. 4-15; Diod. 15. 40. 6).796 The attack consisted of troops from Pellene, 
Sicyon, the Theban garrison at Sicyon and the mercenaries of Euphron. With a combined 
force of probably over 4,000 soldiers the Phliasians were heavily outnumbered and should 
not have proven too difficult to overcome. However, with quick reactions, the Phliasians met 
the attackers when their forces were divided and managed to rout them before they could 
unite (Xen. Hell. 7. 2. 11-16).797 Not long after this the Sicyonians experienced further 
setbacks: while they were fortifying Mt. Thyamia, which lies just to the northeast of Phlius, 
the Phliasians, with the help of Athenians under Chares, attacked the worksite and occupied 
the fort themselves. This allowed for easy communication and transportation of supplies 
between Corinth, Phlius and Pellene.798 
 
During the same year, internal strife also arose at Sicyon. The Arcadian general, 
Aeneas of Stymphalus, believing that the situation at Sicyon could no longer be tolerated, 
took his army up to the acropolis and called together all of the aristocrats and those who had 
been exiled. These proceedings caused Euphron to panic and he fled to the port and 
presumably occupied it with his mercenaries. He then sent for Pasimelus from Corinth and, 
through him, gave possession of the port to the Spartans, while offering some paper-thin 
excuse for having betrayed their trust in the first place (Xen. Hell. 7. 3. 1-3). It is interesting 
to note that the Arcadians seem to have conducted this while the Theban harmost and 
garrison were supposedly still in Sicyon: it seems unlikely that Aeneas would occupy the 
acropolis of a city that was currently occupied by an allied force. Griffin assumes that the 
garrison was removed from Sicyon and later reinstalled, but he offers no explanation for this. 
	





joined	 their	 Achaean	 brethren	 by	 re-establishing	 their	 alliance	 with	 Sparta,	 which	 Xenophon	 later	
confirms	(Xen.	Hell.	7.	4.	17).		
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Alternatively, Lolos et al. suggest that the harmost may have invited Aeneas, perceiving that 
Euphron was becoming a threat.799 One possibility may be that the coup could have occurred 
while Euphron and the Theban garrison were occupied with the expedition against Phlius: 
both parties could have returned to Sicyon and discovered what had transpired. This would 
account for a temporary absence of the harmost and may explain the ease with which 
Euphron occupied the port, considering he had his mercenary force with him. He did not, 
however, hold the port for long as the nearby Athenians who were supporting his position 
were recalled to Attica to help with affairs at Oropus (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 1). 
 
Before long stasis broke out in Sicyon between the aristocrats and the populace, 
presumably over issues of property and wealth. Euphron consequently hired a force of 
mercenaries from Athens and used them to occupy the city with the help of the people. 
However, the Theban harmost and garrison still held the acropolis, which he could not take 
without giving Thebes a casus belli against him. He therefore set off for Thebes with the 
intention of buying their support; though, unfortunately he was followed by some of the 
aristocrats who assassinated him upon the Cadmea, before he could speak to the Theban 
council. The perpetrators were apprehended and brought before the boule. Only one of them 
pleaded guilty to the charges but gave a defence, which secured their freedom (Xen. Hell. 7. 
3. 4-12).800 Underhill had previously suggested that the officials who voted upon the trial 
(τοῖς ἄρχουσι) were in fact the boeotarchs,801 which, if true, would indicate that 
Epameinondas himself was likely to have been directly involved. However, as Swoboda and 
Hermann have noted, the case was tried in the local Theban boule, which dealt only with 
criminal offences that occurred within Theban territory. Thus, the archons referred to were 
most likely to be the polemarchs, who had authority over local judicial matters.802 We can 
therefore conclude that, despite the political nature of the trial, Epameinondas could not have 






802	 Swoboda	 and	 Hermann	 (1913),	 253,	 267	 n.	 4.	 See	 also	 Bonner	 and	 Smith	 (1945),	 20-21;	 Buckler	
(1980a),	32.	
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On the other hand, someone with the political authority of Epameinondas was not 
likely to have been entirely absent or neutral in this whole affair. There are a few things we 
can surmise: because the third Boeotian invasion was likely to have occurred after Euphron’s 
seizure of power and his authority was not challenged, it is probable that Epameinondas had 
no real grievances with the coup. Whether or not the Theban harmost and garrison occupying 
Sicyon were there at his behest we cannot say, though it is possible that they were stationed 
there during the second or third invasion. Having said that, the harmost was perhaps not a 
close associate of Epameinondas, considering his apparent military incompetence. We might 
note that others who are known to have been within Epameinondas’ political circle (i.e. 
Pelopidas, Gorgidas and Pammenes) all demonstrated astuteness in military matters. I would 
then conclude that Epameinondas did not personally select the harmost himself. As for the 
trial of Euphron’s killers, it is doubtful that Epameinondas had any personal issue with the 
murder per se, though it would not be surprising if he was incensed that it occurred on the 
Cadmea of Thebes. But since he had previously demonstrated no particular preference (in 
foreign states) as to whether power remained in the hands of the aristocrats or the people (i.e. 
oligarchs or democrats), provided they were allied with Thebes, he may have happily 
remained neutral in this situation. Euphron would subsequently be venerated by the people of 
Sicyon who apparently benefited from his reign (Xen. Hell. 7. 3. 12). This indicates that, 
despite the tyranny, the stasis really was a matter of democracy versus oligarchy. 
 
 
The Oropus Affair 
 
While events in Sicyon and Phlius were progressing in the Peloponnesus a territorial 
dispute was instigated when Themison, the tyrant of Eretria, occupied the city of Oropus, 
which lay on a bay on the north coast of Attica, nearly 20 kilometres east of Tanagra, where 
the modern town of Skala Oropou now stands. According to our sources, Themison and one 
Theodorus, along with some exiles from Oropus, seized the port city, before calling for aid 
from Thebes in response to an oncoming force from Athens. The Athenians accordingly 
received no help from their allies and abandoned the territory to the Thebans pending some 
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form of mediation.803 Though, on the surface, the incident appears rather minor, the 
consequences were far reaching and involved a major military sortie by both Athens and 
Boeotia, the latter plausibly led by Epameinondas himself.804  
 
Oropus had a long history of disputed possession: initially it belonged to Boeotia,805 
then was transferred into Attic territory probably sometime during the late sixth century.806 In 
411 the city was captured by the Boeotians (Thuc. 8. 60), though they are said to have 
maintained the Oropians’ autonomy. In 402, however, because of civil strife, they were again 
brought under Theban influence, this time being awarded citizenship in the Boeotian 
Confederacy. The inhabitants were then relocated, albeit briefly, to a settlement seven stadia 
inland, possibly where the modern town of Oropioi lies, approximately two and a half 
kilometres to the southwest.807 After the Corinthian war and the King’s Peace in 387/6, it is 
generally suggested, and appears likely, that the city was returned to Athenian control. 
Although it was never officially incorporated into the Athenian demoi, it remained in their 
control until the present situation.  
 
Because of this historical claim and the probability that Themison would not risk 
facing the might of Athens alone, Buckler has suggested that the plan was masterminded by 
the Thebans. While Themison could well have conceived the plot by himself, Buckler is 
undoubtedly correct in asserting that he must have been counting on Theban support. Indeed, 
we may speculate that Thebes had been desirous to reclaim Oropus ever since the 
reformation of the Boeotian League; however, it seems apparent that they were never quite 
willing to risk direct conflict with Athens on the borders of Attica and Boeotia. Instead, by 
allowing a third-party figure to initiate the conflict, they could not be held directly 












On the other hand, if successful, they could then support the perpetrators and assume control 
of the city while claiming their historical right to it.808  
 
The Thebans may have also had a more practical motivation for taking Oropus: 
plans for implementing a large-scale Boeotian navy809 were undoubtedly already underway 
and the port of Oropus could harbour at least 42 ship, which it had previously done in 411 
(Thuc. 8. 94-95). Not only would this provide them with an additional port, it would also 
have been strategically valuable; thus serving to help inhibit Athenian control of Euboea as 
well as diminishing the efficiency in which Athens could be supplied with its grain.810 The 
apparent alliance with Eretria, the port of which lay about seven kilometres to the north on 
the southern coast of Euboea, would have further secured this situation, giving the Thebans 
control of the Euripus Strait.  
 
Bearing these factors in mind, a basic reconstruction of the series of events may be 
attempted. Though we cannot be certain where the coup was initially conceived, it is clear 
that we must begin with Themison and Eretria. Like Oropus, Eretria had variously been in 
and out of Athenian control over the centuries. Supposedly the inhabitants were originally of 
Ionic descent, coming from an Attic Eretria, thus sharing some kinship with Athens; 
however, Strabo indicates that some accounts say they came from Triphylian Macistus in Elis 
(Hdt. 8. 46; Strabo 10. 1. 10). Nevertheless, their perceived connection with Athens and the 
Ionic states was apparent when they sent five ships with the Athenians in support of the 
Ionian Revolt in 499 (Hdt. 5. 99). Unfortunately, this move had dire consequences for Eretria, 
which was subsequently sacked and its inhabitants removed in 490, during the first Persian 
invasion of Greece (Hdt. 6. 100-102). The prisoners were luckily freed by Darius and 
resettled in Cissian territory (Hdt. 6. 119). By 485, Eretria was being rebuilt and settled by 
some of its former inhabitants, as well as some migrants from Attica. Nonetheless, the failure 
of their Athenian allies to support them during the war resulted in an ingrained feeling of 
betrayal throughout the fifth century, which is evident in the failed Euboean revolt of 446 for 







95).812 Following the Peloponnesian war, little is said about Eretria except that it was part of 
the Athenian League in the 370s813 until the cities of Euboea sided with Thebes late in 370 
(Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 23). Then by 366, in the current situation, we find it under the control of the 
tyrant Themison. From this brief survey of Eretrian history we can conclude that the 
inhabitants had very little reason to feel compelled to side with Athens despite their distant 
kinship with them.  
 
Some scholars have noted that the revolt in 411 bears much similarity with the 
events at Oropus in 366.814 Thus, in the context of the two cities, it is worth viewing the 
earlier event as a precursor to the latter. Early in 411, the Boeotians took Oropus with help 
from the Eretrians and some of the locals (Thuc. 8. 60). If the Eretrians and the rest of 
Euboea were determined to further diminish the threat of Athens, then this was a tactically 
sound decision. It is clear that control over both cities was vital for control of the Euripus and 
this is confirmed when, later that year, the Spartan fleet under Agesandridas attacked the 
Athenian fleet that was stationed at Eretria. The inhabitants again aided the invaders by 
removing the city of its supplies, thus drawing many of them away from the city. With the 
Athenians caught off guard they signalled to the Spartan fleet, which had anchored at Oropus, 
to attack (Thuc. 8. 95). With such close proximity between the two cities they were ideal for 
attacking one another: Agesandridas realized this and the Athenians apparently did not. We 
may surmise that the Eretrians helped to deprive Athens of Oropus in order to secure the 
strait and prevent reprisals in the wake of their rebellion. As Hanson asserts, the capture of 
Oropus enhanced the “success of insurrection” in Euboea.815 
 
The distant memories of these events would still be vivid for many of the older 
citizens from both states in 366 and, for others, the chance to replicate their fathers’ deeds 
was now appealing. If Themison desired for Eretria and the rest of Euboea to be protected 
from Athenian influence, it was necessary to secure Oropus and, to do this, they would need 








himself by saying that Thebes’ retaining of the city was an unexpected loss.816 This is hardly 
likely considering he could never have expected to hold the city without continued support 
from the Thebans. It is more probable that he sent word to Thebes offering to take Oropus for 
them, provided they sent a force to support him. A plot was then conceived employing help 
from one Theodorus (Dem. 18. 99) and exiles of Oropus. Considering the initial coup came 
solely from Eretria, we may speculate that the exiles used inside help to enter the city before 
providing the Eretrians access to the port, perhaps by silencing the watchmen. Either way, 
with no description of the attack itself, it was undoubtedly a quick and successful affair. 
 
The immediate response from Athens was to send their entire force to Oropus.817 It 
cannot be exactly determined what sort of figure, but the army could have been a similar size 
to the 12,000 soldiers sent to aid the Spartans in 369.818 Though perhaps less would be 
expected considering how readily they would avoid aggressive confrontation with the 
Boeotian force. It is apparent from the subsequent trials in Athens that Chabrias was made 
general and his political ally, Callistratus, tagged along.819 They also sent for Chares, who 
had been assisting the Phliasians against attacks from Sicyon, along with a request for 
support from their Peloponnesian allies, but unfortunately none of them responded (Xen. 
Hell. 7. 4. 1). Under the circumstances this is unsurprising: Phlius and Corinth were too 
bogged down by their own neighbouring enemies to consider sending support since it would 
weaken their own defences. While the Athenian force mustered, the Eretrians must have 
fortified themselves within the city and sent word to Thebes.  
 
The Thebans probably mustered a general Boeotian levy, numbering up to 8,000 
hoplites, plus cavalry. We may well have found Epameinondas at the helm of this sortie, 
though there is no conclusive reason to assume this. It is, on the other hand, reasonable to 
speculate on his presence merely due its plausibility. Of the known Theban figures at this 
time, only Epameinondas had good experience in leading large scale military operations: 
Pelopidas would have been quite capable but, by this stage, he had not led more than 1,000 







death (Diod. 15. 94. 2). It is further clear from the botched rescue operation in 368 that 
Thebes was lacking in experienced replacements.820 In order to guarantee their success it 
would have been a prudent choice to elect him as general.  
 
With the arrival of both forces the potential for a large-scale engagement was in the 
air. It was clear that the Athenians would have to defeat the Boeotian force if they wished to 
regain control of the city. Chabrias was an experienced general and he undoubtedly realized 
the dangers of a head on attack against the veterans of Leuctra. This decision was supported 
by Callistratus, who apparently advised Chabrias to leave Oropus under Theban control 
(Aristot. Rhet. 1. 7. 13). We may assume that a series of diplomatic discussions occurred 
between the two sides, which resulted in the agreement that the city would remain under 
Theban control until the city’s ownership could be decided by third party arbitration (Xen. 
Hell. 7. 4. 1). For Epameinondas and the Thebans the result could not have been better: they 
had increased their influence and obtained a strategically significant port without bloodshed. 
However, for Chabrias and Callistratus, though they had acted prudently against a superior 
force and only unofficially accepted Theban occupation of Oropus, they were brought to trial 
in Athens. According to various sources, Callistratus succeeded in gaining acquittal by giving 
one of his most eloquent speeches ever.821  
 
The significance of this event should not be underestimated. Boeotia’s historical 
connection with Oropus indicates that the city was on the agenda for incorporation into the 
league as far back as the establishment of the federal assembly after 379/8. More important 
was the effect it had on the overall political situation on mainland Greece: the Athenians, 
being incensed at their allies’ lack of support, were compelled to seek alliance elsewhere. The 
Arcadians too were desirous of change and, on hearing of this situation, Lycomedes 
convinced the myrioi that an alliance with Athens would be propitious. He subsequently 
journeyed to Athens where his negotiations were successful. Unfortunately for Lycomedes, 
on his return home, he was assassinated by Arcadian exiles (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 2). Nonetheless, 
the συμμαχία was established, which put the Arcadians in the awkward position of being 
	
820	See	above,	172-174.	
821	 Dem.	 21.	 64;	 Plut.	Dem.	5.	 1-3;	Vit.	 Dec.	 Orat.	8/844b;	 Diog.	 Laert.	 3.	 1.	 23.	 On	 the	 trial	 see	 Sealey	
(1956),	195-196;	Cawkwell	(1961),	84.		
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allied to Athens while technically being at war with Athens’ allies (i.e. Sparta, Corinth, 
Phlius, etc.) and vice versa.  
 
There is one further point to address in relation to the Oropus affair and that is 
whether or not the issue ever actually underwent arbitration. According to a fragment of 
Agatharchides’ account of European affairs, some form of arbitration did indeed take place 
between Boeotia and Athens concerning an unknown territory referred to as Sidai 
(Agatharchides FGrH 86 F 8 = Athen. 14. 64). Epameinondas, who was naturally 
representing his country, demonstrated that the territory was truly Boeotian by presenting a 
pomegranate to the Athenians and asking them what they called it. The representative of 
Athens said they call it “ῥοάν” to which Epameinondas replied that, in Boeotian dialect, they 
say “σίδη”. He therefore proved the Boeotian origin of the territory’s name, especially 
considering its abundance of pomegranate trees. Whether or not Sidai can be associated with 
Oropus, it is impossible to say with certainty; however, using the process of elimination and 
probability, Buckler has concluded that there is no other territory on the border between 
Attica and Boeotia that could be associated with this instance.822 Indeed, from what we know 
of events during Epameinondas’ career, the Oropus affair is the only one in which a plausible 
connection can be made. Buckler’s sole reservation on the historicity of the fragment is in 
determining an appropriate arbitrator.823 However, I see less issue with this: firstly, it is worth 
speculating when the arbitration was likely to take place. It could plausibly have occurred 
after the Peace of 366/5 (see below), probably just a few months later, when some states (i.e. 
Corinth and Phlius) were allowed to attain a neutral position and would therefore no longer 
be compelled to choose sides (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 10). Such neutral states would have been the 
perfect candidates for arbitration. We may thus conclude that, though some Athenian orators 
would later deem the action illegal,824 the fragment indicates that Oropus ultimately fell into 











The Peace of 366/5 
 
Once the alliance with Arcadia had been concluded Demotion convinced the 
Athenian assembly to tighten their control over Corinth (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 4). Aristotle 
indicates that the Corinthian oligarchs feared a democratic revolution (Arist. Pol. 5. 1306a. 
21-4), but their loyalty to Sparta may have been waning as well. Chares was then sent with 
the fleet to Cenchreae. News of this reached the Isthmus first and the Corinthians acted 
quickly: they sent the local Athenian garrisons away and refused Chares entry into the port, 
before hiring mercenaries to further protect their territory (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 4-6).825 Despite the 
fact that the Athenians had not used force to secure the city, Corinth decided it was time for 
their part in the ongoing conflict to conclude. Thus, they sent word to Thebes requesting a 
peace to be granted to them and any other of their allies that so desired (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 6-7). 
This was great news for the Thebans especially considering the recent failure at Susa. If they 
could successfully conclude a treaty the collapse of the Peloponnesian League would be 
complete. Epameinondas would undoubtedly have been delighted at the prospect of further 
isolating Sparta from their allies. 
 
The nature of this treaty has been the subject of some controversy for nearly a 
century on account of a divergence in the sources. Diodorus’ brief account states that it was a 
Common Peace (κοινή εἰρήνη) initiated by the Persians (Diod. 15. 76. 3). On the other hand, 
the more detailed Xenophon portrays the peace instead as a more localized treaty between 
Thebes and several of Sparta’s remaining Peloponnesian allies (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 6-11). The 
primary issue centres on whether or not Diodorus’ account can be trusted or not, an issue 
which is unlikely to ever be fully resolved. However, since there are some issues with the 
most recent discussion of the peace and because the nature of the peace directly underpins the 
situation in Thebes (and by implication Epameinondas), it is appropriate to reappraise the 
matter. 
 
With few exceptions, scholarship has tended to accept that both accounts refer to the 




rejected in favour of Xenophon. By and large this position is adopted without discussion;826 
however, the exceptions that do indeed justify their position are varied and deal with a range 
of contextual issues. Grote provides an early rejection of Diodorus by discrediting both of his 
assertions: first, there is no other indication of Persian intervention on Greek affairs since 
Pelopidas’ return from Susa with the king’s rescript about a year before, though he asserts 
that the present treaty appears to be based on this rescript. Secondly, he also rejects the 
possibility of a Common Peace since the war continued between the major parties 
involved.827 The strength of these arguments notwithstanding, they have essentially formed 
the basis of subsequent scholarship on the issue; thus the questions: ‘could the Persians have 
been involved?’ and ‘could the treaty have been a Common Peace?’ are the focus of this 
discussion.  
 
One factor plausibly relevant to this peace, as suggested by Cawkwell, is in 
determining when Athens’ claims to Amphipolis and the Chersonesus were recognized in an 
assembly by the Persian king and the other Greek poleis. These proceedings are mentioned 
only by the Athenian orators Demosthenes, Aeschines and Hegesippus,828 whose statements 
have been used in various arguments intended to associate them with known events. 
Aeschines explicitly says that a representative of Amyntas was present at the recognition of 
Amphipolis, which gives us a terminus ante quem of 369.829 Indeed, the majority of scholars 
agree with Accame’s suggestion of the conference in Athens in 369 for the event in which 
their claim was recognized.830 However, this is only mentioned in the context of a congress of 
the Greeks and he does not mention the Persian king or Chersonesus, which may open the 
possibility that the latter was recognized at a later date; indeed, the recognition of the 
Chersonesus is only mentioned in a single passage by Demosthenes that also does not include 
Amphipolis. Arguing along these lines Cawkwell points out that Athenian operations against 
Chersonesus did not begin until Timotheus had taken Samos in 365 (Isoc. 15. 112) and, 
because of this, their right to it must have been recognized not long prior. He then notes that 








a representative of the Persian king, who had previously promised a rescript to Athens of the 
recent failed treaty in Susa (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 36).831 From such context it would certainly 
appear apt to conclude that a Common Peace could have occurred around this period, which 
would make Diodorus correct and Xenophon incomplete.  
 
This interpretation has, however, been challenged by a number of scholars. Ryder 
appears to disagree, though his only major criticism is that he thinks the royal rescript for 
Athens would not necessarily lead to a general treaty and it may instead have been a 
“separate conciliatory approach”. He also warns that we should be wary of Demosthenes’ use 
of πάντες.832 Sealey also disputes the conclusion; however, he only cites Cawkwell’s note on 
Aechines’ passage referring to Iphicrates as the general against Amphipolis (Aeschin. 2. 27) 
and Demosthenes’ passage referring to Timotheus as the general against Amphipolis and the 
Chersonesus (Dem. 23. 149). Cawkwell merely states, as an addition to his previous 
argument, that these passages may reflect the difference in policy between Amphipolis and 
the Chersonesus.833 Sealey may be correct that Aeschines simply did not feel the need to 
mention the Chersonesus in relation to Iphicrates but he does not address any other aspects of 
Cawkwell’s argument and far from proves that “it is likely that the Athenians sought 
recognition of their claims to Amphipolis and Chersonesus at the same time”. His main 
argument is based on the arbitrary observation that the claims were initiated in a “revival of 
Athenian concern for the northern Aegean”; presumably he supposes this to be in the late 
370s or early 360s.834 Later still Buckler has also expressed his reservations against 
Cawkwell: first, he notes that the date when operations against Amphipolis or Chersonesus 
began is not necessarily indicative of the date in which their claims were recognized, citing 
Athens’ later failure to act against Amphipolis when Philip offered it to Athens in 359 (Dem. 
2. 6; 23. 116; [Dem.] 7. 26). He then proceeds to discuss the various problems associated 
with establishing a date for the recognition of Athens’ claim to both cities essentially 
concluding that it cannot be used as evidence for a Common Peace.835 However, neither 








Chersonesus is not once mentioned in relation to the recognition of Amphipolis. Is it then 
wise to simply assume they occurred at the same time or can we at least be open to the 
possibility that they are distinct events? 
 
More recently this distinction has received a great deal more consideration. Heskel 
further points out the possibility that the Greeks’ recognition of both territories could well 
have occurred separately from Artaxerxes’ recognition.836 We then have the overall potential 
for four separate events, which could have happened at a variety of different times. As we 
can see, when examining the scholarship, basically every known possibility has been argued 
at one stage or another.837 It has then become quite impractical to attempt to come to some 
definitive conclusion on the matter because we cannot rely on anything other than 
circumstantial evidence. It must be pointed out that not one of our major sources (i.e. 
Xenophon, Diodorus, Plutarch) offer us any real indication that Athens’ claims to either city 
actually happened. The one possible exception being the Persian king’s rider offered to 
Athens during the failed Peace of 367, which implies further diplomacy between Athens and 
Persia; however, we can neither be certain about the date of such negotiations or the subject. 
In the end it will always be something of a stretch associating known events with 
indeterminate events mentioned by Athenian orators some two decades post hoc. Thus, we 
must conclude that the date when the Greeks or the Persian king recognized Athens’ claim to 
the Chersonesus cannot be used as any kind of evidence in favour or against Diodorus’ 
Common Peace of 366/5.  
 
	
836	 Heskel	 (1997),	 102-103.	 Dmitriev	 (2011),	 405-406,	 admits	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 this	 distinction	 but	
does	not	prefer	it.	
837	Earlier	 scholarship	 tended	 to	place	all	 these	events	with	 the	peace	conference	of	371	 in	Sparta,	 e.g.	














Another argument purported by Cawkwell concerns Isocrates’ Archidamus. This 
speech was essentially a rhetorical exercise put in the mouth of Archidamus, son of 
Agesilaus, and future Spartan king. It is set in the Spartan assembly and the young prince is 
addressing the Ephors in relation to the issue of whether or not Sparta should accede to a 
peace with Thebes that is being strongly advocated for by their allies and apparently many 
Spartans as well. The latest historical reference is to the death of Dionysius the Elder of 
Sicily (Isoc. 6. 45), which occurred sometime in the Spring of 367 (Diod. 15. 73. 4-74. 5) and 
since he lists Thebes’ destruction of Thespiae and Plataea without mentioning Orchomenus, 
which was destroyed around 365/4 (Isoc. 6. 27), it is reasonable to conclude that the speech is 
set sometime between those two dates.838 At this time, the only plausible peace treaty that 
Isocrates could be referring to is the current one under discussion. Because of this and its 
references to the peace, it should be considered additional evidence for our overall 
interpretation, as Isocrates was undoubtedly well disposed to write about it.  
 
Cawkwell makes two observations about this speech, which he asserts add weight to 
Diodorus’ Common Peace. For the first it is important to note that the central focus for the 
speech’s argument concerns Sparta’s claim to the land and people of Messenia. It is made 
abundantly apparent that by accepting the terms of the treaty at hand, the Spartans would 
have had to recognize the autonomy of their former territory and slaves (e.g. Isoc. 6. 11, 13, 
16, 81, 87). We must add that Diodorus later confirms that the autonomy of Messenia was at 
the forefront of discussions (Diod. 15. 81. 3). Now, during Archidamus’ ramble he points out 
that the Persians have possessed Asia for a much shorter time than the Spartans had 
possessed Messenia (Isoc. 6. 26). He then goes on to say, “they give up Asia to the barbarian, 
being its ancestral right” (Isoc. 6. 27).839 Cawkwell argues that, because of the present tense 
used, Isocrates is referring to a clause, which Xenophon fails to mention, in the current peace 
treaty that included the recognition of Persia’s right to the Greek states of Asia Minor.840 If 
this is correct, the clause could well be reflected in Diodorus’ account, which includes 








His second observation is about the uncertainty of the number of parties involved in 
the peace. In the speech, Archidamus names only Epidaurus,841 Corinth and Phlius (Isoc. 6. 
91), which Cawkwell argues is because the speaker is only concerned with the remaining 
members of the Peloponnesian League. He also adds that Xenophon indicates that Argos was 
involved (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 11) and I would further add that Epidaurus is nowhere mentioned 
by Xenophon in this instance. The inconsistency between the two sources at the very least 
demonstrates that we cannot make an argumentum ex silentio about the specific parties that 
were included in the peace. Building on this argument Cawkwell states that the fact that 
Archidamus says that the Athenians would save Sparta (Isoc. 6. 62) does not exclude the 
possibility that they were involved nor would it matter if they were a party to a peace that 
recognized the autonomy of Messenia as they certainly were in 362/1.842 By the same token 
none of the evidence may be specifically used to exclude Persian involvement in the peace 
especially since Archidamus does not hold any hopes for the Persians to lend support to 
Sparta.843 
 
Unlike the previous line of reasoning, only a couple of arguments have since arisen 
against these conclusions. Ryder asserts, for the first observation, that Archidamus could just 
as easily have made the comparison with Persia’s claim to Asia if the peace was just a limited 
rehash of the failed peace at Susa and need not necessarily include such a clause. As to the 
situation with Athens he simply states that the Spartans could have felt that the Athenian 
alliance with Arcadia had rendered their own alliance with Athens valueless.844 Other than 
this, Dmitriev contented himself by simply stating that it is difficult to see how this evidence 
“can confirm that the treaties made by these cities and Thebes in 366-365 represented a 
Common Peace”.845 Of course we must again agree with these critics that Cawkwell’s 
arguments do not in any way prove that the treaty was indeed a Common Peace; however, it 
is also fair to say that not one of their arguments prove that it was not.  
	











Cawkwell’s final argument in favour of a Common Peace simply establishes a 
plausible context in which Athens would now accept such a treaty: the leading politicians, 
Callistratus and Chabrias had now fallen out of public favour since their failure at Oropus 
and, as their accuser, Leodamas, was apparently pro-Theban (Aeschin. 3. 139), public 
opinion may have swayed more favourably towards diplomacy with Thebes.846 Again, Ryder 
has criticized this context by saying that the pro-Boeotian nature of Leodamas says nothing 
of Athenian policy itself and, rather, he argues that Athenian policy had become more 
aggressive, considering the re-election of Timotheus, the alliance with Arcadia and the 
attempt to secure Corinth.847 Cawkwell later addressed these points and, without going into 
unnecessary detail, he more firmly established the plausibility of his context.848 It will suffice 
to add that none of these actions by Athens run counter to a potential treaty with Thebes and 
other mainland states, particularly as the attempt on Corinth occurred before said peace 
anyway. But, regardless of whether Athens’ involvement is plausible or not, it proves nothing 
in the end about the Common Peace and such a context could just as well fit into a more 
limited settlement with or without Athenian inclusion.  
 
Since Cawkwell’s article over five decades ago, in spite of the majority of scholars 
remaining unconvinced, there have been at least three other discussions in favour of 
Diodorus’ evidence. Two of these emphasize the fact that a divergence with Xenophon is not 
necessarily evidence against Diodorus, especially considering how Xenophon is inclined to 
ignore the koine dimension of all peace treaties. Jehne adds that Ryder’s contention that it 
was not a koine eirene simply because Sparta and (probably) Athens were not included is 
only a criterion of a Common Peace from a modern perspective. Zahrnt further points out 
that, whether or not Athens and Sparta were involved is irrelevant to the propaganda that an 
alleged Common Peace meant for Thebes.849 Stylianou also argued in favour of Diodorus, 
emphasizing similar points to Jehne and Zahrnt, though, unlike them, he asserts that the 
Athenians were a party to the peace, which, if true may well confirm the treaty as koine. 







Xenophon. Like Jehne and Zahrnt he states that Xenophon’s omission is not evidence against 
Diodorus, but he further explains that, since the autonomy of Messenia was recognized at this 
peace (Isoc. 6. 11), and since Xenophon had previously omitted to mention even the founding 
of that particular polis, it is no wonder that he would deign to record the legitimization of its 
status as autonomous.850  
 
Other than making various contextual arguments, the main reason that scholars 
cannot accept Diodorus’ Common Peace is, as Buckler says, “until Sparta’s participation in 
the supposed peace is proved – and Cawkwell has failed to do so – Diodorus’ report of a 
Common Peace made in 366/5 cannot be taken as accurate”.851 As I mentioned above, Jehne 
and Zahrnt asserted that the involvement of Sparta was not necessarily a criterion for a 
Common Peace. In the most recent assessment Dmitriev does indicate Sparta’s inclusion as 
important but does not address the argument itself in any detail: perhaps he feels it is not 
relevant?852 But we must contend that it is perhaps the most relevant point, as no other 
argument for or against has been able to stand up to serious scrutiny. We need only look at 
other Common Peaces from this period of history to discover that the inclusion of Sparta was 
not necessary and was never likely. As we can see, in 375/4 and twice in 371, Thebes was 
excluded from three Common Peaces and in 362/1 Sparta was excluded. In each of these 
cases there is little doubt that these were indeed Common Peace treaties. By default, all of 
these instances indicate the superfluousness of Sparta’s involvement. Thebes did not require 
Sparta or Athens to enact a Common Peace. They already had Persia’s support from the 
previous peace attempt in Susa and, if this was indeed a rehash of that treaty, they could cite 
Persian involvement with or without their presence. More important, as Zahrnt asserted, was 
the propaganda value of the Common Peace: just as Sparta used Thebes’ rejection of the first 
peace in 371 as an excuse to make war on them, Thebes could now isolate Sparta from its 
allies in exactly the same way. We must stress that, even if Sparta was not a party to the 
peace conference, the evidence from Isocrates suggests that its allies requested permission 
from Sparta to accept the peace independently. This further indicates that the Spartans were 






the end it is not possible to prove whether the peace was common or not; however, as I have 





During this period the Boeotian League had functioned as hegemon of the federal 
alliance, albeit haphazardly, in the affair with Euphron; it had finally restored its pre-
Corinthian War boundaries by seizing Oropus and had secured a militarily beneficial peace, 
that was also a political success since it properly recognized Thebes as the guarantor, which 
was a position the Spartans had previously held. It is apparent the general opinion of Sparta's 
allies had changed considerably since the failure of the Common Peace at Susa. While, as I 
have argued above, Epameinondas may not have thought a settlement with the Spartans could 
be achieved at this stage, the conclusion of a peace, which removed their most significant 
remaining allies and recognized Messenian autonomy, in many ways, was the pinnacle of the 
general’s plans against Sparta. Though the Boeotian-Peloponnesian alliance would fragment 
later in the year with the Elean-Arcadian war, it cannot have been entirely obvious that this 
conflict was about to erupt. Indeed, as Hamilton has argued,853 the Peloponnesian League had 
truly been dismantled: of their remaining allies, the Spartans could now only expect to 
receive help from various groups of exiles, the Achaeans and a small number of poleis on the 
Argolid (such as Hermione and Troezen), which had generally contributed very little to the 
war effort. These successes explain why the Boeotian naval project was able to progress: 
since the threat of Sparta had been all but neutralized, Thebes could now revert its attention 
to Athens. The fact that Epameinondas acquired the backing of the federal council for the 
naval endeavour indicates that, whatever public favour was lost in his mishandling of the 
settlement in Achaea, he had regained the people’s support by 364. It is therefore reasonable 
to give some credit to Epameinondas for the Boeotian League’s foreign policy between late 







Chapter 9  
The Boeotian Naval Project 366-364 B.C. 
 
 
With the essential collapse of the Peloponnesian League, following the Peace of 
366/5, the Thebans could now turn their attention to the power of Athens in the Aegean. 
Epameinondas announced in the assembly at Thebes his intention to construct a fleet in order 
to achieve supremacy over the sea. Without any apparent hesitancy the people voted in 
favour of the project and agreed to build 100 triremes854 along with the necessary dockyards 
to accommodate them (Diod. 15. 78. 4-79. 1). As we shall see, in 364, when this ambitious 
plan came to fruition Epameinondas travelled to several of the most prominent Greek islands 
hoping to convince them to join the Boeotian federal alliance. Our details on the entire affair 
are unfortunately quite sparse, relying predominantly on Diodorus, which has led to 
disagreement among scholars on a number of points that significantly affect how the whole 
event should be interpreted. It is then doubtful that any reconstruction could possibly satisfy 
all scholarly grievances; however, in the past few decades there have been a number of 
relevant epigraphical discoveries, which have enhanced our understanding of the topic. This 
has led to recent studies that offer several fresh and insightful interpretations. In this chapter I 
have attempted to combine all of these ideas together in order to present an exhaustive study 
of the Boeotian naval project. 
 
 
Diodorus and Epameinondas’ Speech 
 
Our main source for the construction of the Boeotian navy survives in a brief 
account in Diodorus. He states that Epameinondas addressed the assembly in a speech that 






During these occurrences Epameinondas, the Theban, being held in great esteem by his countrymen, 
in a gathering of the assembly addressed the citizens, compelling them to secure supremacy of the sea. Amidst 
this speech, which had been considered for a long time, he proposed that such an enterprise was both in their 
interests and feasible, stressing in particular that for those who are powerful on land it is easy to secure rule over 
the sea: for the Athenians, in the war against Xerxes, filled 200 ships themselves while being subject to the 
Spartans who provided 10. Having presented on this and many other things appropriate to the occasion he 
persuaded the Thebans to secure supremacy of the sea (Diod. 15. 78. 4).855  
 
 It is apparent that Diodorus has heavily condensed a speech that his source 
(probably Ephorus) put in the mouth of the Theban general.856 As has been well established, 
Epameinondas’ oratorical abilities were renowned and tested against some of the best. There 
is little doubt that he put on a commendable performance when he spoke in front of the 
Theban assembly since convincing the demos to adhere to his plan may have been difficult, 
particularly considering the incredible expense of constructing and fielding a large fleet. 
Whether or not Diodorus’ source provided a genuine Epameinondas oration is unverifiable, 
but we have no reason to doubt that it retains an echo of what was actually uttered. In any 
case, it is liable to reflect some contemporary fourth century views on the Boeotian naval 
enterprise.  
 
On examination, what stands out in particular is that the purported intentions of the 
endeavour were to strive for hegemonia and arche of the sea.857 Though it is possible that 
these are Diodorus’ own terms there is contemporary evidence that exhibits similar rhetoric. 
Within a couple of decades Isocrates would also use arche in reference to the Boeotian navy 
(Isoc. 5. 53). Aeschines too asserted that Epameinondas, speaking to the Theban assembly, 
said that they should remove the Propylaea at Athens and place it on the entrance of the 
Cadmea (Aeschin. 2. 105). The connection is not explicit but, since the Athenian Propylaea 
	
855	 ἅμα	 δὲ	 τούτοις	 πραττομένοις	 Ἐπαμεινώνδας	 ὁ	 Θηβαῖος,	 μέγιστον	 ἔχων	 τῶν	 πολιτῶν	 ἀξίωμα,	
συναχθείσης	 ἐκκλησίας	 διελέχθη	 τοῖς	 πολίταις,	 προτρεπόμενος	 αὐτοὺς	ἀντέχεσθαι	 τῆς	 κατὰ	 θάλατταν	
ἡγεμονίας.	διελθὼν	δὲ	λόγον	ἐκ	χρόνου	πεφροντισμένον	ἐδείκνυε	τὴν	ἐπιβολὴν	ταύτην	συμφέρουσάν	τε	
καὶ	δυνατήν,	τά	τε	ἄλλα	προφερόμενος	καὶ	διότι	τοῖς	πεζῇ	κρατοῦσι	ῥᾴδιόν	ἐστι	περιποιήσασθαι	τὴν	τῆς	
θαλάττης	 ἀρχήν:	 καὶ	 γὰρ	 Ἀθηναίους	 ἐν	 τῷ	 πρὸς	 Ξέρξην	 πολέμῳ	 διακοσίας	 ναῦς	 ἰδίᾳ	 πληροῦντας	
Λακεδαιμονίοις	 δέκα	 ναῦς	 παρεχομένοις	 ὑποτετάχθαι.	 πολλὰ	 δὲ	 καὶ	 ἄλλα	 πρὸς	 ταύτην	 τὴν	 ὑπόθεσιν	
οἰκείως	διαλεχθεὶς	ἔπεισε	τοὺς	Θηβαίους	ἀντέχεσθαι	τῆς	κατὰ	θάλατταν	ἀρχῆς.	
856	Cawkwell	(1972),	270-271;	Stylianou	(1998),	494.	
857	While	hegemonia	 is	 somewhat	ambiguous,	arche	 is	 frequently	used	by	Diodorus	 to	mean	 ‘rule’.	 In	a	
decree,	dated	to	this	period,	proscribing	Theban	hαγεμονία	over	Oreus/Histiaea,	 it	 is	apparent	 that	 the	
term	is	used	to	refer	 to	 leadership	 in	military	matters,	see	Aravantinos	and	Papazarkadas	(2012),	239-
254.	
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represented Athenian naval power, most scholars agree that Aeschines is referring to the 
same event. While the image is stirring and plausibly fits the kind of message that 
Epameinondas wished to convey, it is doubtful that Epameinondas did in fact speak of 
attaining supremacy of the sea, as he was hoping to take advantage of the disaffection of 
Athenian allies. Certainly, he would not want to give said allies the impression that Thebes 
was intending to replace Athens as hegemon of the sea. However, the impression that has 
been preserved for us is that which was felt in Athens itself as appears to be indicated by the 
statements of the Athenian orators. It has been argued that these sentiments are the result of a 
Theban propaganda campaign attempting to incite fear in the Athenians,858 which illustrates 
the genuine anxiety that Athens had concerning the pending Theban expedition. When news 
reached Attica of Epameinondas’ speech his words were undoubtedly exaggerated with the 
intention of spurring the Athenian populace into action. Thus, as we shall see, it is entirely 
credible that steps would be taken to prevent the success of the endeavour. 
 
While Diodorus or his source’s rhetoric could have obscured the exact intentions of 
Epameinondas and the Theban assembly there may be, on the other hand, a semblance of 
actual Epameinondan rhetoric preserved in this brief condensation. The text indicates that a 
major theme of the oration was the argument that supremacy of the sea is easy when one is 
already dominant on land. To back up this claim he apparently referred to the Persian wars 
when Athens provided 200 ships for the Greek armada, while the Spartans only provided 
10.859 Epameinondas is here making reference to the fact that, although the Spartans could 
only send a small amount of ships, they were still made the official leaders of the armada 
owing to the prestige of their superior land force. This, it has been argued, means that the 
Boeotians did not need to match the strength of the Athenian navy while they remained a 
formidable land power; instead a moderate fleet would be sufficient.860  
 
However, on analysis, the sentiment contains further illumination. Another possible 
reference to the speech is from Aristides who says that Epameinondas said that their 







explicitly advances the idea that the power of Athens could not be rivalled without taking the 
fight to the Aegean. Grote,861 in reference to the speech, noted the similarities with two 
Thucydidean speeches: the first was Brasidas’ address in the Spartan assembly and the 
second was Hermocrates at Syracuse (Thuc. 2. 87, 7. 21). Both are exhortations for the 
respective poleis to strive for dominance in naval warfare. To this we may include 
Themistocles’ own successful attempt to convince the Athenians for the same, though no 
such speech is preserved (Hdt. 7. 144; Plut. Them. 4. 1-2). We thus observe the recurring 
scenario in which a nation is compelled to strengthen their navy in the face of an enemy that 
already possesses one: i.e. Athens against Persia, Sparta against Athens, Syracuse against 
Athens and Thebes against Athens. Following these events we continue to see a similar 
pattern with Jason of Pherae’s plans for the construction of a fleet and Alexander of Pherae’s 
naval raids against Athens in 362,862 Philip of Macedon’s utilization of a fleet against Athens 
in the 350s863 and, later, Rome’s construction of a strong fleet against Carthage in 261 
(Polyb. 1. 20-21).864 It is clear from these factors that the people of the ancient Mediterranean 
understood that the only way to defeat a naval power is to have a powerful navy. 
Epameinondas knew that, as in the Peloponnesian war, they would never suppress the power 
of Athens by land alone. 
 
In addition to this, by implication, the sentiment also implies that a sea power is 
made all the more effective by a strong land force. This idea bears much precedent in the 
history of classical naval warfare and is recognized as such by modern scholars.865 Thus 
Epameinondas was not only saying that naval supremacy was achievable, he implied that 
because of their land superiority they would have a distinct advantage over the Athenians. 
While Athens had by no means an insignificant land force, they were undoubtedly inferior to 
the Boeotians and, in recent years, Athenian military activity on land had been primarily of a 
defensive kind. Thus there may have been a genuine strategic facet he was attempting to 










the snake.866 It is easy to see how such rhetoric could compel the Theban assembly to vote in 
favour of the expedition.  
 
Grote, continuing his reconstruction of the assembly at Thebes, imagines that 
Epameinondas’ plan received some opposition from Menecleidas.867 Plutarch and Nepos both 
tell us that Menecleidas criticized Epameinondas for thinking he had attained the glory of 
Agamemnon. In response Epameinondas claimed that the comparison was not unfounded 
since Agamemnon took 10 years to take Troy while he defeated the Spartans in a single day 
at Leuctra (Plut. Pel. De Se Ipsum 9/542b-c; Nep. Epam. 5). While the evidence is anecdotal 
and we have no definitive reason to equate it with the naval expedition presumably Grote 
thought that, since Agamemnon also took a navy across the Aegean, this is an appropriate 
context for the altercation. Indeed, we can expect that there was some opposition and, if so, it 
would have been spearheaded by Menecleidas, who was against Epameinondas’ continued 
aggressive policy. However, since there is no sign of this opposition in Diodorus, it will not 
have amounted to anything and the naval program appears to have had little or no trouble 
securing the popular vote. 
 
 
The Construction of One Hundred Triremes 
 
Accordingly, the assembly voted to have 100 triremes built, along with the required 
dockyards to house them (Diod. 15. 79. 1). The logistics of such an enterprise are such that 
many scholars have concluded that the Thebans could not have actually built the fleet; 
however, the consensus is divided and many maintain that all 100 were built, manned and 
sent across the Aegean. Because this completely underpins the nature of any reconstruction 
of events, it is necessary to examine the issue in some detail in order to establish the extent of 
plausibility that the fleet was in fact constructed. 
 
Though earlier scholars did not explicitly dispute the construction of the fleet, some 





particular, Pomtow wondered where such money came from.868 A few decades later 
scepticism arose when Beloch argued that not more than 40 ships were built, otherwise the 
entire endeavour would surely have achieved more. While his figure is not based on any 
actual evidence, he believes that the building program had actually begun and Epameinondas 
merely took with him the first few that had been completed. Though he points out that there 
were insufficient funds to maintain the fleet after the first voyage, it appears his main query is 
with the time constraint from the announcement of the program to the fleet’s maiden 
voyage.869 Later, Fortina also supposed that Diodorus was exaggerating the numbers that 
were actually built.870 Thus the main issue with the construction of the fleet was the question 
of how the Thebans could possibly have paid for it.  
 
A potential solution to this issue was presented by Carrata-Thomes who suggested 
that funding could have come from the Persians who, at this stage, were happy to see 
Athenian power curbed.871 While this possibility is indeed incapable of being conclusively 
proven, it is too far to claim that there is “not a shred of evidence” that connects Persia with 
the Theban naval program.872 There are, in fact, a number of contextual factors that may 
indicate Persian funding. It is first worth considering what might have motivated the Persians 
to help the Thebans in the first place. We know that, until the visit of Ariobarzanes’ agent, 
Philiscus, in 368, the Persians still considered the Spartans to be the most influential Greek 
state on the mainland. It must then have come as a great surprise to find that the political and 
military situation in Greece had been drastically altered over just a few years. Then, in 367, 
Artaxerxes held a Common Peace conference in Susa in which Pelopidas came out on top 
above all the other representatives. Despite the fact that some attendees refused to sign the 
treaty, it is clear that a treaty was signed and the Thebans were made guarantors of it on 














held after the Peace of Antalcidas, which gives them Persian permission to enforce the terms 
of the treaty, much like the Spartans did when threatening the Thebans with invasion if they 
failed to sign. It is worth noting that the treaty in Susa contained a clause demanding that 
Athens disband its fleet. Failure to do so therefore provides ample justification to threaten 
them with force. It is then logical, if the Thebans did not have the resources, for the king to 
provide what was required to achieve such a task, just as Persia provided money to Sparta873 
during the Peloponnesian War for the same purpose and again in the late 390s for the 
Athenians (Xen. Hell. 4. 8. 6-12; Diod. 14. 84. 3-5). We must remember that the king desired 
Greek mercenaries to help against various revolts and with Athens still at war with Thebes 
and potentially supporting Ariobarzanes,874 this was his best option without getting his own 
hands dirty in the process. In addition to this Artaxerxes gave great gifts to all who attended 
the treaty (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 38; Plut. Pel. 30. 6); it is possible that Pelopidas was awarded a 
hefty sum, enough at least to begin construction of the navy.875 
 
Whether or not one can accept Persian funding, perhaps the biggest point of 
contention has arisen out of the ambiguity of the language. Diodorus does not outright say 
that the ships were ever actually built; instead he indicates that the assembly voted to build 
them. While he does say that Epameinondas was sent out with a powerful force (μετά 
δυνάμεως), it has been presumed that, since the Thebans did not have the means to construct 
the fleet, they must already have had a modest amount of ships at hand.876 The Boeotians did 
have a small naval tradition and may indeed have had a cohort of ships at hand, making this 
supposition perfectly plausible. However, it is just as easy to make the opposite argument; 
hence, Buckler asserts conversely that Diodorus does not indicate a disbelief that all the ships 
were constructed.877 But since this failed to convince some scholars878 Buckler made two 







315,	 is	 open	 to	 a	Persian	 subsidy	but	 also	notes	 that	 large	 sums	of	money	may	have	been	acquired	 in	






makes the case from a linguistic perspective: Diodorus says that the assembly voted 
(ἐψηφίσατο) to build (ναυπηγεῖσθαι) the ships and dockyards. Buckler points out that the 
main verb is an aorist middle, which implies the decision was made. This is followed by a 
present infinitive, indicating a “continued or repeated action”, as opposed to an aorist 
infinitive, which does not. Thus, Diodorus is here indicating the construction of a fleet, which 
would indeed require continued action.879 This in itself does not necessarily prove anything 
concerning the Theban navy; however, it does seem to imply that Diodorus did in fact believe 
that the ships were constructed.  
 
On the other hand, perhaps more poignantly, Buckler argues that, in order to pose 
any real threat to the Athenian navy, a large force was needed.880 Despite some claims to the 
contrary the Athenians were undoubtedly capable of mustering a fleet of a comparable size881 
and, since Athenian culture had been entrenched in naval warfare for well over a century,882 a 
modest Boeotian force would pose little threat, as well as being in serious danger of being 
overwhelmed by an Athenian fleet of equal or larger size. It is hard to imagine that 
Epameinondas would seriously consider making a costly and potentially dangerous voyage 
across the Aegean, intending to undermine the authority of the Athenian thalassocracy, 













120	 (minus	one	 if	we	consider	Chabrias	went	down	with	his	 ship)	 (Diod.	16.	7.	3;	21.	1).	Numbers	 for	
operations	during	 the	period	 in	question	are	unfortunately	 lacking	and	while	 the	30	 in	368/7	and	366	
seem	like	the	standard	for	that	period	(it	appears	to	have	been	60	in	the	370s),	it	is	clear	from	the	case	of	
357	 that	 the	 Athenians	 generally	 kept	 at	 least	 the	 same	 amount	 of	 ships	 in	 reserve,	 while	 probably	
capable	 of	 fielding	 more,	 though	 mercenary	 manpower	 may	 have	 been	 needed.	 A	 naval	 inventory	 of	
357/6	says	that	there	were	283	triremes	in	the	Piraeus,	though	not	all	were	seaworthy	(IG	II2	1611.	1-9).	




882	 One	 need	 only	 give	 a	 cursory	 glance	 of	 Athenian	 fifth	 century	 history	 to	 confirm	 this	 statement;	
however,	for	an	excellent	study	dedicated	to	Athenian	naval	culture,	see	Hale	(2009).	
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The previous argument, however, is ultimately underpinned by how one interprets 
the actions of the Athenian fleet under Laches that retreated in the face of the Boeotian fleet. 
Diodorus indicates three significant points: one, Laches was sent out with the purpose of 
hindering (διακωλύειν) Epameinodas; two, he is said have had a considerable fleet (στόλον 
ἀξιόλογον); three, he was forced to retreat. While this clearly indicates the relative strength of 
the Boeotian fleet, Diodorus’ statements have been disputed. Cawkwell, against all three 
points, argued that, contrary to Diodorus, Laches did not attack Epameinondas since that 
would constitute a breach of the recent peace treaty of 366/5; thus Laches was not sent to 
διακωλύειν Epameinondas, nor did he require a large force.883 While this line of argument 
has not been challenged with much discussion,884 I have above demonstrated that the 
Athenians were by no means necessarily a party to the peace and would therefore have had 
no political reason to avoid battle with the Theban armada: Athens was still technically at war 
with Thebes.885  
 
Stylianou also argues that στόλον ἀξιόλογον tells us nothing since it was just 
Diodorus “making good his source’s silence on the matter”. He points out that ἀξιόλογος is 
used when Diodorus’ source does not provide numbers for military forces;886 thus concluding 
that Laches probably had a small fleet that was on guard duty at the Hellespont.887 However, 
against this assertion, Buckler showed that Diodorus only uses the phrase when he refers to a 
large military force.888 It is true that the phrase is frequently employed when figures are 
lacking; however, to assert that Diodorus uses it as a way of filling in the gaps of his source 
material is demonstrably false. There are, in fact, at least four occasions where the same 
phrase is used and Diodorus actually does provide figures for military units, all of them large 
(Diod. 12. 32. 1, 3; 54. 6; 61. 1-2; 16. 25. 1). It is therefore quite manifest that στόλον 
ἀξιόλογον refers to a considerable fleet. Given due consideration we must conclude that the 










evidence, as we shall see, the Theban naval project appears to have been much more 
extensive than has often been assumed.  
 
 
The Boeotian Naval Tradition 
 
Buckler compared the Boeotian naval project to that of Imperial Germany, before 
World War I, when it established itself as a naval power despite lack of experience.889 While 
the Boeotian League had never attempted anything to this scale before, they were not entirely 
without experience in such matters; indeed, the last couple of generations had seen some 
significant naval activity; both in construction and warfare. The evidence for this is minimal; 
however, enough survives for us to establish an overview for the role of the Boeotian navy in 
Greek history. 
 
The earliest reference to a Boeotian navy is in Homer’s catalogue of ships going to 
Troy: he states that they sent 50 ships, each with 120 men on board (Hom. Il. 2. 494-510; cf. 
Eur. IA. 253-255). This indicates the belief that Boeotia was able, at least in the past, to put 
together a significant fleet. There is also an eighth century Attic Geometric bowl depicting an 
oared ship with 60 rowers a side, which was found in Thebes. It has been suggested that it 
was commissioned by a Theban client.890 But, since no Boeotian ships were used during the 
Persian wars, it is apparent that any historical association with a naval tradition had long 
fallen into despondency by the early fifth century.  
 
Later, in 413, just after the Sicilian expedition, the Spartans bid their allies to build 
triremes, which included a quota from the Boeotians amounting to 25 (Thuc. 8. 3. 2). While it 
is not certain whether all the ships were built891 there were at least 10 of them being prepared 
to sail to Lesbos early in 412 (Thuc. 8. 5. 2) and may have been part of the Peloponnesian 





number	 of	 ships	 from	 various	 allies	 destroyed	 at	 Cynossema,	 their	 contributions	 must	 have	 been	
significant.	
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feat demonstrates that the Boeotians already had the facilities to construct the ships as well as 
the necessary contacts to obtain the imported materials.892 This fleet would then embark upon 
several military operations throughout 412 and 411. It is unclear how much the Boeotian 
ships were utilized throughout these events; however, they were certainly used. Although 
most of the ships that were sent to Chios were disabled (Thuc. 8. 10. 4), two Boeotian 
triremes were destroyed at the Battle of Cynossema, in 411 (Thuc. 8. 106. 3). This suggests 
that they participated throughout the campaign. It is also apparent that the Boeotian League 
maintained the means to produce triremes but had never spared the expense to produce more 
than a few; probably for the purpose of protecting their harbours. Thus, we can see that the 
precedent for building a fleet in Boeotia existed nearly 50 years before the naval project of 
the 360s. 
 
There was a continuation of this trend in 377 when the Thebans, having had their 
land ravaged for two consecutive years, sent two triremes to Pagasae in order to obtain food 
for the populace (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 56).893 We also later find, in 371, before the Battle of 
Leuctra, Cleombrotus and the Spartan army occupied the Boeotian port of Creusis and 
captured either 10 (Diod. 15. 53. 1) or 12 triremes that belonged to the Thebans (Xen. Hell. 6. 
4. 3).894 The number of ships at Creusis was probably their largest conglomeration since they 
were only at war with the Spartans by this stage and Creusis was the most vulnerable 
Boeotian port on the Corinthian Gulf.895 The two ships sent to Pagasae may also be indicative 
of the number of triremes stationed at the eastern ports: perhaps four or five. From this 
evidence it is more than apparent that the Boeotians, while not in the habit of large-scale 
trireme production, continually maintained and constructed triremes throughout the 370s and 
probably into the 360s. 
 
To add to this, we also find evidence that, in the 370s, the Boeotian League provided 
a fleet to serve in the navies of the second Athenian League. In the speech, Against 
	








Timotheus, written around 362 for Apollodorus,896 who is, by modern scholars, credited to 
have composed it,897 the Athenian general Timotheus is being sued for having borrowed 
money from Apollodorus’ father, the banker, Pasion. During the accusation, Apollodorus 
claims that Timotheus had used some of the money to provide payment for the Boeotian 
fleet. He is quite clearly referring to the naval campaign of 374/3 when Timotheus was sent 
to attack Laconia; however, due to lack of crew and resources, he spent a protracted amount 
of time in the Cyclades attempting to remedy the situation. Because of this the Athenians 
removed him from his command and replaced him with Iphicrates.898 In the speech, several 
statements give us an indication for the organization of the Boeotian contribution to the 
Athenian fleet. There are a number of references to a Boeotian fleet: twice literally as the 
Boeotian triremes (τῶν Βοιωτίων τριήρων/αἱ Βοιώτιαι τριήρεις: [Dem] 49. 14, 50) and twice 
as Boeotian ships (τῷ Βοιωτίῳ… τῶν νεῶν/τὰς Βοιωτίας ναῦς: [Dem] 49. 15, 16). This 
implies that the Boeotians provided several ships for the operation: a number similar to what 
Cleombrotus confiscated at Creusis may well be an apt estimation.  
 
Apollodorus also tells us that, at the head of this fleet, an unnamed admiral was in 
charge: this is referred to twice as the Boeotian leader (τῷ Βοιωτίῳ ἄρχοντι τῶν νεῶν and 
τῷ… Βοιωτίῳ ἄρχοντι: [Dem] 49. 15, 49) and 11 times, more literally, as ὁ Βοιώτιος 
ναύαρχος ([Dem] 49. 21, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54). We thus have a Boeotian official whose 
responsibility was clearly, in this case, to distribute payment amongst his ships’ crew. He 
must furthermore have been in charge of the fleet’s movements before and after joining the 
Athenians, where overall authority was given to the likes of Timotheus. Finally, we twice 
hear of Boeotian trierarchs (τοῖς Βοιωτίοις τριηράρχοις: [Dem] 49. 14, 48). We can therefore 
conclude that the Boeotian League, in the 370s, had the necessary personnel to both 
manufacture and operate several triremes in order to contribute to major naval actions 
conducted by the Athenians. It is, however, uncertain whether the rowers used were drafted 








army was almost constantly campaigning on land, it may have been difficult to fill the quota 
of a 173 rowers for each trireme.  
 
In addition to this we have references to Theban triremes in an Athenian naval 
inventory, which has been dated to around 373/2 (IG II² 1607. 49-50, 152-158). In lines 49 to 
50 it mentions a trireme, the name of which is lost, provided for the Thebans. The text states 
that it was not equipped ([ἀν]επίσκευον), i.e. lacking in oars, sails, etc. Then, in lines 152 to 
158, another trireme, named Aphrodisia, was to be equipped (ἐπισκευάσαι) by the Thebans, 
or perhaps at Thebes’ expense. Although the text says that the ships were used by Θηβαῖοι 
rather than Βοιώτιοι, this is because the Thebans had joined the Athenian League 
independently from the Boeotian League;899 thus, officially they were Theban. But as we can 
see from Apollodorus’ speech, in practice, the Athenians recognized that the Theban 
contingent constituted a Boeotian fleet. From this text we can ascertain that, though lacking 
in ships, the Boeotians were quite capable of providing the necessary personnel to man 
triremes under their own steam.900 
 
It is apparent that the Boeotian League had maintained and utilized their ability to 
possess a navy from at least the late fifth century to the present situation in 364. Though the 
attempt to build and man 100 triremes is vastly greater than any of their previous navies, it is 
clear that the precedent for it had long existed and had experienced a surge of activity in 
recent years. They were then liable to already have at hand much of the required workforce 
and trade connections necessary to complete the task with reasonable efficiency. It is 










900	 This	 is	 one	 of	 a	 few	 examples	where	 the	Athenians	 leased	 out	 triremes	 to	 allied	 states,	 see	 Jordan	
(1975),	90	n.	109.	
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Building Triremes: Logistics and Preparations 
 
Whether or not all 100 triremes were ever actually built cannot ever be confirmed; 
however, based on the arguments above it seems probable that a large-scale ship-building 
program was, in fact, realized to some extent. The logistics for such an endeavour are 
extensive, particularly for the Boeotians who had never attempted anything remotely 
comparable. It is therefore worthwhile to consider the means by which they managed to 
achieve, at least to some extent, the construction of a considerable number of triremes. The 
following discussion will proceed under the assumption that all 100 were built, though it is 
worth noting that, if the figures were halved, it would still have been an ambitious task.  
 
The triremes of the fifth and fourth centuries are often considered to be the height of 
the technology of the period.901 They were intricately designed for the sole purpose of 
ramming enemy ships and had been the dominant force in naval warfare since at least the 
Persian Wars. However, the decision to actually build a significant number was, by any 
respects, an incredibly mean feat. A single trireme required at least 15 tonnes of wood for the 
hull alone. This was usually made from either pine (πεύκη) or fir (ἐλάτη), the latter being 
preferable since it was lighter and therefore produced a faster vessel. The keel of the ship was 
normally made of oak. A further 10 tonnes were needed for the outriggers, thwarts, decks, 
stanchions and braces. At least 173 oars were needed per ship not including a significant 
number of spares: these were usually made from fir. In addition to this, masts and yards were 
needed, also made of fir. Thus, in wood alone, 100 ships would require approximately 2,500 
tonnes, not to mention the wood for well over 17,000 oars, along with 100 masts and 
yards.902  
 
Other than timber, each trireme required copious amounts of stopping material, 
which may have been either flax or papyrus, along with pitch to soak it in and cover the hull, 
	
901	While	 the	 interpretation	of	 a	Greek	 trireme	as	a	 three-tiered	 ship	has	 come	 into	question	 in	 recent	
years,	 e.g.	 Tilley	 (2004),	 it	 is	 still	 the	 standard	 and	 will	 be	 utilized	 in	 this	 discussion.	 In	 general,	 see	
Morrison	 et	 al.	 (2000).	 Still	 useful,	 particularly	 for	 iconographic	 evidence,	 is	 Morrison	 and	 Williams	
(1968).	 Now	 also	 see	 Rankov	 (2012),	 for	 arguments	 both	 in	 favour	 and	 against	 the	 standard	
interpretation.	See	also	Murray	(2012).	
902	Morrison	et	 al.	 (2000),	179-181	 (wood	 types),	188	 (masts	and	sailyards),	111,	188-189	 (oars),	210	
(weight	of	trireme).	
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which was made from tar or something equivalent. Extensive lengths of rope were needed for 
use as halliards, brailing ropes and for the hypozomata. These were made from flax or 
papyrus. The same material was used for the sails, which, for each ship required about 90 
square metres for the mainsale and a quarter of that for the foresail (c. 22.5 square metres). 
This makes something like 11,250 square metres of sail for 100 ships. As we can see, the 
amount of flax or papyrus needed was considerable. Each trireme would also be fitted with a 
bronze ram weighing some 200 kilograms, i.e. some 20 tonnes for 100 ships. Along with this, 
bronze was needed for nails and the metal rings that attach the sails to the sailyards and for 
the bronze fitting on the mast-heads. It is also possible that the ships would be equipped with 
iron anchors, which could weigh up to almost 600 kilograms each. Large quantities of leather 
were needed for the askomata903 and for the oar loops on the tholepins, which would need to 
be replaced frequently. It is clear from this brief assessment that it would have taken a 
considerable amount of organizing to procure all of these materials, particularly since much 
of it would have to be imported.904  
 
The question of where the Boeotians obtained all the necessary materials must 
remain largely speculative; however, a few suppositions can be made based on the available 
evidence. While sails and rope could have been produced within Boeotia itself, most of 
mainland Greece was not known for its flax cultivation; thus, would therefore have needed to 
acquire the raw flax from overseas. It is also possible that the materials were purchased 
having already been processed into rope or linen. For the Classical period the main sources of 
flax were from the Black Sea area (particularly Colchis) and Egypt. There is also some 
indication that a type of flax and linen was produced in the Cycladic island of Amorgos. 
Xenophon indicates that Phasian (from Colchis) and Carthaginian flax were the best (Xen. 
Hunt. 2. 4). We also find, in a fragment of Hermippus, that Carthage manufactured textiles, 
carpets and embroidered pillows (Hermippus fr. 63 = Athen. 1. 49) and Pollux later attested 
the prominence of Carthaginian linen, which, he says, was of a high quality, along with the 
linen from Sardinia (Poll. 5. 26). It is clear that the flax and linen trade in Carthage was 






one of these sources, there may be reason to consider Carthage as a probable candidate. There 
is an inscription for a Carthaginian proxenos, named Nobas, in Boeotia, which has been dated 
to either 366 or 365 (IG VII 2407).905 Glotz suggested, based on the historical context, that 
Nobas was a naval technician employed to help with the design of the triremes;906 however, 
because Boeotia already had experience, albeit small scale, in naval construction, it has since 
been argued that such a technician would not have been required.907 Despite this, in light of 
the increasing array of proxeny decrees from the period, more recent scholars tend to accept 
that the Carthaginian proxenos was likely to have had something to do with the naval project, 
particularly since both Carthage and Boeotia had mutual interests against Dionysius II of 
Sicily.908 However, because Nobas was probably not a naval technician, a plausible 
alternative in fact may be that he was responsible for providing the Boeotians with the 
necessary materials for the rope and sails of their ships. 
 
To acquire the necessary bronze, it appears to have been most common to trade 
copper and tin separately. The ores of both would be smelted into ingots and transported to 
their destination where they were alloyed together to make bronze. The most obvious place 
for Boeotia to obtain copper was from Chalcis in Euboea from the Lelantine plain. Other 
candidates include Delos, Seriphos, Argolis, Sicyon and also Macedonia,909 which, as we 
shall see was the most likely source of timber. The ultimate source of tin is less certain: it has 
been argued that tin, for Athens, may have come from as far as Gaul and Britain. Perhaps 
more significant, in this case, is the likelihood that it was transported and traded by 
Carthaginian merchants.910 We thus find another plausible reason for Nobas’ proxeny. If 
anchors were built the iron for this could be found in Boeotia itself, though this may have 
been supplemented with imports, which could be found in Euboea, Thasos, Laconia (not in 
this case), Chalcidice and, again, Macedonia.911 Considering the existence of the iron 
	
905	 See	 Koehler	 (1889),	 636-640;	 Beloch	 (1922),	 126	 n.	 2;	 Glotz	 (1933),	 331-335,	 though	 Cawkwell	
(1972),	272	n.	1,	thinks	that	the	early	350s	is	possible.	
906	Glotz	(1933),	335-339.	See	also	Carrata-Thomes	(1952),	25-26;	Roesch	(1965),	75-76;	Fossey	(1994),	
35.	 Cary	 (1926),	 190-191,	 proposed	 the	 interesting	 idea	 that	 Nobas	 entertained	 Theban	 guests	 in	








deposits and Boeotia’s previous experience in building triremes, it is probable that they had 
the necessary personnel to work all the metals in Boeotia itself. 
 
The timber would also need to be imported since the only local sources were small 
deposits on Mt. Cithaeron and Mt. Helicon. The largest major supplies in the vicinity could 
be found at Euboea, Amphipolis and Macedonia. Amphipolis was far too dangerous to obtain 
wood from because of its importance to Athens. Euboea may have been a viable option 
because of its close proximity and alliance with Boeotia; however, Euboea was known to 
have had poor quality trees (Theoph. Hist. Pl. 5. 2. 1) and had no tradition of trading timber 
in such a large scale unlike Macedonia, which undoubtedly had all the necessary lumber 
crews and transports for delivering the wood. Contextually Macedonia is the best choice for 
timber, which is the conclusion that scholars have generally arrived at.912 Since then, another 
proxeny decree was discovered when a brick from the church at the modern town of Lefktra 
(the site of the Battle of Leuctra) was dislodged in February 1981 during an earthquake. The 
proxeny was for a Macedonian named Athenaeus, son of Demonicus and may be dated to 
around 365, though possibly somewhat earlier (SEG 34:355[1]). We also later find one 
Demonicus, son of Athenaeus, serving as a trierarch in the navy of Alexander the Great (Arr. 
Ind. 18. 3). It has thus been suggested that we have evidence here for a Macedonian seafaring 
family.913 Lane Fox has added that Athenaeus’ name may indicate that his father had dealings 
with Athens during the last years of the Peloponnesian War (c. 407-406).914 It therefore 
seems highly plausible that Athenaeus was awarded the proxeny as a reward for shipping all 
of the wood to Boeotia.915 
 
In Euripides’ Iphigenia in Aulis it is stated that the 50 ships that Thebes sent to Troy 
were decorated on the prow with representations of Cadmus grasping a golden dragon (Eur. 








around the time the play was written, between 408 and 406.916 We can imagine that, in 364, 
the newly constructed triremes were adorned with some similar such patriotic imagery. 
 
 
Boeotian Naval bases and Shipsheds  
 
Another facet of the naval expedition is the question of where the triremes were 
harboured. While there were several docks on the coasts of both northeast and southwest 
Boeotia, Diodorus specifically indicates that new facilities were to be built in order to house 
the unprecedented number of triremes. The term νεώρια, though generally used to mean 
simply ‘docks’, is here synonymous with νεώσοικος, referring more specifically to 
shipsheds.917 Since Boeotia was clearly in possession of a small number of triremes it is 
probable that a few small-scale shipsheds already existed; however, for 100 ships, this new 
construction would be monumental by comparison. Unfortunately, no definitive remains of 
shipsheds have been found in any of the Boeotian ports, which has led to disagreement over 
the most plausible site of the naval base. Without further evidence it is impossible to come to 
a completely reliable conclusion; it is then worth assessing all possibilities for their 
advantages and disadvantages. 
 
The construction of shipsheds constituted another major expenditure for the 
Boeotians, which again may have been funded with Persian money. Without any remains of 
shipsheds we can only speculate on the structure (or structures) that was actually built. If we 
were to assume that the minimum criterion for neoria was employed, i.e. uncovered slipways 
made mostly of timber, it would require approximately 8,800 ‘man-days’, including 
construction and transport of about 175 tonnes of wood. If roofed slipways were built, the 
inclusion of stone foundations, columns, clay roof tiling and various other logistical additions 
would increase the expense exponentially: nearly 40,000 ‘man-days’ for only 10 slip-ways.918 






Zea	 in	 the	 Piraeus.	 While	 the	 expense	 for	 the	 Boeotians	 was	 undoubtedly	 substantially	 different,	
Pakkanen’s	figures	serve	as	a	useful	guide.	
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(though this quarry is thought to have not been used till the third century) or possibly even 
from Cenchreae in Corinth,919 which had recently concluded a peace treaty with Thebes. The 
timber, just as for the triremes, probably came from Macedonia. Since no remains of 
shipsheds have been found it may be that the structures in question were made only of wood, 
which could potentially have had wooden roofing as well.  
 
Deciding where was the most practical and strategic place to construct the naval 
base must have taken a considerable amount of planning and discussion amongst 
Epameinondas and his associates. Though they had some experience in naval matters, it is 
quite possible that wiser counsel was sought from foreign benefactors; indeed, this may fit 
the context of the Spartan proxenos, Timeas, whom Mackil has argued could have in some 
way been involved in the naval project.920 During this planning several factors had to be 
considered before an appropriate site could be chosen. Three major criteria were needed for a 
good war harbour: first, the site would need to have ample space for docking the triremes, i.e. 
in this case, space for the large number of shipsheds. Second, the waters in the harbour would 
need to be relatively calm since triremes were not good seafaring ships. Finally, it would 
need to have good communications with the interior of Boeotia, particularly with that of 
Thebes, in order to respond quickly in the event of a naval attack.921 A fragment of Ephorus 
states that Boeotia is well situated for supremacy at sea since it is connected to three seas and 
has a number of good harbours (Ephorus FGrH 70 F119 = Strabo 9. 2. 2). Ephorus is here 
referring to Boeotia’s excellent potential for maritime trade throughout the Mediterranean; 
however, a number of factors, such as inaccessibility and rough weather, unbeknownst to 
Ephorus meant that Boeotia was probably never a major centre for maritime trade let alone a 
naval power.922 In spite of this, all Boeotian ports were liable to have been used for trade and 







922	 See	 Gomme	 (1911/12),	 189-210,	 against	 the	 theories	 of	 Bérard	 (1902/3).	 On	 the	 context	 of	 the	
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On the southwest coast of Boeotia there were a total of four ports available: 
Chorsiae, Thisbae, Siphae and Creusis (Map 1). The westernmost of these was Chorsiae, 
which was an ancient settlement about 5.7 kilometres to the south of the peak of Mt. Helicon, 
Palaiovóuno (1748m). Situated on a small spur near the foot of the mountain, known now as 
Kástro, are the remains of a fortified settlement. Around two kilometres south of here lies 
Saranda Bay, which is flanked by a small peninsula to the west and the Malia Senga Ridge to 
the east. Although no evidence of an ancient port has been discovered, some remains of an 
extensive fortification have been found on the western peninsula, though these have yet to be 
dated. The bay itself is naturally ideal for beaching ships and, if the western fortifications 
could be dated to the period in question, it would be unsurprising if the bay was able to house 
a few triremes, even if only as a way station. It should further be noted that the settlement of 
Chorsiae itself was fortified in an extensive enceinte of coursed-ashlar masonry, which 
encircles the acropolis and the lower town and has been dated to the period after the Battle of 
Leuctra.923 However, the primary downfall for Chorsiae as a major naval base was the fact 
that it is completely enclosed from inland by mountains that would make access and 
communications with Thebes very limited.924  
 
Moving eastward across the Malia Senga ridge we find the extensive bays of the 
Domvrena Gulf, which contained the ports of Thisbae and Siphae. The fortified ancient polis 
of Thisbae is on a small but steep hill directly to the northwest of the modern village 
Thisvi,925 which is at the northern end of the Domvrena plain that continues southward for 
just over two kilometres before lightly ascending into a low mountain range made up of the 
three peaks (running west to east) Mavrovouni (c. 320m), Khimadhio (269m) and Kokkithari 
(291m). Between the first two of these there is a low pass that allows for easy access to two 
little inlets on the north side of the gulf. The easternmost of these, just south of Khimadhio, is 
the site of the church Agios Ioannis and a marina that holds a couple dozen small vessels. 
While it is accessible through an easy route along the western side of the mountain, it is far 
too small and narrow for any number of military vessels,926 lacks drinking water and is 
	
923	On	the	territory	of	Chorsiai	see	Fossey	(1988),	186-196,	for	overview	and	bibliography.	





exposed to serious southerly gales. Further to the west, just south of Mavrovouni, is the much 
larger inlet, Vathy. The beach here is large, sandy and would be good for beaching triremes; 
however, its access point, along the south side of the mountain, is steep and much more 
difficult. There is no definitive evidence which of these inlets served as the port of 
Thisbae,927 but due to its capacity and the presence of some remains (albeit minor) Vathy 
may be the preferred choice; though because of its accessibility, Heurtley argued in favour of 
Agios Ioannis.928 On the other hand, the whole western section of Domvrena may have 
served as an anchorage, which is apparently confirmed by an inscription from 170 (IG VII 
2225).929 But even if this is the case, such an occurrence is not conducive to a military port, 
which required ample docking space for triremes. While the harbours are clearly not ideal, it 
should be noted that the journey from the city of Thisbae itself to Thebes was an easy one.930 
 
At the eastern end of Domvrena is the Bay of Alyki where the remains of the 
fortified polis of Siphae can be found. At the eastern and largest section of the bay lies a 
sandy beach that continues for about 950 metres, which is broken some 220 metres from the 
southern most point by a small but steep rocky hill where the acropolis was situated. To the 
east the bay is separated from Creusis by the heights of Korombili (907m) and to the south 
the bay is enclosed (and for that matter all of Domvrena) by the smaller ridge of Tapsila 
(234m).931 The acropolis and the lower town were fortified in a well-constructed wall of 
ashlar masonry, which includes the impressive remains of a watchtower. These have been 
dated to the fourth century.932 The wall runs westward all the way to the waterline and from 
here clearly enclosed off the settlement from the north. At this point, moving southward, 
there are remains of what appear to be ancient slipways or perhaps even shipsheds.933 Baika 
is sceptical of them being shipsheds though she does agree that some of Epameinondas’ 
shipbuilding program may have been carried out at this port.934 The remains are very clear for 












indicate, as Schwandner established, that the slips ran practically the full extent of the 
enclosed beach, some 120 metres (Schwandner’s measurement). Though Schwandner 
suggests that they are Roman or Byzantine due to the presence of concrete, a conclusive date 
for their construction has yet to be established.935  
 
If these remains can be considered shipsheds then it is apparent that they could have 
accommodated about 20 triremes maximum. In addition to this, nearly 90 metres north of the 
wall there appears to be a few bricks that bear resemblance to the alleged shipsheds, which 
may indicate a much larger docking capability. It is more than clear that Siphae was an 
impressive and important port city, which undoubtedly had significant military capabilities. 
Regardless of whether one can accept the presence of shipsheds the long sandy beach would 
have been ideal for triremes and could well have housed a large number of them. On the 
other hand, once again, communication with Thebes would have been difficult936 and has led 
Buckler in particular to conclude that it could not have been the main naval base for the new 
armada.937 
 
East from Siphae, over Korombili we find the wide Bay of Livadostro where the 
ancient port of Creusis lay. The bay is situated on a plain located between the ridges of 
Korombili and the westernmost ridges of Cithaeron, which are separated at the mouth of the 
bay by nearly 550 metres. At the western end of the bay, on a diamond shaped hill at the foot 
of Korombili lie the remains of a fortified city. The walls are made in essentially the same 
ashlar masonry as found at Siphae and the western section similarly runs from the shore 
northward up the hill to a small plateau where the acropolis was situated. From there the wall 
ran in a northeasterly direction down to the foot of the hill. The eastern portion of the wall 
has now been almost completely destroyed due to the construction of a modern road but had 
previously been observed by Roesch.938 While there are no apparent remains of the ancient 
dockyard, Pausanias tells us that it served as the port of Thespiae (Paus. 9. 32. 1) and, as 
noted earlier, it housed either 10 or 12 triremes in 371, which implies the existence of 







used by Turks travelling between Eremokastro (Thespiae) and Livadostro since a useful road 
existed, which may explain why it was the preferred port for Thebes in Frankish times. 
However, he also points out that the harbour itself is not ideal and is subject to sudden gales 
from Mt. Geraneia (1,350m) to the southeast, on the Isthmus, which sweep across the water 
with “extraordinary suddenness”.939 In addition to this, as in the other southern bays, the area 
is surrounded by mountains, which means, as Gomme asserts, that the way is short, but 
difficult.940 Though this implies that communication was not necessarily liable to be too 
problematical, transport of supplies and large units of military personnel would have been. 
 
Overall the southern ports of Boeotia have a number of strong points for military 
harbours: they generally have ample space for beaching triremes and for the most part are 
easily accessible by sea. In particular it is interesting to note that, with the exception of 
Thisbae, all of the ports appear to have been fortified with the same style of masonry, i.e. 
from the period following the Battle of Leuctra in 371. It is clear that these ports were 
strengthened as part of a major fortification program during the period in an attempt to 
prevent any further Spartan invasions from the south.941 Naturally it would have been 
apposite to fortify the site of any major naval bases that were built; however, it may be too far 
to assert that these enceintes were constructed in conjunction with the naval program. Each of 
the southern points has poor communication with Thebes and the possible presence of 
slipways or shipsheds at Siphae is not evidence for involvement in the naval program since 
there is evidence that these ports could already house small naval arsenals. Furthermore, the 
only naval operation that we have evidence for occurred (as far as the evidence indicates) 
solely in the Aegean and it is apparent that the reason for the navy’s construction was to 
combat Athens, whose primary concern was in the Aegean. Our ultimate conclusion of this 
must be that the principal base for the Boeotian naval program was almost certainly on the 
coast of northwest Boeotia. 
 
On the northwest coast there are at least six potential harbours: Halae, Larymna, 






remote is Halae, which is located in Opuntian Locris on the easternmost section of the 
Opuntian Gulf, now known as the Bay of Atalante. The remains of the old acropolis can be 
found in the modern town of Theologos at the northern end of the Theologos beach, just a 
few metres away from the waterline. Much of the area has now been encroached upon by 
modern buildings but the acropolis itself is still exposed. The enceinte was built in a similar 
style to other fortifications in the area (Larymna in particular) and has been dated to as early 
as the time of Epameinondas, though closer to the 350s may be preferable.942 While the site is 
traditionally part of Opuntian Locris, in the fourth century it joined the Boeotian League and 
was therefore potentially utilized by the latter as a naval base.943 Along the beach, directly to 
the west of the main part of the acropolis lie substantial remains of what have been 
interpreted as shipsheds.944 Moving south along the beach, sparse fragments of these remains 
continue for the entire length of the acropolis. However, this conclusion has been disputed945 
and more recent assessment has determined these to be the remains of an outer wall, also 
dated to as early as the fourth century, though plausibly during Hellenistic times.946 In spite 
of this the beach itself is very wide and could have housed a substantial number of triremes, 
though it is fairly rocky so slipways would have needed to be constructed. Some scholars 
have suggested the site as a possible base for the Boeotian navy,947 but Buckler has argued 
against this since it is far too remote from Thebes.948 
 
Heading southeast along the Euripus Strait we come to Larymna, which was an 
ancient port town located in the Bay of Larmes. At its widest and eastern end the bay is a 
little over 2.1 kilometres wide but moving westward it tapers out, over the course of some 2.5 
kilometres, to an average of about 600 metres. At the western end there are three inlets: the 
southern being by far the largest, extending to the southwest some 700 metres and ending at 
the mouth of the Cephisus River; the northern two inlets are much smaller. The middle inlet 
is about 200 metres wide at its widest, which narrows into a beach about 60 metres wide. The 











and middle inlets is a small peninsula where we find the extensive remains of the enceinte of 
what was clearly a fortified port city. The walls are of ashlar masonry; built, using a reddish 
limestone.949 Like Halae, the walls at Larymna have previously been dated to the time of 
Epameinondas and have even been associated with the naval program.950 Indeed, many 
scholars have considered it an excellent candidate for the main Boeotian naval base.951 This 
assertion is based, in part, on Pausanias who says that Larymna voluntarily became a 
Boeotian city in the time of Thebes’ ascendency (Paus. 9. 23. 7). While this could not mean 
any other time than the time of Epameinondas, the passage has been disputed since a much 
more contemporary source (c. 350), Pseudo Scylax, describes the city as part of Locris 
([Scylax] Periplus 60).952 However, the nature of Boeotian influence in the area is more 
complicated than that, especially since Larymna would continue to change hands throughout 
history and we can confirm that Opuntian Locris was allied to the Boeotian League by 370 
(Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 23).953 It is therefore not possible to come to a definitive conclusion on the 
matter; on the other hand, the topography may offer some indication. While there are no 
remains of ancient shipsheds the lower inlet could have housed a considerable number of 
ships, whereas, at the middle inlet, only a handful. Gomme noted that there was ample 
drinking water and that the path to Orchomenus is an easy one, whereas, the path to Thebes is 
difficult.954 Buckler too points out that because of the surrounding mountains 
communications with the interior are impeded. He also adds that the area is subject to high 
winds and storms, which could have been a serious danger for large numbers of triremes. 
While Buckler thinks the fortifications may indeed belong to the time of Epameinondas and 
the harbour may well have served as a secondary base, he argues that it was insufficient as 
the primary naval base.955 
 
Heading some seven kilometres southeast (as the crow flies) we come to the largest 
harbour in northern Boeotia, Skroponeri. At the entrance is the small island of Gatza 











direction. Near the mouth it is just over a kilometre at its narrowest point and, further in, 
expands to about 2.3 kilometres at its widest. The entire bay is surrounded by steep 
mountains, particularly the heights of Mt. Ptoion to the south. On the southern bay a small 
peninsula spurs out northward about 400 metres at a maximum width of nearly 150 metres. 
Here the remains of a small settlement have been found. At the southwest end of the bay on a 
small hill called Kastro are the remains of a fortified acropolis with walls of a rather 
indistinct style. Because of this, and the scarcity of ceramic sherds, a dating has not been 
established with certainty. Between the two settlements is an inlet with considerable beaching 
space: at Kastro, over 600 metres of beach and a similar size at the peninsula. Because of its 
isolation the bay is well protected from strong winds and the water is nearly devoid of a 
current, as well as being quite deep, making it an ideal place for mooring. There is also an 
abundance of fresh water from multiple sources.956 A series of fortifications have been 
discovered on the mountains that surround the area that would have prevented anyone from 
entering Skroponeri by land or sea without being sighted from a distance. These 
constructions, though less well built than the fortifications on the south coast, have all been 
dated to the fourth century.957 It has been argued by Fossey that these forts were built in 
conjunction with the Boeotian navy, which may have been housed at Skroponeri. Indeed, due 
to the many practicalities discussed, this bay was undoubtedly one of the more appropriate 
candidates. However, in spite of its potentially excellent docking capabilities, the site has 
long been known for the probability that it never had a large settlement and there is no 
evidence that a significant seaport ever existed there, let alone a fortified seaport with 
extensive slipways and shipsheds to boot.958 Fossey rightly points out that the slips could 
have been built of wood but,959 without evidence of a port, his overall conclusion may be 
somewhat unfounded. We must also add, of course, that the communications with the interior 
are not good; in fact, the area was virtually isolated until the main road was built in 1965.960 
 
	







There are, however, some traces of an ancient road from Skroponeri that headed 
eastward to the open and more exposed bay of ancient Anthedon.961 The ruins can be found 
about two kilometres north of modern Loukissia, in the municipal unit of Magdilo, at the foot 
of Mt. Ktypas (or Messapius). Here, in a small inlet are the remains of a port for the polis of 
Anthedon, the acropolis of which stood on the coastal hill immediately to the southeast. 
There are substantial remains at the port of two moles both about 120 metres long: the 
northernmost one running from west to east and the other, southeast along the bay, running 
south to north. It is apparent that the moles were fortified and the entrance to the port was 
narrow and could have been closed off by a chain. The extant remains have been dated to a 
late Roman or early Byzantine period, i.e. between the fourth to seventh century A.D.962 A 
number of scholars have associated the site with Epameinondas’ naval program,963 though no 
remains from the fourth century have been discovered. While the area is surrounded by 
mountains scholars have been rather contradictory over the site’s accessibility: Buckler says 
that the communications with the interior are bad and Fossey described the coastal plain as 
difficult to access.964 However, Gomme had earlier stated that the path to Thebes is not 
difficult and Buckler more recently changed his opinion by commenting on the site’s good 
accessibility.965 My own observations would incline towards the latter two statements since 
the main road to Thebes goes south from Loukissia along the eastern edge of Ktypas, along 
the side of a valley (with the low ridge of Mt. Rachi on the western side), which does not 
appear too difficult to navigate.966 Overall it is agreed that, as a naval base, Anthedon is far 
too small.967 There is no evidence for the remains of slipways or shipsheds; but even if they 
were built only a handful of triremes could have fit into the small inlet,968 unless some were 
built without. In addition, Fossey points out that the port is exposed to attack along with 
strong winds and currents.969 Despite this, the moles would have protected any ships from the 
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currents, along with attacks from small forces; therefore, the port would have made an 
excellent outpost regardless of its involvement in the naval program. 
 
Further southeast we enter the lower section of the Euripus, in the waters just south 
of Chalcis and the narrow straits southeast of Vourko Bay we find two smaller bays: the 
northerly and smaller one called Mikro Vathy and the southern and larger one called Megalo 
Vathy. Between these is the rocky hill of Vesalas where the remains of the fortified acropolis 
of Aulis can be found. To the west a valley is formed between Vesalas and the slopes of 
Megalo Vouno, though it opens at the southern end in a basin called Skhoinousa. At the foot 
of Vesalas on the northwestern side are the remains of a temple of Artemis amongst other 
buildings.970 The port of Aulis was famous in antiquity as the rendezvous site for the ships 
that were destined for Troy (Hom. Il. 2. 303) and, in 396, was a point of contention when 
Agesilaus attempted to sacrifice there in imitation of Agamemnon but was driven out by the 
Thebans.971 Before the construction of a large factory the Mikro Vathy had a beach of some 
200 metres in length and the Megalo Vathy has a stretch of over 600 metres. The Megalo 
Vathy alone had the space to house the entire fleet of 100 triremes.972 Indeed, it is worth 
mentioning that a more recent study has shown that, during the period from 1050 B.C. – 500 
A.D. something of a lagoon was attached to the southern end of Mikro Vathy that stretched 
nearly all the way to the site of the agora.973 While it was not likely to be very deep during 
this period, the water displacement of triremes was not great and the lagoon could have been 
used as further docking space. The site affords protection from strong winds and offers good 
communications with the interior being the closest harbour to Thebes along natural land 
routes.974 It is worth noting that in 312 Antigonus’ admiral Ptolemy was able to dock 150 
ships at Aulis (Diod. 19. 77. 4) and in 306 Demetrius would also land a sizeable force (Diod. 
20. 100 5-6). This in itself ought to indicate the port’s suitability. The only particular 
reservations against the site are given by Fossey who argues that a more northern port is 
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attack from the Athenian fort of Rhamnus.975 However, Buckler has argued that the fort was 
predominantly used only for defence976 and, since Epameinondas’ fleet would indeed be 
attacked by an Athenian fleet, it is plausible that they sailed out through the south of the 
strait. 
 
The final candidate for the base of the Boeotian navy is, further southeast along the 
Euripus from Aulis, the port of Oropus. Situated on the north coast of modern Attike, directly 
to the south of Eretria, is a sizeable semicircular harbour. At the centre and southernmost 
section of this lies the modern village of Skala Oropou. To the very southwest of this is a 
steep hill where some remains of the ancient acropolis have been found.977 Unfortunately no 
such remains of the ancient port still stand, though the remnants of an ancient breakwater 
were present as recently as the late nineteenth century.978 The eastern half of the beach is 
wide with small pebbles, easily providing nearly two kilometres appropriate for triremes, 
though the western section could be fitted as such without much difficulty. It is known that 
the port could house at least 42 triremes as recently as 411 (Thuc. 8. 94-95). Communications 
with Thebes are excellent, but scholars have tended to discard it as a possibility for the naval 
project because of its exposed position and proximity to Attica and the Athenian fort of 
Rhamnus.979 However, this point is inconsistent with Buckler’s previous statement that the 
fort was only used for defence. It is also possible that the ancient breakwater was fortified 
with defensive walls and the port may have been close-able, which may be indicated by the 
recent annexation of the city by Thebes.980 This would make the port far more sheltered from 
the elements and defensible than is initially obvious on first inspection of the site. 
 
In the end, without any definitive textual or archaeological evidence conclusions on 
this matter must inevitably be tentative. Neither Fossey nor Buckler can safely argue for their 
preferred suggestions without admitting some fallibility. Having considered all available 
evidence it is apparent that it can be claimed that each Boeotian port had various advantages 









fact, be mistaken in attempting to determine where the ‘main’ base for the Boeotian navy was 
situated; rather, an option that ought to be considered is that several were important. First, it 
must be noted that, in the year before the navy was launched (365), Oropus had been 
captured by the Boeotians. As I have argued above, this affair also implies an alliance with 
Eretria, across the strait. It is manifest that control of these two ports was vital to protect the 
southern entrance to the strait. It would only be prudent, from then on, for the Boeotians to 
continue to house a few triremes in either port. This would be particularly crucial if Aulis was 
to have many new neoria built there. Second, while the northern access to the Euripus had 
been freed up to some extent due to the temporary quelling of Alexander of Pherae and the 
alliance with Macedon, Athenian interest had been predominantly focused on the 
northwestern Aegean, making it a serious possibility that the Boeotians could run into an 
Athenian fleet en route. Because of this it is not certain that Epameinondas did not lead the 
fleet into the Aegean via the southern exit of the Euripus. It is clear that defence of the 
Euripus must have been of the utmost concern for Thebes and it would therefore be 
unsurprising and militarily apt for several of the ports in the area to have been strengthened 
with additional triremes and shipsheds, along with fortifications.  
 
 
The Aegean Theatre of War 366-364 B.C. 
 
By 364 the fleet was ready for its first (and only) campaign with Epameinondas as 
its admiral. The situation in the Aegean at this stage was by no means secure for any side. 
Following or contemporary with the Peace of 366/5 the Athenians sent Timotheus eastward 
at the helm of a force of 30 triremes and 8,000 peltasts981 (Isoc. 15. 111) with instructions to 
assist the satrap Ariobarzanes, who was in open revolt against Artaxerxes, without violating 
their treaty with the king. On discovering that the island of Samos had been garrisoned by 
one Cyprothemis acting on the orders of Tigranes, satrap of the king, he proceeded to besiege 
the city, which he managed to capture after a 10 month campaign, probably ending towards 







an Athenian cleruchy (Arist. Rhet. 2. 6. 24; Aeschin. 1. 53; IG II2 1437. 20). It has often been 
purported that the disaffection of Athens’ Aegean allies began in response to this act. It is 
true that the cleruchy was an imperialistic deed that smacked of the fifth century Athenian 
empire; indeed, the Athenian orator Cydias is quoted to have bid the demos to consider the 
effect the cleruchy would have on their allies (Arist. Rhet. 2. 6. 24). However, it is generally 
admitted that Samos did not belong to the Second Athenian League and did not, therefore, 
have any legal protection under the Decree of Aristoteles.983  
 
Whether or not the cleruchy on Samos was legitimate it has frequently been assumed 
that Epameinondas’ naval project was instigated by this activity.984 While this is an attractive 
notion, we must be wary when making causal connections between two events both of which 
are uncertainly dated. This uncertainty is such that one scholar has even conversely argued 
that Timotheus’ campaign was instigated by the construction of the Boeotian fleet.985 As a 
result, the provenance of such an assumption depends greatly on our understanding of the 
chronology of events. The only explicit evidence we have is from Diodorus who places both 
the construction of the fleet and its campaign in 364/3. Of course, this may be doubtful since 
it would have been impossible to construct a fleet of any size and launch a campaign all in 
the same season; however, it would be unsurprising if this was the time in which the 
campaign was launched. Thus, the majority of scholars place the expedition in 364,986 
particularly since Orchomenus was destroyed this year supposedly when Epameinondas was 
absent.987 Accepting this date presupposes that the naval project began substantially earlier; 
possibly as a far back as the Peace in Susa (367) when funding from the Persians was 
plausibly secured. Buckler argues for an inception in 366 when Timotheus’ campaign had 
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only just begun.988 Heskel, building on this, has developed the conjecture that Theban 
embassies were sent to several Aegean cities in 366/5 in an attempt to facilitate ties, in spite 
of Athens, prior to the construction of the navy.989 Though incapable of proof, it is certainly 
believable that diplomacy between Thebes and many of Athens’ allies began well before the 
grand expedition set forth since the appearance of a large Boeotian fleet could have provoked 
many different responses without being forewarned. While construction of the fleet may well 
have begun in 366, plans for a navy may have developed much earlier and Athenian naval 
activity, rather, provided only the opportune moment for Epameinondas and his colleagues to 
float the idea in the Theban assembly. It is then doubtful that the cleruchy in Samos instigated 
the Boeotian navy, let alone the naval expedition, since it was liable to set out as soon as it 
was ready. The cleruchy, however, provided an excellent opportunity as its initiation 
undoubtedly incited disaffection amongst members of the Athenian confederacy.  
 
Aside from the Samian affair other activities in the Aegean may have further 
precipitated the movements of the Boeotian fleet. Once Timotheus had taken Samos, he 
sailed to the northeastern Aegean where he replaced Iphicrates who had been unsuccessfully 
campaigning against Amphipolis for about three years. Just prior to his arrival, 
Amphipolitans had given up their city to Olynthus in order to protect themselves from the 
Athenians (Dem. 23. 150). Timotheus probably spent the rest of 365 attempting to take 
Amphipolis without success since their defences were bolstered by the Olynthians. He did, 
however, form an alliance with the new Macedonian king, Perdiccas III.990 Then, in 364 he 
moved against the Chalcidice, where he managed to secure the cities of Potidaea and Torone, 
and would conduct operations there well into the following year (Diod. 15. 81. 6; Isoc. 15. 
108).991 It was in this area that the Athenian navy was focused when Epameinondas set out at 











The Boeotian Naval Campaign 364 B.C. 
 
Before embarking on the expedition, a crew of up to 20,000992 was needed to fully 
man the ships, most of which were rowers. While the Boeotians could probably provide all 
the trierarchs and other officers required, Buckler argues that mercenaries, obtained from all 
over Greece, were utilized. This is plausible, but, because of the shear numbers and skill 
required to effectively use triremes, it may have been difficult to acquire so many 
mercenaries. Consequently, a large number of the rowers could have come from the 
disenfranchised population of Boeotia. It is possible that, during the time spent in planning 
and construction, much of the crew were trained in the ships that were already available at 
Boeotian ports.993 Thus, having established all the necessary facets of their voyage the fleet 
disembarked from the newly furnished ports in the Euripus.  
 
It is, of course, impossible to determine the exact route that Epameinondas took and 
it may, in fact, be folly to presume that any attempt would ultimately be worthwhile since we 
will never know how accurate or egregiously mistaken it would be. However, for the sake of 
convenience, a theoretical route shall be utilized in the following discussion, partly as a way 
to determine the order of which port of call to examine first to last. Buckler assumes that 
Epameinondas headed north since he (also) assumes that Byzantium was the first place that 
the fleet visited. While Byzantium may have been the most significant given its importance 
for the Athenian grain trade in the Black Sea, Buckler also admits that Rhodes was an 
important waypoint for trade with Egypt.994 Thus, we cannot simply assume that Byzantium 
was the first port of call. My reasoning, rather, adopts the same logic I have earlier used, i.e. 
Diodorus arguably recorded the cities that Epameinondas visited in the same order that his 
source described them.995 This works out to be Rhodes, Chios and Byzantium (Diod. 15. 79. 
1). Certainly, Chios would have been second (of the three) even if Byzantium was first. 
However, in light of epigraphic evidence that essentially proves that Epameinondas also 









majority of known sites are in the eastern or southeastern Aegean we may presume (though 
with little certainty) that more time was spent in this region. I will therefore suppose that the 
cities were visited in the following order, heading from south to north: Rhodes, Cnidus, Chios 
and, finally, Byzantium. It is, in addition, also worthwhile to include extra sites that 
Epameinondas plausibly visited based on some circumstantial evidence and some reasonable 
supposition. Much of the following discussion is admittedly theoretical, but this is necessary 
when such miniscule evidence is available to us.  
 
If Epameinondas first set out in the direction of Rhodes, he would have left the 
Euripus through the southward passage. This would inevitably have led the fleet to sail past 
Attica. Since an Athenian force was sent out under Laches in order to circumvent the fleet it 
is quite possible that this is the point in which they disembarked. Buckler asserts that Laches 
met Epameinondas as he disembarked but did not pursue him since he headed for the 
northern passage of the Euripus: this is possible if that was the route he took.996 Conversely, 
Stylianou has suggested that Laches was guarding the Hellespont: this is also possible;997 but, 
since Diodorus explicitly states that Laches was sent out to stop Epameinondas, it is more 
credible that the two forces met as the Boeotian fleet was beginning its journey. Laches 
apparently had a sizeable force: we may imagine at least 30 or 40 triremes, if not significantly 
more.998 Despite this, he did not attack since he was probably outnumbered and, instead, 
sailed back home. Nor did Epameinondas make any attempt at open hostility with Athens: 
Buckler rightly asserts that it was not his intention to, at this stage, use the fleet as a weapon; 
rather, he planned to use it as a diplomatic tool to convince Athens’ allies to join the Boeotian 
federation. The fleet also lacked military experience and, although they would probably have 
defeated Laches, the skilled Athenian rowers could have caused many unnecessary losses.999 
Having warded off the enemy, Epameinondas now had a free rein to visit the islands of the 
Aegean. 
 
Once they departed the Euripus, the fleet inevitably would have journeyed through 







these islands triremes very rarely spent nights at sea. The most the fleet could have achieved 
in a long day’s rowing was not much more than 230 kilometres (probably quite a bit less in 
this case)1000 and it is over 500 kilometres to Rhodes from Aulis. It therefore stands to reason 
that at least one or two of these islands were visited on their voyage to the eastern Aegean. 
While most poleis in the Cyclades had maintained a fairly good relationship with Athens, 
there were certainly a few potential candidates for joining the Theban’s escapade. The 
Cyclades had a long history of subjection to Athens. In the 470s, the Naxians attempted to 
secede from the Delian League in a revolt, which was subsequently suppressed by the 
Athenians (Thuc. 1. 98. 4; Polyaen. 1. 30. 8). There is some suggestion that Tenos, Andros 
and the cities of Ceos revolted in 450, though this is speculative.1001 Then, between 450-447, 
cleruchies were installed on both Naxos and Andros.1002 Later, after the Sicilian Expedition, 
along with Carystus in Euboea, hoplites from Andros and Tenos assisted the Four Hundred 
against Athens.1003 Throughout the 370s most of the Cyclades joined the Second Athenian 
League and appear to have been mostly content with this arrangement despite some small-
scale contributions they had to make to the league.1004 It is possible that an inscription 
involving the settlement of a dispute at Paros is indicative of a revolt against Athens in 
373;1005 however, it has more reasonably been argued that the inscription refers to an internal 
dispute that was settled by the synedrion of the league.1006  
 
While many of the islanders probably benefitted from adherence to Athens, the 
recent establishment of a cleruchy on Samos may well have brought a sour taste to many 
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of the expedition (or shortly afterwards) the cities of Ceos (Iulis, Carthaea, Poeessa and 
Corressia) did revolt against Athens. This was followed by another revolt of Iulis. It is also 
possible that the island of Thera may have been involved in these events in some way.1007 
Ruzicka warns against associating these events with the actions of Epameinondas since they 
were “not likely to be of particular significance”.1008 Indeed we must be careful associating 
any city with events that we do not have explicit evidence for, but the timing of these revolts 
is rather telling. Even if Epameinondas did not try to sway the people of the Cyclades, there 
is a good chance that the Boeotian fleet sailed through their territory, which could have had a 
significant impact itself. In spite of Ruzicka’s contention that the Cyclades were not 
important enough for the Thebans to bother with, they were obviously important to the 
Athenians, which would have been enough for Epameinondas. We may speculate that he was 
hoping to bring as many members of the Athenian League to his side as he possibly could.  
 
Recent studies have argued that during this period the cities of Ceos seceded from 
the Athenians and joined the Boeotian League. There are three major reasons for this: one, 
Ceos would indeed revolt from Athens around this time; two, both Ceos and Boeotia had 
significant ties with the cities of Euboea, at this stage;1009 three, on a list of Carthaean 
proxenoi one Cnidian was inscribed alongside the Boeotian proxenoi. This last factor has 
been interpreted to indicate diplomacy between Ceos and Cnidus,1010 the latter of which 
certainly was visited by Epameinondas.1011 There is much merit to this view since the fleet 
was liable to have sailed in the vicinity of the island; however, any visit to Ceos would have 
been dangerous due to its close proximity to Attica. If the Boeotians did stop at the island it 
would probably have been a brief stay. In any case, their mere presence in the area could well 
have spurred the Ceans, particularly as they learned more about the voyage.1012 It is therefore 
possible further diplomacy between Thebes and Ceos followed the expedition.  
 
The journey would inevitably have passed the island of Delos and it would be 









series of third century Delphic inscriptions, which refer to a crown sent back (άπελθών) by 
Epameinondas. Though the significance of this crown in relation to the name of 
Epameinondas is unknowable, it is not impossible to associate it with the naval 
expedition.1013 
 
Having docked somewhere in the Cyclades for at least a night, the fleet could 
reasonably have gone straight to Rhodes at this point. However, it has been suggested that 
Epameinondas may have led the fleet to Crete and even Cyrene, on the northeast coast of 
Libya. Cyrene appears to have had some ties with the Second Athenian League during the 
370s and 360s, though it is not clear to what extent. Anti-Athenian sentiments may have 
begun to surface when the city took in some refugees that Timotheus had expelled from 
Samos.1014 Then, following the Boeotian expedition, we find the brief existence of a radical 
democracy that was reformed by Plato and the Athenians, c. 363-362.1015 Dusanic argues that 
such a ‘democracy’ may have been established through the intervention of Epameinondas.1016 
Though possible, this is much less plausible than other theories simply because of the 
distance: even from Crete the journey is nearly 300 kilometres. On the other hand, any anti-
Athenian sentiment that developed between 365 and 363 was quite conceivably influenced by 
these events. 
 
Crete, by contrast, is closer to the realms of possibility since it was not completely 
out of the way for the fleet to visit and, like Rhodes, it was potentially useful for policing the 
Athenian grain trade that came from Egypt. However, we have no real evidence, contextually 
or otherwise, that Crete was visited during the campaign and Dusanic’s only reason for 
arguing so is due to the fact that the island was important for the Athenian League and also 
fell under the designs of Mausolus.1017 Most of the cities of Crete do not appear to have been 
part of the Second Athenian League and had not suffered at the hands of Athens. Thus, with a 
	








relatively neutral status,1018 the Cretans had very little to gain from joining Epameinondas 
and, if he actually did visit the island, they would credibly have been hospitable but would 
probably have sent him away having achieved very little.  
 
From a possible visit to the southern Aegean (or beyond) we now come to firmer 
ground with the fleet’s arrival to the Dodecanese islands. The largest and most influential of 
these was the island of Rhodes. It is probable that Epameinondas went to the city of Rhodes 
itself, which had been founded by the cities of Ialysus, Camirus and Lindus in 408/7 as the 
island’s capital.1019 The country had been among the first to join (before 377) the Second 
Athenian League,1020 which may have been due to a concern over the imperialistic actions of 
Sparta. Once the strength of the Spartans had been dismantled and the Athenians joined with 
their former enemies, many people in Rhodes may have seen little reason to remain in the 
league. Since, during the Peloponnesian war, they were subjected to Athenian tribute 
payment, the recent actions of Timotheus could have stirred a negative feeling amongst the 
people. Rhodes had also been a member of the ΣΥΝ coin league from the late fifth or early 
fourth century in which Thebes may have been attached, along with several other Aegean and 
Propontic poleis. This connection was surely remembered by many in Rhodes and it is 
possible that Epameinondas brought with him a mint of electrum coinage that was designed 
to reiterate this bond.1021 Certainly we can imagine that this is exactly the sort of rhetoric that 
Epameinondas used, perhaps speaking to the Rhodian assembly, in an attempt to sway them 
against Athens.1022  
 
A heavily fragmented reused proxeny decree found in Thebes, dating from this 
period, has been reconstructed to be for a Rhodian (SEG 25. 465).1023 If accepted, it could 
indicate continuing diplomatic relations between the two poleis; however, the reconstruction 










a rho and an omicron on the inscription.1024 Another connection may also be found in some 
Theban coins that bear the first part of Epameinondas’ name (ΕΠΠΑ/ΕΠΑΜ) and a rose, 
which may have been minted in commemoration of his visit.1025 Again, this view has been 
questioned,1026 though the significance of the rhodon on Theban coinage has yet to be 
conclusively explained.1027 More recently, Schachter has developed an interesting thesis from 
a lost inscription at Aulis bearing the name of Tlepolemus, who was a mythical founder of 
Rhodes and a son of Heracles, arguing that a cult of the hero was established at the port in 
honour of the diplomatic arrangements between Rhodes and Thebes.1028 While ultimately 
impossible to prove, as we shall see, similar events may have taken place at other poleis as a 
result of, or in preparation for, the expedition. Unfortunately, the evidence concerning the 
relationship between Rhodes and Thebes at this time is largely circumstantial and uncertainly 
associated with these events; however, their existence is most easily explained by this 
association. An optimistic interpretation would therefore conclude that diplomatic relations 
between Thebes and Rhodes were prolific and Rhodian enthusiasm for joining the Boeotian 
naval venture was apparent. 
 
Once his business in Rhodes had been concluded Epameinondas led the fleet 
northwest to the Carian port city of Cnidus. The journey could have been completed in less 
than a day of rowing, possibly stopping for lunch on the island of Syme, where the bay of 
Panormitis could have provided an excellent site for beaching the ships. On their arrival at 
Cnidus, the fleet must have been well-received and afforded full docking privileges. Our 
evidence for the visit to this large port city comes from a proxeny decree found in Burgazada, 
Turkey,1029 which confirms that Epameinondas was made a proxenos of Cnidus and, since 
this naval voyage was the only time he was known to be in that part of the world, it was 
almost certainly enacted on this occasion. The terms of the decree ensured that 
Epameinondas and his descendants were made proxenoi and that he (and presumably his 












Unlike the other states that we know were visited Cnidus provides a stark contrast 
from the others: though the city had been a member of the Delian League, it had revolted 
from Athens in 412 and joined the Spartans. They later joined the ΣΥΝ coin league of the late 
fifth, early fourth centuries. However, after the Corinthian war, by the terms of the King’s 
peace in 387/6 the city belonged to Persia. Epameinondas’ friendly relations with Cnidus are 
indicative of Thebes’ symmachia with Artazerxes II. This meant that the Boeotian fleet had 
the legal right to secure some assistance from Greek members of the Persian Empire. Though 
military support may be less plausible since it could have been considered a breach of 
Persia’s precarious peace with Athens, they could grant docking rights and provide a market. 
As a result, a proxeny was the perfect alternative since it was more of a personal bonding 
between the city of Cnidus and Epameinondas rather than with Thebes or Boeotia. But, in 
practice, it certainly did foster a diplomatic connection between the two political entities.  
 
While the decree does not imply the existence of a formal alliance the awarding of 
the proxeny was not merely a symbolic gesture from the Cnidians. By accepting the title 
Epameinondas was taking on a significant political and social position that could entail great 
responsibility. In general, the status of proxenos meant that the receiver would have a 
particular bond with the city that awarded it. They would earn this title because the city 
deemed that they had either provided some sort of service or would do so in the future. There 
was also an expectation that the recipient, and their descendants (ἔκγονος), would continue to 
serve as a liaison between the city that awarded the proxeny and the city of the recipient.1030 
Thus, Epameinondas may have made an agreement with the Cnidians. One may speculate 
that the only thing the Theban could offer them was military protection, if his naval 
endeavour were successful. On the other hand, they would benefit him by allowing his fleet 
to use the ports of Cnidus, perhaps even as a base. Indeed, the right to sail in and out of 
Cnidus unmolested is the main stipulation of the decree that survives, though such a clause is 
a standard for Cnidian proxeny decrees (e.g. IK. Knidos 1. 1-10). Based on other examples 
the decree for Epameinondas was liable to extend these docking rights to include “in times of 




program Epameinondas would still have a duty to maintain ties with Cnidus. There is 
perhaps, as noted above, some indication for this in a Carthaean list of proxenoi. 
 
After what was probably a few days at the Cnidic peninsula, the fleet headed north 
across the mouth of the Ceramic Gulf. We know that Chios was certainly en route during this 
part of the voyage; however, it was over 200 kilometres away (as the crow flies) and we can 
therefore surmise that they stopped elsewhere during this stretch. The most obvious port of 
call from Cnidus was the island of Cos, which was a journey of just over 30 kilometres (to 
the city of Cos); thus, it could have been reached in just a few hours of travel. Cos had been a 
member of the Delian League and had to pay tribute, but it is not certain whether a cleruchy 
was ever installed.1031 While they joined the Spartans in 407 (Xen. Hell. 1. 5. 1; Diod. 13. 69. 
5), they would secede from them after the Battle of Cnidus in 394 (Diod. 14. 84. 3). It is not 
clear whether they joined the Second Athenian League since their name was not inscribed on 
the stele of Aristoteles, but they would later take part in the Social War against Athens (Diod. 
16. 7. 3; Dem. 15. 3, 27).1032 In 366/5 the Coan poleis of Astypalaia and Cos Meropis 
synoecised into the city of Cos, which was made the capital of the island as a unified state 
(Diod. 15. 76. 2: Strabo 14. 2. 19). Though there is no direct evidence, the proximity of this 
event to the Boeotian naval expedition is a striking coincidence.  
 
It has earlier been suggested that the Coan synoecism occurred as a result of 
Epameinondas’ voyage.1033 Chronologically the two events cannot have, strictly speaking, 
had much to do with one another since the expedition occurred up to two years after the 
founding of the city of Cos. Sherwin-White further points out that the Coans may also have 
harboured some hostility towards Thebes’ hegemonic activities since they would soon after 
provide citizenship to refugees from Orchomenus.1034 However, since the city was destroyed 
during the naval voyage, it is unlikely to have had any influence on Coan opinion of the 








which she argues attempted to secure an alliance but were unsuccessful.1035 The synoecism 
itself was more liable to have been directly influenced by the synoecism at Halicarnassus by 
Mausolus, the satrap of Caria.1036 The nature of Coan politics would imply that the move was 
more economically motivated than militarily; however, they also gave support to refugees 
from Samos, which could indicate resentment towards Athenian naval policy (SEG 1. 
354).1037 This means that Cos could well have been quite open to the idea of an alliance with 
Thebes, but their tendency to remain fairly neutral probably prevented them from concluding 
any kind of formal alliance. Based on these arguments, a visit from Epameinondas, during his 
voyage, is quite plausible, but it is doubtful that anything of lasting value was achieved, 
except, perhaps to add to the anti-Athenian atmosphere that was surely brewing.  
 
Between Cos and Chios there was still a long voyage ahead and many other 
potential stops along the way. Though Samos is improbable the fleet may have made stops at 
Halicarnassus,1038 Iasus and Ephesus.1039  
 
From Ephesus to Chios it is a 120 kilometre journey, which could have been 
achieved in one day of rowing. After reaching the very western end of the Çeşme peninsula 
and proceeding northwest, the fleet would have just been able to see the city of Chios on the 
island of its namesake. The Chians had a tradition of shipbuilding and would have been an 
important addition to the alliance; indeed, as part of the Delian League they provided the 
Athenians with ships rather than money during the fifth century. They were one of the 
founding members of the Second Athenian League but would later revolt against it in the 
Social war. There may be some indication of Boeotian-Chian diplomatic relations in the form 
of a fourth century stele that refers to a Boeotian Demeter (SEG 17. 396), which may be, as at 













earlier, it is imaginable that Epameinondas took part in, or oversaw, some form of ceremonial 
ritual in order to initiate the new practice. In either case, from Diodorus’ statement it appears 
that the visit was relatively successful and the Chians were supportive of the Theban’s cause. 
 
From Chios the next logical waypoint was at the isle of Lesbos,1041 on which the 
most important settlement was the city of Mytilene. The city lies on the western side of the 
island, facing the coastline of Asia Minor on the Strait of Mytilene. In 427 the Mytileneans 
suffered greatly at the hands of Athens when 1,000 of their citizens were executed, the city 
walls were torn down, their possessions seized and their hinterland divided amongst Athenian 
cleruchs (Thuc. 3. 50). The city was a founding member of the Second Athenian League and, 
probably in 375, allowed an Athenian garrison to occupy it (SEG 19 204). It was a significant 
sea power, producing large numbers of triremes. While there might be some historical 
precedent for disdain towards Athens, Mytilene had been a loyal ally since at least 389. In 
any case, if the garrison still occupied the city, the Boeotian fleet would undoubtedly have 
avoided it. Another important Lesbian city was Methymna, which is on the northern side of 
the island. Even more so than Mytilene, Methymna was inclined towards the Athenians, 
apparently never having to provide tribute or receive a cleruchy during the fifth century. They 
were also founding members of the Second Athenian League and producers of triremes.1042 It 
seems that most poleis on Lesbos were fairly loyal to the Athenians during this period and it 
is credible that Epameinondas’ cruise had no major impact upon them; however, since the 
island was an important military asset to the Athenians, it is also credible that he attempted to 
persuade them to revolt. We must remember that the island is directly en route between Chios 
and the Bosporus. 
 
Once the fleet had reached cape Lectum (modern Baba), the most western point of 
Asia and the Troad, it would have headed north along the final stretch before the Hellespont. 
Possible stops along the way could have been Larisa on the coast to the west of modern 
Kösedere or further north at Colonae, which lay to the west of modern Akçakeçili. Another 






point) off the Turkish coast, just to the northwest of the modern port village of Dalyan. This 
polis had been a member of the Delian League and was currently a member of the Second 
Athenian League. It would have little obvious reason for wanting to support the Thebans; 
however, an interesting inscription dated c. 355-346, refers to a Tenedian proxenos, 
Athenodorus, in Boeotia who provided 1,000 drachmas as a contribution during the Sacred 
War (IG VII 2418). Though we cannot know exactly when Athenodorus was made a 
proxenos, it has been suggested that it may echo Boeotian naval policy in the area, since 
Tenedos’ position would have been useful for hindering the Athenian grain trade.1043 
However, because Tenedos would remain loyal to Athens, and even be honoured by them in 
340/39 (IG II² 233), it does not seem tenable that the island ever seceded from the league. On 
the other hand, Athenodorus was clearly a Boeotian sympathizer and may well have obtained 
his contribution from a number of Tenedians.1044 It is therefore plausible that Epameinondas’ 
voyage facilitated a certain amount of support from Tenedos, which however, did not affect 
the island’s overall policy towards Athens. 
 
The opening of the Hellespont is about 23 kilometres from Tenedos. From there it is 
a journey of some 65 kilometres to the entrance of the Propontis. To Byzantium through the 
Propontis it is over 200 kilometres. The journey through the Hellespont could have been 
achieved in a day without too much trouble but, because the strait is vital for access to the 
Black Sea, a stop or two along the way is likely. While all the cities on the Propontic coast 
were undoubtedly part of the Persian Empire, the cities on the south coast of the Chersonesus 
are a different matter. The only city recorded as a member of the Second Athenian League is 
the city of Elaeus, which was situated not far beyond the entrance of the strait, at the eastern 
end of Morto Bay. Other than this it is assumed that the entire peninsula was controlled by 
Ariobarzanes. It is generally thought that, in 365, the cities of Sestus and Crithote were given 
to Timotheus for services to Ariobarzanes; however, as has been established, the Athenian 
was most plausibly still campaigning around Chalcidice in 364 and would not go to the 
Hellespont until after Epameinondas had left. Thus, Sestus and Crithote were, at this stage, 
more reasonably controlled by the Persians.  
	





Ariobarzanes, the Persian satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, as early as 366, was in a 
state of revolt against Artaxerxes. The satrap and his lackey, Philiscus, had been fortifying 
Hellenic cities, including Atarneus, Assus and Adramyttium, from which they were besieged 
by Autophradates and Mausolus, possibly in 366/5.1045 It is not certain what the exact 
situation was in 364 but, since Ariobarzanes would later give the Athenians control of Sestus 
and Crithote, the Hellespont was probably still under his authority, or possibly that of 
Philiscus (Dem. 23. 141-143). Though the satrap did not have any strategic reason to be 
hostile to the Thebans, their alliance with Persia and antipathy towards Athens could well 
have constituted a long-term threat to his independent rule of the territory. We must 
remember that Ariobarzanes and Philiscus had been made Athenian citizens and, whether or 
not it mattered to them, they were honour bound to side with Athens. The duo also may have 
had a personal aversion to the Thebans since it was because of them that Philiscus failed to 
gain Greek military support in 368.1046 Thus, the fleet may not have been entirely welcome at 
ports held by Ariobarzanes. 
 
Lampsacus has been suggested as a possible stopping point. This is a reasonable 
supposition since it was amongst the most prosperous cities in the area and a natural place to 
stop if the fleet came from Tenedos. The city was also probably part of the alliance of the 
ΣΥΝ coinage league. On the other hand, Lampsacus was most assuredly controlled by 
Philiscus, who was assassinated by two Lampsacenes (Dem. 23. 142). But it is not certain 
whether he was actually present, at this point, making it possible that a faction in the city 
wished to secede from Ariobarzanes. Either way, the Boeotian fleet certainly proceeded 
through the Hellespont.  
 
After quickly navigating the Hellespont the ships entered the Propontis (the Sea of 
Marmara). On the way to Byzantium a stop at one of the other cities of Propontic Thrace 
would be expected. The obvious port of call was the city of Perinthus, which was a journey of 






centre of the north coast. It had been a member of the Second Athenian League but, around 
this time, was subject to the control of Philiscus, and had endured hostilities from Cotys 
(Dem. 23. 142; Arist. Econ. 2. 1351a).1047 The chronology of these events is, however, 
uncertain but a possible scenario may be that the Perinthians were dissatisfied with Athens’ 
disinterest in providing protection from the Odrysians and consequently appealed to 
Philiscus, who subsequently occupied the city with mercenaries. If the opinion of 
Demosthenes is anything to go by Philiscus was a brutal man who committed many 
atrocities; thus, his influence on the city may have provoked great contempt amidst the 
populace. To be sure, Epameinondas would not have entered a city occupied with soldiers 
that were potentially hostile, but this was not necessarily the case in 364. There are, at least, 
two potential contexts in which the fleet visited Perinthus: firstly, the city could still have 
been an independent member of the league but, due to aggression from Cotys, were happy to 
consider joining the Theban naval alliance; however, since the endeavour did not come to full 
fruition, the city was forced to seek help from elsewhere. The second possibility places 
Philiscus’ occupation before 364, which would mean that Epameinondas offered them 
protection after the garrison had left. Accordingly, they were forced to return to Athens’ side. 
A decade later, they would again secede from Athens and form an alliance with Philip II, in 
352/1, because of continuing problems with Cotys (Schol. Aeschin. 2. 81). 
 
These rather attractive reconstructions of events may be a stretch; however, there is 
some potential evidence that connects Perinthus to the naval expedition: a recently published 
fragmentary Boeotian proxeny decree, which has been dated to the 360s, for two individuals 
(SEG 58. 447). Unfortunately, the section that indicates the proxenos’ city ethnic has been 
fragmented and all we have are the last six letters: -ινθίως. Vlachogianni has argued in favour 
of restoring it to refer to either Olynthus or Corinth, while discounting Perinthus due to its 
ties with Athens.1048 However, as Russell notes, Epameinondas was definitely in the area1049 
and, as I have argued, Perinthus’ feelings towards Athens were not necessarily that positive 
around this time. It is important to remember that a proxeny was very different from a formal 
	
1047	Isaac	(1989),	207.	Cf.	Loukopolou	and	Laitar	(2004),	920.	
1048	 Vlachogianni	 (2010),	 361-372	 and	 365	 n.	 25,	 against	 Perinthus.	 Fossey	 (2014),	 20-22,	 has	 also	
suggested	Amarynthos	in	Euboea,	but	see	van	Wijk	(2019),	90	n.	38.	
1049	 Russell	 (2016),	 69,	 187	 n.	 19.	 See	 also	Gartland	 (2013),	 29	 n.	 33,	who	 finds	 Perinthus	 a	 plausible	
reconstruction.	
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alliance: one could be a proxenos for a polis even if they were technically at war with each 
other.1050 The city was also a natural waypoint when crossing the Propontis, making it readily 
conceivable that the fleet did indeed stop there. Although Olynthus and Corinth are both 
plausible options, there is no reason to discount the possibility that the decree refers to two 
Perinthians. 
 
With another 90 kilometres of travel Epameinondas finally made it to, what may 
well have been, the most crucial polis to assume into an alliance, Byzantium. The city lay at 
the very head of the peninsula between the Bosporus and the Golden Horn, known today as 
the Promontory of Sarayburnu or Seraglio Point. Byzantium’s strategic position for guarding 
access to the Black Sea made the city incredibly important to the Athenian grain trade. It was 
also a significant sea power, having provided ships and crew to the Delian League in the fifth 
century. The city was part of the ΣΥΝ coinage alliance and was a founding member of the 
Second Athenian League.1051 Since the Byzantines would, in 357, join in revolt against 
Athens, it is conceivable that they would entertain the notion at this stage.  
 
In 362, Byzantium, in collaboration with Calchedon and Cyzicus, began to forcibly 
beach Athenian grain ships and made them unload their cargo ([Dem.] 50. 6-7, 17-19; 45. 64; 
Dem. 5. 25). These events have been interpreted as resulting directly from Epameinondas’ 
voyage.1052 Apollodorus’ speech indicates that the primary reason for these actions was due 
to a lack of grain and further economic reasons, for the seizing of ships’ cargo, are indicated 
by Pseudo Aristotle ([Arist.] Econ. 2. 1346b). Some scholars have questioned whether this 
should be considered overt hostility towards the Athenians since they were not the only ones 
targeted.1053 But, in spite of this, we should not underestimate the importance of the Black 
Sea grain trade: Athens undoubtedly considered the actions hostile.  
 
We may have further evidence of the visit to Byzantium from another Boeotian 
proxeny decree honouring a Byzantine (IG VII 2408). The recipient was awarded exemption 







guarantee of personal safety. It has been suggested that the Byzantine may have been in the 
employ of Epameinondas for assistance with either naval policy or maritime strategy.1054 It 
has also been argued that the Byzantine was awarded such an honour as a result of 
contributing to the defection of Byzantium from the Athenian League.1055 Another potential 
cult exchange has also been observed by Schachter who speculates that the cult of Achilles in 
Tanagra may have come from Byzantium where worship of that figure was widespread from 
the Troad to the Black Sea.1056  
 
A fragment of Ephorus’ account of this period (book 23) attests that the town of 
Chrysopolis, which was traditionally controlled by Calchedon, was awarded to “the allies” 
(Ephorus FGrH 70 F83 = Steph. Byz. s. v. Χρυσόπολις). It has been suggested that a plausible 
context for the fragment is Epameinondas’ visit to Byzantium, where he may have awarded 
the city with possession of Chrysopolis in return for agreeing to join Thebes.1057 Buckler 
disputes this by pointing out that Chrysopolis (via Calchedon) was part of the Persian Empire 
and was therefore not liable to be awarded by the Thebans to Byzantium, which was 
technically allied to Athens.1058 However, since Epameinondas’ meddlings in Byzantium 
were, for all intents and purposes, anti-Athenian, it is not impossible for Artaxerxes to have 
nominally approved such an arrangement, if it proved to be useful.1059 We also find that this 
relationship with Thebes continued into the 350s when Byzantium contributed to the war 
effort against Phocis (IG VII 2418) and a formal alliance is possibly attested by Demosthenes 
(Dem. 9. 34).1060 
 
At some point during the expedition, Epameinondas received a plea for assistance 
from Heraclea Pontica (Just. 16. 4. 1-4). The city was undergoing stasis between the ruling 
class and the common people; as a result, the council requested help from Timotheus, who 
refused. Then, Epameinondas was also beseeched, but he refused, possibly because he did not 
	
1054	Roesch	(1984),	56.	






1060	Mackil	 (2013),	80	n.	128,	84	n.	146,	 though	 the	passage	may	actually	 refer	 to	Philip	 II,	 see	Russell	
(2016),	69.		
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want to get too involved in the internal affairs of a Persian held city.1061 Buckler has 
suggested that the Boeotian fleet had actually sailed all the way to Heraclea,1062 which is a 
journey of over 220 kilometres from Byzantium. There is some indication of a contemporary 
connection in the form of an epitaph for a citizen of Heraclea who died at Thebes longing for 
his homeland. The inscription mentions that the city will undergo a perishing grief (ἄχος 
φθιμένου), which may well refer to the tyranny of Clearchus (IG VII 2531).1063 However, 
since Epameinondas refused the plea, it is doubtful that he would have spared the time and 
expense to go to a city that was not strategically beneficial to his current endeavour. It is 
consequently more plausible that embassies were sent to the Theban when he was relatively 
close to the area,1064 making Byzantium a good option, though he could well have been 
anywhere else in the Propontis. Because of his refusal, the oligarchs were forced to seek help 
from the exiled Clearchus, who would, shortly afterwards (364/3), make himself tyrant of 
Heraclea (Diod. 15. 81. 5).  
 
From Byzantium it is possible that the fleet also made a stop in Calchedon, 
particularly if Epameinondas did indeed give the Calchedonian controlled town of 
Chrysopolis to the Byzantines. We also find the city joining Byzantium, in 362, beaching 
Athenian grain ships ([Dem]. 50. 6, 17). While this indicates an alliance with Byzantium, it 
has been inferred that the city was likewise allied with Thebes.1065 Since Calchedon was 
technically under Persian control it is debateable that the city would involve itself in hostility 
towards Athens; however, Demosthenes, in a speech delivered in 353 or 351, implies that the 
city, along with Selymbria, were taken over by the Byzantines (Dem. 15. 26). Such an 
occasion is also mentioned by Theopompus, commenting on Byzantine democratic 
drunkenness (Theopompus FGrH 115 F62 = Athen. 12. 526e-f). It is possible that this was 
part of a Byzantine expansionist policy during this period,1066 though it is hard to reconcile 
their support of Thebes and apparent antagonism towards Persia. We may further consider 
the possibility that the Persians were willing to actually cede some of their territory in order 










Having finished with the Bosporus, it was time to head west back towards the 
Hellespont. There is a possibility that another stop was made, this time in the southern 
Propontis, at the polis of Cyzicus. The city lay on the southwestern side (near modern Belkis) 
onf an island known as the Arctonessus, which is now a tombolo of Anatolia that may have 
been connected to the mainland by Alexander the Great (Plin. Nat. Hist. 5. 40). By this stage, 
however, the isthmus did not exist and the western harbour could have been accessed, 
coming from the east, without having to circumnavigate the entire island. From Byzantium it 
is a journey of over 120 kilometres, which could have been achieved in a hard day’s rowing, 
perhaps lunching on the island of Imrali Adasi. The city was part of the ΣΥΝ coinage league 
and appears to have been part of the Second Athenian League (Schol. Dem. 21. 173), though 
this is not certain. Shortly after Epameinondas’ visit to the area the city was being besieged, 
possibly by the Persians, during which Timotheus arrived to lend support (Diod. 15. 81. 5; 
Nep. Timoth. 1. 2).1067 In spite of this, in 362, Cyzicus would join Byzantium and Calchedon 
in the beaching of an Athenian grain ship, which may indicate sympathetic ties with Thebes 
or, at least, Thebes’ allies, plausibly instigated by Epameinondas’ meddling.1068 
 
The fleet could now begin the journey homeward. From Cyzicus to the entrance of 
the Hellespont it is about 180 kilometres, which could be completed in a day though they 
possibly stayed somewhere along the way. The distance from the Hellespont back to Aulis is 
over 440 kilometres, which would have taken two or three days. This also would have 
included stops though few more were of significance. There has been some suggestion for 
Olynthus being on the agenda;1069 however, this would have added nearly 200 kilometres to 
the journey and Timotheus was liable to be in the vicinity with an Athenian fleet. I would 
thus argue that that whole section of the Aegean (northwest) was generally avoided. After 
what was almost certainly a rather long voyage the grand expedition finally made berth in its 
Boeotian ports and, before long, the crew was probably disbanded.  
	
1067	Grote	(1872),	292,	suggested	that	it	was	Epameinondas	who	besieged	Cyzicus,	but	this	is	improbable	








A low estimate for the overall distance of the voyage is somewhat more than 2,000 
kilometres but, including potential stops, is nearly 3,000. With minimal stops the whole 
voyage would have taken at least 13 days, which would make a total of 26 stops. At the 
higher end, including potential stops, it would have taken at least 20 days, assuming some of 
these places were visited for a couple of hours at a time and roughly 25 days if, at each of 
these potential stops, the fleet stayed the night. We must also account for the fact that some of 
the stops may have required Epameinondas to stay for a few nights in order to put forth his 
proposal to the heads of states. This would mean, at a rough estimate, that the entire 
expedition probably took around a month to a month and a half. For each ship of 200 sailors 
being paid one drachma per day, one talent would be needed for a month. Therefore, it would 
have cost between 100 and 150 talents for the Thebans to float the expedition.1070 
 
 
Conclusion: The Achievement of the Boeotian Naval Project. 
 
The most controversial aspect of the whole naval affair is the extent to which it can 
be deemed a success. Diodorus admits that Epameinondas did not, in the end, achieve what 
he had set out to achieve but believes that he could have: “If, then, this man had lived for a 
longer time, undeniably, the Thebans, with their leadership by land, would have gained rule 
of the sea” (Diod. 15. 79. 2).1071 This statement, however much it praises the general, implies 
that the Theban bid for sea supremacy was an ultimate failure. This is, of course, undeniable 
since it is apparent that the fleet would never sail again. Plutarch too admits that the great 
Theban’s sea endeavour did not live up to his reputation. On the other hand, Plutarch 
attempts to explain away this failing, quoting Plato, by saying that Epameinondas did not 
want his fellow citizens to become decadent seamen (Plut. Phil. 14. 1-2; cf. Plat. Laws 706). 
Because of this, modern scholarship has generally tended to conclude that the naval project 








More recent work, however, hinges on the interpretation of Diodorus’ use of the 
word ἰδίας, in which he says: ἰδίας τὰς πόλεις τοῖς Θηβαίοις ἐποίησεν (Diod. 15. 79. 1-2). 
Sherman’s translation, “made the cities friendly to the Thebans”,1073 has been deemed too 
weak (certainly too vague),1074 while taking it to refer to an actual formal alliance,1075 is 
perhaps too strong.1076 Because of this some scholars, such as Berthold, have erred on the 
side of caution, arguing that Diodorus should not be taken literally; rather, his statement 
“reflects some sort of favorable response from the cities”.1077 Schachter too, more recently, 
has taken this stance, reasoning that the phrase means that Epameinondas “won them [the 
cities] over to the Theban cause”.1078 Indeed, ἰδίας is most often used by Diodorus to refer to 
someone’s personal character traits (such as ἀρετή or ἀνδρεία) and personal ownership of 
something (most particularly with that of soldiers, ships and land), but on a number of 
occasions it refers to someone’s fatherland, city or fellow citizens.  
 
Buckler cites two instances1079 where the word is used similarly to our current 
example: the first is when Aristeides secured alliances from the Greek states with Athens, 
thus forming the Delian League (Diod. 11. 44. 6). Here we get “τὰς πόλεις… ἰδίας ἐποίησε 
τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις”, where it is clear that the formulation of the phrase is almost identical with 
the one in question. Oldfather translated this to mean that the states were “made adherents of 
the Athenians. In this case the situation most certainly does refer to an alliance; however, as 
Buckler notes, ἰδίας is used to indicate that the poleis were making their decisions 
independently. The second example is from 319 where Antigonus Monophthalmus attempted 
to lift the siege of Cyzicus, which was being attacked by Arridaeus, satrap of Hellespontine 
Phrygia (Diod. 18. 52. 1). Diodorus says that κρίνας δὲ τὴν κινδυνεύουσαν πόλιν ἰδίαν 
κατασκευάσασθαι. Like the other two examples, ἰδίαν is paired with πόλιν, where Geer 
translates the phrase as “Deciding to get possession of the endangered city”.1080 Buckler 












city, “owing allegiance” to no-one. However, in this case, a more natural interpretation is that 
Diodorus is saying that Antigonus, who is the subject of the sentence, was attempting to 
procure the city as his own personal possession. To this we may add an example from the 
contents of book 12 stating “the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians had concluded an 
alliance between them” (Diod. 12. contents).1081 Here, an actual symmachia is explicitly 
stated but ἰδίᾳ is used to refer to the private nature of the arrangement, i.e. an alliance 
between the two states, but no other.1082  
 
It is clear, as Buckler argues, that ἰδίας is not a technical term; rather, a stylistic 
device, though he may not be correct in saying that, coupled with πόλεις, it necessarily refers 
to a “state capable of making its own political decisions”. Instead the term seems to indicate 
the personal/private nature of the affair with the city. Coming back to the case in 364 our 
only conclusive evidence for Epameinondas’ diplomacy during the naval endeavour is from 
the Cnidian proxeny decree. The decree itself is very much a personal arrangement with the 
polis, which is distinct from the public nature of formal symmachia. It is then apt to propose 
that similar diplomacy occurred with many of the other cities that Epameinondas visited. 
Russell has recently argued that, rather than an alliance, ἰδίας refers to an arrangement in 
which the Theban convinced the cities (particularly Byzantium) to begin their anti-Athenian 
activity without the necessary state of revolt required if they were to explicitly side with 
Boeotia contra Athens.1083 This would make sense if the agreements made were purely 
personal (with Epameinondas) rather than overtly political, i.e. on a public level. From this 
analysis it is then apparent that formal alliances were not concluded with most of the cities 
visited; instead, a series of under-the-table agreements were made, which, however, had the 
ultimate intention to foster an alliance purposed to combat the power of Athens.  
 
However one interprets this evidence, it seems entirely probable that many of the 
subsequent events, as highlighted above, throughout the Aegean, Hellespont, Propontis and 
Bosporus were directly influenced by the Boeotian naval expedition. While it is perhaps 
	
1081	Ἀθηναίων	καὶ	Λακεδαιμονίων	ἰδίᾳ	συνθεμένων	συμμαχίαν.	





doubtful (and certainly incapable of proof) that any formal alliance was ever concluded with 
any of the poleis visited (including Byzantium), there is enough evidence to show a surge in 
the unrest of Athens’ allies between 364 and the onset of the Social War in 357. It is surely 
too far to say that the Social War actually began seven years earlier than the dating that 
Diodorus provides,1084 but it is far from unusual for him to simplify and condense events that 
were actually far more involved and complicated, thereby offering us a heavily skewed sense 
of the chronology.1085 We must therefore at least entertain the clear plausibility that the 
results of Epameinondas’ naval project were indeed far-reaching and thus provided the 
backdrop to the events leading up to the fracturing of the Second Athenian League. 
 
It was here that all Boeotian naval activity came to an end. What was to be the 
projected future for the fleet? We can only speculate, but it is easy to imagine that 
Epameinondas wished to continue with further expeditions that would ultimately lead to a 
major naval confederacy with the power of defeating Athens. Unfortunately, this was never 
to be the case. The expense of maintaining the fleet was enormous and, without conducting 
any major military actions, it is apparent that no further funding was acquired. It has also 
been speculated that, since Artaxerxes expected the fleet to be used as a weapon against 
Athens, he was disappointed with Epameinondas’ lack of results and thus refused to pay the 
Thebans any more.1086 Whether this was indeed the case or not, trouble brewing on the 
mainland would undoubtedly have prevented the continuance of the Boeotian navy. It is 
unclear what became of all of the triremes that remained, but without maintenance they 


















The Death of Pelopidas and the Destruction of Orchomenus 
 
When Epameinondas returned home from his naval voyage he would have become 
privy to much grave news. Earlier in the year, Alexander of Pherae had redoubled his efforts 
to conquer Thessaly and had occupied Phthiotic Achaea and Magnesia. In response the 
Thessalian League requested help from the Boeotians, asking in particular that Pelopidas lead 
the force. It is probable that Pelopidas, the propagator of the league, argued in favour of this 
and the assembly agreed to send a force of 7,000 hoplites. It is plausible that the northern 
Aegean campaigns of Timotheus also influenced the assembly’s decision to reassert their 
influence in the north, particularly as they had previously supported Alexander against 
Thebes. Unfortunately, just before the army set off, on July 13 364,1087 a solar eclipse 
occurred, which the seers interpreted to be an ill omen for the army; as a result, it refused to 
go. Ignoring the warnings, Pelopidas took 300 mercenary cavalry and whatever Boeotians 
would volunteer before setting out for Thessaly. He joined an allied Thessalian force at 
Pharsalus before marching out to engage the enemy. Nearby, at the ridge of Bekidhes, 
Pelopidas fought against Alexander of Pherae at the Battle of Cynoscephalae. Though the 
engagement is considered a tactical masterpiece on Pelopidas’ half, the great Theban general 
was slain while attempting to prevent Alexander’s forces from regrouping. None were more 
distraught at his death (except maybe his wife and children) than the Thessalians who held a 
funeral of epic proportions alongside commissioning a bronze statue to be sculpted by 
	
1087	Plutarch	states	 that	Thebes	was	covered	 in	darkness	during	the	daytime;	however,	 if	 the	eclipse	 in	
question	 can	 be	 identified	 with	 the	 one	 on	 13	 July	 364,	 the	 sun	 would	 have	 only	 been	 about	 three	
quarters	 obscured,	 see	 Chambers	 (2018),	 85.	 Information	 on	 ancient	 eclipses	 can	 be	 obtained	 from	
https://eclipse.gsfc.nasa.gov.	
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Lyssipus at Delphi.1088 The loss of Pelopidas was a grave one for the returning general. He 
had clearly been Epameinodas’ great friend and most important political ally. We are given 
the impression quite evidently that Pelopidas was held in high esteem by the people of 
Thebes: apparently more so than Epameinondas. Without his companion, the one remaining 
great Theban leader would probably now face tougher opposition from the assembly, thus 
making his plight for an aggressive foreign policy all the more desperate. However, in 
retaliation, the assembly sent a force of 7,000 hoplites and 700 cavalry, which defeated 
Alexander, made him into a subject-ally and forced him to relinquish control of Magnesia 
and Phthiotic Achaea (Plut. Pel. 35. 2-3).1089 
 
Meanwhile, probably sometime after Pelopidas had left for Thessaly (or even after 
his death), some Theban exiles bid 300 Orchomenian horsemen, who had been regularly 
going to Thebes for review under arms, to join them in a conspiracy with the intention of 
replacing the government with an oligarchy. However, the exiles changed their minds 
seemingly at the last moment and betrayed the Orchomenians to the boeotarchs. The 
horsemen were arrested and executed, following which the assembly decreed that the city of 
Orchomenus be razed to the ground with the execution of its citizenry and enslavement of the 
women and children.1090 The decision was rash and brutal but there stood a longstanding 
enmity between Thebes and Orchomenus and the Thebans may have genuinely been fearful 
of the dangers that a revolt from that city could entail. While the inhabitants were all 
undoubtedly innocent the conspirators themselves may have been concerned that the 
Boeotian Confederacy was becoming more of a radical democracy, like Athens, particularly 
with the recent naval activity.1091 Both Plutarch and Pausanias are at pains to assert that 
neither Epameinondas or Pelopidas (in Plutarch) were present for this atrocity. Indeed, the 
timing would fit the absence of both men.1092 Epameinondas, in particular, surely would have 
been horrified over what had happened, since he vehemently opposed the killing of his fellow 
countrymen. Though Orchomenus had been a traditional enemy of Thebes, Epameinondas 
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felt kinship with his fellow Boeotians. We must remember that, back in 370, the assembly 
had previously charged him with subduing and reducing Orchomenus. Epameinondas 
managed to secure the city’s safety by, instead, reducing its political power; however, this 
clearly did not satisfy many of the Thebans who viewed the Orchomenians with distrust. The 
more recent conspiracy gave them the excuse they needed to remove the city entirely. I 
would, as a result, tend to agree with our ancient writers’ assessments of the Theban general. 
The incident also implies that the policies of Epameinondas and Pelopidas did not completely 
dominate the federal council at this time. 
 
 
The Elean-Arcadian War and the Collapse of the Arcadian League 365-362 B.C. 
 
While matters in Boeotia and Thessaly had more or less stabilized, the situation in 
the Peloponnesus had grown potentially very dangerous for the Boeotian federation. The 
precarious system of alliances that Epameinondas had established with Argos, Arcadia, 
Messene and Elis, with the purpose of shutting in the Spartans, had properly fragmented 
when, in 365, the Eleans attacked the Arcadian controlled city of Lasium. As a result, the 
Arcadians, with some Athenian assistance, invaded the territory of Elis, occupying several 
cities including Pylos and Olympia, which was given to the Pisatans who claimed an ancient 
entitlement over the sacred city.1093 In response, the desperate Eleans, in outright 
contravention of the Boeotian-Peloponnesian League, concluded an alliance with the 
Spartans, who set out in full force to Arcadia. With Archidamus at the helm they occupied 
the city of Cromnus, which lay on the road between Messene and Megalopolis, before 
leaving three lochoi, out of 12, and returning home. The Arcadians, having received some 
reinforcements from Argos and Boeotia, sent their eparitoi to take back the city. This they 
achieved after some difficulty and successfully captured over 100 Periocoi and Spartiates. 
The prisoners were divided up between the allies (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 12-27; Diod. 15. 77. 1-4). 
 
	




In the following year (364), while the Pisatans and Arcadians were administering the 
Olympic games, the Eleans made an attack just as the wrestling portion of the pentathlon was 
about to begin. Fighting took place in the sacred precinct and, while the Eleans had some 
success, the Arcadian force managed to drive the enemy off, following which they fortified 
the area with wooden stockades (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 28-32). Because of the mounting expense of 
funding the 5,000 hoplites of the eparitoi, magistrates of the Arcadians began to exact funds 
from the sacred treasury at Olympia. Although the money was officially taken as a loan, by 
363, the Mantineans, independent of the Arcadian federal assembly, voted to cease from this 
offence to the god. The magistrates of the league became concerned and sent the eparitoi to 
arrest the officials in Mantinea. Once the army arrived, however, the city shut its gates, 
barring it from entry. As a result of this the assembly of the myrioi began to disapprove of the 
sacred treasure appropriation and quickly voted to put an end to it (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 33-34; 
Diod. 15. 82. 1-2).1094 
 
This meant that the soldiers of the eparitoi had to be replaced with wealthy 
aristocrats and their friends, which placed a great deal of Arcadian power in the hands of 
those with oligarchic predispositions. Those magistrates, probably those more democratically 
inclined, who had been involved in dealing with the Olympic treasury, were now in a rather 
tricky predicament: if they were made to account for their dealings they could be condemned. 
Because of this they appealed to the Thebans for support, who, in turn, prepared to send an 
army. But the Arcadian assembly sent word to Thebes, telling them not to come with their 
army unless first requested by the assembly. The oligarchs then concluded peace with Elis 
after abandoning the Elean cities and leaving the Pisatians to their own device. Thus ended 
the war that had begun two years earlier between Arcadia and Elis;1095 however, the peace by 
no means settled the political turmoil in the Arcadian League. Those of the Arcadians 
(Tegeans in particular) that were still fearful of being brought to account for their actions, 
along with a Theban officer1096 at the helm of 300 hoplites, entered Tegea and arrested a 
number of the aristocrats. The Mantineans reacted to this by occupying the passes to their 
	
1094	Xenophon	states	that	it	was	Tegean	magistrates	that	utilized	the	sacred	funds,	whereas	Diodorus	says	
that	 it	 was	 Mantineans.	 Perhaps	 it	 is	 prudent	 to	 assume	 that	 there	 is	 truth	 in	 both	 statements	 and	





territory and sent word to the Theban, demanding he release the prisoners and that no 
Arcadian should be imprisoned or executed without trial. The Theban complied and offered a 
petty excuse that some of the Arcadians were planning to betray Tegea to the Spartans. He 
was allowed to return home, but the oligarchs sent ambassadors to Thebes demanding that he 
be condemned for his actions (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 34-39; Diod. 15. 82. 2-3). However, 
Epameinondas, who was general at this time, cautioned the ambassadors that the Theban 
officer had acted more correctly when he made the arrest than when he released them. As 
Xenophon asserts: 
 
“For,” saying to them, “it was for you that we joined the war and without our knowledge made peace; 
is it then not justifiable for us to accuse you of treason? Well be aware,” he said, “that we shall send an army to 
Arcadia and, with those that are with us, we shall make war” (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 40).1097  
 
Genuine or not, this quote that Xenophon puts in the mouth of Epameinondas very 
suitably reflects Epameinondas’ attitude and it is certainly believable that this would be his 
response. First, he would have felt obliged to defend the Theban officer, as it was his 
tendency to prioritize the plight of his own countrymen. Buckler adds that the quote implies 
the existence of a federal legal clause, which the Arcadian aristocrats had betrayed: they had 
concluded a peace treaty with Elis without obtaining Theban approval. If such a clause was in 
fact part of the loose ‘constitution’ of the Boeotian-Peloponnesian alliance then it may have 
been implemented to prevent any one of the allies abandoning the cause of the others; thus 
maintaining the alliance.1098 However, the evidence suggests that very few formal clauses 
existed to safeguard the alliance and it likely that Epameinondas’ arguments were specious. 
In spite of this, one may ask, since the peace with Elis was surely beneficial, why did 
Epameinondas and the Thebans not just simply side with the aristocrats? From the point of 
view of the assembly, the age-old story of oligarchs versus democrats could be a factor, i.e. 
they were compelled to support the democratic faction of the Arcadian League. 
Epameinondas, on the other hand, was less motivated by political ideology: he was probably 







drastic activities. Arcadia had made an alliance with Athens and fallen into internal stasis; in 
addition, Elis had made war on Arcadia and formed an alliance with Sparta. The Boeotian-
Peloponnesian alliance was about to completely collapse and this was the opportunity for 





The Fourth Invasion of the Peloponnesus: The Road to Mantinea 
 
Probably sometime early in the summer of 362 the Boeotian army once again 
mobilized for its fourth and final campaign in the Peloponnesus. Envoys were also sent to 
their allies requesting reinforcements. They had positive returns from the Euboeans, 
Aenianians, Malians, Locrians, and, from Thessaly, soldiers sent by Alexander of Pherae and 
Achaeans from Achaean Phthiotis.1099 An envoy had apparently been sent to the Phocians but 
they refused on the grounds that their alliance with Thebes was only defensive. The army 
would also be bolstered by allies from the Peloponnesus including the Messenians, Argives, 
Sicyonians and, of the Arcadians, the Tegeans, Megalopolitans, Aseans and the Pallantians 
(Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 4-5; Diod. 15. 84. 4, 85. 2). With his force from central Greece fully 
mustered, Epameinondas set forth for the Isthmus. Because of the neutral status of Corinth 
and Megara there was no attempt to prevent the army’s entry into the Peloponnesus. As 
usual, they arrived at Nemea, their regular rendezvous point, where they undoubtedly met 
many of their Peloponnesian allies (Xen. Hell 7. 5. 6). All in all, the call to arms was an 
absolute success, as Diodorus states that they managed to gather a force of more than 30,000 
hoplites (including some light arms) and some 3,000 cavalry (Diod. 15. 84. 4). 
 
Meanwhile the Arcadians, who were led by Mantinea, being fearful that the Thebans 
intended on weakening the cities of the Peloponnesus in order to enslave them,1100 sent for 
help for the upcoming campaign from the Achaeans, Spartans, Eleans and also from the 
	
1099	 The	 Achaeans	 mentioned	 by	 Diodorus	 are	 probably	 those	 of	 Phthiotis	 in	 Thessaly,	 since	 the	




Athenians (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 1, 3; Diod. 15. 84. 4). In this newly fledged military alliance, it 
was decided that command would be given to whichever territory was the seat of battle (Xen. 
Hell. 7. 5. 3). As these forces began to assemble the Boeotian federal army arrived at Nemea 
where they may have been informed that a large force of Athenian soldiers was preparing to 
journey to the Peloponnesus as well. Epameinondas reasoned that, if he could prevent the 
Athenians from joining the rest of their allies, they would hopefully give up on the endeavour 
and return home. This would have given him an overwhelming numerical superiority over the 
combined opposing force. However, Athens, perhaps expecting some such ploy, decided to 
prepare for the army to be transported by sea (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 6-7).1101 Although 
Epameinondas probably had to wait in Nemea at least a couple of days for all of the allies to 
assemble, his wasteful lingering may have afforded the enemy the same convenience1102 and, 
as we shall see, was the first of many setbacks the Theban-led force would undergo. 
 
From Nemea our sources are divergent on what happened next. Xenophon states that 
Epameinondas went to Tegea and fortified himself within the city. He commends the Theban 
for doing so since the army was safe and concealed within the walls and could easily be 
provisioned. The Theban also hoped that more cities would come to his side, but it appears 
that none did. More pertinent was his anticipation of being attacked at Tegea, rather than 
attack the enemy in their defensible position at Mantinea. Epameinondas remained at Tegea 
for some time until he caught word of the approach of the Spartan army under Agesilaus 
(now 82),1103 which had reached the town of Pellana in the northern reaches of Laconia.1104 
As a result the Theban general decided to march his troops down to Sparta (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 
7-9). Diodorus, on the other hand states that, when the Boeotian federal army arrived in the 















that point, the order to march south was made (Diod. 15. 82. 5-6). However, both Plutarch 
and Polybius indicate that Epameinondas was in Tegea when he heard that Agesilaus was 
heading for Mantinea and thus decided to attack Sparta (Plut. Ages. 34. 3; Polyb. 9. 8. 2-3). 
Because of this, Xenophon’s account is the preferred one.1105 It is possible, however, that the 
assertion in Diodorus that the Spartans were at Tegea is not a mistake. Indeed, Xenophon, 
while remarking on Epameinondas’ decision to occupy Tegea, states that an enemy force was 
somewhere in view of the city and could be seen by Epameinondas himself (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 
8). This seems to confirm Diodorus’ statement that a force of enemy soldiers was within the 
vicinity of Tegea, which would provide ample explanation for why Epameinondas remained 
in the city for a period of time without attempting a more aggressive strategy. 
 
Upon learning that Agesilaus was on the move with the Spartan army, 
Epameinondas made the decision to bypass the enemy and head into Laconia, making an 
attack against the city of Sparta itself. The city was largely undefended and would be an easy 
target, particularly if it was caught by surprise. Occupying Sparta would compel Agesilaus to 
return without joining his allies where he would be at a heavy disadvantage against 
Epameinondas’ massive force. It is conceivable that the Theban general wished to force the 
Spartans into concluding a settlement with them. Not only would this have been a great 
embarrassment to the Spartans, if the city was taken, they could have been removed as a 
threat in the upcoming fight against Mantinea. The plan was a daring one, but militarily 
sound if successful.1106 
 
Having left about half of the army in Tegea (Just. 6. 7. 4), probably mostly Boeotian 
hoplites, along with the Boeotian and Thessalian cavalry,1107 Epameinondas ordered his men 
to have an early dinner and took the hardiest of his troops, probably mostly Boeotian, 












Agesilaus, who was avoiding the direct route to Mantinea (through Tegea), was taking the 
more circuitous path through Pellana and Asea,1109 which meant that he could reach Sparta 
quickly and without being observed by the Spartans. In a further attempt to maintain the 
secrecy of the endeavour he also spread false information, which conveyed that he was 
leaving Tegea in order to gain a favourable position against the enemy in Mantinea (Polyb. 9. 
8. 3). Unlike the last invasion of Laconia, over seven years before, this time Epameinondas 
must have genuinely held high hopes of taking the city of Sparta. In 370/69 he gave up due to 
expedience and because he had other plans. On this occasion, the result would be a gross 
embarrassment for the Spartans and could determine the entire outcome of the war, 
particularly since Thebes’ Peloponnesian enemies would probably not maintain their unity in 
the face of a major Spartan defeat.1110 This was surely not lost upon the general as he 
marched his crack troops southward for some 50 kilometres in a single night, along 
mountainous terrain. The fact that these soldiers could manage the difficult and long journey 
and still be battle ready on their arrival at Sparta is a testament to how well trained and 
experienced the Boeotian army had become. We have no reason to doubt that Epameinondas 
deserves much credit for this feat.1111 
 
The success of the attack, however, was almost wholly dependent upon its 
concealment and unfortunately for the invaders, despite Epameinondas’ cautions, the plan 
was betrayed to Agesilaus by an informant, who was probably, as Callisthenes states, a 
deserter from Thespiae named Euthynus.1112 On this matter the sources do not agree: 
Xenophon states that the informant was a Cretan while Plutarch’s testimonial of Callisthenes 
says he was a Thespian. The answer to the problem may lie in Diodorus’ account in which he 
asserts that Agesilaus merely guessed what Epameinondas was attempting and thus sent out 
	
give	the	impression	that	the	army	remained	at	Tegea.	He	would	then	use	the	same	tactic	to	escape	from	





1110	 Kromayer	 (1903),	 39-40,	 further	 suggests	 that	 Epameinondas	 may	 have	 intended	 on	 freeing	 the	
remaining	 Helots	 and	 Perioeci	 and	 thereby	 establishing	 something	 similar	 to	 the	 state	 of	 Messene	 in	
replacement	 of	 Sparta.	 While	 this	 is	 an	 attractive	 theory	 it	 is	 doubtful	 that	 the	 Theban	 general	 had	
thought	that	far	ahead	since	the	attack	was	decided	on	the	spur	of	the	moment.	
1111	Kromayer	(1903),	38.	
1112	 Callisthenes	FGrH	 124	F26	=	Plut.	Ages.	 34.	 4;	 Xen.	Hell.	 7.	 5.	 10;	Diod.	 15.	 84.	 6;	 cf.	 Polyb.	 9.	 8.	 6;	
Polyaen.	2.	3.	10.	See	Stylianou	(1998),	508-509.	On	Euthynus,	see	Rzepka	BNJ	124	F26.	
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Cretans to warn Sparta. We may speculate that the confusion can be accounted for if the 
informant was indeed a Thespian, but the messengers sent out were Cretan. Stylianou adds 
that the informant can only have known the direction the Boeotian force went and that 
Agesilaus guessed what Epameinondas was attempting. This explains Diodorus’ statement 
that Agesilaus was the more cunning general on this occasion (Diod. 15. 83. 1). 
 
The Spartan king quickly sent word back home and wheeled his own force around to 
assist in the defence of his city. At this point, the sources on the attack on Sparta diverge 
considerably and, although Xenophon’s account is usually preferred over the rest, his 
inherent biases in favour of Sparta and against Thebes denote that we ought to proceed with 
some caution. The first issue that arises is in identifying the position of the Spartan army. As 
stated above, Xenophon says that Epameinondas heard that Agesilaus was in Pellana. 
Conversely Polybius says that Agesilaus was in Mantinea when he heard what the Theban 
was doing (Polyb. 9. 8. 6). Xenophon is undoubtedly correct in this case since it would have 
been impossible for Agesilaus to have arrived at Sparta from Mantinea (some 75 kilometres) 
before or even after the Boeotian attack began.1113 From Pellana to Sparta it is a journey of 
just over 18 kilometres. If Agesilaus was there when he heard the news it is plausible that his 
army arrived at Sparta before the Boeotians.  
 
The march from Tegea to Sparta would have taken at least 10 hours to complete and, 
if the Boeotians arrived at around eight or nine in the morning as has been estimated,1114 they 
would have had to leave by 10 or 11 the previous night. 10 o’clock, or slightly later may be a 
good estimate since, during the middle of the year, it does not become fully dark until after 
9.30 and closer to 11 in the middle of summer.1115 The march from Pellana to Sparta would 
have taken at least four hours and, since we must add at least a couple of hours for the city to 
prepare its defence, Agesilaus must have left Pellana by two or three in the morning. In order 
to reach Pellana in time, the message from Tegea must have been sent by horse since it is 
nearly 40 kilometres distance. The rider would have taken a couple of hours because the 
	
1113	Roloff	(1903),	7-11;	Stylianou	(1998),	509-510.	Cf.	Buckler	(1980a),	211,	316	n.	50.	





mountainous terrain and darkness surely prevented top speed. This means that the rider must 
have left Tegea by midnight or one in the morning. Allowing that Agesilaus could have 
arrived at Sparta another hour or two earlier, the timing for the messenger to Pellana and 
Agesilaus’ march south works out rather well with Epameinondas’ night march. 
 
Out of the 12 Spartan lochoi, three had gone to Arcadia, along with a mercenary 
force and all of the cavalry, thus leaving nine (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 10).1116 Roisman assumes that 
the three lochoi, along with mercenaries and cavalry, were present with Agesilaus but were 
sent on to Mantinea while the rest returned to Sparta. This is certainly plausible but it is 
equally possible that this force had already been sent northward, which may explain 
Diodorus’ statement that the Spartans had been ravaging the territory of Tegea1117 and it may 
also clarify why Polybius thought Agesilaus was in Mantinea.1118 With nine lochoi, this 
would mean that the city had, at its defence, an army of up to 5,640 men at its highest, though 
an estimate closer to 3,000 is probably more appropriate for the period.1119 While this amount 
falls far short of the number Agesilaus had previously had to defend the city in 370/69, 
Epameinondas’ present army was also much smaller than on that occasion. Because of this, 
with fair warning the Spartans had sufficient manpower to establish a strong defence.  
 
As the Boeotians were pushing their way, in the night, along the rugged terrain, the 
Spartans in Pellana began their own rapid journey. The sources provide divergent information 
about when the Spartan army arrived at the city. Xenophon states that Agesilaus arrived at 
Sparta before Epameinondas and notes that the city had very few men to do this with since 
some of the army were in Arcadia (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 10). Here Xenophon rather curiously 
contradicts himself because, as stated above, he implies that nine of the 12 lochoi were 
present, which, along with the old men and youths, amounted to a substantial defensive force. 
It is then generally assumed that this force came with Agesilaus to the defence of the city. 








guard the city, adding that he would return swiftly (Plut. Ages. 34. 4; Diod. 15. 82. 6).1120 
Justin and Polybius both indicate that Agesilaus arrived with his army after the attack had 
already begun (Polyb. 9. 8. 6; Just. 6. 7. 9). If the remaining people of Sparta managed to 
withstand the Boeotians for a time before the arrival of Agesilaus and the nine lochoi, it is 
difficult to believe that Xenophon, who was undoubtedly privy to first-hand information on 
the attack, would fail to record this. We can therefore discount the statements of Justin and 
Polybius. Plutarch and Diodorus, on the other hand, may offer some insight. Xenophon’s 
narrative jumps from Agesilaus’ discovery of the attack to his arrival in Sparta before the 
enemy. However, Plutarch and Diodorus say that a rider was sent ahead of the army to warn 
the city. If this is true, then it is manifest that the defence preparations began at this moment 
and not when the king arrived. Agesilaus surely sent instructions to make the necessary 
arrangements, which would have been on the way to completion by the time he arrived. 
Accepting this would allow for a later march back from Pellana to Sparta by a couple of 
hours. 
 
Once the Spartans that remained at home received the news of the impending attack, 
they prepared their defence under the instructions of Agesilaus. They began, according to 
Xenophon, by placing soldiers at particular points and stationing old men and youths on the 
rooftops in order to pelt the attackers (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 10-11). Diodorus substantially 
confirms this action, adding that the soldiers were placed at the city’s entrance and along 
difficult terrain. Plutarch and Polyaenus confirm that Agesilaus organized the defence1121 and 
Aeneas Tacticus provides us with some very specific information: he tells us that, in 
preparation of the defence, the Spartans began filling baskets with stones from houses, fences 
and walls, along with the bronze tripods from the temples, which they used to block up the 
entrances and passages of the city (Aen. Tact. 2. 2). The defence was apparently done very 
similarly to the attack in 370/69,1122 but probably with even more haste since the city can 
only have had a few hours to prepare.1123 We may suppose that, since the last attack, the 
	






Spartans were much more wary of such an occurrence and would therefore be more efficient 
in their organization. 
 
Overnight the Boeotian army must have taken the track that went along Caryae and 
Sellasia, which Epameinondas had before made use of. By morning they had navigated the 
mountains to the north of Sparta and entered into the Eurotas River valley.1124 On arriving 
within the vicinity of Sparta we are told three different things about the Boeotian dispositions 
before the battle. Xenophon says that Epameinondas did not bring his troops up to where they 
would have to fight the Spartans on an even plain and be pelted by those on the rooftops, or 
where the few defenders would have an advantage over the many. Instead, he says, rather 
vaguely, that the Boeotians took the position from which Epameinondas thought they would 
have an advantage, i.e. they would descend upon the city as opposed to ascending. Xenophon 
then says in his narrative of the fighting that Archidamus would cross a certain obstacle and 
march uphill against the enemy (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 11-12). Diodorus adds that, before the 
attack, Epameinondas divided his army into several columns with the intention of attacking 
multiple areas at once (Diod. 15. 83. 4). Finally, Plutarch also says that, prior to the attack, 
the invaders crossed the Eurotas (Plut. Ages. 34. 4). 
 
Xenophon’s imprecision, in this case, has caused a substantial amount of confusion. 
Westlake, in particular, notes that Xenophon, in spite of an undoubted knowledge of the area, 
does not make any specific references to landmarks that could indicate the site of the battle. 
Nor does he tell us exactly what the obstacle was that Archidamus crossed.1125 It seems clear 
that the Boeotians occupied some higher ground in order to descend upon the city; however, 
there is more than one option as to where he is referring. On initial observation of the area’s 
topography the obvious position would be on the hill to the northwest of the acropolis where 
the General Hospital of Laconia now lies. Buckler agrees to this as a possibility but argues in 
favour of the higher ground on the eastern bank of the Eurotas since the river is surely the 





indeed struggle to ford it.1126 However, these arguments are hardly definitive and Roisman 
has more recently concluded that either possibility is plausible.1127  
 
Much of the problem, it seems, arises from the elusive nature of the topography of 
the city of Sparta. While the acropolis is easily identifiable, the location and limits of the 
agora and urban areas are not and have not been identified conclusively. The most probable 
area is the plateau to the east of the acropolis, which spans some 200 metres toward the 
Eurotas. This would, as Waywell states, fit well with Pausanias who describes the agora first 
after crossing the Eurotas bridge (Paus. 3. 11).1128 This may well have been the ancient bridge 
just north of the modern one, the remains of which were observed by nineteenth century 
travellers to the area.1129 In addition to this, Polybius specifically states that the Boeotian 
force successfully broke into the agora and the area of the city that slopes towards the river 
(Polyb. 9. 8. 5). If this report can be trusted it most certainly favours an attack from the 
east,1130 making the eastern bank of the river the most probable candidate for the so-called 
higher ground.  
 
Accepting this assertion thus allows for a vivid reconstruction of the attack: having 
brought the army along the road east of the Eurotas, Epameinondas probably passed the 
ancient bridge, which may have been under guard and was certainly impractical to cross with 
the entire army while hostile forces were near. Somewhere about this point the Theban 
general realized that his ploy for secrecy had failed; however, he was not going to march all 
this way without at least making an attempt upon the city. He then began to line his men up 
into several columns along the high ground on the eastern bank of the Eurotas. I would 
suggest the army was facing the eastern side of the acropolis around the area of, or not much 
further south than, the Eurotas Altar, which lies about 120 metres eastward of the modern 
bridge. The Boeotians were then given the order to cross the river after which they attempted 




1127	 Roisman	 (2017),	 325.	 Westlake	 (1975),	 33	 n.	 28,	 thinks	 that	 Xenophon	 merely	 assumed	 that	






nature of the battle; instead, they are more interested in the personal valour of specific 
soldiers. We are thus more reliant on Diodorus and Polybius, at least for the first stage of the 
attack. Diodorus states that the Boeotians attacked from every side (Diod. 15. 83. 4). This is 
an undoubted exaggeration but fits with his previous statement that the army was divided up. 
As Epameinondas would not have wanted to attack at one point, thus allowing the Spartans to 
concentrate their defence, it was prudent to divide up the force into several smaller units and 
attack at different points. One could imagine a division of some five groups of 3,000 soldiers, 
or even as small as 15 groups of 1,000 men, plus cavalry either functioning as its own unit or 
supplementing each divided unit of infantry. The attack was then aimed at several different 
entry points to the city, which had, however, been blockaded by the Spartans. Epameinondas 
chose to aim for the area of the agora where the streets were more open and therefore less 
vulnerable to missile attack from the rooftops.  
 
Aeneas Tacticus and Plutarch seem to imply that the invaders did not manage to 
actually enter the city itself (Aen. Tact. 2. 2; Plut. Apo. Lac. 2.74/761d); whereas, Polybius 
says that they went all the way to the agora. The issue here is easy enough to solve when one 
understands the full scale of the situation. If the Boeotian force did number 15,000 soldiers 
and were divided into a number of units it is conceivable, given the nature of the defences, 
that several of the units did indeed fail to enter the city; however, considering the divergence 
in the sources, it is also easily believable that several of the units, managed to break into the 
city itself, at least temporarily.  
 
Amidst this chaotic affair the stories of Xenophon and Callisthenes thus find 
context. The former states that Archidamus, with 100 Spartiates, attacked the invaders by 
crossing an obstacle (the Eurotas) and advancing uphill against them. The assault caused the 
opponents to flee, killing many; however, in their pursuit many Spartans were, in turn, slain. 
Archidamus apparently erected a trophy to celebrate this victory and allowed the enemy to 
gather their fallen (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 12-13).1131 While a great story of heroics, we might 
suspect a fair amount of hyperbole from the Spartophile. Plutarch, who had Xenophon at his 
	
1131	Plutarch	says	that	it	was	Agesilaus	who	erected	the	trophy	(Plut.	Ages.	34.	5).	This	was	probably	what	
was	 said	 in	Callisthenes	who	may	 simply	have	 assumed	 this	 since	 it	was	Agesilaus	who	organized	 the	
defence.	In	either	case	both	father	and	son	undoubtedly	received	much	praise	for	their	efforts.	
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disposal, offers slightly different information, which surely came from Callisthenes. He 
reports that Archidamus ran to and fro to the endangered points (τὰ θλιβόμενα) in the city 
(Plut. Ages. 34. 6). This seems to indicate that Archidamus and his crack troops fought at a 
number of different areas of the city, undoubtedly helping to prevent some of the Boeotian 
units from properly entering. Combining this with Xenophon it is apparent that, at some 
point, Archidamus managed to drive one of these units all the way back across the Eurotas 
but was not likely to have pushed much further and would have had to back off once the 
Boeotians reorganized themselves into a defensive position. This story seems also to be 
reflected in Justin (though heavily distorted) who says that 100 old men fought off all 15,000 
of the enemy (Just. 6. 7. 3-7). With Xenophon alone it is possible to see how such a tradition 
may have propagated: he gives the impression that Archidamus deserved credit for chasing 
off the entire army; but, with a unit of 100 men, this is practically impossible and it makes 
much more sense to see his account as accurate, yet only narrating a small portion of the 
overall assault. Xenophon, who would surely have had access to first-hand information, was 
not interested in providing an account that betrayed the success of the Boeotians entering the 
city; rather, he wanted to emphasize the brilliance of Agesilaus and Archidamus, who were 
his own benefactors. Thus Archidamus’ victory was a minor one and probably does not fully 
explain why the attack failed overall. 
 
We find further anecdotal information from Plutarch, probably using Callisthenes, 
who says that Isidas, the son of Phoebidas, had entered battle in the nude since he had just 
covered himself in oil. With sword and spear he leapt across the rooftops before throwing 
himself into the enemy. Miraculously he struck down many a foe without himself receiving a 
single blow. Apparently the ephors would later adorn him with a garland before fining him 
1,000 drachmas for not wearing armour (Plut. Ages. 34. 6-7). Aelian adds that Isidas was not 
old enough to fight as a hoplite, which added to the fine (Ael. Var. Hist. 6. 3). This fits with 
Callisthenes’ report that he was on the rooftops, with the other young and old men. While the 
story adds little to our understanding of the attack it does reflect the desperation of the 
inhabitants of Sparta and it seems that many of those within the city did not have much time 
to prepare for the battle. We may also wonder why Xenophon did not include this story since, 
while preferring to glorify Archidamus, he would surely have found merit in including the 
story of Isidas. We can only speculate on many of the details, but none should deny the skill 
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and resilience of the defenders for once again saving the city against, what may have seemed 
like, overwhelming odds. 
 
Though part of the city was taken, the fighting was fierce and the body count was 
amounting. Eventually Epameinondas sounded the signal to withdraw. Exactly what 
triggered this is far from unanimous. As well as Archidamus’ attack, Xenophon states that 
Epameinondas was concerned that the Arcadians (Mantineans) would send reinforcements to 
Sparta and it was therefore best to withdraw (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 14). Diodorus reports that both 
reinforcements and the onset of night were what caused the Boeotian force to leave (Diod. 
15. 83. 5). In his De Gloria Atheniensium, Plutarch also states that the Boeotians retired 
because of the arrival of reinforcements. Similarly, Polybius is under the impression that the 
Spartan army’s appearance forced the Boeotians to call off the siege (Plut. De Gloria 346c; 
Polyb. 9. 8. 6). Justin adds that two unnamed generals (on the Boeotian side) were killed 
before Agesilaus was nearing the city and the attackers were forced to retreat (Just. 7. 6. 8-9). 
Thus, we have four different sources that seem to think that reinforcements arrived well into 
the attack. Plutarch, Frontinus and Polyaenus also state that the invaders left under the cover 
of night.1132 Though these are substantial differences on the nature of the attack, as follows, 
when examining the similarities, much is reconcilable.  
 
The attack would not plausibly have taken the entire day, especially since the troops 
must have been exhausted and the losses on both sides would have been catastrophic. It has 
therefore been estimated that the attack was called off around late morning or early 
afternoon.1133 It is also doubtful that Agesilaus arrived after the battle had started since 
Xenophon, Plutarch and Diodorus all agree that he arrived earlier. However, we can probably 
trust Xenophon when he says that the Mantineans were on their way. The approach of the 
Spartan allies may have aroused the confusion that Agesilaus arrived late, since it is quite 
possible that the Spartan force that was already in Mantinea was present with the 





which caused Epameinondas to call off the attack, since it was not possible for them to march 
from Mantinea to Sparta, a journey of over 75 kilometres, until sometime in the evening.1134  
 
On the other hand, Diodorus goes on to say that Epameinondas learned of the 
approach of the Mantineans from Spartan captives and then proceeded to withdraw his men. 
They camped a short distance from the city, probably on a defensible position, and prepared 
dinner.1135 Polybius, substantially agreeing with Diodorus, perhaps more correctly states that 
they prepared breakfast and took time to rest after the siege.1136 Plutarch similarly says that 
the Boeotians gave the impression that they were going to ravage the countryside but instead 
deceived and lulled their suspicions, i.e. by making camp (Plut. De Gloria 2/346c). 
Elaborating on this Diodorus and Frontinus tell us that Epameinondas lit watch fires, kept 
alive throughout the night by a few cavalrymen left behind, in order to appear as if they 
would remain the night; but when it became dark, the army slipped away (Diod. 15. 84. 1; 
Front. 3. 11. 5). During the attack, however, some of the soldiers had been forced to flee and 
shamefully cast away their shields in the panic.1137 Epameinondas, being desirous that his 
men remain confidently battle ready, did not want to trifle with something as petty as that. He 
therefore ordered all of his men to place their shields with the hypaspists or other attendants 
thus concealing their action (Polyaen. 2. 3. 10). Once this had been completed, having had a 
few hours of rest, the army embarked on another forced march back up north, to Tegea. 
 
The question of Epameinondas’ generalship on this occasion has received some 
debate. In spite of the failure of the endeavour, it has been noted that the attack was not 
altogether a failure since it managed to keep the Spartan reinforcements from joining with the 
allied army in Mantinea.1138 As Westlake states, “the Spartans were unlikely to endanger their 
city again by leaving it almost defenceless”. Thus nine of the 12 lochoi remained in Sparta 
for the rest of the campaign.1139 However, it may be too far to argue, as Cartledge does, that 










Epameinondas intended on taking the city and “simply changed his mind” when the fighting 
got too tough. He adds that the Theban general may not have had the tenacity to take the city, 
consequently giving up after an initial disappointment.1141 Nevertheless I would argue that 
these interpretations fail to appreciate exactly what Epameinondas attempted. As stated 
earlier, he was ultimately hoping that the march south would go unnoticed by Agesilaus until 
it was too late. If it had, the city could surely not have been able to withstand the attack. The 
fact that he went for it, in spite of this failure, clearly indicates the intention to take the city. 
The Callisthenic sources imply that a significant portion of the city was taken, which, if 
correct, suggests that the siege may have had a fair chance of success. However, the assault 
was proving to be difficult and the knowledge of the approaching reinforcements, without 
intelligence on their exact location, would understandably impinge upon Epameinondas’ 
decision to retire. We cannot therefore assert that Epameinondas purposely employed a 
diversionary tactic to prevent the Spartans from joining their allies. Nor is it a case of simply 
changing his mind. The Theban general was, rather, reacting to each situation 
opportunistically: first, the prospect of a clandestine attack on Sparta presented itself, which, 
if successful, could have had a tremendous effect on the outcome of the war. During the 
battle, when word of the Mantineans’ approach was received, Epameinondas was forced to 
depart. It was at this point that he had to alter his plans, not due to a lack of tenacity, but 
because the impending arrival of the enemy reinforcements made it impractical to continue 
the attack. 
 
The army then began another forced march back to Tegea, probably arriving around 
the same time that they arrived in Sparta the previous morning. Once again, the Boeotians 
demonstrated their amazing stamina; indeed, the scope of the Boeotian army’s ability is 
comparable to what would later be achieved by the Macedonians under Alexander the 
Great.1142 Indeed, Polybius also pegged the achievement as a precursor to Hannibal’s march 
against Rome (Polyb. 9. 8. 1-2). Kromayer further made the comparison with Caesar’s march 
for the siege of Gergovia and, more recently, by the march of General von Bülow of the 
Prussian army on the campaign to the Battle of Waterloo, when on the night of June 16/17, in 





kilometres, before marching at least another 17 to Dion-le-Mont during the day.1143 
Epameinondas’ opportunism, however, was not over and, before or during the march to 
Tegea, he conceived of another plan to thwart the enemy. He reasoned that the soldiers that 
had gathered in Mantinea were on their way to Sparta and that the city would be defenceless. 
He also considered that, because it was harvest time, all of the cattle and people of Mantinea 
would be out in the fields. Thus, on arriving at Tegea, he bid his cavalry force to proceed 
further north in the hope of once again catching the enemy by surprise (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 14). It 
was apparent that, while the cavalry could not take the heavily fortified city, Epameinondas 
intended on seizing the enemy’s crops, cattle, and any prisoners they could capture. These 
could have been used as hostages to compel the Mantineans to surrender.1144 Stylianou and 
Westlake both argue that Epameinondas planned on marching his hoplite force to Mantinea 
after they had had a few hours to rest, but desisted from the idea once the cavalry attack 
failed.1145 This is possible but, if the general wished to provide hoplite support to the cavalry, 
he could easily have sent the 15,000 fresh soldiers that had been waiting patiently on guard. It 
is just as plausible, perhaps more so, that the cavalry was supposed to bring the spoils back to 
the walled city of Tegea. 
 
Stylianou and Westlake’s contention derives from the fact that Diodorus and 
Polybius seem to imply that the entire army was sent to Mantinea in order to capture the city. 
(Diod. 15. 84. 2; Polyb. 9. 8. 9). However, Xenophon states that it was just the cavalry that 
were sent (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 14). This has caused some dissension amongst historians over 
whether or not infantry units were sent to support the cavalry. Roisman has recently 
presumed that a hoplite force was sent with the hope of arriving before the Athenian infantry 
and made it within seven stadia from the city as they were spotted coming over the 
mountain.1146 This is based on Polybius’ statement that a Theban force had arrived near the 
city before the Athenians appeared (Polyb. 9. 8. 11). But his use of πρωτοπορείας, meaning 
an advance guard, should not necessarily refer to an infantry force, but just as easily to 
cavalry. Indeed, it seems that our Callisthenic sources have failed to recognize that the attack 







these accounts provide a number of details that Xenophon does not, the latter may be trusted 
particularly as two of his sons were liable to be involved in the skirmish.1147 We shall 
therefore proceed under the supposition that, for this attack, only the Boeotian and Thessalian 
cavalry were sent to Mantinea. 
 
The cavalry proceeded along the road from Tegea to Mantinea, a journey of over 17 
kilometres. Polybius tells us that they arrived at midday (Polyb. 9. 8. 9), which would make 
sense particularly since they would have plausibly taken a couple of hours to rest in Tegea. 
They proceeded northward, passing into Mantinean territory, which probably began 
somewhat south of Mt. Mytika. From there they must have gone through a wooded area 
known as Pelagos (ocean) before reaching the more open plains of farmland. When they 
arrived in the vicinity of Mantinea, it is apparent that Epameinondas was correct and the 
people were out harvesting in the fields (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 15). At this point most of the sources 
indicate that the Athenians arrived just in time; however, Plutarch says that the cavalry force, 
having caught the Mantineans by surprise, encircled the walls of the city (Plut. De Gloria. 
2/346d). This assertion seems to originate from the mistake that Epameinondas sent infantry; 
otherwise, surrounding the heavily fortified city would achieve very little. It is possible that 
Plutarch’s ultimate source made this assumption when being informed that the area outside of 
the city was surrounded as the attackers attempted to round up prisoners and cattle. Perhaps, 
as an alternative, the cavalry force adopted a wide formation that proceeded towards those 
fleeing to the city, which may have given the impression that they were attempting to 
surround the city. Polybius, on the other hand, states that they only made it as far as the 
Sanctuary of Poseidon, which lay at the southwest foot of Mt. Alesium, some seven stadia 
(1,295 metres)1148 from the city, when the Athenian horse arrived. If we combine both of 
these accounts it is apparent that the Boeotian and Thessalian cavalry had already pushed 
through and ravaged some of the farmland south of the Poseidium and, since we do not know 
how far north or south the Pelagos stretched, they could have covered well over a kilometre 







It has been assumed, by Buckler, that soldiers from Achaea and Elis still remained at 
the city.1150 But there is no indication of this, merely, from Polybius, that some of the 
Mantineans that were left behind would eventually man the walls (Polyb. 9. 8. 12). Diodorus 
and Frontinus also state that the city was without protection (Diod. 15. 84. 2; Front. 3. 11. 
5).1151 However, we need not take their statements literally since they assumed the city itself 
was the target. It was, rather, the people in the field who were defenceless. Polybius’ 
statement suggests that some soldiers were indeed left behind and, it must be admitted, after 
what had happened to Sparta, it would be verging on stupidity not to at least leave enough to 
man the battlements in case of a surprise attack. It may then be safe to say that a few soldiers 
were present within the walls of the city during the attack but were not battle-ready at the 
time the cavalry appeared entering the field. Whether or not any of these were Achaeans or 
Eleans, is not clear.  
 
In reaction to the attack the people of Mantinea fell into a panic as they scrambled 
for the safety of the city walls. Plutarch paints a vivid picture telling us of the people running 
to and fro, particularly noting their dismay (ἔκπληξις) (Plut. De Gloria. 2/346d). Fortunately 
for them, as the attackers reached the Poseidium, the Athenian cavalry happened to be near at 
hand. Once again our sources provide contradictory information: while they all agree that the 
Athenians saved the day, Xenophon indicates that some of the Athenian soldiers were already 
encamped (καταστρατοπεδευσάμενοι) within the city walls (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 15). Diodorus 
says that all 6,000 Athenian soldiers under the command of Hegesileos1152 arrived and 
Plutarch asserts that both Athenian cavalry and infantry were present, though he agrees that 
the fighting took place only between the cavalry (Diod. 15. 84. 2; Plut De Gloria 2/ 346e). 
Both of these sources, plus Polybius, agree that the Athenians were seen descending a 
mountain in the distance (Polyb. 9. 8. 11). Naturally we therefore have various interpretations 
of this: Kromayer prefers Xenophon’s account, saying that the other tradition’s contention 
that the Athenians appeared at just the right time is “effekthascherei” or sensationalism.1153 








erroneous.1154 However, Roisman has recently attempted to reconcile the sources by 
indicating that, since the Athenian infantry were probably marching behind the cavalry, their 
arrival during the battle is not impossible. Therefore, the Athenian cavalry arrived just before 
Epameinondas’ cavalry and the Athenian infantry arrived a short while later. He also asserts 
that, since Xenophon’s sons, Diodorus and Gryllus, were involved in the cavalry 
engagement, and the latter was killed, he could plausibly have exaggerated the role of the 
cavalry in saving the city without recognizing that the arrival of the infantry was what caused 
the attackers to ultimately withdraw.1155 This interpretation is certainly plausible and should 
not be rejected merely because one prefers the account of Xenophon. 
 
Xenophon says that the Athenian cavalry proceeded from Eleusis, had dinner on the 
Isthmus before passing through Cleonae (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 15),1156 which lay about 4 
kilometres to the northwest of ancient Nemea. The route described appears to be consistent 
with the modern road to the plain of Mantinea from Eleusis. The road, now known as the 
Moreas Motorway, passes just west of the modern village of Nestane and enters the plain in a 
valley southeast of Mt. Stravomyti. They would therefore approach the city from a 
southeasterly direction. Alternatively, they could have entered the plain by taking the path to 
modern Pikerni, along the northern foot of Mt. Barberi. From there they would have 
approached the city from the north, which may be consistent with Diodorus’ statement that 
they appeared on the opposite side of the plain (κατήντησαν ἐπὶ θάτερα τῆς Μαντινείας: 
Diod. 15. 84. 2): since the attackers certainly came from the south, the opposite side must be 






Corinth	 (Xen.	 Hell.	 7.	 5.	 16).	 This	 has	 often	 been	 interpreted	 to	 mean	 that	 the	 Corinthians	 actually	
attacked	 them	 as	 they	 passed	 through	 the	 Isthmus,	 see	 Buckler	 (1980a),	 212;	 Hamilton	 (1991),	 248;	











assertion that the Athenians appeared descending a mountain into the plain (Plut. De Gloria 
2/346d; Polyb. 9. 8. 11). Another option may be that they entered the plain by going over the 
low saddle between the peak of Alesium and Mt. Stravomyti,1157 which would certainly give 
the appearance of a descent from a height. While all three suggestions are plausible, I would 
tend not to take specific statements from Diodorus too literally; therefore, it may be 
preferable to rely on Plutarch and Polybius. 
 
Xenophon also emphasizes that the Athenians’ opportune arrival was due to fortune 
and not planned ahead of time; a fact which all of our main sources agree on.1158 Yet, this 
seems somewhat contradictory with Xenophon’s statement that the Athenian horsemen went 
to battle without having had breakfast, thus implying that, having had dinner at the Isthmus, 
they proceeded on their own forced march overnight.1159 The question then arises why the 
Athenian horse rushed to reach Mantinea if they had no idea that the Boeotian and Thessalian 
cavalry were about to make an attack? Though they may simply have wanted to reach 
Mantinea as quickly as possible, there is potentially an alternative reason for this. Overall, it 
is about 130 kilometres from Eleusis to Mantinea. Going by Xenophon’s directions, it is 55 
kilometres to the Isthmus, which would have taken nearly 8 hours, going at an average 
(horse) walking pace of 7 kilometres per hour.1160 From there the distance to Mantinea is 
somewhat over 70 kilometres, which would have taken at least 10 hours, or perhaps longer 
when travelling by horseback at night. Therefore, accounting for the dinner and rest in the 
Isthmus for a couple of hours, the Athenian cavalry could have reached Mantinea from 
Eleusis in less than 24 hours.  
 
Complications are, however, apparent when attempting to account for the Athenian 
infantry. It is highly doubtful that the 6,000 hoplites could have covered the distance in less 
than two days, even if they did make a forced march. Once again, without knowing about the 
attack on Mantinea, why would a forced march have been deemed worthwhile, especially 








ready if they journeyed well over double the distance the Boeotian hoplites marched in their 
attack on Sparta. We should then conclude that the Athenian infantry did not make an 
especial effort to reach Mantinea. On the other hand, as noted above, it has been argued that 
the infantry did indeed arrive as the battle between the two cavalry forces raged. If this is 
true, the presence of the infantry needs to be further explained. It is possible, as insinuated 
above, that the infantry may have actually been transported by sea. This would mean that the 
army could have arrived at Mantinea within two days. It would then make sense that the 
cavalry went on a forced march the day before in order to arrive around the same time as the 
hoplites. But, since Xenophon strongly indicates that the whole army went by land, a new 
theory is required: the simplest interpretation is that, en route, the Athenians became privy to 
the fact that Mantinea was undefended and therefore sent their cavalry ahead of the infantry 
in order to secure the city. This would only be plausible if the Athenian army was already on 
the march before Epameinondas first set out from Tegea.1161 It may be that Xenophon has 
exaggerated the nature of the Athenians’ forced march, when, in fact, they probably only 
heard of the attack on Sparta late the previous night, or even on the morning of the attack on 
Mantinea. Thus, probably just a few hours march from Mantinea, Hegesilaus was informed 
that the city was defenceless and therefore sent his cavalry unit ahead of the infantry; this 
would explain why the infantry arrived only a short while after the cavalry. 
 
Thus, the Athenian cavalry had arrived at Mantinea, just before the attackers arrived, 
and many of them had yet to properly make camp. As the raid on the field commenced and 
panic ensued, the Mantineans bid the Athenians rescue those that were in danger of being 
captured. The Athenian horsemen, probably numbering several hundred,1162 banded together 
and charged the enemy. Our sources provide very little detail of the engagement itself. 
Xenophon is more interested in glorifying the Athenian cavalry by emphasizing their inferior 
number and the fact that the Boeotian and Thessalian cavalry were considered the best 










have included his son, Gryllus.1163 Plutarch offers some extra detail, saying that the fighting 
occurred near the gates and wall of the city. This would make the most sense if the Athenian 
horse came from the city rather than from one of the entrances into the plain, where the 
attackers would surely have sallied forth to meet them. On accepting that the Athenian 
infantry arrived during or just before the engagement we can then include the statements of 
Plutarch and Polybius that, when the infantry understood the situation, Hegesileos arrayed the 
men into ranks and proceeded towards the city. Though the cavalry engagement was tough, it 
is probable that the attackers would have ultimately been successful, considering their 
superior numbers and skill, if it were not for the approach of the infantry. As Stylianou points 
out, Greek cavalry generally fought with more zeal when hoplite support was near at 
hand.1164 It is apparent that one of the Boeotian generals (perhaps the hipparch) was killed in 
the engagement by Gryllus, who also fell, along with Cephisodorus of Marathon, hipparch of 
the Athenians (Paus. 8. 9. 8, 10). As a result, the attack was called off and the bodies of the 
dead were retrieved under a truce. It is also implied that the Athenians erected a trophy of 
victory.  
 
Epameinondas’ second attempt to catch the enemy off guard and secure an easy 
triumph was once again a failure. However, as Polybius rightly points out, the general acted 
exactly as a good strategist ought to but was defeated by fortune (Polyb. 9. 8. 13). Though we 
can speculate that Epameinondas may have somewhat underestimated his opponents, the 
arrival of the Athenian cavalry could not have been anticipated and, as Xenophon failed to 
mention, the Boeotian and Thessalian cavalry were undoubtedly far more exhausted than the 
Athenians.1165 Despite this the engagement apparently received a certain amount of praise, 
distinct from the major battle a few days later, in its own time when the famous painter and 
sculptor, Euphranor, painted the attack, with particular emphasis on the courageous resistance 






Athens and a copy was made in the gymnasium at Mantinea, which Pausanias saw (Paus. 1. 
3. 4, 8. 9. 8).1166  
 
 
The Battle of Mantinea 
 
After the failure of the attack the Boeotian and Thessalian cavalry returned back to 
Tegea where they received a well needed rest while the forces of Mantinea and its allies 
returned to the city. Epameinondas could no longer rely wholly on subterfuge since the allied 
force of the enemy had now fully combined: a pitched battle must have seemed essentially 
inevitable. Xenophon offers three different reasons for Epameinondas’ decision: the first was 
that the time allocated to him for the campaign was almost up. It is not at all clear exactly 
what was the reason for this time constraint but most often scholars interpret that either the 
Theban assembly had placed a limit,1167 hoping that there would not be a repeat of the 
invasion of 370/69, or that the Boeotian allies had employed a constraint of their own, 
particularly since they were eager to harvest their crops.1168 The second reason was that the 
general did not want to leave his allies unsupported since they would surely be besieged by 
the enemy if he did so. Finally, and in the most detail, Xenophon indicates that 
Epameinondas was concerned that his reputation was at stake, especially since he had just 
been defeated in two separate engagements. Thus, all these things would be forgiven if he 
now achieved victory or, alternatively, it would at least be a glorious death (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 
18). While Epameinondas was surely not about to abandon his allies, Xenophon’s depiction 
of a desperate general, unwillingly pushed into a pitched battle as a last resort is undoubtedly 
incorrect. His attempts on Sparta and Mantinea should not necessarily be considered losses, 
	




1168	 Stern	 (1884),	 238.	 Cf.	 Hamilton	 (1991),	 248	 n.	 110,	 who	 considers	 both	 options	 to	 be	 possible.	





though	 this	 seems	 doubtful,	 in	 this	 context	 it	 is	 possible	 the	 statement	 was	 merely	 a	 conjecture	 of	
Xenophon’s.	
	308	
merely failed gambits or setbacks. From the beginning a pitched battle was to be expected but 
Epameinondas saw other opportunities that may have proven more expedient had they 
succeeded. He had certainly not put all his eggs into one basket and surely had the confidence 
to reproduce his success at Leuctra, especially with his numerically superior force.1169 On the 
other hand, the general’s reputation back at Thebes was hardly unblemished. A great deal 
was riding on the outcome of the campaign, both politically and personally. 
 
Plutarch indicates that Epameinondas remained in Tegea for a few days (Plut. Ages. 
35. 1). While this is the only evidence we have of a temporal gap between the cavalry battle 
and the Battle of Mantinea proper, it would make a great deal of sense: both infantry and 
cavalry would have greatly benefited from a couple of days rest, especially since they were 
the army’s crack troops. Once the whole troop had recovered Epameinondas finally gave the 
order for them to prepare for battle. Without any sign of complaint, indeed, with enthusiasm, 
his men readied themselves with the horsemen painting their helmets white1170 and the 
Arcadian hoplites painting clubs on their shields just like the Thebans.1171 All, in turn, 
sharpened their spears and swords and shined their shields (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 20). From the 
keenness for battle displayed by the force under Epameinondas it is clear that the coming 
confrontation was exactly what everyone was expecting to transpire, perhaps even hoping 
for. We are told, from Diodorus, that sacrifices were made on both sides and, on both sides, 
victory was predicted (Diod. 15. 85. 1). Thus Epameinondas, with the combined army of the 
Boeotian League and its allies, set forth towards the Mantinean border.  
 
Before proceeding it is worthwhile establishing the respective armies’ numbers. Our 
chief information comes from the testimony of Diodorus (Diod. 15. 84. 4). He tells us that, on 
the Theban side, the infantry numbered at 30,000. At least 7,000 of these were Boeotian and 
as many as 4,000 or 5,000 from Locris, Malis, Aeniania and, especially, Thessaly, since 
	
1169	See	Grote	(1872),	321-322;	Roisman	(2017),	328,	for	similar	sentiments.	






fourth	 century	 have	 been	 found	with	Boeotian	 shields	 adorned	with	 clubs,	 see	Head	 (1881),	 211-213,	
217.	
	 309	
Alexander of Pherae would have had a reasonable number at his disposal and many of the 
other Thessalian states were, at this stage, quite loyal to Thebes. We are also informed that a 
large number of these were light infantry (hammipoi) and peltasts (Diod. 15. 85. 4; cf. Xen. 
Hell. 7. 5. 23-25). From Euboea an estimate of around 3,000, as were sent to Nemea in 394, 
is realistic. Of these, most probably came from Eretria,1172 though undoubtedly some were 
from Chalcis. Also at Nemea were the Sicyonians, who provided some 1,500, which again 
may be a reasonable estimate for this occasion (Xen. Hell. 4. 2. 16-17). From Arcadia Tegea 
and Megalopolis probably had 2,000-3,000 veteran hoplites left over from the eparitoi but, 
since their territory was at the seat of battle, a few thousand less experienced men would 
plausibly have joined along: perhaps 3,000 from both cities and their surrounding territory 
would be reasonable.1173 The polis of Asea would only have sent a handful of men since 
much of their population had been involved in the synoecism of Megalopolis (Paus. 8. 27. 
3).1174 Pallantium, on the other hand, did not end up taking part in the synoecism1175 and 
could probably have sent a few hundred men, though their involvement in the battle has been 
questioned.1176 Lastly, from Messenia, the population there would surely allow for a fairly 
large contribution, but they were probably not expected to send an overly conspicuous 
amount, perhaps some 2,000-3,000.1177 These figures make an upper estimate of about 28,000 
hoplites.  
 
Diodorus says that the Boeotians had a total of 3,000 cavalry. These would have 
consisted mainly of Boeotians and Thessalians, though perhaps with a handful from 
elsewhere.1178 Stylianou considers the figure to be too high, suggesting that Ephorus may 
have guessed that the cavalry were a tenth the size of the infantry. Polyaenus indicates that, 
during the battle, a cavalry action took place with 1,600 horsemen (Polyaen. 2. 3. 14). 
	
1172	Eretria	alone	could	have	sent	up	to	5,000	soldiers,	see	Reber	et	al.	(2004),	652.	









1178	 Chalcis	 provided	 100	 cavalry	 at	 Nemea	 (Xen.	Hell.	 4.	 2.	 17)	 and	 Sicyon	 was	 known	 for	 breeding	
horses,	see	Gaebel	(2002),	20.	
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Because of this Stylianou further estimates that the Boeotians and Thessalians numbered 
between 1,000 and 1,200 with a few hundred others.1179 Certainly 3,000 would be a much 
larger cavalry force than was usual at the time but the Thessalians were known to be able to 
field astonishing numbers of horsemen.1180 Therefore a higher number is, arguably, quite 
feasible and Polyaenus’ number may be nearly correct. 
 
On the side of the Mantineans we are told that they mustered an infantry force of 
more than 20,000. From Sparta there were three lochoi, probably numbering close to 
1,000,1181 along with some mercenaries.1182 Athens had sent 6,000 hoplites.1183 The amount 
from Elis is difficult to determine but may have been between 2,000 and 3,000.1184 From 
Achaea, one would not expect a huge number but they could certainly muster a couple 
thousand soldiers if they were compelled to.1185 Finally, the Mantineans, who were not 
known for large military contributions,1186 however, were also liable to have some remnants 
of the eparitoi. Thus, a figure of around 3,000 may be plausible. A 17 kilometre journey to 
the north lies Arcadian Orchomenus, which could surely have sent up to 1,000 men from 
there and the surrounding territory if they had to.1187 These moderate estimates do not, 
nevertheless, quite add up to the amount purported, therefore perhaps Buckler is right in 
suggesting that the figures simply reflect both armies’ relative strengths.1188 On the other 





take	account	of	 the	probability	 that	 the	nine	 lochoi	still	 remained	 in	Sparta.	While	 the	 total	 size	of	 the	




1184	 At	 the	 Battle	 of	Mantinea	 in	 418,	 Elis	 sent	 3,000	 soldiers	 (Thuc.	 5.	 75).	 Likewise,	 at	 the	 Battle	 of	




1186	 Mantinea	 sent	 1,000	 at	 the	 Battle	 of	 Mantinea	 in	 418	 (Thuc.	 5.	 50).	 Lysias	 also	 says	 that	 the	
population	of	Mantinea	was	 less	 than	3,000	 (Lys.	 34.	 7).	As	Nielsen	 (2004),	 518,	 notes,	 it	 is	 unwise	 to	
attempt	an	estimate	of	the	total	population,	based	on	this.	However,	the	figure	of	3,000	is	surely	far	too	
low	for	the	entire	population	and,	instead,	may	reflect	the	amount	capable	of	taking	to	the	field.	





serious consequences for them. As a result, it is to be expected that they utilized every able 
body that they could spare; therefore, an extra 1,000 or so would not be surprising. Diodorus 
does, in fact twice refer to the presence of some other (ἄλλοι τινές) unspecified soldiers at the 
battle (Diod. 15. 84. 4, 85. 2). This would bring us to an upper estimate of 18,000 hoplites. 
 
The cavalry figure reported is again given as a tenth of the total hoplite force, i.e. 
2,000. While Kromayer accepts this figure, assuming that both Sparta and Athens sent 600 
each and some 200-300 from Elis,1189 Stylianou argues that a smaller force is more plausible 
since only a few hundred were liable to come from both Sparta and Arcadia.1190 Indeed, if we 
accept the lower figure of Epameinondas’ cavalry, we would expect a lower figure still from 
their opposition, perhaps about 1,000.1191 Overall Diodorus’ numbers appear to be fairly 
reasonable if not a little exaggerated. With such a numerical superiority, there is no question 
that Epameinondas and his soldiers were very confident in their chances at achieving 
victory.1192  
 
Upon leading the grand army north from Tegea towards the border of the territory of 
Mantinea, Epameinondas would have quickly learnt of the enemy’s dispositions. The actual 
site of the battle is uncertain since no definitive geographical or archaeological features, as 
indicated by the sources, have been securely identified. We essentially have two pieces of 
information: after setting off, Epameinondas took his army to some mountains to the west 
(Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 21) and, when the Theban general had been wounded he was taken to a 
nearby place called Scope, where he was subsequently buried (Paus. 8. 11. 7-8). In an early 
study of the area Boblaye seemed to place the battle in the Pelagos wood around the sites of 




1191	 For	 the	 troop	 numbers	 at	 the	 Battle	 of	 Mantinea,	 see	 also	 Kromayer	 (1903),	 114-123,	 whose	
estimates	are	somewhat	higher	than	mine.	Kromayer	(1903),	119	n.	3,	argues	that	the	city	of	Phlius	sent	
some	 soldiers	 on	 the	 side	 of	Mantinea,	 which	would	 undoubtedly	 have	 included	 cavalry,	 cf.	 Stylianou	
(1998),	513.	Kromayer	cites	their	inclusion	in	the	alliance	of	362	with	Athens	(IG	II²	112)	and	the	fact	that	
Diodorus	mentions	other	(unnamed)	soldiers	(ἄλλοι	τινές)	(Diod.	15.	84.	4,	85.	2).	However,	Phlius,	along	
with	 Corinth	 (who	 were	 also	 absent),	 had	 obtained	 a	 neutral	 status	 after	 their	 peace	 with	 Thebes	 in	
366/5,	see	above,	223,	therefore	they	would	have	had	no	obligation	to	join	the	campaign.	





Tripoli, but according to old maps lay nearly 3 kilometres to the northeast of the city centre. 
Vosouna also ceases to be mentioned on modern maps but appears to have been about 2.3 
kilometres to the east of Matsagra, approximately around the site of the modern village, 
Pelagos. Boblaye, citing one Vietti, says the tomb of Epameinondas was discovered in this 
area.1193 This section of the plain would certainly be suited for a pitched battle; however, 
subsequent investigation into the area found nothing of the sort and it is possible that Vietti 
had instead discovered the temple of Poseidon, Hermes or Heracles. This position would also 
place the battle much too close to Tegea, giving the impression that the Mantinean force 
attacked the territory, which goes against all indication in the sources and provides no 
suitable candidate for the mountains, which Xenophon refers to.1194 
 
Perhaps more reasonable is the suggestion of Leake who, taking Xenophon’s 
statement into account, says that Epameinondas moved towards the foot of Mt. Maenalus, 
just south of Scope. Presumably he refers to the site of the modern village Skopi, which sits 
on the southern foot of Mt. Mytika. From here, Leake says, he followed the base of Mytika 
northward into the Mantinean plain. He then lined up his troops with his back to the foot of 
Mytika and the mountains running northwest to the peak of Mt. Kapsias.1195 This would place 
the battle somewhere in the plain between Mytika and Mantinea. Kromayer criticizes Leake 
since he mistakenly thinks that Epameinondas was leading the right wing of the army rather 
than the left, which is indisputable.1196 On the other hand, if we ignore this slip, one could see 
how this section of mountain could have been ideally suited for drawing up the phalanx. One 
issue, however, is that Xenophon specifically says that the army did not use the shortest 
(συντομωτάτην) route to reach the enemy. If Epameinondas was aiming for the northern foot 
of Mytika then the narrow plain between Mytika and Kapnistra would manifestly have not 
been guarded; there would thus be no point in heading for the southern foot and then skirting 
around the base of the mountain when they simply could have taken the main road until they 









these two suggestions because of factual impossibilities and because they lack external 
justification from the sources.1197  
 
We thus come to the most generally accepted site of the battle. When examining the 
Tripolitan plain, it is clear that the narrowing in the plain between Mytika and Kapnistra is 
the most obvious and naturally defensible point between Tegea and Mantinea. Here the plain 
is not much more than two kilometres wide and with 20,000 men they could easily cover this 
entire section.1198 This factor has been recognised by Grote, who asserts that the Mantinean 
force was here lined up; thus, he interprets Xenophon’s statement to mean that Epameinondas 
proceeded east to the foot of Mt Mainalos (approximately nearby modern Tripoli) before 
skirting northward toward Mytika, where, at some point, the army faced to the northeast, 
toward the enemy’s position.1199 Loring later offered two pertinent arguments in favour of 
this: firstly, Pausanias says that Epameinondas was killed in the Pelagos forest (Paus. 8. 11. 
10), which probably stretched from around Mytika some distance into the Mantinean plain 
and some distance into the Tegean plain.1200 Thus, Mytika is a very plausible candidate for 
the site of Scope. Secondly, Xenophon, who provides our only information on the army’s 
march from Tegea, says that “he did not take the quickest route to approach the enemy, but 
steered toward the western hills opposite Tegea (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 21).1201 Loring argues that 
τὰ πρὸς ἑσπέραν ὄρη should naturally be interpreted to refer to the hills above Pallantium, i.e. 
the Krávari range or, more specifically, Mt. Maenalus. And, since the battle was surely 
fought in the direction of Mantinea, it is generally assumed that the army marched on a 
northwesterly bearing.1202 Fougères and Kromayer subsequently offered further 
circumstantial evidence on the strategic logic of guarding the plain at that point and 
	
1197	Kromayer	(1903),	50.	Philippson	(1892),	94,	has	identified	the	Scope	with	the	hill	of	Gourtsouli,	just	
over	half	a	kilometre	 to	 the	north	of	Mantinea.	But,	as	Kromayer	 (1903),	47,	 cf.	51	n.	2,	has	noted,	 the	
battle	surely	took	place,	at	the	very	least,	somewhere	between	Tegea	and	Mantinea.	
1198	See	Kromayer	(1903),	52-53,	who,	however,	 incorrectly	measured	the	width	of	the	plain	to	be	only	









Epameinondas’ reaction being prudent if it were so.1203 We must also add that ἀντιπέραν τῆς 
Τεγέας confirms that the circuitous path was taken in the Tegeatic plain and, since, as iterated 
above, this meant they were not liable to have proceeded into the Mantinean plain, this 
manoeuvre would only have been useful to Epameinondas if the enemy were guarding the 
narrow at Mytika. It is also apparent that the Mantinean border actually spanned somewhat 
south of Mytika;1204 therefore, a battle in the north of the Tegeatic plain would still constitute 
a battle of ‘Mantinea’. It is worth adding that Polyaenus refers to the battle as being near 
Tegea (Polyaen. 2. 3. 14). 
 
Because of these reasons the area just south of Mytika appears the most reasonable 
site of the battle and, indeed, as we shall see, it has been generally accepted by historians. 
However, Roisman has most recently expressed some doubt by pointing out that the 
landmarks referred to in the sources are all uncertain and that there are also several 
possibilities further north in the territory of Mantinea.1205 However, as has been highlighted, 
if Epameinondas had entered the Mantinean plain, there would not have been any point for 
him to head west until he went passed Mytika, which would contradict Xenophon’s 
indication that they marched to the western mountain in the vicinity of Tegea. Further, on this 
point Roisman is proven incorrect since the mountains Xenophon refers to should be 
considered a landmark and can be fairly certainly identified. Thus, on perusing the various 
possibilities for the site of the battle, in the end, the communis opinio should still take 
precedence. Accepting this, the force of the Mantineans had been drawn up between Mt. 
Mytika and the northern peak of Kapnistra, just below the Pelagos wood, which is not liable 
to have encroached much into the battlefield. The position stands nearly 12 kilometres from 
Tegea and would have been easily defendable with such a force.  
 
On spying the manoeuvres of Epameinondas’ army, the Mantineans and their allies 
readied themselves for battle. Diodorus tells us that the right wing was occupied by the 
Mantineans and other Arcadians followed by the Spartan force, which probably included the 






Athenians established their position on the left (Diod. 15. 85. 2). The Athenian cavalry were 
then placed on the left flank, while the Spartan cavalry probably took the right. We are also 
told that some Elean horsemen were stationed in the rear (Diod. 15. 85. 3, 7). It has been 
suggested that Polybius’ criticism of Ephorus arose from the former’s contention that there 
was not enough space in this area of the plain to hold so many hoplites, along with the 
cavalry occupying both wings.1206 However, the calculations of modern scholars have found 
it perfectly plausible for an army of 20,000 hoplites drawn up 10 to 12 deep and, for the 
cavalry, a depth of six to eight1207 for a total of 2,000.1208 This would fit even more so, if the 
cavalry numbers in Diodorus are exaggerated figures.1209 Though overall command belonged 
to Mantinea, no notable general of the Mantineans is mentioned and it is entirely feasible that 
Agesilaus had the primary influence on the disposition of the army, being, by far, the most 
experienced commander on the field.1210  
 
It is not absolutely clear what was intended from these dispositions but the Elean 
cavalry was undoubtedly a reserve with the expectation that, at some point, the enemy would 
break through.1211 This was a prudent decision given the general superiority of their 
opponents. Their position in the narrow, if true, was also apt since the steep mountainsides 
would prevent the enemy from surrounding them with their superior numbers. Since both 
wings were defended by ample cavalry and the left held by the generally competent Athenian 
hoplites, their dispositions were about as good as one could expect from the situation. On the 
other hand, it was surely a mistake to allow the Mantineans to occupy the far right when the 
Spartan soldiers were certainly a better option, especially when fighting the veteran 
Boeotians and the Sacred Band of the Thebans. This probably reflects the ultimate authority 
of the Mantinean force: though Agesilaus may have had reservations against this action, his 







1210	 Xenophon’s	 curious	 omission	 of	 Agesilaus	 at	 the	 battle	 has	 led	 some	 to	 believe	 that	 he	 was	 not	
present.	 See	 Grote	 (1872),	 326;	 Fougères	 (1898),	 585.	 However,	 he	 had	 already	 been	 pegged	 as	 the	
commander	of	the	Spartan	force	previously	and	we	have	no	reason	to	doubt	that	this	was	still	the	case.	





The position of the enemy stands nearly 12 kilometres from Tegea and would have 
been easily defensible with such a force. However, Epameinondas did not want to face them 
in an area where he could not make use of his superior numbers; as a result, he decided to 
employ a cunning strategem. First, he organized his men into ranks as if they intended to give 
battle right away. But, instead of heading due north, he proceeded in a northwesterly 
direction towards Mt. Maenalus. It has often been suggested that he specifically went to the 
low hillock at the eastern foot of Mt. Maenalus called Merkovouni.1212 Once again, if the 
position of the Mantinean force is correct, this would indeed be the obvious place in the 
vicinity to establish a defensive position while continuing to face the enemy. The distance to 
Merkovouni from Tegea is nearly 10 kilometres and would have taken around two hours to 
march: this is a seemingly negligible distance from what the crack Boeotian troops had 
achieved just a few days earlier. 
 
Once they arrived on the eastern foot of Merkovouni, in plain view of the enemy, 
Epameinondas extended the army out to its full length, stretching out into the plain in a 
southeasterly direction: at this stage they appear to have been lined up in a regular phalanx 
formation of between 8 to 12 deep, giving a total front of somewhere between 2,500 to 3,750 
metres (given an estimate of approximately one metre per soldier), without including the 
cavalry. He therefore gave the initial appearance that they were preparing to give battle. 
However, the order was then given for the army to ground their weapons in order to give the 
appearance that they were making camp for the evening. As a result, the enemy were lulled 
into a false sense of security and thus began to relax, believing they would not fight on that 
day (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 21-22). This strategem was, by now, very typical of Epameinondas and 
demonstrates his skill in deceiving his enemy. Whether or not it was a deciding factor in the 
outcome of the battle is questionable, but it surely gave the Boeotian force an edge over the 
less experienced of their opponents.  
 
Amidst the deception Epameinondas continued to show his true genius when he re-
organized the disposition of his army. According to Xenophon he brought successive 




tells us that this process involved only the Boeotian troops (Arr. Tact. 11. 2). This is 
reasonable since it was they who had the most experience fighting in this manner. It is also 
thought that, as at Leuctra, the wing was lined up to a depth of 50 hoplites.1213 This would 
give a front of about 140 metres for the left wing and between some 1,900 and 2,900 metres 
for the rest. An overall estimate of somewhat over 2 kilometres would be reasonable since a 
much wider front would not fit in the narrow of Mytika and Kapnistra.1214 Since the 
Boeotians took the far left, the rest of the left wing was taken up by the Arcadians. The 
Argive force lined up at the right and the middle was taken up by the rest of the allies: 
Euboeans, Locrians, Sicyonians, Messenians, Malians, Aenianians, Thessalians and other 
allies.1215 As with the enemy, the cavalry were divided up and placed on each wing (Diod. 15. 
85. 2). The light-armed troops or hammipoi were also intermingled with the cavalry units 
(Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 23-25; Diod. 15. 85. 4).1216 Some Euboean troops and some mercenaries 
were stationed on nearby hills to the east in order to attack the Athenians in the left wing if 
they attempted to aid the right (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 24; Diod. 15. 85. 6).1217 We are given the 
impression that all of this was achieved without the opposing force realizing what they were 
doing. 
 
Epameinondas had clearly devised a variation on what he attempted at Leuctra, 
though this time on a much greater scale: he was planning on advancing obliquely with the 









that	 they	were	 employed	 by	 only	 a	 few	 states	 at	 this	 time:	 perhaps	 only	 in	Boeotia	 and	Thessaly.	 See	
Konijnendijk	(2018),	111.	On	hammipoi	in	general	see	Spence	(1993),	21,	58-59;	van	Wees	(2004),	81-85.	
For	Macedonian	hammipoi	see	Heckel	(2012),	15-20.	




further	observation	 from	Fougères	 suggesting	 some	of	 the	 lower	 slopes	of	Mt.	Kapnistra	 and	 the	 river	
Zanovistas.	 Indeed,	 it	would	make	the	most	sense	 if	 they	occupied	a	position	with	a	decent	view	of	 the	




specifically told that the cavalry were on both wings but it is unclear whether this was done 
as a response to the Mantinean force’s dispositions or vice versa. What is clear is that 
Epameinondas was not taking any chance with his wings on this occasion: he probably was 
not concerned with the Spartan horse that would protect the enemy’s right; however, there 
was a genuine danger from the Athenian cavalry who were surely still beaming from their 
victory a few days earlier and, by that token, the Boeotian and Thessalian cavalry would 
conversely have been anxious, since they would again have to face them. Thus, the use of the 
hammipoi was probably meant to be something of a secret weapon since the enemy were not 
liable to have expected them. We are also told that the cavalry on the right were Theban 
(Boeotian) and, on the left, were the Thessalian horse with other Thebans (Diod. 15. 85. 4, 7, 
8). They were apparently drawn up in an embolon or ram-like formation (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 
24).1218 
 
Having established the army’s dispositions, Epameinondas gave the order to march 
out. Xenophon describes the approach of the left wing as that of the prow of a trireme (Xen. 
Hell. 7. 5. 23) As the grand army advanced in an oblique formation, with the left wing 
forward and the right wing tilting back, a distance of somewhat over two kilometres, the 
enemy were taken by surprise. Since some had already removed their breastplates and 
unbridled their horses, they were forced to reform their dispositions hastily (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 
22). In spite of this we are given every indication that the Mantinean force restored battle 
order in time1219 and may have drawn up its left wing southwesterly in order to face the 
approaching army face on. From Merkovouni there are few obstacles and there would have 
been little trouble in maintaining ranks during the advance.1220 Thus, the two sides were 
poised for the coming brawl. 
 
As the main forces got closer Epameinondas sent ahead his cavalry units ahead in 






2. 2. 12; Polyaen. 2. 3. 14).1221 This was probably the lower slope of Mytika to the north of 
the plain. The Theban was attempting to attack the enemy’s right wing in full force with 
every advantage possible. Following this, Diodorus reports that the battle broke out with 
cavalry engagements at both flanks. On Epameinondas’ right we are told that it was the 
Athenian cavalry that attacked. We are given the impression that they advanced beyond their 
own hoplite ranks, probably with the hope of attacking the Boeotian force’s right flank. The 
Theban cavalry and hammipoi were at hand and, after some fighting, in which many were 
wounded and harried to exhaustion, the Athenian cavalry retreated back towards their line. 
Diodorus emphasizes the advantage and skill offered by the use of the light infantry 
combined with the cavalry as the primary reason for their success (Diod. 15. 85. 3-5) and 
Xenophon too recognizes this factor (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 25). The hammipoi and peltasts, in their 
excitement, made an attack on the Athenians on the enemy’s left. They were joined in this by 
the Euboeans and mercenaries that had been posted on the nearby high ground; however, 
both forces were repelled by the Athenian hoplites, probably with help from their reformed 
cavalry unit.1222 Then, the Boeotian cavalry made their own attack against the enemy 
phalanx, hoping to outflank them. Unfortunately for them, the Elean cavalry reserve came to 
the rescue just in time, killing a number of Boeotians and saving the left wing of the 
Mantineans (Diod. 15. 85. 6-7; Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 25).  
 
Meanwhile, the cavalry battle on Epameinodas’ left raged simultaneously. It 
probably occurred on the low slopes of Mytika, with the Boeotian and Thessalian horse 
facing somewhat downhill toward the enemy. Agesilaus, observing Epameinondas’ 
manoeuvre to obtain higher ground, probably sought to attack the Boeotian left and prevent 
their oblique march along the slope. However, though the Spartan horse are said to have 
fought valiantly, their lack of skill and inability to cope with the hammipoi led to a retreat 
back to their phalanx (Diod. 15. 85. 8). As with the Athenian cavalry we are given the 








case great tactical control was demonstrated by both Spartan and Athenian cavalry. All of this 
appears to have occurred before the hoplite forces engaged one another.1223 
 
Epameinondas probably kept his cavalry force close by on his left, since the Spartan 
horse had returned to the Mantinean right. The massive hammer-shaped column of the 
Boeotians then finally crashed into the enemy’s right wing. Here there is a serious divergence 
in our main sources. Xenophon very simply states that, at the point where his wing struck, 
Epameinondas caused the entirety of the enemy force to flee (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 24). On the 
other hand, Diodorus offers a very different account. He comments on the intensity of the 
combat with many spears snapping and soldiers resorting to swords. Both sides fought 
courageously and, as the conflict continued, both sides inflicted many casualties but there 
was no sign of victory for either. Then, Epameinondas, deciding that decisive action was 
needed, took charge of his best men (perhaps the Sacred Band)1224 in close formation and 
pressed the attack. We are told that Epameinondas threw the first javelin and managed to hit 
the leader of the Spartan force. Following this, with the rest of his force, slew many more and 
drove the rest into a panic that caused them to flee. While the Mantinean and Spartan soldiers 
retreated, the Boeotians continued to push into the rear of the enemy, killing a large number 
(Diod. 15. 86. 1-5). At about this point, before the Spartans had fled (but perhaps after the 
Arcadians),1225 a body of them charged forward against Epameinondas’ position and 
unleashed a hail of javelins from which he received a number of wounds before collapsing to 
the ground (Nep. Epam. 9). Plutarch tells us that Agesilaus ordered his men to specifically 
target Epameinondas (Plut. Apo. Lac. 2. 75/ 214c-d). Because of this an intense fight 
	
1223	 Buckler	 (1980a),	 217,	 316	 n.	 57,	 presumes	 that	 this	 cavalry	 engagement	 occurred	 in	 front	 of	 the	
opposing	phalanxes	rather	than	on	the	wings	since,	he	believes,	that	the	slopes	of	Mytika	would	not	have	
allowed	 for	 cavalry	 units	 to	 have	 been	 stationed	 there.	 However,	 this	 contention	 is	 not	 based	 on	 any	










developed over the wounded general’s body and eventually the Boeotians over-exhausted the 
Spartans and forced them to flee (Diod. 15. 87. 1-2).1226 
 
While Xenophon surely has omitted the actual carnage that did occur at Mantinea, 
Diodorus’ account has possibly exaggerated the overall heroics of Epameinondas, though he 
undoubtedly did lead the charge. We are not provided with any figures for the overall losses 
at this battle, but it is apparent that they were high on both sides, though perhaps a relatively 
greater number from the Mantinean force. Xenophon says that no soldier was killed beyond 
the point where the army fled and that the victors failed to pursue the defeated. This 
corresponds somewhat with Diodorus who says that the Boeotians pursued for a short time 
but went back in order to secure the dead bodies (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 25; Diod. 15. 87. 2). In fact, 
Xenophon’s account does not even deny that casualties were high; instead, he emphasizes 
that there were no casualties after the Mantinean right fled, therefore, by implication there 
could have been any number of casualties before this occurred. In spite of the fact that the 
battle was a tactical victory for Epameinondas, the success of the Athenians on the Mantinean 
left, meant that both sides claimed victory and erected a trophy since both sides were in 
possession of the enemy’s dead. Initially neither side sent an envoy requesting to retrieve 
their fallen and admit defeat, but eventually the Spartans conceded and both sides were given 
permission (Diod. 15. 87. 2-4). 
 
 
The Death of Epameinondas 
 
Perhaps the most significant result of the Battle of Mantinea was the mortal 
wounding of Epameinondas. His death quickly inspired much praise and was a point of 












many of the details are certainly spurious it may be possible to sieve through the evidence for 
actual facts. On the other hand, it is additionally worth assessing their origin and purpose in 
the overall mythology of the deceased Theban general. 
 
The extant material that we have is relatively ample and seems to indicate at least 
three or four different traditions of the details surrounding the death. Our only contemporary 
source that makes reference to this is from Xenophon who simply says that Epameinondas 
had fallen, though he makes it apparent that this occurred around about the time that the 
enemy’s right wing had retreated (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 25). This is hardly surprising given 
Xenophon’s clear disdain for the Theban; but also, because, perhaps more pertinently, his 
interest lay in the effect that the general’s death had on the ending of the battle, not in the 
nature of Epameinondas’ death. Our most prevalent account is presented fairly uniformly by 
a number of writers including Nepos, Diodorus, Justin, Cicero, Ammianus Marcellinus and 
Valerius Maximus. These writers provide some or all of the following: Epameinondas was 
taken from the battlefield with a spear-tip lodged in his chest and was informed that once it 
was removed, he would surely die. The general inquired as to whether his shield had been 
secured and whether the enemy had been routed. His followers then despaired since he would 
die childless, to which Epameinondas replied that, on the contrary, he had two daughters: 
Leuctra and Mantinea. Having said this, he pulled the spear-tip from his chest and died.1227 
 
Similar to this but ultimately an alternate tradition is preserved in the writings of 
Plutarch and Aelian: they say that, having been brought from the field mortally wounded, he 
ordered his attendants to tell either Daiphantus or Iolaidus to assume command of the army. 
But, on hearing that they had both been killed in the battle he said that they should instead 
make terms with the enemy since no competent commander still remained.1228 As neither 
Plutarch nor Aelian’s stories bear any similarity with the other accounts, we can confirm that 
the traditions have different origins, especially considering that, out of all Plutarch’s 
attestations of Epameinondas, he never once mentions his childlessness or that he inquired 






Nepos’ source(s), which was probably Ephorus, and Plutarch’s, which may have been 
Callisthenes. The latter’s account reflects Epameinondas’ military pragmatism all the way to 
the end, whereas, the former emphasizes the heroic nature of his death. 
 
Scholars have tended to view some aspects of these accounts with suspicion, while 
accepting one or two details. In general it is thought that Epameinondas was taken from the 
battlefield with a spear tip in his chest and that, on hearing of his victory, he removed it.1229 
Along with this, the Callisthenic version with the deaths of the Theban officers, Diaphantus 
and Iolaidus has further received some concordance.1230 Indeed, Plutarch elsewhere adds that 
one of Epameinondas’ lovers, Caphisodorus, was also killed in the battle (Plut. Amatorius 
17/761d). Nevertheless, all of these stories have been characterized, by Swoboda, as fictitious 
inventions of the same tradition (“geschäftige Erfindungen derselben Tradition”).1231 Though 
perhaps liable to be fictitious, as I have argued, we cannot assume that they originated from 
the same tradition, even more so considering that both anecdotes are meant to be designated 
as Epameinondas’ last words, making them irreconcilable with one another. 
 
However, when one delves into the specificities of our sources a number of clues to 
their origins appear to arise. As Stylianou has surmized,1232 the details surrounding the Battle 
of Mantinea must have developed amidst a certain amount of confusion, especially since both 
sides claimed to be victorious. We must therefore be wary of any details that are wholly 
incompatible with the situation. For instance, Nepos’ account of Epameinondas’ response to 
his childlessness is not placed within the context of the battle. We are instead told that 
Epameinondas said it in response to Pelopidas’ criticism of him and that it was only the 
Battle of Leuctra that was his daughter (Nep. Epam. 9. 10. 1-3). This implies that the context 
of the anecdote is set before Mantinea and, indeed, before Pelopidas’ death two years earlier. 
If Nepos’ version of the quote is the correct one, this is an excellent example of how one 
unsubstantiated story can be amalgamated with another. It also confirms that this aspect of 
the story is liable to have been falsely placed by the other sources. This mistake may have its 







does, however, raise the possibility that he was using a different source from Diodorus. Of 
course, we are faced with the fact that Nepos does indeed place the quote directly after his 
account of Mantinea and Epameinondas’ death. But, from a neutral perspective, it would 
appear that the anecdote was selected not for its historical relevance to Epameinondas’ death, 
rather, because it illustrates the attitude that he was not concerned with child-rearing since his 
deeds would live on forever. This may have been the context in which it was originally used, 
then misused by subsequent writers. Such an origin could be Callisthenic but, since Plutarch 
makes no use of it, it could be otherwise.  
 
We also find a slight variation in Justin’s account, which finishes its narrative of the 
Battle of Mantinea by commenting on how it ended as soon as Epameinondas fell. Following 
this a brief eulogy is given before providing the story of the general’s concern for his shield 
and his victory (Just. 6. 7. 11-12, 8. 13). The structure of this narrative is rather curious 
because the story of the death is given only after the eulogy, which would be a reversal of the 
usual order.1233 It is almost as if Justin only decided to include the anecdote at the last minute, 
while he was writing the eulogy. Perhaps more probable, however, is that it was included 
since it illustrates an aspect of Epameinondas’ character, i.e. it is biographical. But then its 
inclusion in the narrative does not quite fit and it may therefore have been taken from 
something other than Justin/Trogus’ main source material. This is further illustrated when 
examining the text. It is interesting to note that, after Justin says that the battle ended, he then 
reports: “After a few days Epameinondas died” (Just. 6. 8. 1).1234 This would seem to be a 
contradiction with the story of his death since the other accounts imply that he died only a 
short while after the battle. Indeed, the idea that the death occurred a few days later 
contradicts all of the accounts discussed so far.  
 
Nevertheless, these are not the only traditions that we have concerning the death. In 
his travels, Pausanias encountered a number of local traditions pertaining to two important 
details: first, is the identity of Epameinondas’ assassin. Three different versions are 







Spartans also claim a Machaerion of their own. Pausanias, however, is suspicious of this 
since no Machaerion had been awarded honours for bravery at these cities. Thus, he prefers 
the Athenian and Theban version, which designates Gryllus, the Athenian as the killer (Paus. 
8. 11. 5-6, 9. 15. 6). The discrepancy is again reflective of the confusion that resulted from 
the battle, particularly since Gryllus, Xenophon’s son, was almost certainly killed a few days 
earlier at the cavalry engagement near Mantinea.1235  
 
The solution may be found from Plutarch, who also comments on Epameinondas’ 
assassin: he says that Dioscorides wrote that a Spartan named Anticrates did the deed. 
Plutarch adds, probably from his own knowledge of the Spartan tradition, that the 
descendants of Anticrates were continually honoured with the benefit of tax exemption and 
that in, his own day, one Callicrates, still enjoyed this privilege. We are told that these 
descendants are known as machaeriones (swordsmen), since Epameinondas was killed by a 
sword (Plut. Ages. 35. 1-2). In spite of the discrepancy there may, however, be some level of 
truth here: it stands to reason that the killer could not have been an Athenian since they were 
on the left flank; however, the Mantineans and Spartans were on the right, opposing the 
Boeotians, so it was liable to be either of them. On further examination of the battle it is 
apparent that the Mantineans did not distinguish themselves; instead they fled quite easily. It 
was, of course, the Spartans who are depicted as making a solid attempt to push back. 
Plutarch additionally provides an anecdote indicating that Agesilaus purposefully had 
Epameinondas targeted during the battle (Plut. Apo. Lac. 75/214c-d). Because of these 
reasons it is fairly safe to presume that the killer was a Spartan. Furthermore, the Dioscorides 
that Plutarch cites is most probably the one who was a pupil of Isocrates and wrote a treatise 
on the constitution of the Spartans (Plut. Lyc. 11. 4; Athen. 1. 18). Since the source is 
contemporary the assertion that Anticrates was the culprit is highly plausible. 
 
Pausanias’ second detail is the location of Epameinondas’ death. He tells us that 
Epameinodas was carried from the field, clutching his wound, to a place in view of the battle 
called Scope (Look), which he tells us, was named so because of these events (Paus. 8. 11. 7). 
	




The Scope was originally thought to be located at some remains on the eastern side of 
Mytika,1236 but these are now accepted to belong to a watchtower,1237 which may have 
actually been called Scope before the battle and the tradition of the site’s name simply 
reversed the order over subsequent centuries.1238 It has then been argued that Epameinondas 
did not even die there and that he was not buried at Scope.1239 The tower was surely not the 
location of the tomb and the general would certainly not have been carried up the heights of 
the mountain if he was badly wounded. It is, on the other hand, believable that the general, 
having been wounded was taken part way up Mytika on the lower slopes since he would 
surely have been nearby. Whether or not he died there is a matter for debate, but we have no 
reason to doubt that, somewhere in the area Epameinondas was indeed entombed. As 
Pausanias, who clearly visited the site, says, he was buried on the spot where the two armies 
met (Paus. 8. 11. 7). 
 
In addition to these details, Pausanias also tells us that Epameinondas had been told 
by the oracle at Delphi to be aware of pelagos (sea), thus he feared to board either triremes or 
merchant ships. But instead the oracle was referring to the Pelagos wood by Mytika (Paus. 8. 
11. 10; cf. Suda s. v. Ἐπαμινώνδας). This is obviously another story, like with Scope, that 
developed after the events. It tells us little of the death but may help to confirm that the site in 
question is, indeed, around Mytika. 
 
On the whole, Pausanias’ account is essentially the same as the others, i.e. 
Epameinondas was taken from the field, became aware of the results of the battle and died. 
However, a potentially significant difference from the other traditions, which have it that he 
was taken back to camp instead.1240 Grote noted that a camp was not liable to have been 
actually established since they had only left Tegea a few hours earlier, though a tent could 
have been erected; especially for the general.1241 However, it may also be possible that, since 









a few days, as had happened at Leuctra. This may add credence to Justin’s statement that the 
general died a few days later. 
 
Having examined all of the traditions in some detail, it may be possible to 
reconstruct a plausible account of Epameinondas’ death. After being wounded by a Spartan 
soldier named Anticrates the general was taken from the field, perhaps somewhere along the 
lower slopes on the southern side of Mytika. Though he may have inquired about his shield, 
he most probably did not make any comment about Leuctra and Mantinea being his 
daughters. On the other hand, from the alternate tradition, the statement concerning the dead 
Theban officers is believable as it illustrates the military mind of the dying general. It is also 
possible that his lovers, Asopichus1242 and Caphisodorus, had fallen during the battle and 
would be buried nearby. After the battle it is apparent that the army pitched a camp in the 
vicinity. This would be the easiest way to treat the wounded, rather than carry them the two 
hour walk back to Tegea and potentially risk worsening their condition on the journey. It was 
therefore practical to have all available physicians nearby. Thus, a tent was probably 
constructed for Epameinondas on the site. We are also given the interesting possibility that 
the general did not die until after a few days had passed. If we were to also accept Plutarch’s 
statement about the machaeriones being so named since Epameinondas was killed by a 
sword, this contradicts the standard tradition that he was stabbed by a spear or javelin. 
Accepting this interpretation offers a much less heroic and more realistic version of 
Epameinondas’ death, that probably finds its origins in Callisthenes or Theopompus (or 
both).  
 
Thus, the great Theban general was finally laid to rest. His tomb had to be erected at 
the public’s expense, since, at his house, only one iron coin was found (Plut. Fab. 27. 2). He 
was buried, along with many others of his kin and allies, around the spot where the 
Mantineans and Spartans had fled upon the onslaught of the Boeotian left wing. To 
commemorate his grave, a pillar was built on it depicting a shield with a dragon in relief, 






Boeotian dialect, and another, which was later added by the emperor Hadrian (Paus. 8. 11. 
10). It is quite possible that the Boeotian inscription resembled the inscription on the statue of 
Epameinondas that was set up in the agora of Thebes sometime after his death: 
 
By my will, Sparta was stricken from its glory, 
Sacred Messene now receives its children. 
By Theban implement Megalopolis was encircled, 































The Aftermath of Mantinea 
 
In the period directly following Epameinondas’ death Xenophon famously stated 
that, since both sides claimed victory at Mantinea, “even more confusion and disorder in 
Greece emerged after the battle than before” (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 27).1244 In many ways this is 
true: in the early 350s Athens would be severely weakened by the Social War and Philip of 
Macedon began to extend his influence into Thessaly and the northern Aegean. However, 
Xenophon’s assertion seems to stem from an Athenian point of view and does not necessarily 
represent the situation for much of mainland Greece.  
 
Within a year of Epameinondas’ death (362/1), a general peace was concluded by all 
states except for the Spartans, who were still unwilling to recognize the autonomy of the 
Messenians. By implication the Common Peace, like the previous two treaties in 367 and 
366/5, recognized the Boeotian League as its guarantor and the leading city-state in mainland 
Greece.1245 Indeed, the league continued, at this stage, to function as hegemon of the federal 
alliance: in the following year (361/0), turmoil in the territory of Megalopolis resulted in 
Thebes sending 3,000 soldiers led by Pammenes. While this may imply some instability 
within the Peloponnesus, the campaign was successful and, as Diodorus indicates, the 
internal strife was alleviated.1246 Following this incident, most of the states in the 
Peloponnesus would play no further role in the major conflicts of the coming decade.1247 
Sparta would provide some monetary support to Phocis at the beginning of the Phocian War, 
but it ceased its interference in the affairs of the Peloponnesian states for 10 years.  Indeed, 
when the Spartans did attack Megalopolis in 352, the Boeotian-Peloponnesian alliance 
proved its continuance when assistance from Boeotia, Argos, Messenia, Sicyon and 








Sparta again attacked Megalopolis and, again, Boeotian troops were sent, this time proving 
their effectiveness. It is clear from these events that the federal alliance that had been 
established by Epameinondas and his followers in 370, still functioned effectively as an anti-
Spartan institution with Thebes at least nominally as its hegemon. The defensive ring that 
Epameinondas helped to establish through the territories of Messenia, Megalopolis, Tegea 
and Argos, continued to bar the Spartans from regaining any territory they had lost in the past 
two decades.1248 
 
Elsewhere, in the early 350s, the Boeotian League did concede some loss when 
Athens regained its influence in Euboea (357). The Theban assembly also appears to have 
lost interest in Thessaly, thus allowing the Pheraean tyrants to reassert themselves and 
ultimately attract the attention of Philip. In spite of this, in 360/59, Thebes was made 
promanteia of the city of Delphi, which denoted the responsibility of protecting the 
sanctuary. This honour had been awarded to the Spartans in the previous century and now 
provided clear evidence for which polis the Amphictyons considered the most powerful. 
Then, in 356, Philomelos, instigated the Phocian War by seizing Delphi. Boeotia would then 
become embroiled in a ten-year struggle that would significantly reduce its manpower and 
economy. It was this event that truly ended the period of Theban supremacy, but it would 
take nearly the entire war for this to be fully realized. In fact, their conduct during the war 
was generally militarily apt, thereby conceding only a handful of losses to the Phocians. 
However, the seemingly endless supply of funds that the Phocians had access to allowed 
them to continue to fight in spite of losses that would normally have crippled other poleis. 
But the Boeotian League pushed on until 347 when it was forced to request help from Philip. 
The alliance with Macedon facilitated the end of the war in 346 and, much to the dismay of 
the Athenians, allowed Philip to subsequently assert influence in central and southern Greece. 
Though Boeotia was desperate by that stage, unknown to them, the sacred treasury at Delphi 
had been depleted and it was only a matter of time before the Phocians would have had to 
surrender. If the Thebans knew of this, it is possible that they would not have been so eager 






It is clear from this overview of subsequent events that the period of Theban 
supremacy, or the Theban Hegemony, did not truly finish until towards the end of the 
Phocian War and the eclipse of Macedonian power. But the idea that Epameinondas’ death 
signalled the end of the period of Theban supremacy is widespread throughout literature, both 
ancient and modern.1250 It is true that the Thebans did not exploit their advantage and attempt 
to force Sparta into a settlement; thus, official hostility would continue. However, this 
contention can be misleading since, other than the general’s death, the Battle of Mantinea 
neither brought major loss or gains to the Boeotian League. If, in any way, we can call it a 
major turning point, it is because the Common Peace recognized Messenia’s independence by 
all the Greek city-states (except Sparta). But, in reality, it would be a very long time before 
Sparta would give up hope of regaining its lost territory. 
 
 
A Grand Strategy? 
 
The question of what Epameinondas hoped to ultimately achieve during his career 
cannot be certainly determined. It is possible, however, to observe a certain trend in his 
activities. From 378 to 371, he was not likely to have seriously entertained any grandiose 
schemes beyond the defence of Thebes and the re-establishment of the Boeotian League. 
After Leuctra and the suggestion from the Arcadians to invade Sparta it was then almost 
suddenly conceivable that Spartan power could be dramatically reduced. While the liberation 
of Messenia and the founding of Messene can generally be credited to Epameinondas and his 
followers, his involvement in the synoecisms of Mantinea and Megalopolis was probably 
limited to assistance in facilitating the construction of each city’s fortifications. It has often 
been thought that Epameinondas himself envisioned and implemented the idea of forming a 
defensive ring around Sparta with these cities and others; however, it is more likely that the 








Throughout the 360s, though Epameinondas struggled to maintain and enhance 
Theban influence in the Peloponnese, the federation dramatically expanded throughout 
central and northern Greece, including defensive alliances with the cities of Phocis and 
Locris. Pelopidas also managed to gain authority and prestige in Thessaly and Macedonia. It 
is uncertain what Epameinondas’ views on Thebes’ northern policy were likely to be since 
his participation there was limited to securing Pelopidas’ release from captivity in Pherae. 
But there is no reason to doubt his adherence, since Pelopidas was his friend and political 
ally. In 366, on the third invasion of the Peloponnesus, Epameinondas secured the important 
port of Naupactus, in the Corinthian Gulf. This act may have been connected with the 
announcement at Thebes, probably in the same year, that he intended to build a navy. The 
acquisition of Oropus, another significant port, may also be connected to this. In 364 this 
very navy set out on an expedition with the intention of bringing the major powers of the 
Aegean into the federal alliance. It is therefore apparent that Epameinondas hoped to achieve 
a ring of defence (or offense) around Athens that, like the Spartans, would cripple Athenian 
capacity to wage war. 
 
Though Epameinondas’ scheme for the reduction of Athens would not be fulfilled it 
is clear that he envisioned a large network of federal alliances throughout mainland Greece 
and the Aegean under the leadership of the Boeotian League. If he had survived his final 
battle it is possible that Boeotian foreign policy would have continued to aggressively 
manifest and maintain such a network. However, after his death, it is apparent that more 
moderate parties overtook the majority in the assembly and discontinued a number of 





It can be said that Epameinondas was unquestionably a first rate general, arguably 
the best of his day. Though he was not perfect, particularly in his largely unsuccessful 
attempts at siege warfare, his ability to rally and utilize his forces in the field was masterly. 
At Leuctra he demonstrated his excellent use of tactics to overcome the power of the Spartan 
phalanx and the invasion of Sparta in 370/69 proved him a capable strategist as he managed 
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to successfully capitalize on his previous victory. This, indeed, is what Thebes afterwards 
lacked during the Phocian War since, though they would gain a number of victories, they 
failed each time to take advantage of their success. Overall, we cannot be certain, if at all, 
how much Epameinondas’ generalship influenced the development of warfare. We have 
some reason to believe that, during his three year sojourn in Thebes, Philip learned a great 
deal from the likes of Epameinondas and his followers. Unfortunately, it is not possible to 
establish the true extent of this or even if it occurred at all. However, this does not mean that, 
militarily, he had no effect on future generals. In fact, writers throughout history have 
eulogized Epameinondas as the epitome of a virtuous military leader.1252 
 
By contrast, as a politician, he was somewhat lacklustre, partly due to his inability to 
satisfy the needs of both his allies and the assembly back home. He was, however, certainly 
constrained by the federal alliance’s lack of the required constitutional machinery that would 
recognize Thebes as its leader and allow them to arbitrate disputes.1253 But it is clear that he 
was both an excellent orator and a man of vision who was capable of entrancing and winning 
over an audience. Despite his political failures, when viewed in tandem, it is apparent that he 
was usually successful in persuading his fellow Thebans and his opponents in the assembly 
never managed to fully reverse Epameinondan policy while he was still alive.  
 
Ultimately it is pointless to suggest that Thebes’ chance at hegemony ended with 
Epameinondas’ death since we simply cannot know if he would have fared any better in the 
Phocian War than did his successors,1254 though we can perhaps suggest that, in the 
oncoming struggle against Philip, a similar personality to the late Theban general, may have 
been what was required to combat Macedonian ascendency. Nevertheless, Epameinondas 
should hardly be judged for what he failed to achieve or what occurred in the wake of his 
demise; rather, he should be appreciated for the significant imprint and enduring legacy he 
left in Greek history, namely the reduction of Spartan power and the liberation of Messenia. 
These actions resulted in major transformations throughout mainland Greece. When 






different character from what it had some 20 years earlier and he should certainly be credited 
with influencing this change greatly.  
 
To conclude, we may question whether Epameinondas deserves to be called ‘Great’ 
as Plutarch and Montaigne thought, and as the title of this thesis suggests. His achievements 
may appear small by comparison to the vast empires that Alexander and Caesar would build; 
however, Epameinondas is without a doubt the most outstanding military figure from the 


























Appendix I: The Legacy and Reception of Epameinondas 
 
 
Following his death, the figure of Epameinondas has been represented by a number 
of different works of art and literature. These basically occurred in at least three main phases: 
first, in the period following his death, i.e. the mid to late fourth century; second, throughout 
the Roman era; third, from the Renaissance to the late nineteenth century. To this we may 
also add the small but potential re-emergence of in interest in the general in recent decades. 
In each of these phases it is apparent that aspects of his character appealed to various 
audiences, generally erudite ones, though this would begin to change towards the end of the 
Renaissance. The following narrative is a survey of the various ways in which Epameinondas 
has been received and presented throughout history. While many of the works and themes 
that are examined below would merit their own dedicated studies, the present discussion is 
intended to establish the overall trend up to the modern day.1255 
 
 
Late Classical and Hellenistic Greece 
 
In Epameinondas’ time and for a while after his death it is apparent that the general 
was something of a topic of conversation for people throughout the Greek world. His political 
and military influence had affected the entirety of mainland Greece, most of the Aegean, and 
as far eastward as the Black Sea. In spite of this, extant references to the late general, from 
the middle of the fourth century, are far less common than would perhaps be expected. The 
earliest references we have are from Xenophon who wrote his Hellenica in the 350s, though 
the Laconophile omits most of the Theban’s activities and makes a point of emphasizing his 
failures. Within another two decades, however, the historians Ephorus, Callisthenes, 
Theopompus and Anaximenes all certainly wrote in some detail on Epameinondas. These 
writers all composed their work around the time of, or shortly after, the later reign of Philip 
II. The tradition that emerged from Ephorus and Callisthenes is highly eulogistic of the 





Outside of the genre of history, there are only a handful of references. Aristotle 
refers to the philosopher leaders of Thebes, which surely includes Epameinondas and 
Pelopidas, but it is uncertain why their names are not given since he undoubtedly knew of 
them (Aristot. Rhet. 2. 23. 11). Our earliest explicit reference comes from Aeschines in On 
the Embassy (c. 343) and then, around 324, Dinarchus, in his Against Demosthenes, offers 
praise for the achievements of Epameinondas and Pelopidas (Aeschin. 2. 105; Din. 1. 72-73). 
This is a stark contrast from the earlier criticism of Theban activity during the period by 
Isocrates, particularly in his Plataicus and Archidamus. When Dinarchus wrote his extant 
speeches in 324, it is clear that Athenian attitudes to the Theban leaders of the previous 
generation had substantially altered. This is probably due to the latent alliance Athens had 
with Thebes and its unyielding resistance against Macedonian aggression. Indeed, Plutarch 
states that Demosthenes used Epameinondas as a model to inspire resistance to Philip (Plut. 
Dem. 20. 1). This representation may have influenced the historical writing of the period. 
 
It is also conspicuous that Epameinondas is absent from the work of Aeneas 
Tacticus, who was writing sometime in the latter half of the fourth century. His account of 
events that the general was involved in are detailed, even mentioning the Theban officer, 
Pammenes. However, Aeneas’ extant work is concerned with surviving under siege warfare: 
Epameinondas was never amongst the besieged and was generally unwilling or unsuccessful 
in siege warfare. He may therefore have never merited mention in this part of his work. After 
this, there is not a single extant reference to Epameinondas until Polybius, whose work was 
written in the late second century. Polybius was from Megalopolis, the construction of which 
has often been credited to the Theban, and he provides extensive commentary on several 
fourth century historians. It is therefore unsurprising that he held some interest in the general.  
 
 
The Roman Period 
 
By the first century and the eclipse of Roman power a fresh interest in the Theban is 
apparent. From historians there were glorifying accounts from Pompeius Trogus and 
Diodorus Siculus. Cornelius Nepos wrote a short but sharp biography, which was one of his 
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longest pieces. He was, in addition, known to have written a universal history, which may 
have included some account of the Theban Hegemony. We also find Epameinondas 
mentioned in other genres such as in Strabo’s Geography, in which he clearly made use of 
Ephorus. Plutarch also tells us that Cato held the general in high esteem (Plut. Cat. Ma. 8. 8). 
Significantly, the great orator, Cicero, makes several references to him in his speeches, 
letters, and philosophical work.1256 He even goes as far as to refer to Epameinondas as the 
greatest of all of the Greeks (Cic. Fin. 2. 19). This indicates a fairly general acceptance in the 
Roman world of the Theban’s historical significance.  
 
In the following three centuries we are witness to what appears to have been the 
absolute high point for ancient interest and praise of Epameinondas. In the first century A.D. 
he is mentioned by Pliny the Elder, Frontinus and Valerius Maximus.1257 In particular the 
famed politician and biographer, Plutarch, wrote one of his first Lives on the general. With 
well over 50 extant references, it is more than apparent that Epameinondas was one of his 
favourite figures. Though, when one considers that Plutarch was a native Boeotian, this 
comes as little surprise. In the second century A.D. there are numerous references from the 
tactical writers of the period (i.e. Polyaenus, Aelianus Tacticus and Arrian) and in the 
philosophical work of Epictetus and the rhetoric of Aristides.1258 We even have evidence that 
the emperor Hadrian visited Epameinondas’ grave near Mantinea and wrote his own 
inscription.1259 There is something of a continuance of this in the third century A.D. as he is 
mentioned a number of times by Claudius Aelianus, Diogenes Laertes, Athenaeus and Justin 
(whose dates are uncertain).1260 By the fourth century he is only found once in Themistius 
and once in Ammianus Marcellinus.1261  
 
From this brief assessment it is apparent that, during the Roman period, 
Epameinondas sparked a great deal of interest throughout the Graeco-Roman world. A large 











the same time humble and without any apparent desire for personal wealth or gain. The 
writers of this period had a particular interest in his achievements in battle and the heroic 
accounts of his death. 
 
 
From the Middle Ages to the Renaissance 
 
Following this there is no further extant reference to the general for several hundred 
years. Indeed, while some may exist that have not been noted by scholars, we have only the 
five mentions of Epameinondas in the Suda, from the tenth century, and a brief mention of 
praise by Michael Psellus the Byzantine monk from the eleventh century (Psellus 
Chronographica 6. 163). Other than this we have no known mention of the Theban from all 
of Western Europe during the Mediaeval period. The most obvious explanation of this is that 
from about the fourth century A.D. there had begun a major decline in the knowledge of 
ancient Greek; thus, knowledge of ancient Greek culture was acquired primarily through 
Latin texts.1262 Since no Latin writers were known to have written an account of 
Epameinondas (except Nepos’ short Life) or the period in which he lived the absolute 
majority of people in Western Europe did not have access to significant information on the 
general save through the few references made in Latin, as highlighted above.1263 We may 
have expected more from the Byzantines whose classical Greek education continued and, as 
indicated in the Suda, they continued to have access to copies of Ephorus, Callisthenes and 
Theopompus, though perhaps not for long (or many of them). But, it seems that, more often 
than not, the Byzantines maintained a Thucydidean ideology of writing history in that they 
focused on the history of their own time, particularly since the more distant past had already 
been recorded.1264  
 
After Psellus no known reference to Epameinondas has been found until the 









curriculum toward the end of the fifteenth century, along with the establishment of the 
printing press. We thus find a dramatic increase in Latin and vernacular translations of the 
likes of Plato, Xenophon, Plutarch, etc. Epameinondas himself may have taken somewhat 
longer than other figures to capture the interest of scholars since, by this time, Plutarch’s 
Epameinondas, along with other major works depicting the general had been completely lost. 
This therefore made the Theban a relatively inaccessible topic except for those well versed in 
Diodorus and the miscellaneous references in the works of Plutarch. In spite of this, by the 
middle of the Renaissance evidence of interest in the general begins to show itself. The 
Italian diplomat and political theorist Niccolò Machiavelli in his political treatise entitled The 
Prince (1513), says that, once Epameinondas had died, the Thebans gave their army to Philip 
II, who, in turn stole their liberty.1265  
 
More significant is the Dutch scholar, Desiderius Erasmus’ (1466-1536) re-
presentation of anecdotal material in his Apophthegmata, first published in 1531. The work 
was originally dedicated to the fifteen-year old Prince William of Cleves (1516-1592), the 
future duke of Jülich-Cleves-Berge (1539). In his dedicatory epistle he indicates that it was 
intended as an easily accessible guide for the moral instruction of young boys, especially 
princes. It appears to have been quite successful as it was republished twice in 1531 and 
again in both 1532 and 1535. Epameinondas’ representation in Plutarch, and to a lesser 
extent, Nepos, adhered to many of the qualities Erasmus deemed laudatory such as discipline, 
patriotism and constant vigilance. Indeed, Plutarch’s depiction was most important to 
Erasmus who believed that, “of all the Greek writers, Plutarch is the most saintly and the 
most worth reading, especially in the area of moral instruction”.1266 However, Epameinondas’ 
ranking as one of the foremost of all ancient figures appears to be lacking in Erasmus: the 
first two books consisted only of anecdotes concerning the Spartans, mainly from Plutarch’s 
Apophthegmata Laconica, followed, in book three, by a focus on Greek Philosophers. This 
was balanced out, in book four, by famous generals, Greek and Roman: Philip, Alexander, 
Antigonus, Augustus, Julius Caesar and Pompey. The majority of his anecdotes here come 
from the Regum et Imperatorum Apophthegmata in which the section on Epameinondas is the 





until his fifth book, which he did not initially intend to write. This suggests that Erasmus was 
not fully aware of Epameinondas’ historical significance, though he clearly praised what he 
did know. This is partly due the probability that Erasmus did not have access to Diodorus’ 
book 15 and therefore had insufficient information to fully understand the Theban in his 
historical context. However, in spite of this, Erasmus’ brief comments on the anecdotal 
material demonstrate genuine admiration for the obscure general. Erasmus wrote his 
Apophthegmata in the first couple decades of the Reformation and, as a moderate Roman 
Catholic, was surely deeply concerned about the future of Christendom. This would explain 
his interest in the moral welfare of future rulers in Europe.1267 This generally didactic agenda 
would be a common feature in depictions of Epameinondas for the following two centuries. 
 
Within half a century, Michel de Montaigne, one of the foremost thinkers of the late 
sixteenth century, expressed, for the first time since antiquity, a genuine affection for the 
Theban general in his Essays published between 1570 and 1592. This is most strikingly 
apparent in his essay, On the most excellent of men, in which he ranks Homer, Alexander the 
Great and Epameinondas as the three most excellent men in history. Montaigne, however, 
appears to rate the latter above the rest, referring to him as the most “distinguished” of the 
three and heaps praise upon his moral virtues: “as for his morals… he far surpassed… all 
those who have ever engaged in state”. Later, in his On the useful and the honourable, 
Epameinondas is lauded as a heroic model, worthy of emulation. He was praised over the 
likes of Alexander and Caesar, not so much for his achievements but for his paradigmatic 
virtue.1268 Like Erasmus, most of his information probably came from Plutarch and Nepos but 
he also may have used Erasmus’ Apophthegmata, which was widely available and read in 
Montaigne’s time. Once again, there is no indication that Montaigne had access to Diodorus 
and his presentation of Epameinondas is almost entirely influenced by that of Plutarch’s.  
 
The works of Plutarch had become much more widely accessible in the sixteenth 
century, particularly due to Amyot’s French translations of the Lives and the collected 







awarding the palm, above all our writers in French, to Jacques Amyot, not merely for the 
simplicity and purity of his language in which he excels all others, nor for his constancy 
during such a long piece of work, nor for the profundity of his knowledge in being able to 
disentangle an author so complex and thorny… but above all I am grateful to him for having 
chosen and selected so worthy and so appropriate a book to present to his country”. 
Montaigne admits to us that he himself cannot read the original Greek; therefore, he was 
extremely happy to have access to Amyot’s translation, which became enormously successful 
and influential.1269 
 
Toward the end of the century this influence made its way across the channel into 
England when Thomas North began translating Plutarch into English from Aymot’s French. 
The first two editions of these were published in 1579 and 1595 and it is clear that they had a 
widespread appeal. This is perhaps most distinctively apparent in the fact that North’s 
translations were the major source material for three of Shakespeare’s plays.1270 However, 
more important for this study was North’s 1602 edition, which included a number of Lives on 
figures that Plutarch had either never done or were no longer extant such as Philip, Dionysus 
of Sicily and Augustus. The first of these, given the prime position, is a Life of 
Epameinondas.1271 This work was mostly assembled from Plutarch, Nepos and Diodorus and 
it may be considered the first attempt, since antiquity, to reconstruct the life of the Theban. It 
is also the first of a number of works that were intended to remedy the lamentable loss of 
Plutarch’s Life of Epameinondas. This would have pleased Montaigne to no end, had he still 
been alive, as he had previously expressed his grief over the loss.1272 By 1614, Sir Walter 
Raleigh published his incomplete universal history, which included a brief section on 
Epameinondas and the Theban ascendency. Like Erasmus’ Apophthegmata, Raleigh’s 
History of the World was intended to educate the ruling class; in this case, it was dedicated to 











It is apparent that a reasonable proportion of educated people throughout England 
read these works and would therefore have been reasonably aware of Epameinondas. 
Certainly both Goulart and Raleigh were extremely impressed with the Theban’s virtuous 
manner and were happy to reiterate the general praise he received throughout antiquity. A 
continuance of this trend can be detected half a century later when Samuel Clarke, a 
nonconformist puritan clergyman published a Parallel Life of Epameinondas paired with 
Hannibal. Clarke was a prolific writer in the genres of biography and martyrology, publishing 
a number of works detailing the lives of godly people. These were largely compiled by 
excerpting whole sections from eulogies and other such texts. However, the purpose of these 
lives was not to write literary masterpieces but, instead, to provide models of how a devout 
Christian should live. It is not too hard to trace his influences back to Erasmus who was a 
purveyor of the idea that the life of a virtuous person can be used didactically. This was taken 
up in England by the martyrologist, John Foxe (1516-1587), who wrote the famous Actes and 
Monuments (also known as Foxe’s Book of Martyrs), published in English in 1563.1275 Foxe 
determined that the use of Lives as a means of preaching and displaying good character, as 
Collinson asserts, is “more persuasive than doctrine”.1276 Foxe’s writing became enormously 
influential, particularly for its depictions of Catholic persecution of Protestants.1277 Thus, in 
the seventeenth century, Clarke continued this tradition; mostly focusing on people that had 
lived since the Reformation. But between 1664 and 1665 Clarke, albeit briefly, altered his 
scope to include Parallel Lives on figures that are called ‘Great’, i.e. Nebuchadnezzar II with 
Cyrus, Alexander with Charlemagne, Pompey with Artaxerxes and Julius Caesar with 
Augustus.  
 
The Life of Epameinondas and Hannibal appears to have been one of the last of 
Clarke’s delvings into ancient history. The material mostly comes from Plutarch, Nepos and 
Diodorus and in many sections the wording is so similar to Goulart’s version that it is 
apparent that the latter may have been Clarke’s major source for material on the Theban. A 
conspicuous example of this is the assertion of both Goulart and Clarke that Epameinondas 







text, Fabulae, attributed to Hyginus in which it is stated that Creon recognized his grandson 
at Thebes since he bore the mark of Dracon’s progeny, i.e. the Spartoi (Hygin. Fab. 72).1279 
Such an assertion in relation to the Theban general has not been made since these two works. 
Unlike Raleigh and North, Clarke’s writings would not be republished after his death; 
however, in his final publication, he wrote that “never less than a thousand” of each book was 
printed for any given edition.1280 This suggests a reasonably wide readership and, since 




The Enlightenment Epameinondas 
 
By the eighteenth century, interest in the Theban general was no longer almost 
entirely influenced by Plutarch; however, his representation would continue to be strikingly 
didactic. In France the century saw the beginnings of more recognizably academic works on 
the general, most importantly in Seran de la Tour’s Histoire d'Epaminondas, général des 
Thébains, published in 1739 to complement his 1732 history of Scipio.1281 However, outside 
the purely academic, the figure of the general, started to impose itself more prominently in 
other genres and mediums. We thus find a number of artistic depictions of Epameinondas. 
 
One of the earliest visual representations we find is The Death of Epaminondas 
(1726) by the Dutch painter Isaac Walraven (1686-1765) (Fig. 1). This stirring image 
attempts to capture the despair of the general’s companions in his last moments as he 
enquires about his shield and whether or not the battle was won. It was originally intended to 
be coupled with a work entitled Lycurgus showing the young Charilaus to the Spartan 
military leaders, which was unfortunately never completed. The pair may have been intended 








heroic nature of the death, as presented in the ancient literature,1283 provided the western 
world with a model of paradigmatic virtue that would continue to be utilized well into the 
nineteenth century.  
 
Among the more conspicuous of these is a Death of Epaminondas (1773) by the 
British American, Benjamin West (1738-1820), who was amongst the most prominent 
painters of his day (Fig. 2). In terms of subject matter it appears fairly similar to Walraven’s: 
Epameinondas is lying outside his tent with a spear tip sticking out of his ribs; his followers 
despair as he requests his shield to be brought to him and asks if they were victorious. 
However, it is unlikely that West ever saw, let alone knew about the earlier work; rather, the 
virtuous death was a popular topic for historical painters during the period. Indeed, it has 
been noted that West probably drew his inspiration from Charles Rollin’s account of the 
Theban ascendency in his Ancient History (1738), in which the frontispiece, by Hubert 
Gravelot, depicts a remarkably similar engraving of an Epameinondas death.1284 West’s 
version was commissioned by King George III and was intended to complement his most 
famous painting, The Death of General Wolfe (1770). This depicted the death of James Wolfe 
who died in the moment of victory at the Battle of the Plain of Abraham in 1759 (Fig. 3). 
After having been shot three times and being informed of the state of the battle, Wolfe gave 
his final orders before succumbing to his wounds. The similarity between Wolfe and 
Epameinondas was not original but had before been observed in early accounts of the 
battle.1285 As part of this complement, in 1772, West also painted The Death of the Chevalier 
Bayard, depicting the demise of Pierre Terrail, seigneur de Bayard (1473-1524) at the Battle 
of the Sesia River (Fig. 4). Unlike the other two, Bayard did not die at the moment of victory, 
since it was a decisive defeat for the Kingdom of France. However, Bayard, showed a similar 
courage in the face of death and, throughout his life conducted himself in a comparably 
virtuous manner to Epameinondas. Both the Bayard and the Epameinondas are strikingly 
similar, using almost exactly the same colour and composition: when viewed side-by-side it 
becomes apparent that the two paintings were designed to mirror one another. Interestingly, 







This was presumably done in order to more adequately present the two fallen soldiers as 
similar to the younger James Wolfe. These paintings not only show the eighteenth century 
fascination with the virtuous death, but also illustrate the inclination to equate modern events 
with the past.1286 
 
The general’s image was also produced in other mediums, particularly that of the 
statue of Epameinondas at Stowe House in the Temple of Ancient Virtue by Peter 
Scheemakers (1691-1781). Peter was a Belgian sculptor from Antwerp who had inherited a 
lucrative workshop from his father, before coming to London in 1720.1287 The colonnaded 
rotunda, known as the Temple of Ancient Virtue, was designed in 1734 by William Kent 
(1685-1748), who was the architect of a number of buildings at Stowe house. In 1737, 
Scheemaker was commissioned to sculpt four statues of ‘Ancient Worthies’: Homer, 
Socrates, Lycurgus and Epameinondas (Fig. 5). These were all mounted in the temple and 
included Latin inscriptions for each ancient figure: Epaminondas, cujus a virtute, prudentia, 
verecundia, Thebanorum respublica, Libertatem fimul & impérium, Difciplinam bellicam, 
civilem & domesticam, Accepit; Eoque amiffo, perdidit.1288 A contemporary commentator 
(Bickham) presumed a wide public recognition of such illustrious figures, proclaiming that 
these men “made Virtue their only pursuit”.1289 It is possible that the virtue and tragedy of the 
deaths of Socrates, Lycurgus and Epameinondas, were meant to create a comparison with the 
contemporary English state, particularly with the ‘First Minister’, Robert Walpole.1290 
 
During the Enlightenment there were at least two plays written on the subject of 
Epameinondas: the first of these, entitled, Epaminondas: Drama (1774), which was written in 
Latin by one P. Giovanni Spinello, who was apparently a professor of literature at the 
University of Naples. Almost nothing is known of this obscure work but, since it was 
subsequently translated into Italian, we can presume there was some demand for its 










Tragédie en Cinq Actes & en Vers (1771). This work is a dramatization of the trial(s) of 
Epameinondas in 369 after his first and second invasions of the Peloponnesus (the two events 
are amalgamated into one). It depicts Epameinondas and Pelopidas as both lovers of the 
république and enemies of tyranny. It also emphasizes the unjust nature of the accusations, 
since their actions benefited the state. We are thus presented with the theme that service to 
state is the highest of virtues. Unfortunately, since the authors of these works are obscure it is 
difficult to ascertain any kind of cultural or political context; however, Deschamps’ work was 
published only a few years before the French Revolution and it appears likely that it was 





By the turn of the century the ‘virtuous death’ maintained its popularity throughout 
Europe. Thus, in 1811, the French sculptor David d’Angers, early in his career, won the 
Grand Prix of Rome award for his bas-relief of the death of Epameinondas (Fig. 6). Only a 
year later (1812), the Italian artist, Bartolomeo Pinelli (1781-1835), painted another Death: 
this was done in a more minimalist fashion, utilizing only brown and grey colours, though the 
scene is no less stirring than previous attempts (Fig. 7). Again, the scene was also depicted by 
the Belgian painter Louis Gallait (1810-1870) in 1850. In terms of subject matter, these 
works are scarcely different from their eighteenth century predecessors (Fig. 8). It now 
becomes difficult to determine the source material, but it is clear that the symbol of 
Epameinondas’ death continued to be recognized as the ultimate example of civic virtue.  
 
In continuance of this, across the Atlantic, the American educated elite also showed 
appreciation for the general: at Harvard, in the Memorial Hall (completed 1878), a building 
intended to honour members of the university who had been killed during the American Civil 
War, a series of stained glass windows were commissioned at various times depicting pairs of 
famous historical and mythological figures. Thus, in 1879, Daniel Cottier, payed for by the 
class of 1857, produced a diptych pairing Epameinondas with Sir Philip Sidney (1554-1586), 
who was killed at the Battle of Zutphen (Fig. 9). As well as this, Sidney’s education and 
artistic endeavours are also a clear point of comparison with the Theban, illustrating the ideal 
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of the patriotic, yet erudite, soldier. The depiction of the general is remarkably similar to 
Scheemakers statue from the previous century. 
 
The tradition of civic virtue was also reiterated in the realms of public performance 
with the play Epaminondas, Tragédie Patriotique. En Cinq Actes et en Vers (1833) by Louis-
Marie Perenon. This work was written in the wake of the First Canut Revolt (1831), in Lyon, 
after which the ringleaders were charged with treason but eventually acquitted. Like with 
Deschamp’s earlier work, this play is about Epameinondas’ trial of 369 for which Perenon 
was clearly trying to create a parallel. 
 
An exception in the traditional presentation of Epameinondas comes from a poem 
written in the guise of Lord Byron, though the author is unknown, called Don Leon. Probably 
written around 1833 and first appearing in the late 30s, early 40s, the poem is a stern and 
lengthy defence of homosexuality and an attack on its illegality.1291 He cites Plutarch’s praise 
of the love between Epameinondas and Cephisodorus and argues that, despite the greatness 
of the Theban, his affection for “his young catamite”, forces us to condemn him.1292 The 
sentiment criticizes the standard portrayal of the general and alludes to the hypocrisy inherent 
in glorifying a figure who, according to popular English opinion of the time, ought to be 
decried for his sexual leanings. The point here is not that Epameinondas should be 
condemned, but that contemporary English people should not condemn homosexuals, 
particularly when they are happy to glorify the ancient Greeks. 
 
 
 The Twentieth Century to Today 
 
By the turn of the twentieth century we see something of a drop in depictions of, or 
even reference to, Epameinondas outside of the academic world. However, a few exceptions 
are conspicuous: as quoted above, the famous American general, George S. Patton (1885-





Epameinondas’ notions of warfare.1293 The name of Epameinondas was also used by Sarah 
Cone Bryant in her children’s book, Epaminondas and His Auntie, first published in 1907. 
This work portrays a heavily stereotyped black boy named Epaminondas, who, due to his 
own apparent incompetence or stupidity constantly makes a mess of each situation he is 
presented with.1294 The use of the general’s name here is an echo of the trend of slaves to be 
named by their masters after famous historical figures; however, the similarity with the 
ancient general stops here.1295 Throughout the rest of this century there are surely a number 
of other uses of the figure of Epameinondas, though few are apparent. A late example comes 
in the form of the board game, Epaminondas, by Robert Abbott, released in 1975. The games 
is intended to work similarly to phalanx warfare and its name is a sure recognition of the 
Theban’s mastery over said style of combat. 
 
The current century may have seen a subtle increase in appreciation of 
Epameinondas. An interesting example of this comes from the television show Time 
Commanders (2003), which used the game engine of the strategy game, Rome: Total War. 
The show attempts to re-create historical battles using members of the general public (i.e. 
without backgrounds in warfare or military history), while commentary is provided by 
experts. Season one, episode 10 is on the Battle of Leuctra in which a netball team takes on 
the role of the Boeotian army against the Spartans. Interestingly the team recognizes the need 
to attack the Spartan elite head on but makes the mistake of withholding the Sacred Band as a 
reserve unit. 
 
Epameinondas has also appeared as a fictional character in a number of recent books 
from as early as the 1990s: in David Gemmell’s Lion of Macedon (1990) a young Parmenion 
is presented as the brains behind the tactics at Leuctra. Historian Victor Hanson fictionalized 
Leuctra in his book, The End of Sparta: A Novel (2011) and the battle has been most recently 
portrayed in the graphic novel, Serpent and Prey (2018) by Adrian K. Briggs et al. The latter 
appears very much in the style of, and as a counterweight to, Frank Miller’s 300 (1998): the 







innocent inhabitants of Boeotia, while Epameinondas and Pelopidas are presented as military 
geniuses; though with an air of arrogance, which may in fact be an accurate characterization. 
It is apparent that late twentieth and early twenty-first century interest in Epameinondas has 
more or less focused on his military ingenuity. 
 
It is clear that Epameinondas has been a very influential figure throughout history 
since his death, though it took nearly a generation before he was widely recognized as the 
mastermind behind the Theban Hegemony. By the Roman period he was usually praised for 
his virtuous conduct. Indeed, this theme would be reignited during the Renaissance, 
particularly influenced by his representation in the works of Plutarch. Thus, Epameinondas 
was used as a didactic model for the paradigmatic military leader. This conception of the 
general continued into the nineteenth century but appears to have all but disappeared by the 
following century. Epameinondas is largely known now only for his military endeavours, but 
















ΣΥΝ Coinage and the Herakliskos Drakonopignon Type 
 
 
The elusive ΣΥΝ coinage is a series of silver staters from a number of different 
poleis (predominantly Aegean and Propontic) depicting the infant Heracles strangling two 
snakes on the obverse (Fig. 10). On each of these the legend ΣΥΝ is included, which has 
generally been interpreted to be an abbreviation of ΣΥΝΜΑΧΩΝ or ΣΥΝΜΑΧΙΚΟΝ,1296 
which appears to imply a formal alliance between the states. The reverses depict types 
characteristic of each city, generally also including their ethnics. The known members 
include Byzantium, Cyzicus, Ephesus, Samos, Cnidus, Rhodes and Iasus. Because this 
alleged alliance is nowhere attested in the historical record various theories concerning its 
chronology and historical context have been proposed: Waddington argued for between the 
Battle of Cnidus in 394, in which Sparta lost their momentum in the Aegean, and their 
recovery in 391.1297 This would indicate that the alliance was formulated contra to Spartan 
imperial ambitions. In light of the discovery of the Byzantine mint Regling further argued 
that the league must have continued after the capture of Byzantium by Thrasybulus in 
389.1298 Thus, a commonly accepted dating places it from the Battle of Cnidus to the King’s 
Peace (i.e. 394-387/6).1299 However, following this Meyer and Beloch have both preferred 
the period directly after the King’s Peace1300 and, later still, Hiquily pushed the dates to 
between 367 and 364, associating the coins with Epameinondas’ naval voyage.1301 In 1956 
Cawkwell argued against the latter arguments in favour of Waddington’s original dating of 
394. Against this, Cook then assembled an interesting argument for a dating of 391/0, making 
the symmachia pro-Spartan.1302 But, of course, it was not long before Cawkwell came back 
	
1296	Though	generally	overlooked,	Kraay	(1984),	8-9,	proposed	that	the	abbreviation	is	actually	short	for	
ΣΥΝΤΑΞΙΣ	 or	 ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΑ,	 which	 would	 imply	 that	 the	 coins	 were	 minted	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 tribute	









with a rebuttal.1303 Unfortunately, even at this stage, the end of the debate was not in sight: in 
1980 Karwiese argued that the league was created as a result of Lysander’s establishment of 
decarchies in the Aegean in 405, thus again bringing a pro-Spartan, anti-Athenian, character 
to the coinage.1304 This last contribution has generally been accepted by scholars since, 
though with some exception.1305 
 
Other potential members of the alliance have been proposed: Lampsacus, Croton 
and Thebes. These all minted coins from the period using a very similar Heracles type 
(Herakliskos drakonopignon). The Lampsacene mints are clearly of an almost identical type 
with the ΣΥΝ coins and have reasonably been dated to the same period. Because of the city’s 
location in the Hellespont (making an excellent waypoint between the Propontic and Aegean 
cities), they are generally thought, with some caution, to have been part of the alliance.1306 
However, since the coins do not bear the ΣΥΝ legend, Kraay argued that Lampsacus had 
instead copied the type in order to “commend the staters to a wide variety of users”.1307 On 
this it should be noted that the Rhodian mint does not bear the legend either but is 
indisputably considered part of the league.  
 
In parallel with these we also find drakonopignon type coins from southern Italy. 
These include a series of staters with the head of Apollo on the obverse and a diobol, the 
obverse of which depicts the head of a female with an olive sprig. On each of these the ethnic 
for Croton is provided and they have been generally dated to between the years 400-325.1308 
To the following century we have further coins minted with the drakonopignon type: a 
number of diobols from Tarentum have been found, which have been dated to around 280-
228, all with varying Athena heads on the obverse.1309 In addition to this, another 
drakonopignon type diobol has been found, which was minted in Heraclea Italia, depicting an 










around 281-278.1310 The earlier mints have been associated with the formation (or 
reinvigoration) of the Italiote League with Croton as the hegemon, dated by Diodorus to 393 
(Diod. 14. 91. 1).1311 This league was established in order to check the expansion of 
Dionysius I of Syracuse into southern Italy. With the fall of Croton, however, the heart of the 
league was moved further north under the hegemony of Tarentum. It is quite possible that the 
drakonopignon coins from the third century were minted for a similar revamp of the league in 
the face of the encroaching Roman Empire.1312 
 
At Thebes the type goes back further in the city’s history: the first were silver 
staters, dated to the second half of the fifth century,1313 depicting a very similar Heracles 
figure, who is kneeling and facing to his right. Then, by 395-387 (according to Head’s 
dating), another stater was minted, depicting another drakonopignon with Heracles now 
crouching and facing his left. Also, to this period is attributed a mint of electrum coins with 
Heracles crouching but facing his right (Fig. 11). However, a recent study has convincingly 
argued that the electrum coins more correctly belong to the mid 360s and were minted in 
conjunction with the Theban naval project.1314 This means that Thebes utilized the 
drakonopignon type at three very different stages in its history, each being multiple decades 
apart. It is possible that the original minting was prompted to celebrate (or commemorate) the 
restoration of Theban control of Boeotia around 446 in the face of Athenian expansion. It has 
also been suggested that the second mint was related to the ΣΥΝ League, though this is far 










1315	Kraay	(1976),	113,	248	n.	3.	Cawkwell	 (1956),	74,	dismisses	 this	possibility	since	 the	Theban	mint	
was	 smaller	 and	 of	 the	 Aeginetic	 standard.	 However,	 like	 with	 the	 Rhodian	 and	 Lampsacene	 coins,	




any	 involvement	 with	 the	 relevant	 cities	 at	 this	 time.	 Thebes	 also	 directly	 opposed	 Lysander’s	




face of Spartan expansionism and the rise of the anti-Spartan party at Thebes. Then, in the 
360s, the electrum coins could have been employed in an attempt to reignite this connection 
with the members of the ΣΥΝ League through the thematic use of the drakonopignon type. 
 
Finally, from the fifth century, Cyzicus produced an electrum mint depicting 
Heracles and Iphicles struggling with a snake and, later, a hecte was minted that compares 
with the ΣΥΝ type. While the dating of these coins is far from certain they probably fit 
somewhere in the latter half of the century.1316 While not enough is known about the city 
during this period to make any definitive assertions, this earlier mint may have been 
connected with anti-Athenian sentiment. The parallel here with the later ΣΥΝ coins was 
surely not lost upon the Cyzicene. 
 
Overall, it is generally agreed that the theme of Herakliskos drakonopignon 
symbolizes the triumph of good over evil or, more specifically, resistance against an 
oppressor.1317 We can also observe that, in addition to this, the type was commonly used to 
acknowledge the formation of an alliance or a league. It is therefore wholly possible that 
Thebes’ electrum coins from the 360s utilized this specific type to remind the previous 
members of the ΣΥΝ League of their past connection with one another against the oppression 












1317	 Head	 (1911),	 97;	 Cawkwell	 (1956),	 69;	 Karwiese	 (1980),	 14;	 Gartland	 (2013),	 24-25.	 This	 idea	 is	
further	illustrated	in	the	famous	painting	by	Zeuxis	of	Heraclea	(Plin.	Nat.	Hist.	35.36).	
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Map 1: Boeotian South Coast (Google Maps) 
 





Fig. 1: The Death of Epaminondas (1726) by Isaac Walraven 
 
Fig. 2: The Death of Epaminondas (1771) by Benjamin West 
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Fig. 3: The Death of General Wolfe (1770) by Benjamin West 
 
Fig. 4: The Death of Chevalier Bayard (1772) by Benjamin West 
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Fig. 5: Statue of Epameinondas in the Temple of Ancient Virtue (1737) by Peter 
Scheemakers. 
 
Fig. 6: The Death of Epaminondas (1811) by David d’Angers 
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Fig. 7: The Death of Epaminondas (1812) by Bartolomeo Pinelli 
 
Fig. 8: The Death of Epaminondas (1850) by Louis Gallait 
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